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Abstract 
The 1964-70 Wilson government has been the subject of intense criticism, yet 
limited academic study. Attention has focused primarily on its failure to achieve any 
breakthrough in the application of 'white heat' technology. The effect has been that 
many important aspects of the government's industrial policies have been ignored. In 
particular, its commitment to public ownership has received little consideration, 
despite appearing anomalous compared with the nationalisations of the preceding (and 
succeeding) Labour governments. Between 1964 and 1970, only iron and steel was 
brought into public ownership, and that was primarily 'unfinished business' from 
1945-51. 
This thesis determines why the 1964-70 government was so reluctant to use 
public ownership and, specifically, nationalisation. Firstly, the relationship between 
public ownership and the Labour party in 1964 is examined. The Attlee government's 
experiences with nationalisation and the revision of the party's programme during the 
1950s are considered, along with the contribution which Wilson made to that revision. 
The thesis contends that, by 1964, the party's commitment to public ownership was 
genuinely different from that in 1945. However, it further asserts that the economic 
analysis on which it was based had already become outdated by 1964, and 
encumbered the government with an inappropriate ideological framework. 
Secondly, the recent release of official papers has made possible a detailed 
consideration of the 1964-70 government's performance. They reveal that the 
government pursued a more active public ownership policy than is normally 
considered by historians. In shipbuilding and aerospace partial nationalisations were 
undertaken, while more generally interventionist frameworks were established. This 
thesis concludes that such policies were fatally undermined by the over-commitment 
of Wilson to sterling parity. Coupled with the shortcomings of the party's ideological 
framework, this explains both why the 1964-70 government's policies appear 
anomalous, and why the government continues to be severely criticised. 
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Introduction 
The twentieth century has been described by Seldon and Ball as the 
'Conservative century'.' It cannot be denied that the Conservative party was more 
successful in electoral terms and the length of its period in government between 1900 
and 1997 greater than any other British political party. Yet a good case can be made 
for claiming that the last century was 'Labour's century'.^ For while its periods of 
office were infrequent, and though it was not until 1945 that the party obtained an 
overall parliamentary majority, from the perspective of the twenty-first century the 
impact of the Labour party in government has been significant. Many of the most 
important legislative measures in the second half of the twentieth century, and 
controversial issues of political debate, had their origin in policies pursued by Labour 
governments.^ The character and form of the welfare state and the National Health 
Service, established by the 1945-51 Attlee government, have dominated the social 
policy agenda since their inception. Some of the most significant features of Britain's 
post-war economic structure have arisen from policy decisions and directions taken by 
Labour, rather than Conservative, governments. Much of the intensity in economic 
policy debates can be traced to policies implemented by Labour administrations -
concerning the role of the state in the management of the economy; the behaviour of 
' A . Seldon and S. Ball (eds.), Conservative Century: The Conservative party since 1900 (Oxford, 
1994). 
^D. Tanner, P. Thane and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), Labour's First Century (Cambridge, 2000) takes its title 
simply from the fact of the party's foundation in 1900; but the contents indicate that wider claims 
could be made. 
^The Labour party 'is probably the most frequently criticised of Britain's three main political parties': 
Steven Fielding, 'Labourism in the 1940s', Twentieth Century British History, 3 (1992), p. 138. 
mi 
trade unions; and, perhaps most controversial of all, the desirability of nationalisation 
and the balance to be struck between the public and private sectors of the economy. 
The latter issue in particular - the need or otherwise for direct state control and 
ownership over industrial enterprises - has been a topic of lasting political 
controversy ever since the Second World War. In 1945 there was a clear political 
division on the issue of nationalisation: the Labour party campaigned on a programme 
of wholesale nationalisation while the Conservatives refiased to accept a need for such 
radical changes in industrial organisation and ownership. By the 1950s, however, the 
position of both parties had changed - towards part of the 'consensus' of political 
opinion that some historians have seen emerging at this time.'' The Conservatives 
appeared reconciled to the majority of the nationalisations undertaken by the Attlee 
government and to the framework of a mixed economy, while the Labour party had 
decided against the need for any further, ambitious programmes of nationalisation. 
Iron and steel remained a source of controversy, marking as it were the disputed 
boundary of the public sector: finally nationalised by the Attlee government in 1951, 
only to be denationalised by the Conservatives in 1953, then renationalised in 1967. 
Yet the very fact that between 1945 and 1967 the fate of the iron and steel industry 
''See, for example, Paul Addison, The road to 1945 (Oxford, 1975); Anthony Seldon, 'Consensus: A 
debate too long?', Parliamentary Affairs, 47 (1994), pp. 501-14; Denis Kavanagh, 'The post-war 
consensus', Twentieth Century British History, 3 (1992), pp. 175-90. The consensus argument has 
been the subject of a considerable degree of criticism from other historians: see, for example, Ben 
Pimlott, 'The myth of consensus' in Lesley M. Smith (ed.), The making of Britain: Echoes of 
greatness (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 129-42; H. Jones and M. Kandiah (eds.), The myth of consensus: 
New views on British history 1945-64 (1996); Anthony Butler, 'The end of post-war consensus: 
Reflections on the scholarly uses of political rhetoric'. Political Quarterly, 64 (1993), pp. 435-46. 
For a balanced overview of the consensus debate, see D. Fraser, 'The post-war consensus? A debate 
not long enough?', Parliamentary Affairs, 53 (2000), pp. 347-62. In the field of public ownership 
policy there is some validity in Porter's proposition that a degree of consensus had emerged by the 
1950s, i f not on the ideal of nationalisation, then at least on the scope of the public sector: Dilwyn 
Porter, 'Downhill all the way: Thirteen Tory years 1951-64', in Richard Coopey, Steven Fielding and 
Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson governments 1964-1970 (1993), p. 12. This aspect of'consensus' 
is often ignored by other historians in their dismissal of the more general arguments put forward by 
proponents of consensus. See, for example, Martin Francis, 'Economics and ethics: The nature of 
alone 'may be characterised as a classic example of adversarial politics'^ is indicative 
of the extent to which a new status quo had been established by the 1950s, in which 
the balance between public and private sectors was mostly settled. 
Any notion, however, that long-term stability had been reached by the early 
1950s on the balance of public and private within the 'mixed economy' is undermined 
by the dramatic and rapid swings in political support for nationalisation witnessed 
after 1970. At first the political tide seemed to be moving strongly in favour of further 
nationalisation: the 1974-79 Labour government brought shipbuilding, aerospace and 
a large proportion of the motor car industry under public control, while even the 1970-
74 Conservative government under Heath had used public ownership to rescue 
troubled companies such as Rolls Royce which were deemed too important for market 
forces to be allowed to destroy. Yet having been the political flavour of the 1970s -
an essential tool for supporting industry in difficult economic conditions -
nationalisation and public ownership increasingly went out of favour in the 1980s and 
1990s, as the majority political mood swung against state industrial ownership. Under 
Thatcher and then Major, the bulk of the public sector created since 1945 was 
privatised, and the ideology of public enterprise which had underpinned it was 
crificised in both the academic and political arenas.^  
The extent of the change is demonstrated most clearly in the actions of the 
Labour party leadership under Blair. By the time that his 'New' Labour party was 
elected to power in 1997, the party had completed a process of total abandonment of 
Labour's socialism, 1945-1951', Twentieth Century British History, 6 (1995), p. 243; Nick Tiratsoo 
and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state intervention: Labour 1939-51 (1993), pp. 169-70. 
^G.F. Dudley and J.J. Richardson, Politics and steel in Britain, 1967-1988: The life and times of the 
British Steel Corporation (Aldershot, 1990), p. 1; Doug McEachem, A class against itself: Power 
and the nationalisation of the British steel industry (Cambridge, 1980), pp 157-8. 
''See, for example, Correlli Bamett, The audit of war: The illusions and reality of Britain as a great 
nation (1986). 
its long-standing commitment to public ownership and control. Even the most 
superficial of contrasts between the Blair government and that of Attlee some fifty-
two years before, reveals the extent of that abandonment. One of the first economic 
policy decisions of the Blair government was to relinquish control over interest rates 
to a newly-established, politically independent. Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England. While leaving the public ownership of the Bank unchanged, this 
constituted a 'privatisation' of its operations: a Labour Cabinet effectively completed 
the dismantling of the Attlee government's nationalisation programme begun by the 
Blair government's Conservative predecessors.^  This act did more than simply give 
effective independence to the Bank of England: it symbolised a determination by the 
Labour party leadership to demonstrate that the 'socialist experiment' of public 
ownership was at an end. It was a legislative indication that the removal from the 
party's constitution two years before of its 87-year commitment to 'clause IV' , the 
'common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange', had 
signified a real ideological change. 
The deliberate efforts of the contemporary Labour party to distance itself from 
its own past, and to convince the electorate that an 'end of an era' has been reached on 
the role of the state in the economy,^ has stimulated scholars to explore the era of 
'AS Francis has argued, 'Blair's desire to honour the generation of 1945 has not precluded a systematic 
effort to abandon much of its agenda': Martin Francis, Ideas and politics under Labour, 1945-1951: 
Building a new Britain (Manchester, 1997), p. vi. 
*For an overview of the abandonment of clause IV in 1994-5, and the comparisons between it and the 
failed attempt at clause IV reform in 1959-60, see Peter Riddell, 'The end of clause IV, 1994-5' , 
Contemporary British History, 1 1 (1997) , pp. 24-49. 
'Reflected not simply in the abandonment of nationalisation as party policy, but also in the repeated 
claims that there will be no return to the 'old days of boom and bust' of previous governments, both 
Labour and Conservative. The 1997 election manifesto argued that there had been 'too much 
economic instability, with wild swings from boom to bust' in previous decades: Labour party, Britain 
Can and Must do Better (1997) . It is a point continually reinforced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown. In his November 1997 pre-Budget statement, for example, he argued 
that 'for forty years our economy has [had] an unenviable history, under governments of both parties. 
nationalisation, public ownership and state control of industry. While the impression 
given by current 'New Labour' propaganda that nationalisation is a tool of economic 
policy with a past but no future is surely no more than a projection of the current 
political climate onto an unknown future (no doubt as a consequence of its desire to 
convince 'middle England' of Labour's genuine 'newness'), it certainly raises 
questions about why nationalisation was a tool of economic policy for the first four 
post-war decades. The process of historical reconsideration has been under way since 
the early 1990s, when Millward bemoaned that 'the causes of the nationalisations of 
the 1940s in Britain [a]re very thinly treated in the literature'.'" 
Despite the volume and value of the subsequent historical work on the subject, 
gaps nevertheless remain in our understanding of the political economy of British 
nationalisation over the period since 1945 a whole. In particular, the period after 
the 1940s nationalisations continues to be 'thinly treated in the literature'. The 1960s 
stand out as a decade in which understanding of government use of the economic 
'tool' of public ownership and control is remarkably weak. I f considered at all, it is 
usually regarded in the historiography as essentially a continuation of the claimed 
period of 'consensus' of the 1950s." The only event thought noteworthy is the 
renationalisation of the iron and steel industry, and that is frequently considered to be 
little more than 'unfinished business' from the Attlee years, and so not requiring 
substanfial further examinafion.'^ 
Yet the fact that little use was made of nationalisation or other forms of public 
ownership and control during the 1960s should attract the attention of scholars. From 
of boom and bust': Gordon Brown, Pre-Budget statement of 25 November 1997, issued by HM 
Treasury (1997). 
'"Robert Millward, 'Preface' in Robert Millward and John Singleton (eds.). The political economy of 
nationalisation in Britain 1920-1950 (Cambridge, 1995), p. xiii. 
' 'See McEachem, A class against itself pp. 188-9. 
the perspective of 'consensus' historiography, the relative absence of ftirther 
nationalisation might be considered more evidence of the extent to which both parties 
had accepted the existing balance between the public and private sector. However, the 
renewed use of nationalisation in the 1970s demonstrates that such a hypothesis is not 
easily sustained. The apparent 'inactivity' of the 1964-1970 Wilson government 
seems anomalous in the longer-term context - when contrasted to the activities of 
both the preceding and the succeeding Labour governments. 
This thesis will analyse the acfions of the Wilson government on public 
ownership and control. In reality, there was important activity in this area, but it did 
not solely take the form of outright nationalisation that predominated in the 1940s and 
again in the 1970s. The reasons for changes in the form of industrial intervention will 
be examined: whether these provide evidence of a growing distrust of nationalisation 
within the Labour party, or more simply that the conditions of the 1960s were 
inappropriate to large-scale expansions of the public sector. It will be asked why and 
how direct intervention was undertaken to alter the ownership structures of certain 
industries (iron and steel, shipbuilding, aircraft manufacture), while in other instances 
where such intervention might similarly have been expected (the computer industry 
for example), it was not used. The constraints, avoidable and self-inflicted, which 
limited the scope for action in industrial policy will be scrutinised and their effects 
determined. 
Throughout the thesis, the notion of 'failure', which has long dominated 
discussion of the 1964-70 government, will provide a framework to analysis. In 
particular, attention is paid to whether the government's actions in public ownership 
policy contributed to that sense of failure, and i f so whether this is justified. The 
''Ibid. 
behaviour of the Wilson government will not, however, be studied simply in isolation. 
It will be placed firmly within the context of Labour party history. The ideological 
origins of the policies pursued by the government will be explored. This analysis will 
consider the Labour party's long-standing commitment to public ownership in the 
context both of the experiences of nationalisation under the Attiee government and the 
process of ideological revisionism that was to follow in the 1950s. The extent to 
which the Wilson government pursued a 'revisionist' industrial policy, and whether its 
experiences of practical economic and industrial management justified or negated 
their ideological convictions of 1964, will be examined. The value of this 
investigation lies not just in gaps in the historiography of nationalisation, but also in 
that of the 1964-70 Labour government. Nationalisation policy under Wilson has 
received little attention either in terms of its importance to his government, or in terms 
of the long-term use of nationalisation as a means to greater industrial efficiency and 
production. This thesis will address both gaps. 
I 
Historical consideration of public ownership policy has mostiy focused on the 
period up to and including the nationalisations of the 1940s. This concentration on 
the Attlee years has been prevalent in many different strands of the political and 
economic literature since the publication in 1975 of Addison's The Road to 1945. 
This is not to deny the desirability of a clear understanding of the causes of the Attlee 
government's 1945 electoral triumph and the content of its political programme: 
Morgan's 1984 observations both that it was 'amongst the most effective of any 
British goverimient since the passage of the 1832 Reform Act', and that study of it has 
frequently been ' in great danger of retreating from reality into the half-world of legend 
and fantasy', are equally justified.'^ Indeed, the government's reputation as achieving 
a high point of economic and social reform supports the case that the legacy of the 
twentieth century belongs as much to Labour as to the Conservatives. Yet the 
dominance of a 1940s perspective, and, in particular, the dominance of a 'road to the 
1940s' perspective, has tended to divert attention from later periods. 
Within the current literature, the work of Millward offers the most 
comprehensive analysis of the causes of nationalisation in the 1940s. He has 
consistently argued that 'traditional' explanations of the nationalisation programme 
leave substantial questions unanswered.''' Caimcross has proposed that 
nationalisation was the inevitable consequence of the election of a Labour party whose 
'socialist vision' had public ownership at its centre,'^ while Morgan has argued that 
nationalisation was in essence a pragmatic rescue package for certain troubled 
industries.'^ Millward argues that treating the nationalisation programme simply as 
part of the party's socialist vision raises the question of why such a vision should 'be 
restricted to transport and fuel'. Similarly, to see nationalisation as a method of 
rescuing ailing industries leaves unanswered how we are to 'account for the fate of 
other ailing industries such as cotton and shipbuilding which were not nationalised 
and industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and airlines which were 
nationalised and yet were clearly young and healthy'.'^ 
"Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour in power, 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 1, 503. 
'""Robert Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain: Means to an end or the means of 
production?', Economic History Review, 50 (1997), pp. 209-234; Robert Millward, 'Industrial 
organisation and economic factors in nationalisation', in Millward and Singleton, The political 
economy of nationalisation, pp. 3-12. 
'^As he argues, 'o f all the achievements of the Labour government, there were few more closely 
identified with Labour party doctrine than the series of measures for the nationalisation of major 
industries': A. Caimcross, Years of recovery: British economic policy, 1945-51 (1985), p. 463. See 
also Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain', p. 209. 
'^ See Morgan, Labour in power, pp. 97-100. 
'^Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain', pp. 209-10. 
In place of such 'limited' explanations, Millward has suggested a five-point 
thesis to explain the 1940s nationalisations. As the only comprehensive explanation 
of the nationalisation process, h must be considered in some detail. His thesis is that: 
(a) The infrastructure industries of electricity, gas, water, transport, and 
communications display the classic problems of natural monopoly 
and externalities on a substantial scale and this explains why ... 
they were subject to increasing government control. 
(b) The failure of arm's length regulation of the infrastructure 
industries in the inter-war period explains why in the 1940s public 
control took the form of public ownership and why this had support 
over a wide political spectrum. 
(c) Manufacturing, commerce, and agriculture did not have problems 
of natural monopoly and externalities on anything like the same 
scale and were left largely in private ownership. 
(d) The fundamental class division between wage earners and owners 
of capital ... played a limited role in the 1940s drive to public 
ownership and had a clear manifestation only in [one] ... industry ... 
- the coal industry. 
(e) The election of a Labour government in 1945, and its commitment 
to economic planning together with the specific historical context 
of reconstruction following the Second World War go a long way 
to explaining the particular institutional arrangements which 
emerged in the public sector, specifically the nation-wide 
dimension of public ownership, the legal form of the public 
corporation, the means of achieving co-ordination within the fuel 
and transport sectors, and the nationalisation of the Bank of 
England.'^ 
Millward's thesis represents a considerable advance over previous 
explanations, in particular for the sense it brings of the range of causes which lay 
behind implementation of the nationalisation programme. Most of its main 
contentions are supported by the more narrowly focused work of other scholars: for 
example, industrial studies such as that of Hannah on the electricity industry are in 
agreement with points (a) and (b) relating to the 'infrastructure''^ industries.^" 
''Ibid., p. 215. 
"Also frequently referred to as 'utilities' and 'network' industries, both by Millward and others, 
without any intended difference in meaning. 
^°L. Hannah, Electricity before nationalisation: A study of the development of the electricity supply 
industry in Britain to 1948 (1979); J.F. Wilson, 'The motives for gas nationalisation: Practicality or 
10 
Similarly, Supple's and Greasley's work on the coalmining industry reinforces 
Millward's conclusion that it was a peculiar 'political' case?' More generally, recent 
work on the Attlee government's industrial policies has implicitly adopted Millward's 
thesis as the framework for discussion the nationalisation programme.^^ 
This study will seek to determine whether Millward's analysis has broader 
relevance in explaining the use of nationalisation by British governments over the 
longer post-war period. For while Millward's work has provided an invaluable 
analytical framework, his approach - to 'observe what emerged by the end of the 
decade [i.e. the 1940s] and to try and ascertain from that complex outcome what were 
the main causal factors' of the nationalisation programme^^ - is now unnecessarily 
narrow in its chronological perspective, not least given the availability of new archive 
material covering the 1960s. Superficially, several aspects of his thesis appear to be 
as central for explanations of nationalisation in the 1960s and beyond as they are to 
the 1940s. The failure of arm's length regulation, for example, was cited by the 
Wilson government in the 1960s as one reason why renationalisation of the iron and 
steel industry was essential. Similarly, it remained as true in the 1960s and 1970s as it 
had been in the 1940s that the particular 'institutional arrangements which emerged in 
the public sector' were often the result of political rather than economic 
considerations. However, without detailed analysis of nationalisation beyond the 
1940s, firm conclusions cannot be drawn. 
ideology?', in Millward and Singleton, The political economy of nationalisation, pp. 144-163; M. 
Chick, 'The political economy of nationalisation: The electricity industry', in ibid., pp. 257-274, 
^ ' B . Supple, The history of the British coal industry, iv. 1913-1946: The political economy of decline 
(Oxford, 1987), Chapter 14, 'Nationalizing the coal industry 1945-1946', pp. 628-66; D. Greasley, 
'The coal industry: Images and realities on the road to nationalisation', in Millward and Singleton, 
The political economy of nationalisation, pp. 37-64. 
^^M. Chick, Industrial policy in Britain 1945-1951: Economic planning, nationalisation and the 
Labour governments (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 72-90. 
"Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain', p. 215. 
11 
The current historiography has created a sense that the Attlee government's 
measures were on such a great scale, and were so much more significant than all other 
nationalisations, that consideration of them alone is necessary to understand the whole 
political economy of public ownership. Yet this implicit approach is problematic in 
two main respects. First, and perhaps most significantly, it pre-judges the significance 
of events without subjecting them to rigorous analysis. The very fact that the scale of 
nationalisation was so much less in the years after 1950 surely makes it all the more 
necessary to understand those nationalisations which did occur. Second, it also limits 
the fullness of any understanding of the causes of nationalisation in general, even in 
the 1940s. Comparing nationalisations undertaken in the immediate post-war years, 
when the need was for rapid economic reconstruction, with those of the 1960s and 
1970s, when the economic need was for accelerated growth, allows substantial light to 
be shed on the balance of factors which lay both behind the choice to nationalise, and 
the method of public control that was implemented. 
Consideration of the post-war history of the iron and steel industry 
demonstrates the value of such longer-term perspectives. Like coalmining, it was a 
'notable exception' to the 'infrastructure industries' which dominate the 1940s 
nationalisation programme.^ "* While arguably oligopolistic in operation, it was not 
demonstrably monopohstic, nor obviously a 'utility' industry. Its nationalisation is, 
indeed, difficuh to explain from an economic point of view - a situation which in part 
explains the controversy which surrounded the process. Understanding the causes of 
its nationalisation, however, is surely made easier by virtue of the fact that it was 
nationalised not once but twice. The examination of the causes of its renationalisation 
offered in this thesis may be primarily useful for understanding Labour policy on 
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public ownership and control in the 1960s, but it also casts new light on the 1940s 
nationalisations. The exercise is still more useful given the contrast with road haulage 
- also denationalised by the Conservative government, but unlike iron and steel not 
renationalised by Labour. Explanation for the difference in treatment of iron and steel 
and road haulage is as relevant to an analysis of the 1940s nationalisation programme 
as it is to an understanding of the substance of the Wilson government's industrial 
policy. 
Despite the potential value of an analysis of the Wilson government's public 
ownership policies, however, many aspects have remained unexplored. While the 
recent literature on the history of Labour economic and industrial policies has not 
been as narrowly focused on the 'road to 1945' as that concerning nationalisation per 
se, the 'road to 1964' still remains considerably less well trod by such historians.'^ ^ 
Yet, as Jefferys notes, 'there [is no] ... shortage of important questions that might be 
asked' concerning the 1964-70 Wilson government.^ ^ In particular, from the 
perspective of Labour party history, it must be asked why the government, which was 
not obviously unpopular during its first two years of office, has from 1966 until the 
present day suffered from persistent and severe criticism: popular, political and 
academic.'^ ^ 
The extent of the criticism can be gleaned from the most superficial of 
examinations of the political literature of the late 1960s and 1970s. Woodrow Wyatt, 
for example - despite having served as a Labour MP during the period of the Wilson 
^''Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, p. 74. 
^^As Jefferys has argued: Kevin Jefferys, 'British politics and the road to 1964', Contemporary Record, 
9 (1995), pp. 120-146. 
^^Ibid.,p. 121. 
"See Peter Catterall, 'Anatomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', Contemporary Record, 7 (1993), pp. 321-2. 
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government^^ - used his 1977 book. What's Left of the Labour party?, to allege that 
the government had overseen the 'take-over' of the Labour party by a cabal of 
'communists, crypto-communists and their associates and friends'.'^^ While perhaps 
one of the most dramatic of assaults on the government, Wyatt's attack was by no 
means an isolated one. Paul Foot's 1968 biography of Wilson - written from a left-
wing political perspective'^ '^  - is hardly less critical than Wyatt's work.^' Moreover, 
although written after a distance of ten years, Stephen Haseler's 1980 work The 
tragedy of Labour nonetheless reinforces the impression of a government of great 
unpopularity.^^ 
The existence of such bitter condemnation of the Wilson government, which 
shows little sign of abating in certain sections of the popular media even today,^ '^  has 
focused the attention of historians on the question of why the government was 
perceived to have 'failed'. In particular, consideration has been given to the idea that 
its unpopularity was directly linked to the 'excessive' rhetoric that had been prominent 
in Labour party propaganda in the months preceding the 1964 election, particularly in 
the speeches of Wilson. Attention has been especially focused on the most famous 
aspect of the pre-election message - the appeal to embrace a 'white heat' of 
technological revolution. Certain authors have argued that this message was shallow 
^Vlbeit one who vigorously opposed the government's plans to nationalise the iron and steel industry 
(and one who eventually defected to the Conservatives): see below, Chapter V. It is significant that 
the other Labour MP who opposed the nationalisation (Donnelly) also wrote critically about the 
government: see Desmond Donnelly, Garadene '68: The crimes, follies and misfortunes of the 
Wilson government (1968). 
^Voodrow Wyatt, What's Left of the Labour party? (1977), p. 75. 
•'"That is to say, from someone of whom Wyatt was alleging Wilson had mistakenly supported. 
''Paul Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson (1968). 
'^Stephen Haseler, The tragedy of Labour (Oxford, 1980). 
"Christopher Kitchens, for example, in August 1999 described the Wilson government as 'mediocre 
and corrupt ... an administration so truly frightful and dispiriting that it has taken an unusually long 
time to "revive"'. He continued by alleging that by 1969 Wilson 'was in power only to be in power 
and was sickening the electorate and poisoning the atmosphere as nobody except his deceptively 
jovial deputy James Callaghan was to do': London Evening Standard, p. 27 (4 Aug. 1999). 
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political rhetoric without foundation in policy, and that, having built up public 
expectations to a high level with talk of 're-defining and re-stating our Socialism in 
terms of the scientific revolution','^'' the Wilson government had to face the 
consequences when no practical legislative changes were forthcoming.'^' Yet recent 
work has disputed the idea that 'little of substance' underpinned the scientific vision 
that Wilson proclaimed. In particular, detailed examination of the role of the Ministry 
of Technology in the formulation of industrial policy has shown that over the course 
of the government new and distinct 'white heat' policies were at times attempted. 
In his contribution to a 1993 volume on the Wilson govemment,^^ Coopey 
asserted that the Ministry of Technology (MinTech) provided 'the central industrial 
policy initiative[s] of the period' .Despite this centrality, however, other historians 
have - wrongly in his opinion - ' focus [ed] on more marginal organisations, notably 
the DEA [Department for Economic Affairs] and the IRC [Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation]'.'^^ His approach has been supported by Edgerton, who has argued that 
from its inception MinTech was a 'novel' development in the administrative structure 
of industrial policy making, and that from 1966 to 1970, when many of the industrial 
functions previously assigned to other ministries were systematically transferred to it, 
it was a 'very significant' player in the economic policy arena.^ ^ There can be no 
doubt that the Ministry of Technology's role has received inadequate scholarly 
^"LPACR 1963, p. 140. 
^^ See, for example, Noel Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party: The economics of 
democratic socialism, 1884-1995 (1996), pp. 183-194. 
^^This work represents one of the few broad studies of the government and was inspired by the sense 
that in the atmosphere of universal condemnation, 'whole areas of study which might have 
contradicted the generally damning conclusions have been ignored': 'Introduction: The Wilson 
years', in Richard Coopey, Steven Fielding and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson governments 1964-
7970 (1993), p. 5. 
•'^Richard Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat of the scientific revolution', in Coopey, Fielding 
and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, p. 103. 
^^Ibid., p. 120. 
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analysis. Moreover, its importance to the government's pursuit of industrial 
development policies is clear: as Coopey notes, by the end of the government it had 
'either direct or indirect control, or responsibility for most manufacturing industries, 
including those in the public sector. It administered grant and regional policy and 
controlled the largest defence procurement budget in the government'.''" Yet while 
this new work is a valuable addition to the existing literature, the extent of the 
emphasis on just one ministry leaves other policies pursued by rival ministries 
unexplored. For, as Coopey himself states, it was not until 1969 - that is to say, after 
five of the six years of the government's existence - that the ministry was effectively 
in sole control of industrial affairs, with the amalgamation of the functions of the 
Ministry of Power, the DBA and the Board of Trade. 
Long before 1969, however, other ministries had made direct interventions in 
the iron and steel, shipbuilding and aircraft industries. Explanation for such actions is 
not offered by either Coopey and Edgerton,'" yet to ignore them appears perverse. 
This is all the more so in a longer-term perspective of the Labour party's industrial 
policies. During the 1970s several industries (such as shipbuilding and aerospace) for 
which the Ministry of Technology had been responsible in the 1960s were fully 
nationalised. This raises questions about why outright nationalisation was felt by the 
1964-70 government to be unsuitable except in the case of iron and steel. 
This thesis will address these problems and questions, and explore a range of 
issues which have as yet not been explored, let alone answered. First, it will seek to 
^'David Edgerton, 'The "White Heat" revisited: The British government and technology in the 1960s', 
in Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1996), pp. 53-82. 
""Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat', p. 112. 
'"Quite inexplicably in some instances: Edgerton, for example, in his 1996 article analyses both 
government policy towards the aircraft industry, and the MinTech-sponsored Industrial Expansion 
Act, yet fails to mention the government's attempts to take-over the Beagle Light Aircraft Company, 
which was part of the latter Act: Edgerton, 'The "White Heat" revisited', pp. 59-70. 
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determine i f nationalisation was used sparingly in the 1960s because of a belief in the 
superiority of alternative forms of industrial management, such as those undertaken by 
the Ministry of Technology. Second, even i f nationalisation had been a desired 
policy, did the circumstances either warrant it, or allow it to be used? Third, does the 
1964-70 government's use of nationalisation and other forms of public ownership''^ 
and control demonstrate that the Labour party leadership viewed such policies in an 
essentially pragmatic light - as policies which, when the circumstances justified them, 
would be used, but to which no dogmatic attachment was felt? Such questions cannot 
be answered until detailed analysis is made of the use of such policies by the Wilson 
government. Indeed, judgements as to the nature of the government's entire industrial 
policy appear uncertain without such analysis. 
II 
This study is based on a wide range of primary sources: government records, 
political pamphlets, parliamentary debates, party conference reports, propaganda 
materials and ministerial diaries. Particular use, however, is made - especially in 
chapters IV-VII - of the official papers of the 1960s Wilson government recentiy 
released at the Public Record Office (PRO). Such concentration on PRO records is 
not without its critics. Booth and Glynn argued in the late 1970s that in undertaking 
research 'an excessive and narrow concentration on [the content of] State papers could 
cloud or bias understanding'."^ In any case, such study was in their opinion for the 
''^Here, as throughout the thesis, 'nationalisation' and 'public ownership' are taken to mean slightly 
different things. 'Nationalisation' is considered to be the 100% take over of an industry or company 
by a government (as undertaken by the Attlee government). 'Public ownership' is more broad, 
general state involvement in the ownership of industries or companies, including less than 100%. 
Nationalisation is therefore a subset of public ownership. 
''^A. Booth and S. Glynn, 'The public records and recent British economic historiography'. Economic 
History Review, 32 (1979), p. 311. Likewise, Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo have argued that it 
leads to 'little [being] said about the party machines ... [while] the ordinary voters remain somewhat 
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most part unnecessary, since 'there is rarely any shortage of material outside the State 
papers relating to policy decisions ... and in most cases the broad outlines and 
justifications are already known'."'' More recently. Ball has returned to the issue, 
arguing that, at least as far as his own researches into 1950s defence policy were 
concerned, the release of government papers under the thirty-year rule had done little 
to advance his knowledge of the subject.''^  There have been strong reftitations of such 
criticisms from PRO officials, but it is Lowe who provides the clearest case for the 
continued use of newly-released government papers.''^  
Lowe is quite open in acknowledging the faults in certain sorts of government 
records. In particular, he accepts Booth and Glynn's argument that the records of 
Cabinet, especially of Cabinet meetings, can be 'deliberately misleading, inaccurate, 
and incomplete'.'*^ Such a criticism - often made during the Wilson years by Richard 
Crossman in his political diary''^ - is certainly one which must be accepted. The 
records of Cabinet meetings were never intended to provide a verbatim account of the 
debates that took place, but to record the decisions that were made and the actions that 
ministers and ministries were consequently expected to take. Moreover, as Lowe 
fiirther recognises, on many occasions it was neither at Cabinet, nor indeed at Cabinet 
committees, that decisions were taken, but in informal meetings of ministers, officials 
mysterious, present at election times in the psephological data but otherwise without a significant 
voice': Stephen Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, 'England Arise!' The Labour party 
and popular politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester, 1995), p. 4. 
""Booth and Glynn, 'The public records', p. 311. 
"^S. Ball, 'Harold Macmillan and the politics of defence'. Twentieth Century British History, 6 (1995), 
especially pp. 97-100. 
"^The best defence of the use of the PRO archives fi-om 'within' is offered by A. McDonald: 'Public 
records and the modem historian', Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1990), pp. 341-50; R. Lowe, 
'Archival report: Plumbing new depths: Contemporary historians and the Public Record Office', 
Twentieth Century British History, 8 (1997), pp. 239-65. 
"^owe, 'Plumbing new depths', p. 250; Booth and Glynn, 'The public records', pp. 304-5. 
"^ See, for example, Crossman, Diaries, i, p. 90 (7 Dec. 1964). 
and advisors, the records of which may never have been produced, still less kept.''^  
Yet despite accepting both points, it remains the case, as Lowe argues, that 
government papers provide an indispensable source of material on the policy 
formulation and implementation process. To ignore them is to 'impoverish' the work 
being undertaken, and fundamentally weaken its conclusions; as Lowe concludes, 'for 
those interested in policy making, the simple fact... is that there is no more important 
single archive'.^'' 
One of the most important benefits of using government records to the fullest 
practical extent is that they reveal, to a far greater extent than any other source, the 
alternative policy directions that were considered by the government but not acted 
upon. Other sources, be they published or oral records, necessarily concentrate on the 
events that did occur, rather than those which did not. Even the voluminous political 
diaries which exist for the period of the Wilson government - in particular those of 
Crossman, Benn and Castle - focus primarily on the decisions made, rather than the 
discarded policy options. Only on occasions where the diarist disagreed with the 
policies adopted - for example, over the decision to attempt to maintain sterling parity 
in the case of Crossman and Castle - is substantial attention given to policy 
alternatives. Yet it is only through detailed examination of the different policy 
alternatives which the government considered that a true picture can be created of the 
reasons why policies were adopted or rejected. 
Understanding the policy formulation process would, of course, be difficult 
solely through the consideration of Cabinet records, which tend, as noted, only to 
present the conclusions of policy debates rather than their inception - although there 
'"Lowe, 'Plumbing new depths', pp. 247-9. 
^°Ibid., p. 240. 
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are frequent, often crucial, exceptions to this generalisation.^' However, as Lowe (and 
many others) argue, when Cabinet records are supplemented by examination of the 
'bulk of records generated by the "lower" levels of government', such gaps in an 
understanding of the formulation of particular policies can be overcome.^ '^  The 
chapters of this thesis which address the formulation and implementation of industrial 
policy by the Wilson government therefore make use of a wide range of such 'lower' 
level records, from the correspondence of Wilson's Cabinet Office Economic 
Advisor, Thomas Balogh, to the records of interdepartmental committees of officials, 
especially in the Department for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Power, the Board 
of Trade, and the Ministry of Technology. 
The recent availability of such archival material has allowed analysis of policy 
decisions which have received only the briefest of considerations in existing studies of 
the period. For example, the deliberations of the Wilson government on alternative 
methods of achieving public control over the iron and steel industry are clearly 
revealed in the records of the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Power. 
Such debate within the government, however, has until now been largely unexplored 
due to the Thirty-year rule. A more balanced examination of the content of the 
Wilson government's industrial policy, and in particular its policies relating to the 
expansion of public ownership and control in industry, is now possible. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I explains why public 
ownership and control became an issue of such great importance for many in the 
Labour party, and traces its evolution as party policy in the period before their first 
major election triumph in 1945. The focus is on the period immediately following the 
^'For example, the agonising, carried out at Cabinet level, over the Wilson government's decision to 
intervene in the Fairfields shipyard in 1965: see below Chapter V I . 
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second Labour government of 1929-31, in particular the attempts made to re-work the 
industrial objectives of the party's programme into practical proposals for legislative 
change. The content of this new programme is explored, and the reasons for and 
consequences of the dominance of the 'Morrisonian' model of public ownership and 
control from the mid-1930s onwards are discussed. The association of the party's 
ideological commitment to public ownership and control with Morrison's corporatist 
model of socialisation, which was explicitly made at this fime, provides the 
background to Chapters I I and III . Chapter I I focuses on the emergence during the 
1940s of doubts about the relevance of Morrisonian ideas both to the efficient 
organisation and development of post-war industry, and to the fulfilment of the party's 
ideological commitments. The implementation of the Attlee government's 
nationalisafion programme is investigated, in particular the extent to which it relied on 
Morrison's corporatist organisational structures. A discussion of the contrast between 
the straightforward implementation of the fuel and power nationalisations and the 
complicated and protracted nationalisation of the iron and steel industry is followed by 
examination of the precise nature of the discontent that was emerging on the long-
term consequences of the nationalisation process, both within the Attlee Cabinet and 
among other sections of the party. 
Chapter III explores how, in the minds of certain leading party intellectuals, 
these doubts about Morrisonian nafionalisation became linked by the mid-1950s with 
a perceived need to re-consider the party's ideological commitment to public 
ownership and control per se. While stressing that this did not lead 'revisionist' 
thinkers to reject public ownership and control, the chapter will consider the new 
approaches they proposed - in terms of the reasons for their implementation, and the 
^^Lowe, 'Plumbing new depths', p. 241. 
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results which might be expected to emerge from their adoption. An examination of 
the difficulties the revisionists experienced in persuading the remainder of the party to 
accept their new proposals is followed by analysis of the 'scientific' socialism that 
Wilson developed in the early 1960s, focusing on its similarities and dissimilarities to 
that of the revisionists. The success of Wilson in convincing the party to accept his 
particular revision of the party's programme is explored, along with a consideration of 
how great the differences were in industrial policy between the 'scientific' socialism 
of the 1964 election manifesto and the party programme in 1945. 
The remaining four chapters examine the implementation of industrial policy 
under the 1964-70 Wilson government. Chapter IV explores the economic framework 
within which the government pursued its industrial policies, focusing on the 
constraints which were faced, both economically and politically. The ability of the 
leading members of the government to cope with these constraints, and the extent to 
which their own actions exacerbated the constraints, is investigated. Chapter V 
analyses the single large-scale act of nationalisation in which the government engaged 
- iron and steel. A detailed examination is made of the precise terms of the 
nationalisation act, and the organisational structures it created, comparison being 
made to the previous measure of the Attlee government. A discussion of the 
difficulties that were experienced in nationalising the industry is followed by an 
exploration of the various alternatives to outright nationalisation that were offered and 
considered, and the reasons for their eventual rejection. 
Chapter V I examines the government's broader use, or not, of public 
ownership and control as a means of supporting industry. For example, explanation is 
sought for why the computer industry, which appeared a potential target for such 
support, was left in private hands, when parts of the shipbuilding and aircraft 
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industries were taken over. Two case studies - the Fairfields Shipyard and the Beagle 
Light Aircraft Company - are examined in detail to identify the circumstances 
considered by the government to justify intervention, and also the sort of intervention 
which was appropriate. Consideration is given to the extent to which such 
interventions demonstrate the adopfion of 'new' industrial policies, of the sort 
proposed in the 1950s and early 1960s. Such a discussion provides the background to 
the final chapter, which explores the attempts by the government to set up a general 
framework for industrial support. An analysis is made of the nature of the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation and the Industrial Expansion Act, the reasons for their 
creation, and the results which came from them. The extent to which they represented 
a genuinely new form of industrial intervention from that of nationalisation is 
discussed, along with the consequences for the future of the party's industrial policies. 
Chapter One 
Nationalisation and the Labour party: 
The creation of an industrial policy 
The Labour party successfully fought both the 1945 and 1964 general elections 
on the basis of programmes promising new directions in economic policy.' The 1945 
manifesto, Let us Face the Future, boldly promised that erroneous decisions taken in 
the interwar years, which had resulted in economic and social hardship for many 
working people, would not be repeated. The manifesto contended that after the Great 
War 'the people lost th[e] peace' to the 'hard-faced men who had done so well out of 
the war ... and their political friends'. In the years after 1945, however, the Labour 
party claimed it would 'keep a firm constructive hand on our whole productive 
machinery', planning economic development to ensure 'jobs for all' and 'industry in 
the service of the nation'.^ 
After two decades of post-war economic development in which Britain had 
seen its rivals attain a superior rate of economic growth, the party's 1964 manifesto, 
Let's Go with Labour, once again offered a radical change. A 'New Britain', it 
pronounced, would be forged by a Labour government 'poised to swing its plans into 
instant operation[; ijmpatient to apply the New Thinking'.'^ ft is not, however, simply 
in terms of rhetorical style and vision that the two manifestos were similar. Of equal 
'Although, as Jefferys argues, the extent to which either election was 'won' by the Labour party 
programme, rather than lost by the Conservatives, must not be exaggerated: Jefferys, 'British politics 
and the road to 1964', p. 142. 
^Labour party, Let us Face the Future (1945), pp. 1, 4-7. 
'Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', reprinted in F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British 
general election manifestos 1900-1974 (1975), p. 255. 
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significance is the commitment of both to the industrial policy of public ownership 
and control. 
In Let us Face the Future, it was considered an essential part of post-war 
economic 'replanning' that ownership and control over some of the most 'basic 
industries' would be wrested from those whose 'private monopolies ... may be 
likened to totalitarian oligarchies within the democratic state'.'' These industries -
primarily fiiel and power, transport, and iron and steel - were 'ripe and over-ripe for 
public ownership and management in the direct service of the nation'. They were 
considered 'fundamental to our economic structure', and were claimed to have 
'wholly or partially failed' the nation during the war, a claim which in some cases, 
notably coal, was hard to refute.^ In 1964, while the party did not enter the election 
with a similarly ambitious programme of nationalisation, it was still committed to 
nationalisation of the iron and steel industry - after its denationalisation by the 
Conservative government in 1953. It also promised that public o'wnership and control 
would be used whenever, wherever and however necessary to overcome inefficiency, 
backwardness and other barriers to the 'New Britain'. 
Merely noting that in 1945 and 1964 the party had election commitments to 
nationalise numerous industries, or otherwise extend public ownership and control, 
does little to explain why it believed that such changes were crucial both in the 
transition to peace, and in the search for faster economic growth in the 1960s. Before 
the detail of the industrial policies of these governments can be examined, it is 
necessary to understand why it was that the party remained committed to state 
""Labour party. Let us Face the Future, p. 2. 
^Ibid., pp. 5-6. For details of the performance of the coal industry during the war, see Supple, The 
political economy of decline, especially Chapter 11, 'From surplus to scarcity: 1939-1942', pp. 497-
536 and Chapter 12, 'Getting through the war, 1942-1945', pp. 537-90. 
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ownership over a prolonged period of time. For, as Millward and others have 
contended, while the nature of the Labour party's public ownership commitment was 
not the sole cause of the post-1945 nationalisations, it affected both the choice of 
industries subject to direct government control and the method of control adopted. No 
explanation of the industrial policies of any of the Labour governments before 1997 is 
possible without this long-term perspective: it is only by understanding the ideological 
inspiration behind the party's policies that the execution of those policies in 
government can be adequately explained.^ 
I 
The socialist ideology of the Labour party in 1945 was built around public 
ownership. After all, since 1918 the party's constitution had contained among the 
party aims a commitment (clause IV) 
to secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruit of 
their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that 
may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange and the best 
obtainable system of popular administration and control of each 
industry and service.' 
However, to conclude that post-war nationalisation was just a fulfilment of the party's 
aims oversimplifies the situation. As Millward has demonstrated regarding the 1940s 
nationalisations, it leaves unanswered a whole series of questions on the choices of 
industries taken over and the methods adopted for the implementation of that 
programme, a subject which clause IV did not address at all. It also leaves unexplored 
*Both the lack of consideration given by many twentieth century historians to ideological questions, and 
the necessity of such consideration, are emphasised in Francis, 'The nature of Labour's socialism', 
especially pp. 220-1. 
'Labour party constitution, 'Party Objects: Clause IV, Part Four' (originally Clause 3 (d) when adopted 
in February 1918). The words 'distribution and exchange' were only added in 1929. 
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an even more fundamental issue: why was it that the party adopted a commitment to 
public ownership and control in the first place? 
When the party was established at the turn of the last century, industrial 
nationalisation was not a key component of its programme. Although there were 
many socialists among the party's membership, and although some trade unionists -
in the Miners' Federation, for example - supported public ownership for their 
industries, Labour was not as yet 'a socialist party and proud of it'.^ However, even 
before the First World War the influence of socialists within the party was 
disproportionate to their numerical strength. Many of the party's leadership, including 
MacDonald, were staunch socialists, and much of the intellectual activity within the 
party was of a socialist nature. 
Yet significant as socialism was within the party in its early years, ambitions 
such as the 'socialisation' of industrial production were not the immediate priorities of 
the party at this time. Before these matters could be addressed, more fundamental 
issues, especially the right to vote of all members of the working class, dominated the 
party's priorities. In 1914 there was little indication that the onset of war would do 
anything to alter this situation. Indeed, the only consequence of the war for Labour 
appeared to be that the party was split between those, such as MacDonald, who 
adopted a pacifist position, and others, such as Henderson, who were prepared to 
support the government - and from 1916, join it. However, by 1917 it was clear that 
the end of the war, whenever it came, would see the enfranchisement of the majority 
of the adult population. 
*As the 1945 election manifesto had proclaimed: Labour party, Let us Face the Future, p. 6. See J. 
Winter, Socialism and the challenge of war: Ideas and politics in Britain 1912-18 (1974), p. 16; Jim 
Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy: The Attlee years, 1945-1951 (Cambridge, 
1997), pp. 2-3. 
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This change was recognised by the party leadership as an event of fundamental 
significance for the party as much as the country. Firstly, the party would have to win 
the support of a substantial number of these new voters i f it were ever to form a 
goverrmient.^ This support, however, could not be taken for granted: the party's 
programme would have to offer a distinctive approach to that of the Conservatives and 
Liberals. Moreover, this approach could not simply be 'sectional', but of broader 
nafional appeal. Secondly, given that 'political' reform was already being 
implemented, there was a strong case for arguing that this programme should move on 
from political reform to social and economic change. The consequences for the party 
were twofold. First, Labour, like the other main parties, would need a stronger 
organisational and administrative structure to cope with the increased size of 
electorate.'° Second, the adoption of a distincfive national programme of economic 
and social reform pointed inexorably towards a greater emphasis on a 'socialist' 
content than before - this being one area in which Labour was unquestionably distinct 
from the Liberals. 
This combination of factors is revealed in the changes implemented by the 
party leadership during the last year of the war. The party's most skilled 
administrators, primarily Henderson and Webb, produced a new constitution as well 
as a new programme." The heart of the constitutional changes was not the public 
ownership of clause IV, but the re-structuring of the party's bureaucratic structures -
especially the strengthening of the National Executive Committee.'^ Nevertheless, the 
adopfion of clause IV was far more than a 'sop' by the trade unions to the 
Voss McKibbin, The evolution of the Labour party 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974), p. 92. 
'"Something recognised by MacDonald: Winter, Challenge of war, pp. 234-6. 
' W . p . 261. 
'^McKibbin, Evolution of the Labour party, pp. 91, 93, 97; Jim Tomlinson and Nick Tiratsoo, 
Industrial efficiency and state intervention: Labour 1939-51 (1993), p. 11. 
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'professional bourgeoisie' in the party, as some historians have argued.'^ It was an 
explicit public confirmation of the distinctive political agenda that the party was 
offering.''' While the party's electoral fortunes in the 1920s indicate that its appeal 
was, at best, limited, its role in separating Labour from its political rivals cannot be 
doubted - a separation deemed essential in a long-term perspective.'^ 
II 
Regardless of its impact on the electorate, the socialist content of the party's 
post-war programme is clearly revealed by its reconstruction plans outlined in the 
1918 publication Labour and the New Social Order. Written by Webb, it elaborated 
Labour's commitment to build a 'new social order, based ... not on the competitive 
struggle for the means of bare life, but on a deliberate plarmed co-operation in 
production and distribution for the benefit of all'. '^ The significance of the war was 
emphasised to the greatest possible extent: it was, ' i f not the death, in Europe, of 
civilisation itself, at any rate the culmination and collapse of a distinctive industrial 
civilisation'.'^ As part of the 'new' industrial civilisation, the party would seek to 
establish 'a genuine scientific reorganisation of the nation's industry ... on the basis of 
1 St 
the Common Ownership of the Means of Production'. This commitment was 
explicitly recognised as being the policy which 'marks off this Party most distinctively 
'^McKibbin, Evolution of the Labour party, pp. 96-7, 102. See also A. Thorpe, A history of the British 
Labour party {1991), p. 45 
'""Tomlinson and Tiratsoo, Industrial efficiency and state intervention, p. 11. 
'^It also, Jones has argued, 'served to unbue [the party's] members and supporters with a spirit of 
collective identity and common purpose', as well as providing 'a source of inspiration' which 
'furthered the cause of party unity, drawing together a loose political organisation': Tudor Jones, 
"Taking Genesis out of the Bible': Hugh Gaitskell, clause IV and Labour's socialist myth', 
Contemporary British History, 11 (1997), p. 4. 
""Labour party. Labour and the New Social Order {\9\Z), p. 4. 
"Ibid., p. 3. 
'^Ibid., p. 12. 
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from any of the other political parties'.'^ However, while indicating a vast number of 
industries and services which were suitable candidates for immediate nationalisation -
including coalmining, railways and most other forms of transport, electricity, iron and 
steel, health care and insurance, and 'the entire manufacture and retailing of alcoholic 
drink'^° - it was noticeably weak in offering concrete explanations of exactly how 
public ownership was to be achieved and administered. This lack of detail was to 
characterise Labour's thinking throughout the 1920s, and was a direct consequence of 
the intellectual dominance of Webb and the particular brand of socialism - Fabianism 
- with which he was associated. 
The essence of Fabian socialism was a conviction that capitalism suffered 
from a fundamentally flawed structure, both economically and ethically. It exhibited 
'irremediably monopolistic' tendencies which, under private enterprise, led both to 
ever-reduced efficiency of operation and to increased exploitation of the workforce.'^' 
Since both outcomes were patently undesirable and unsustainable, it was, Fabians 
asserted, 'inevitable' that just as private competition was evolving into private 
monopoly, so the latter would evolve into public monopoly, a condition in which 
exploitation and inefficiency would disappear as industries came to be run by a 
'selfless, professional, intellectual elite' acfing for the public good.^ ^ 
Fabian socialism, like Marxism, thus presented itself as a 'scientific' 
interpretation of society and the direction in which it was evolving.^^ However, in 
place of the revolutionary change predicted by Marxism, Webb and other Fabians 
assumed only a gradual - though inevitable - evolution from capitalism to socialism. 
''ibid, p. I I . 
^°See the section entitled 'Immediate nationalisation': ibid., pp. 13-15. 
^'Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, pp. 15, 18-19. 
^^Winter, Challenge of war, p. 52; Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, p. 20. 
^^Ibid.,p.2l. 
30 
The domination of Labour's intellectual thinking during the 1920s by Fabianism had 
profound implications for its policies and politics. The notion of the 'inevitability of 
gradualness', as Webb referred to the progress towards socialism, implied that the 
implementation of the party's programme was wholly compatible with conventional 
parliamentary politics.^'* Since progress towards socialism was 'scientifically' 
assured, the existing political, economic and social systems could be gradually 
reformed to bring about socialism. Moreover, given that such reform would be 
gradual, the need for the party to prepare detailed plans for immediate nationalisations 
was minimal - the methods and scope of public ownership would naturally evolve 
over time. This was the approach taken in Labour and the New Social Order, and 
remained substantially unchanged throughout the 1920s, as revealed by the 1928 
programme. Labour and the Nation?^ 
Il l 
The experiences of the second Labour government between 1929 and 1931 
mark a turning point in the relationship between the party, Fabian socialism, and 
public o w n e r s h i p . U n t i l 1929 it had remained possible to argue, as the party 
leadership under MacDonald did, that progress towards the establishment of socialism 
was both inevitable and gradual. However, the fortunes of the second Labour 
government, especially economically, cast substantial doubts on such conclusions. 
^""indeed, as Fielding points out, the rejection of any extra-parliamentary method of bringing about 
socialism has been a defining characteristic of Labour's programme at all times: Fielding, 'Labourism 
in the 1940s', p. 147. 
"Tomlinson and Tiratsoo have criticised Labour and the Nation on the grounds that 'beyond th[e] 
rhetoric there was little in the way of practical policy proposals': Tomlinson and Tiratsoo, Industrial 
efficiency and state intervention, p. 14. However, it should be noted that in several policy areas. 
Labour and the Nation did contain 'practical policy proposals': for example, the establishment of a 
National Economic Committee and an Employment and Development Board were proposed to try and 
overcome the nation's unemployment problems: Labour party. Labour and the Nation, pp. 20-1. 
^""Alan Booth, 'How long are light years in British politics? The Labour party's economic ideas in the 
1930s', Twentieth Century British History, 7 (1996), p. 4. 
31 
Throughout the 1920s, the continuing power of the 'capitalist class' in industries such 
as coalmining to impose its will on the workers had been repeatedly demonstrated.'^ ' 
For the majority of the 1920s, however. Labour had been in opposition, and unable to 
act. Difficult as the economic conditions were in 1929, the party at last had a chance 
to begin to move the country's economic and social development in a socialist 
direction. 
Yet the limited record of socialist advance made by the government indicated 
to many in the party that the Fabian approach was unsuited to the situation which had 
to be faced. The existing industrial owners showed no inclination towards voluntary 
socialisation.'^^ The resistance of the financial markets to the government's policies -
culminating in the 'Bankers' Ramp' - was equally clear to party members.Even 
before the fall of the government, such resistance indicated that i f any progress was to 
be made towards socialism, the party would have to adopt a more aggressive, and 
quite possibly confrontational, programme. This conclusion was certainly reached by 
the younger members of the party leadership such as Dalton and Morrison. They were 
impatient at the gradualness of Fabian socialism: as Morrison^^ stated, 'socialism for 
me is a policy for today and not for some indefinite day after tomorrow'.^' 
The 1928 programme. Labour and the Nation, promised to 'convert industry, 
step by step ... from a sordid struggle for private gain into a co-operative undertaking. 
^^The failure of the General Strike, for example, convinced many trade unionists such as Bevin that only 
with the emergence of socialism could their fortunes be improved: A. Bullock, The life and times of 
Ernest Bevin, i: Trade union leader, 1881-1940 (1960), pp. 446, 499. 
^^Booth, 'How long are light years?', p. 7. 
^^For a discussion of the validity of this judgement by the party, see Philip Williamson, National crisis 
and national government: British politics, the economy and Empire, 1926-32 (Cambridge, 1992). 
^°Who had been one of the few members of the 1929-31 government to be actually involved in 
socialisation (with London Transport). 
^ ' H . Morrison, Socialisation and transport: The organisation of socialised industries with particular 
reference to the London Passenger Transport Bill (1933), p. 140. 
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carried on for the service of the community and amenable to its c o n t r o l ' . Y e t there 
was clear evidence of doubt about what form those steps should take. In banking and 
finance, for example, the programme conceded that 'a searching inquiry' would be 
needed before the party could determine its policy. '^^  It is true that the programme 
promised 'the transference to public ownership of the coal, transport, power, and life 
insurance industries', along with land.^'' Yet the foreword implicitly recognised that 
the 'formidable list' it had drawn up might prove impossible to implement in a single 
parliament. The party would simply have to take 'every parliamentary opportunity' to 
make progress, no matter how slow that was.^ ^ However, as Dalton argued, the 
difficulties experienced by the 1929-31 government indicated the need to 'hammer out 
a firm detailed policy of socialist reconstruction' by which Labour could be seen to be 
offering a decisive step towards socialism in the life of just one parliament.'^ ^ 
The desire to take such a clear step did not indicate any alteration of thinking 
on what socialism entailed: public ownership and control over industry was central. 
Morrison stated unambiguously in 1933 that 'socialism presupposes the public 
ownership of a large number and a wide variety of industries'.^^ Dalton agreed, 
considering 'socialisation' to be one of the six defining objectives of socialism; while 
for Evan Durbin, who was to emerge as an important party thinker during the 1930s, it 
was essentia] for the state to acquire 'the power to decide the output, investment and 
^^Labour party, Labour and the Nation (1928), p. 14. 
" A M , p. 20. 
^Ubid., pp. 47-8. 
^^Ibid., p. 4. 
^^Dalton, at PLP meeting, 28 August 1931 in Hugh Dalton, Memoirs, i: Call back yesterday, 1887-1931 
(1953), p. 279; Hugh Dalton, Practical socialism for Britain (1935), p. 93. 
"Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. 39. 
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employment policy of any economic undertaking'.^^ The strong consensus was 
reflected in the commitment of the 1934 policy statement. For Socialism and Peace, 
to 'convert industry ... from a haphazard struggle for private gain to a planned national 
economy owned by ... the community ' .What was new was the determination that, 
within one term of office, 'an important group of industries and services, central in the 
life of the nation, shall be added to the socialised sector'.""^  
Frustration at the resistance to the party's ambitions had led by 1934 to the 
adoption of one of the central features of the post-1945 approach to nationalisation - a 
realistic programme of change which could be implemented during the course of a 
government. While little doubt existed about the need to socialise an 'important 
group' of industries, considerably more doubt existed as to which industries and 
services were important enough to be first targets, and how their socialisation was to 
take place. The need to be clear on these specifics was keenly felt, yet neither 
question was easily answered - in particular deciding the 'appropriate criteria' for 
selecting industries proved to be a 'fundamental problem'.'" The difficulty was that 
although, as Morrison argued, the ideal criteria might well be to 'secure efficiency in 
the public interest','*^ such coldly rational calculations had to be tempered by other 
considerations, political or otherwise. 
^^Dalton, Practical socialism, p. 27; E.F. Durbin, The politics of democratic socialism: An essay on 
social policy (1940), p. 294. See also Stephen Brooke, 'Evan Durbin: Reassessing a Labour 
'revisionist", Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1996), pp. 27-52. 
'^Labour party. For Socialism and Peace (1934), p. 8. 
'"'Dalton, Practical socialism, p. 93. 
"^'Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour party and the economics of democratic socialism 
(1985), p. 125. 
"^Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. 150. 
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IV 
The primary difficulty faced by those responsible for creating the party's 
programme in the 1930s was the vast range of industries and services, and the vast 
range of reasons, for which nationalisation could be argued, from a socialist 
perspective, to be necessary. For certain industries - coalmining being the best 
example - public ownership had been proposed for decades. Bills for nationalisafion 
of the coal industry were introduced in parliament even before the First World War. 
The miners union was vociferous in its calls for nationalisation: its case was 
immeasurably strengthened firstly by the centrality of coal to the economy, and 
secondly by the record of their suffering at the hand of the coal-owners in the 1920s. 
The 'necessity' of coal nationalisation, however, stemmed as much from the political 
power of the miners union within the party as it did to any economic arguments. The 
union was a dominant force in the TUC and sponsored a large number of Labour MPs; 
its case could not easily be ignored. In any event, the industry's nationalisation was a 
matter of faith to the likes of Dalton, who occupied mining constituencies.'''' The 
economic malaise in so crucial an industry merely made the need for public ownership 
more apparent to those such as Morrison with no emotional ties to the coalfields. 
This evidence of broad-ranging economic and political justifications lying 
behind potential nationalisation targets is repeatedly demonstrated. Strong economic 
arguments were advanced for other fuel and power industries joining coal in public 
ownership. Both gas and electricity generation and supply were already partially in 
public hands, in the form of local authorities. Moreover, the establishment by a 
Conservative government of the Central Electricity Board as a public enterprise from 
''^Dalton's feelings for the miners can be seen in his emotional speech in favour of the Second Reading 
of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act in 1946: HC Deb. (418), cols. 819-20 (29 Jan. 1946). 
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its inception, indicated a general political recognition that the development of these 
infrastructure industries would involve the state. Equally important was the desire to 
create a unified fuel and power industry so that a 'great degree of stability can be 
introduced into the national life' through the co-ordination of fuel supply and 
pricing.'*'* This emphasises the importance, as Morrison asserted, of economic 
efficiency as a criteria for nationalisation: the Labour party was not concerned simply 
with the transfer of ownership for its own sake. 
The ideal of co-ordinated services, and hence increased efficiency, also 
brought the transport sector to the forefront of the targets for nationalisation. One of 
the few achievements of the 1929-31 government had been the co-ordination, under 
Morrison's direction, of London's transport system into the publicly-owned London 
Passenger Transport Board.''^ Morrison consequently sought to extend this co-
ordination to a national level, bringing road, sea, air and rail transport under one single 
authority. Such a publicly owned national system of transport, it was felt, could be 
used in both 'the planning of industries and also of amenities... [and] to assist in 
the[ir] proper location'.''^ 
However, while economic co-ordination and efficiency were of great 
importance in justifying nationalisation for industries such as these, discussion of the 
financial sector provide evidence of the 'political' inspiration behind choices for 
public ownership. The Bank of England, perceived as central to the 'Bankers' Ramp' 
which 'sabotaged' the Labour government in 1931, became thereby an obvious 
political target for nationalisation. This is not to say that obtaining control over the 
'financial power' that the City of London was 'able to assert against the government' 
''''Clement Attlee, The Labour party in perspective (1937), p. 185. 
''^Although the measure was not in fact enacted until 1933 by the National Government. 
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was only a political aim.''^ Since the 1920s there had been investigations into various 
aspects of the financial services industry - banking, investment, the provision of credit 
- such as the Macmillan Committee. Many Labour thinkers had concluded that 
nationalising the Bank of England would allow a Labour government to 'ensure that 
credit policy [in the City] will be in line with the policy of the government' and would 
ensure that 'capital [could] be directed into the channels of most advantage to the 
community'.''^ 
There was far less agreement on whether the nationalisation of the joint-stock 
banks would also be necessary. Strong arguments were advanced in favour of the 
proposition: the 1932 Party Conference had passed resolutions calling for such 
nationalisation; the Socialist League, dominated by Cripps, saw it as an 'integral part' 
of socialism; and Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell initially considered it necessary.'*' 
However, the political risks of this particular nationalisation were significant. By the 
mid-1930s, a consensus emerged among the party leadership that it would be better, 
and more realistic, to 'control' the joint-stock banks through nationalisation of the 
Bank of England, thereby avoiding any unnecessary panic and opposition to Labour 
among the financial institutions, a fear that Dalton especially held.^" 
The rejection of widespread nationalisation in the financial sector emphasises 
the importance given to questions of perceived practicality in the production of a 
nationalisation programme. This is further demonstrated by the great number of 
industries whose nationalisation was considered to be desirable during the 1930s, yet 
did not necessarily find their way into the 1945 nationalisation programme. The sheer 
'^^Attlee, Labour party, p. 188. 
^^Ibid., p. 179; Labour party. For Socialism and Peace, p. 16. 
^^Ibid., p. 17; Attlee, Labour party, p. 180. 
""Nicholas Ellison, Egalitarian thought and Labour politics: Retreating visions (1994), pp. 8, 14. 
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volume of the industries examined, such as cotton, shipbuilding, aircraft manufacture, 
milk production and distribution, and flour milling, is evidence of the energy with 
which the process of reforming the party's programme was undertaken. A 
reorganisation of the policy subcommittee of the party's National Executive 
Committee (TSfEC) to incorporate standing committees on - among other areas - the 
reorganisation of industry, and finance and trade, provided active forums for debate of 
possible nationalisation.^' The work of these committees was supported by the 
Economic Committee of the TUC, which by 1932 'had become the TUC's most 
influential body'," and even more so by numerous independent discussion and 
campaign groups (for example, The Socialist League, the XYZ Club, the Society for 
Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP), and the New Fabian Research Bureau 
(NFRB))." 
These organisations and committees, with overlapping memberships, '^' 
provided a dynamic environment in which investigations of future nationalisations 
progressed apace. The NFRB in particular, drew up a huge volume of pamphlets and 
reports concerning possible targets for nationalisation.^^ Very few of these could be 
added to the infrastructure nationalisation programme without the risk of expanding it 
beyond the feasible legislative limits of a single government. In 1934, for example, 
the party's For Socialism and Peace included a long list of industries and services for 
^"Attlee, Labour party, p. 150; Booth, 'How long are light years?', p. 19; Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 
75. 
^'This was particularly the case of the finance and trade committee under Dalton: Booth, 'How long are 
light years?', p. 8. 
^^Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 77. 
•^'See Booth, 'How long are light years?', p. 8; Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 81; Thompson, Political 
economy and the Labour party, p. 88; Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 
1977), p. 36. 
^"Dalton, for example, chaired the Party's finance and trade committee, was closely involved in the 
workings of the XYZ Club, and even found time to act as a party representative on the TUC's 
Economic Committee. Other young economists, such as Durbin and Gaitskell, were even more 
energetic: Durbin, New Jerusalems, pp. 76-81. 
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whom 'the time has come for drastic reorganisation, and for [which in] the most part 
nothing short of immediate public ownership and control will be effective'.^^ Yet the 
party's 1935 election manifesto reduced this list substantially." In part this was 
simple practicality, but the party also had to consider the probable impact of a massive 
nationalisation programme on non-socialist voters.^ ^ Of the additional industries on 
list in For Socialism and Peace, in 1945 only iron and steel was deemed sufficiently 
central to overall economic production of the country to be included. 
The one other key sector of the economy in which there was a determination 
among the party leadership and intellectuals in the 1930s to advance public ownership 
was the land. The common ownership of land once again demonstrates how the 
grounds for such ownership were a mix of economic and political considerations. On 
the one hand, arguments were put forward that public ownership would lead to far 
more 'reasonable security for tenure' and also the 'proper utilisation of land as an 
integral part of Socialist planning'.^' On the other hand, for those such as Dalton who 
believed 'inherited wealth ... [to be] both wasteful and unjust', and Gaitskell who saw 
'an underlying hatred of inequality and the Class Structure... [as] the germ of all 
socialist feeling', expropriating the landed rich was a fundamental political 
objective.^" Even here, however, it was not to prove possible to find space to include 
its nationalisation in the 1945 programme.^' 
"See (i/o'., p. 121. 
^^More than a dozen, including water, shipping, shipbuilding, engineering, textiles and chemicals: 
Labour party. For Socialism and Peace, p. 15. 
^'Down to just seven - banking, coal, transport, electricity, iron and steel, cotton, and the land: Labour 
party, 'The Labour party's call to power', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 108. 
^^Booth, 'How long are light years?', p. 9. 
^'Attlee, Labour party, p. 152; Labour party, For Socialism and Peace, p. 20. 
^"Ellison, Egalitarian thought, pp. 14-15; Hugh Gaitskell quoted in P. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A 
political biography (1979), p. 69. 
^'The manifesto promised only that 'Labour believes in land nationalisation and will work towards it ': 
Labour party. Let us Face the future, p. 9 
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The excess of potential nationalisations over the space deemed to be available 
in the party's programme is of great significance for an examination of Labour's use 
of nationalisation post-1945. For it is clear that the extensive examination process 
undertaken in the 1930s had produced far more targets than could be dealt with by just 
one government. The implication must be that the process had created a framework 
for long-term nationalisation. At each election the party would chose the most 
suitable candidates for nationalisation on the basis of the economic conditions then in 
existence, and proceed with the implementation of that programme. This would be 
repeated at the following election, while in the intervening years examinations of 
various private industries, and their 'need' for nationalisation, would be undertaken. 
Yet, as wil l be seen in later chapters, the Labour party's commitment to future 
nationalisation after 1945 proved substantially less straightforward than this. 
V 
Even given some partial consensus regarding the particular industries to be 
subjected to public ownership in the new Labour programme, it still remained to be 
determined how these industries were to be operated. Critical though this issue 
plainly was, littie attention had been paid to it before the 1930s. The party's 1928 
programme, Labour and the Nation, maintained that 'the Labour party, unlike other 
parties, is not concerned with patching the rents in a bad system, but with 
transforming capitalism into social ism' .Yet it offered little of practical note to back 
this up.^ '^  While arguing that, in 'planning the machinery through which nationalised 
industries are to be administered', a Labour government would give serious 
consideration to factors such as 'individual initiative and business experience', it 
^Labour party. Labour and the Nation, p. 4. 
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provided no indication that planning of this nature was necessary before achieving 
64 
power. 
Yet the experiences of the 1929-31 government demonstrated that, i f progress 
was to be made towards socialism, the party would not only need a clear idea of which 
industries and services the party should seek to nationalised, but also to have a clear 
idea of how it was to nationalise and run these new public industries and services. 
The problem was that few members of the party had any practical experience of 
attempting either to set up or then operate a public concern. With Morrison almost the 
sole exception, it was to him that the party turned for practical policies, and with him 
that the origins of the post-1945 corporatist model of nationalisation lay. 
Morrison translated his experiences with the establishment of the London 
Passenger Transport Board^^ into a set of guidelines of how socialisation could be 
given practical effect: Socialisation and transport: The organisation of socialised 
industries with particular reference of the London Passenger Transport Bill. At the 
heart of the book lay Morrison's personal conviction that 'socialism must stand the 
double test of being ethically sound and economically sound; for man cannot live by 
abstract ethics a l o n e ' . I t was this goal of economic 'soundness' which led him 
inexorably towards the conclusion that the public board or corporation represented the 
most ideal form of public industrial organisation. 
Morrison rejected the idea of direct ministerial control over newly-socialised 
industries - in the manner of the Post Office - since such a system of control would 
require a 'greater number of ministers than is healthy for the proper functioning of 
"/6;c/., pp. 23-4. 
^'Ibid., p. 24. 
65 Experiences of 'great value' in his opinion: Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. viii. 
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parliament' and was in any case impractical, because the minister, as a busy politician, 
'could not in fact really manage the industry, even i f he were personally qualified to 
do so'.^ ^ By contrast, creating a board of control ensured 'that management [wjould 
be sufficiently free from ... undesirable pressures' from politicians or other interests 
such as workers and consumers, and thus be able to 'stand its ground in the interests 
of the undertaking which is committed to its charge'. At the same time, by ensuring 
that there were 'perfectly proper contacts between [a relevant] Minister and the 
boards', and also that 'Consultative Councils' were established, there could be no 
question that Labour simply wished to replace unaccountable private monopolies with 
similarly unaccountable public ones. To Morrison, the advantages of such boards 
were overwhelming - he stressed, for example, how their 'freedom' from 'Treasury 
control' would allow them to pay salaries sufficient to obtain, and retain, the best 
employees.^^ 
Having decided on a public corporation, this still left open the issue of how the 
boards were to be constituted. Morrison saw three alternatives: 'the full-time board of 
technical experts[;] the board composed in the main of representatives of the interests 
concerned with the industry[;] ... and the corporate board of ability'. He was 
dismissive of the first idea, noting that 'the technical expert is by no means always a 
good administrator'.^" He believed that a board comprising those appointed purely on 
their abilities to be 'upholding the best traditions of socialism', but he was well aware 
^^Ibid., p. 281. He was far from alone in adopting such a view: Douglas Jay stated that the case for 
socialism was 'mainly economic and rests on fact': quoted in S. Brooke, Labour's war: The Labour 
party during the Second World War (Oxford, 1992), p. 20. 
^^Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. 139. 
'Vi/^/.,pp. 137, 171, 174. 
'^Ibid., p. 165. 
™/6;a'.,pp. 178-9. 
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that strong pressure existed in favour of the notion of an 'interest' dominated board/' 
More specifically, pressure existed in favour of compulsory worker representation on 
the boards of the public concerns. 
The notion of worker representation had a long tradition within the party, right 
back to the pre-First World War Guild Socialism of G.D.H. Cole. He and many 
others - such as the transport workers' leader, Bevin - put forward strong arguments 
for workers' claims for a role in the running of their industry, epitomised in the call of 
'the mines for the miners'.^^ Such calls for 'industrial democracy', however, found 
very little sympathy with Morrison, who facetiously enquired i f the proponents of 
such industrial democracy wanted 'the dust for the dustmen'.''^ He refused even to 
accept the necessity of having statutorily-required representatives of labour on the 
boards. In his view it was an 'undignified and humiliating proposal' for it pigeon-
holed individuals as 'workers', which as an idea 'seems to me to be capitalist rather 
than socialist in its philosophical basis'. Much better, he argued, to have a board 
appointed by a minister purely on the grounds of ability and thereby ensure that 
workers or trade unionists who were appointed would be equals in all respects with 
their fellow board-members.^ '* 
Confident as Morrison was of the efficacy of his ideas, he nonetheless 
included within Socialisation and Transport the caveat that the public corporation 
'must not be regarded as a pattern to be applied uniformly to all industries and 
services'.^^ This did not, however, prevent others seizing upon his ideas as a virtually 
'uniform' model of control. Dalton, for example, modelled much of his thinking in 
"/fe;W.,p.212. 
''^ Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, p. 29. 
'^Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. 209. 
''Ibid., pp. 209-10. 
'W,p. 137. 
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this area on Morrison's work.'^ Like Morrison, he dismissed - in his 1935 Practical 
Socialism for Britain - direct ministerial control as 'an old-fashioned form of 
socialism', whereas 'modem though ... tend[ed] to favour ... the idea of the public 
corporation'.^^ 
The extent to which Dalton was influenced by Morrison is demonstrated by his 
ideas on the composition of such boards. While stating that 'the principle of workers' 
control' and 'industrial self-government' constituted 'essential elements of economic 
democracy', he nonetheless concluded that 'Mr Morrison, in my judgement, is right 
when he argues that the board ... should not be composed of representatives of 
sectional interests'. The question of appointments was plainly an issue which 
troubled him (perhaps unsurprisingly, given that his parliamentary constituency was a 
mining district and the miners' union were strong advocates of workers' 
representation), for despite further admitting that Morrison was correct in arguing that 
boards 'should be appointed on their own merits', he still felt that 'some of the 
appointments ... should be made only after consultation with the trade unions', 
seemingly contradictory notions.'^ 
While others in the party such as Durbin supported Morrison's public 
corporation model of nationalisation, this support was not universal. On the contrary, 
it was bitterly attacked by Bevin in particular. Bevin had been critical of the nature of 
the London Passenger Transport Board, since it excluded representatives of his own 
'*And given Dalton's position within the party (he was chair of the NEC's finance and trade 
committee), his reliance on Morrison's thinking is a matter of significance: see Durbin, New 
Jerusalems, pp. 76, 87. 
^^Dalton, Practical socialism, pp. 94-5. 
'^^Ibid., pp. 161, 163. 
''''Ibid., p. 163. 
"^Who served as honorary secretary for the NFRB, acted as economic expert to the XYZ Club and, by 
1936, had been seconded by Dalton onto the finance and trade subcommittee: Durbin, New 
Jerusalems, pp. 76-81. 
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union. The idea that London Transport was to be the model for future nationalisations 
filled him with horror. He told the Economic Committee of the TUC in 1932 that it 
represented 'positively the worst form of public control'.^' Yet despite his status in 
the trade union movement, the Committee dealt 'rather slightingly' with his 
comments, and 'came out strongly in favour of public corporations' appointed on the 
grounds of ability. The fact that Bevin found himself in a minority of just one 
indicated how significant the influence of Morrison's ideas was - or, at least, how few 
alternatives seemed available.^^ 
VI 
Debate did not stop, however, with acceptance of the Morrisonian public 
corporation. Durbin, for example, argued that establishing the socialised industries 
was only the first stage in what Labour must offer and would, by itself, do 'little 
good'. It would be just as necessary to establish, 'at an early stage', a 'central control, 
or Supreme Economic Authority', in order to co-ordinate the socialised sector. The 
need for such an overarching authority had been accepted by Morrison as well; he 
considered it 'probable that some sort of Economic Council will be established'.^'' 
Dalton agreed, seeing the role of a Supreme Economic Authority as providing the 
machinery to plan the relations between socialised industries.^^ 
Economic planning and co-ordination was considered by Durbin and others to 
be as essential a part of socialism as public ownership and control. However, while 
Morrison and Dalton were equally convinced of the need for such planning, for them 
''Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 510. 
''/6/i/.,p. 510. 
'^Durbin, Politics of democratic socialism., pp. 302-3; Thompson, Political economy and the Labour 
party, p. 112. 
'''Morrison, Socialisation and transport, p. 294. 
'^Dalton, Practical socialism, p. 310. 
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it was a required part of economic management, not socialism. Dalton saw it thus: 
'planning is not the same thing as socialism. Socialism is primarily a question of 
ownership, planning a question of control and direction'. Planning may have been 
prominent in the Labour party's programme - in 1934 the party promised not only a 
Supreme Economic Authority, but also a National Investment Board which, in 
conjunction with a publicly-owned Bank of England, would direct and control 
investment - but Dalton's definition of socialism in terms of public ownership was 
unambiguous. For better or worse, the ideological re-thinking of the 1930s had made 
nafionalisafion a defining aspect of Labour's socialism and its programme. 
This evidence of differing ideological positions was emphasised by the 
experiences of the Second World War. The war was responsible for many of the 
conditions that swept the party to power at its end - for example, the Coalition 
government's stress on the need for 'egalitarianism and community feeling [which] 
became, to a great extent, the pervasive ideals of social life' played very clearly to 
oo 
Labour's advantage. However, by extreme irony the war also gave credence to 
theoretical challenges to the socialisation that lay at the heart of its successful 
programme.^^ The main basis of these challenges lay with a reinterpretation of how 
control over the economy was to be obtained. The inspiration was the success of war-
time 'Keynesian' techniques of economic management. Even before the war, the 
'''Labour party, For Socialism and Peace, pp. 16-7; Attlee, Labour party, p. 180. 
'^ Booth has forcefully argued that it was for the worse, claiming that in reality the commitment to 
nationalisation revealed how little ideological development had occurred: 'nationalisafion remained 
the same Utopian political rallying cry devoid of economic content or analysis. In this context, it 
mattered little whether Labour had plans to nationalise one industry or twenty in the form of a public 
corporation or a worker co-operative'. It does not appear justifiable, however, simply to equate a lack 
of ideological 'progress' (for which he primarily blames Dalton) with a contmued commitment to 
nationalisation, the party's posifion on public ownership in 1939 or 1945 was substantially more 
sophisticated than that of 1931: Booth, 'How long are light years?', especially pp. 22-3. 
'^Addison, The road to 1945, pp. 18-19. Fielding accepts this within limits, but argues that the party 
was 'mistaken' in considered that a 'new moral sense' had been developed by the war: Fielding, 
'Labourism in the 1940s', p. 141. 
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ideas of Keynes had an important impact on Labour thinkers.^'' Douglas Jay,^ ' for 
example, argued that Keynes's General Theory^^ demonstrated that 'socialists have 
been mistaken in making ownership of the means of production the test of 
socialisation'.^'^ Seconded onto the Treasury staff during the war, Keynes succeeded 
in 'transform[ing] the budget into the key regulator of the market economy'. 
Budgetary fiscal controls were used both to 'regulate aggregate demand' and to stave 
off the danger of national bankruptcy. The potential they offered to regulate the 
peace-time economy was not lost on Jay and others. '^' 
Jay himself went on to attack the very notion that nationalisation was 'any 
solution' to the 'central aim of socialist policy' - which he saw as the 'redistribution 
of resources and incomes'.Nationalisation, while redistributing ownership, brought 
'no transfer of income from rich to poor ... at all'.^^ He argued that 'there remains in 
effect only one method, taxation', whereby monetary redistribution could take place. 
He found support from other party thinkers, notably Durbin, who argued that the 
successful direction of industry by the Coalition government during the war tended to 
indicate that it was possible to obtain 'substantial control without ownership'.^^ In 
^'Brooke, Labour's war, p. 231; Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 70. 
'"jim Tomlinson, 'Planning: Debate and policy in the 1940s', Twentieth Century British History, 3 
(1992), p. 158. 
'^Who was a rising intellectual in the party during the 1930s: see Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 81; 
Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, pp. 118-19. 
'^ John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of employment, interest, and money (1936). 
'•'D. Jay, The socialist case (2nd edn., 1947), p. 195; Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, pp. 69-
70. 
'""Jay, Socialist case (2nd edn.), pp. 170-1. As Tomlinson has argued, 'Jay's evolution is typical of the 
way in which the perceived success of wartime planning encouraged the view that planning was 
central to Labour's peacetime programme' (although it should be noted that 'planning' per se was by 
no means an exclusively Keynesian concept): Jim Tomlinson, 'Planning: Debate and policy in the 
1940s', Twentieth Century British History, 3 (1992), p. 159. However, as Booth notes, neither 
Durbin nor Dalton were totally convinced by Keynes' arguments: Booth, 'How long are light years?', 
p. 18. 
'^Douglas Jay, The socialist case f2nd edn., 1946?), pp. 183, 198. 
^^Ibid., p. 199. 
'^Durbin, Politics of democratic socialism, p. 294. 
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place of socialisation, 'control and efficiency could be achieved through subtler 
go 
means . 
The war therefore began a process which risked, in the long-term, undermining 
the unchallenged centrality of nafionalisation to the party's ideology.^^ However, 
there was no question in 1945 of the party abandoning its commitment to 
nationalisation. Public ownership and control had been a key part of the party's 
programme since the adopfion of the new constitufion in 1918. Even before that time 
socialist intellectuals in the party had been arguing in favour of such a commitment, 
but the political changes implemented at the end of the First World War persuaded the 
majority of the party to accept a distinct, socialist, political programme. After the 
collapse of the 1929-1931 government, many party leaders and intellectuals 
determined that the commitment had to be translated into a practical programme for 
immediate nafionalisation. It was that programme, established by the mid-1930s, 
which essentially provided the framework for the actions of the Attlee government. 
However, this long-term basis for the party's nationalisation programme was a 
weakness as well as a strength, for the economic conditions of 1945 were very 
different from those of 1934 or 1937.'°° It was a recognition of this which lay behind 
the ideological questioning of the young intellectuals. I f the 1945 'shopping list' of 
nationalisations proved successful in securing the aims laid out for it, then it was 
unlikely that such questioning would have an impact on the party's relationship with 
nationalisation. However, i f nationalisation did not prove the panacea it was 
considered by the party leadership then its place within the party programme might 
Brooke, Labour's war, p. 231. 
'^Ellison, Egalitarian thought, p. 16; Booth, 'How long are light years?', p. 23. 
'""The dates of For Socialism and Peace and Labour's Immediate Programme, which laid out the 
basics of Let us Face the Future. 
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not be as secure as it seemed in the 1930s. Given this, consideration of the content of 
the 1945 programme and the methods adopted for its implementation is of great 
significance to the future of nationalisation. Although it would be wrong to claim that 
the party's public ownership commitment was on trial before it had even been tested, 
there is some validity in concluding that its continued place at the heart of the party's 
socialism was in no small part dependent on the 1945 'shopping list' being a success. 
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Chapter Two 
The 'Commanding Heights': 
Nationalisation and the 1940s Attlee government 
Only in 1945 did the Labour party gain real power for the first time. In both 
1924 and 1929-31 the Labour governments had been restricted by lack of a 
parliamentary majority from bringing about large changes in areas such as industrial 
ownership, whether or not it had been desired to do so. In 1945, an absolute majority 
of almost 250 held out the promise that little effective opposition would be raised in 
the House of Commons to any of the government's legislative proposals.' At first 
glance, however, this parliamentary strength appeared insignificant when compared 
with the problems of the immediate post-war years - exceeding even the considerable 
economic difficulties of 1924 and 1929-31. 
Despite this, the new Labour govermnent came to power promising an 
extensive programme of industrial nationalisation at 'the heart of [its] economic 
policies'.^ According to the party manifesto. Let us Face the Future, the experience 
of war had shown some 'fundamental' industries to be '[injcapable of rising to new 
heights of efficiency and expansion'.^ Nationalisation was considered an essential 
part of their post-war reconstruction. Three main categories of industries were felt to 
be in this position: the fuel and power industries (coal, gas and electricity); inland 
transport (rail, road, air and canal carriers); and iron and steel."* 
'Although opposition in the House of Lords was likely (and proved) to be more substantial. 
^Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 94. 
3 T Labour party, Let us Face the Future, p. 5. 
'Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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This nationalisation programme was similar to that proposed by Labour in the 
1930s, but the economic circumstances were now substantially more favourable to the 
Labour case. First, some of the industries concerned had, as Labour argued, 
performed badly during the war. Coalmining in particular had proved incapable of 
meeting the demands placed upon it in terms of output, as well as suffering from 
chronic industrial relations problems and low productivity.^ Others, while having 
performed adequately, reached the end of the war in a state of virtual collapse. The 
railways, for example, faced a substantial backlog of maintenance both to the network 
infrastructure and to the trains themselves: overworking of ageing rolling stock and 
damage from bombing had seriously affected the industry.^ The need for some form 
of prolonged government intervention in such industries, whether nationalisation or 
not, was almost inevitable regardless of the outcome of the 1945 election. 
Second, the conduct of the war from an economic and industrial perspective 
supported the Labour party's argument that the state should play a greater role in the 
management of the economy.^ Like the First, the Second World War saw the state 
taking responsibility for a wide range of industrial operations deemed essential to the 
war effort: coal and the railways are obvious examples. More significantly, the state 
also assiomed greater responsibility for macroeconomic management than had been the 
case in peace-time. Although by the end of the war the country's financial position 
was perilous, the success of the state in financing the war effort and directing scarce 
'See Supple, Political economy of decline. Chapter 11, 'From supply to scarcity: 1939-1942', pp. 497-
536 and Chapter 12, 'Getting through the war, 1942-1945', pp. 537-590; William Ashcroft, The 
history of the British coal industry, v. 1946-1982: The nationalized industry (Oxford, 1986), pp. 3-5; 
Greasley, 'The coal industry', pp. 39-46. 
^Gerald Crompton, 'The railway companies and the nationalisation issue 1920-50', in Millward and 
Singleton, The political economy of nationalisation, p. 141. 
^Although, as Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo argue, the legacy of the war is substanfially more 
complex than is often assumed, and cannot simply be assumed to have turned the electorate towards 
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labour and raw materials was in stark contrast to the perceived failure of arms-length 
intervention in the inter-war years. 
By 1945 it was implicitly assumed by the members of the Coalition 
government that the methods of economic management utilised during the war should 
be used also in peacetime. The 1944 White Paper on Employment, for example, 
effectively committed both the Conservatives and the Labour party to the management 
of post-war levels of employment. It was indicative of the wartime impetus to the 
notion that the state must take responsibility for certain aspects of economic 
performance and development. In 1945 a larger percentage of the electorate 
apparently considered that the Labour party could be entrusted with such 
responsibility than favoured the Conservatives.^ 
Yet the possession of a substantial political mandate for change and a clear 
programme of nationalisation still left substantial challenges for the Attlee 
government. No administration had ever attempted nationalisation on the scale their 
manifesto envisaged, and the Morrisonian model of public control was untried on an 
industry-wide level. However, despite these difficulties and the need to rebuild the 
remainder of the shattered economy, the government succeeded in fulfilling its 
manifesto pledges. By 1951, all of the key industries and services singled out for 
nationalisation in Let us Face the Future had been taken over. The process of 
nationalisation might therefore appear uncomplicated. From the perspective of the 
ideological posifion held by the Labour party in 1945, the six years of the Attlee 
Labour: Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, 'England Arise!', especially chapter 2, 'Popular attitudes 
in wartime', pp. 19-45. 
^Although it must be recognised that perceptions of the relative abilities of the parties in the field of 
economic management were by means the sole criteria by which voting patterns are to be explained. 
Nonetheless, as Tomlinson and Tiratsoo have argued, during the 1945 election 'Britain's industrial 
future was certainly at the centre of debate': Tomlinson and Tiratsoo, Industrial efficiency and state 
intervention, p. 64. 
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government seem the first crucial steps towards the creation of the all-encompassing 
public sector envisaged in clause IV of the party's constitution.^ Moreover, it could 
be thought that after nationalisation had been achieved in adverse economic 
circumstances, there would be few difficulties with further nationalisation in the 
future. Al l that appeared necessary for continued expansion of the public sector was 
Labour's continued electoral success. 
Successful implementation of the 1945 nationalisation programme, however, 
masks the serious questions - both practical and, more significantly, ideological - that 
the implementation process had exposed.'" For despite all the attention that Labour's 
leading thinkers gave to the issue during the 1930s, the practicalities of nationalisation 
were more complex than had been envisaged. Moreover, far from symbolising the 
first stage in an extended process of future industrial reorganisation, fulfilment of the 
1945 'shopping list' of nationalisations left many within the party questioning the 
need for further nationalisation at all, at least in the form which had been adopted." 
By the time that the protracted nationalisation of iron and steel was finally completed 
in 1951, it was clear that taking industries into public ownership had not proved to be 
the panacea that most had expected.'^ 
An examination of the Attlee government's nationalisation programme is 
therefore essential for any longer-term assessment on the Labour party's public 
ownership policy. While considerable attention has been given to the 1945-51 
nationalisations, however, little work has approached the subject from this 
perspective. The work of Millward, Chick and others, has shed substantial light on 
'Fielding, 'Labourism in the 1940s', pp. 142-3. 
'°A point Francis has rightly emphasised: Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 65-6. 
"Fielding, 'Labourism in the 1940s', pp. 150-1. 
'^Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 123. 
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the causes of the particular nationalisations and the methods used to bring about their 
take over.'^ But i f the consequences of the Attlee government's actions for the future 
of nationalisation are to be understood, the work of these scholars must be 
reconsidered and new questions asked.''* 
I 
Although the range of industries for which nationalisation was considered 
during the 1930s to be essential has been examined in the previous chapter, it was 
noted that substantially more industries were identified than could be included in a 
practical legislative programme. It is of some importance, therefore, to determine 
which target industries identified in the 1930s were judged the most important targets 
for nationalisation in 1945. In explaining the choice of particular industries and 
services nationalised by the Attlee government, and the nature of the nationalisation 
process itself, attention has traditionally focused on shared features of the majority of 
the industries concerned - specifically on the extent to which they could be 
represented as 'utilifies'.'^ However, i f the nationalisation process actually 
undertaken - as against that planned in the 1930s - can be represented as an attempt to 
create a public utility sector, then serious questions must be asked regarding the long-
term fiature of nationalisation. For the number of industries which could be so 
classified is finite: indeed, few genuine 'utility' industries were excluded from the 
1945 programme. This being so, the scope of a public sector built around 'utilities' 
'^ See, for example, Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain'; Chick, Industrial Policy in 
Britain, especially Chapter IV, 'Nationalisation', pp. 72-102. 
'"Francis is almost alone in addressing the topic in any detail,): see Francis, Ideas and policies under 
Labour, Chapter IV, 'Public Ownership', pp. 65-99. Although he stresses, as this chapter will, the 
extent to which the nature of the 1945 nationalisation programme limited the potential for fiiture 
nationalisation, his approach appears to concentrate too heavily on ideological explanations rather 
than on the practicality of method adopted. 
'^ See Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, pp. 72, 74-5. 
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might well have been established after little more than one parliament of 
nationalisation. 
As several authors have argued, however, it is necessary to recognise that there 
are serious flaws with the 'utility' model of nationalisation. The basic features of 
utilities, according to Chick, are that 
their operation was often attended by externalities and spillovers; 
where the social value of output exceeded its private value; many of 
them were important areas of fixed capital investment, often containing 
a natural monopoly component; where the minimum efficient scale was 
large relative to the size of the market, and usually subject to 
decreasing costs; [and] their output was widely used by an electorate 
which had a persistent interest in its availability and price.'^ 
These features are readily apparent in some of the industries nationalised between 
1945-51: the gas and electricity industries, and to a some extent - certainly in the case 
of the railways -the transport sector as well. Yet, as Chick observes, the effort to 
categorise the nationalisation programme as concerned simply with utilities is 'spoilt 
by some notable exceptions'.'^ The water industry was structurally and operationally 
littie different from the gas or electricity industries: few would question that it was 
and remains an utility. Despite this, its nationalisation was not proposed in 1945: only 
in 1950 did it find a place in the election manifesto. On the other hand, two industries 
that were in the 1945 manifesto - coalmining, and iron and steel - were not obvious 
utilities according to the criteria identified by Chick.'^ Neither could be said to have 
possessed natural monopolistic conditions of operation, despite the movement 
towards cartelisation encouraged by the market conditions of the inter-war years. 
'''Ibid., p. 72. 
'fbid., p. 74. 
'*As Francis argues, 'the inclusion of the public ownership of iron and steel in Labour's 1945 
programme made it ultimately impossible for Labour to discuss nationalisation (even if it had wanted 
to) exclusively in utilitarian terms': Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 74. 
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Indeed, in the case of coalmining, the continued fragmentation of ownership was 
considered one of the greatest problems facing the industry.'^ 
Nonetheless, there was within the 1945 nationalisation programme a group of 
utility industries for which nationalisation could be seen as a 'natural' development of 
their pre-existing industrial structure. Gas and electricity were the two most obvious 
examples.'^ *^  Both were distributive utilities serving the entire population, fi-om 
individual householders to large industrial consumers. In addition, both already had 
large proportions of their operations in public hands, primarily via the control of local 
authorities. Moreover, in electricity the publicly-owned and operated Central 
Electricity Board already exercised a considerable influence over the development of 
the industry. 
Similarly the railway industry had been developing in a direction which, while 
different to that of gas and electricity, hinted at fiiture reorganisation on a national 
basis.'^ ' Fragmented before the First World War, the industry had been amalgamated 
in the early 1920s into four main companies, due primarily to a recognition that the 
scope for competition within the industry was severely limited. With the ever-
growing challenge in the inter-war years of road transport, even the justification for 
the existence of four separate rail companies was debatable by 1939. By the end of 
the war, some form of further amalgamation was likely regardless of the composition 
Greasley, 'The coal industry', pp. 44-5; Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 
95. 
^°0f electricity. Chick noted that 'technical demands for the reorganisation of the electricity industry 
were long standing' before 1945: see Chick, 'The electricity industry', pp. 257-74, p. 258. For details 
of the pre-nationalisation of the gas industry, see John Wilson, 'The motives for gas nationalisation', 
pp. 144-163. 
^'AS Gourvish has argued, nationalisation 'was never far below the surface of political debate in the 
inter-war years': Terry Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 15, 16-24. See 
also Crompton, 'The railway companies and the nationalisation issue', pp. 116-143. 
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of the post-war govemment.^^ The war had overstrained the network to such an 
extent that many years of massive financial investment would be required to make 
good the damage. With the ability of a private railway industry to generate sufficient 
capital questionable,^ '^  it was easy for the Labour party to provide convincing 
arguments for not merely amalgamating the industry, but nationalising it as well.^'' 
The nature and structure of these three industries readily explains why 
nationalisation was considered by the Labour party to be suitable and necessary for 
them. Yet few other industries were developing in such a fashion, leaving only 
limited scope for similar targets to be included in any ftature nationalisation 
programmes. However, the presence in the 1945 'shopping list' of coalmining, iron 
and steel, and the remainder of the transport sector demonstrates that control over 
'utilities' was not the sole, or even chief, criterion for nationalisation. This is not to 
say that the programme lacked coherence, quite the contrary. However, rather than 
being merely a matter of utility nationalisation, it had an underlying rationale based on 
three broad concepts - put crudely: power, efficiency and equity?^ 
The first of these three - power - is perhaps more accurately described by 
reference to the 'commanding heights', that phrase beloved by left-wing members of 
the party such as Bevan and Mikardo. Put simply, the desire to nationalise the 
industries and services of the 'commanding heights' was based on a belief that these 
had true power over the economy. They were so fundamental to the operation of the 
economy that control over their current performance and productivity, price structure 
^f bid., pp. 140-1. 
" A S it had been in the interwar years: ibid.. Section 5, 'Financial weakness and its implications', pp. 
131-6. 
Ibid., pp. 132-3, 140. 
^^ The basis of this analysis is IVIillward's thesis idenfified in the introduction (see Introduction above 
and Millward, 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain', pp. 215-6). Since the focus of this study is 
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and future development plans, gave control over the development of the whole 
economy. From this perspective it is easy to see why not just the utilities of gas and 
electricity, but also coal, iron and steel, and transport were deemed essential targets 
for nationalisation. Iron and steel, for example, although as much a manufacturing 
industry as a 'basic' utility, was critical in terms of control over general prices and 
production - its products being almost universally required by other industries. Even 
the Bank of England, which might appear anomalous i f compared to other targets for 
nationalisation, was an obvious objective for public ownership and control given its 
central place within the financial sector - all the more so given that even in 1945, 
many in the party still held that the 1929-31 government had been undermined by a 
'Banker's Ramp'. 
The theme of efficiency in many ways complemented that of power^^ Given 
that these industries were crucial to the performance and development of the 
economy, it was. Labour argued, logical and indeed essential that the state should take 
a direct interest in their efficient development. Such an interest did not necessitate 
nationalisafion: it could - as the Conservatives argued in 1945 - be met by regulation, 
the establishment of supervisory bodies and so on.'^ ^ However, it could be argued that 
the best method of ensuring efficient development of the industries concerned was 
nationalisation. This was certainly true in the case of coalmining. Since the 
beginning of the 1930s, governments had become ever more involved in regulating 
the development of the industry: indeed, in 1938 the National government had 
nationalised coal royalties in the belief that their private ownership was hindering 
more directly related to the behaviour and motivation of the Labour party, it has been considered 
necessary to adapt his thesis in a more explicitly political direction. 
*^See Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, pp. 95-100; Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, 
Industrial efficiency and state intervention, pp. 18-20. 
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development. The failure to achieve substantial improvements in the industry's 
performance had been revealed during the Second World War by a persistent decline 
in the output of coal. Moreover, the deep enmity of the workers towards the owners, 
which even direct government control of the mines had been unable to overcome, and 
their strident support for nationalisation, indicated that only replacement of the owners 
by the state was likely to bring about lasting improvements in industrial relations, and 
hence performance. In a post-war situation in which the need for coal - still the 
primary fuel source - was predicted to be substantial, the case for nationalisation was 
strong.'^ ^ 
The desire to secure the most efficient operation of these key industries 
explains why even in the cases of gas and electricity, where municipalisation already 
provided a substantial degree of public ownership and control, the Labour party 
argued in favour of nationalisation. Fewer and larger production units, it was argued, 
organised in ways which cut across the boundaries of local authorities, made a 
national scheme of ownership and control more logical in economic terms, as did the 
need to satisfy rural as well as urban consumers.^ ^ Similar 'economic logic' lay 
behind the decision to bring under single public control the various transport services: 
co-ordinated, rather than competing, rail and road haulage networks seemed to 
promise tremendous efficiency gains. 
^^Conservative party, 'Mr. Churchill's declaration of policy to the electors', in Craig, Election 
manifestos, pp. 120-1. 
^^Although it was vigorously rejected by the Coal Owners Association and the Conservative party. 
Indeed, even the 1945 Reid Report (widely considered as the death-kneli for private ownership) did 
not explicitly recommend public ownership, arguing only that a 'comprehensive scheme of 
reorganisation' was needed: Ministry of Fuel and Power, Coalmining: Report of the Technical 
Advisory Committee (1945), paras. 676, 760; Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, 
p. 103. 
^'Labour party, Let us Face the Future, p. 6; Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, pp. 79-80, 86-88. 
^"Labour party, Let us Face the Future, p. 7. 
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Explanation for the content of the 1945 nationalisation programme of 1945 
cannot, however, be offered purely in terms of power and efficiency. Labour 
politicians may have occasionally sought to do so in order to convince the electors that 
the programme was based on sound economic principles. However, for the Labour 
movement the programme was more than simply a set of pragmatic economic policies 
necessary for post-war recovery. There was also a strong ethical element in the 
nationalisation programme, one that stressed the social justice rather than economics 
of the transfer of the industries to public hands. It was held to be inequitable for 
private individuals to be in a position to take advantage of the general need for such 
essentials as electricity, gas and coal. The ability of private individuals to make 
profits from such industries should be ended, and their assets and the wealth they 
represented used by the state for the good of all. 
Such ethical arguments did not, of themselves, necessitate nationalisation. In 
the case of gas and electricity, there was no ethical need to change the ownership of 
many concerns, given local authorities. However, when the ethical case was 
combined with economic justifications for nationalisation, it was possible to 
demonstrate that, while ownership by local authority was not inequitable, it remained 
inefficient. The construction of the 1945 nationalisation 'shopping list' was a result, 
therefore, of a combined ethical arid economic justification: the industries chosen 
were centres of power and wealth which, on the grounds of equity and efficiency, the 
state could not, in the view of the Labour party, leave untouched.'^ ' However, as 
Tomlinson convincingly argues, this complex combination of factors contained 
31 Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, pp. 71-2. 
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problems of its own: 'in part', he notes, 'the degree of disillusion over nationalisation 
... may be seen as resulting from this overburden of objectives'.'^^ 
In addition, this perspective also reinforces the impression that the future of 
nationalisation was by no means certain. For not only were there few 'utilities' 
beyond those nationalised between 1945-51; there were also few industries and 
services excluded from the nationalisation programme which could easily be 
presented as sources of genuine 'power' and influence over the economy. The 
nationalisation of many of those which remained from the party's deliberations in the 
1930s - such as water, shipping, and textiles - would not obviously lead to a 
substantial increase in the state's power to direct the economy, certainly not when 
compared to those included in the 1945 programme. Moreover, nationalisation was 
being justified primarily on the basis of the economic and redistributive benefits it 
would bring, rather than on the grounds that it was an inherently 'better' method of 
industrial organisation. If, however, it failed in practice to achieve these aims, it 
would be difficult for the party to seek future nationalisation without new ideological 
justifications. 
II 
Emanuel Shinwell, as Minister of Fuel and Power responsible for the Attlee 
government's first major nationalisation,-'^ the coalmining industry, famously 
observed that when he took office in August 1945 he was shocked to discover that 
'nothing practical and tangible existed' as a basis for nationalisation. Despite all the 
years that nationalisation had been part of the party's programme, he had to sit down 
'^Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 117. 
"The Bank of England was technically the first nationalisation, but coalmining was the first industry to 
be taken over. 
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at 'a clear desk' and work out just how the fuel and power industries, were to be taken 
over.^ "* Shinwell's assertions, however, sit uneasily with reality. On the contrary, the 
methods of nationalisation adopted by the Attlee government were - in most 
fundamental respects - derived from ideas formulated long before 1945; primarily in 
Morrison's 1933 Socialisation and Transport. 
Like the content of the nationalisation programme, the method of 
nationalisation is of critical importance to the future conduct of nationalisation policy. 
The consequences of reliance on a Morrisonian model have been explored by few 
historians.^^ The focus has primarily been on the problems in the newly-nationalised 
industries which made them appear unpopular with customers and the electorate -
especially concerning accountability.^^ However, another question should be asked: 
did the use of the Morrisonian model per se limit the scope for future nationalisation? 
In particular, there should be examination of the extent to which it was unsuited to all 
but a few major industries whose pre-existing organisational structures lent 
themselves - as has been seen - towards 'national' operation. In such circumstances 
the commitment of the Labour party to Morrison's ideas would indicate that any 
future nationalisation might well require a process of ideological rethinking. 
Morrison's pre-eminence on nationalisation issues was recognised from the 
outset by Attlee and his other Cabinet colleagues. His appointment as chairman of the 
Cabinet's Socialisation of Industry Committee ensured that his ideas would form the 
basis of each nationalisafion scheme. It was a recognifion that the model public 
authority he had proposed in Socialisation and Transport represented the most 
'^'Emanuel Shinwell, Conflict without malice (1955), p. 172. 
^^Tomlinson and Tiratsoo, Industrial efficiency and state intervention, pp. 15-16. 
^^ See Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, pp. 78-90. 
^^Ibid., p. 79; Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, pp. 92-97. 
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detailed and well-thought out plan that was available to the government. Indeed, to 
paraphrase Shinwell, it was when alternatives were sought to Morrison's ideas that 
nothing 'practical and tangible' was found to exist. Even though some members of 
the government had doubts about the details of Morrison's proposals, given the 
paucity of alternatives there was little likelihood that the nationalised authorities 
would differ greatly from the public corporations envisaged in Socialisation and 
Transport. 
The structures established for the first nationalisation - coal - laid out the 
basic, Morrisonian, model that was to be followed in the succeeding cases, with subtie 
alterations required by the specifics of the industry concemed.'^ ^ The very first section 
of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act indicates the government's approach. It 
provided that responsibility for the 'working and getting of coal in Great Britain', and 
the 'making supplies of coal available' to all, would rest not - as, for example, was 
the case for the Post Office - with direct ministerial control, but with a 'National Coal 
B o a r d ' . W h i l e responsible to a minister and thereby to parliament and the country, 
the Coal Board would be independent of direct day-to-day control from the 
government - in Morrison's view essential i f efficient management was to be 
possible.'"* 
^^Tomlinson suggests that a concentration on it is consequently 'helpful' to an understanding of the 
nationalisation process in general: Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 102. 
^^Coal Industry Nationalisation Act (1946), Section 1. 
""See Morrison, Socialisation and Transport, pp. 165-71. Morrison's continued adherence to this 
principle is revealed by his opposition, in 1948, to Strauss's (Minister of Supply) proposed inclusion 
in the iron and steel nationalisation Bill of power to 'give specific directions to the Corporation about 
the total capacity of the industry, the quantities, quality and size of its products, and the location of 
new works'. Morrison (with the backing of the Ministerial Committee on the Socialisation of 
Industry) argued that 'the taking of such a power would be contrary to the hitherto-accepted doctrine 
that socialised boards could be trusted to act, by and large, in the national interest and need not be 
subjected to the same degree of control as private industry; the critics of the Bill would ask why it was 
necessary to appoint a Corporation at all; and the minister would find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain competent persons to serve on the Corporation': CAB 128/13, CM (48) 63, 1 (15 Oct. 1948). 
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The desire to give the new public corporations independence in operational 
matters is confirmed by the very broad definitions of what the Coal Board would be 
expected to do. According to the Act, the functions of the Board 'shall include the 
carrying on of all such activities as it may appear to the Board to be requisite, 
advantageous or convenient for them to carry on for or in connection with the 
discharge of their duties'.'" Sceptics might conclude - as the Conservatives alleged in 
parliament - that defining the Board's responsibilities in this fashion merely revealed 
a lack of ideas in the government on what the new public authorities should do.'*^  It 
was far more likely, however, that the intention was to enable the authorities to 
undertake their duties without an over-burdensome legislative framework of 
responsibilities. This is all the more probable given their composition. In what 
amounted to a virtual word-for-word quotation from Socialisation and Transport, 
suitable candidates for membership Coal Board were defined as those persons 
'appearing to [the Minster of Fuel and Power] to be qualified as having had 
experience of, and having shown capacity in, industry, commercial or financial 
matters, applied science, administration, or the organisation of workers'.''^ 
The government was aware, however, that simply to create independent public 
monopolies to run the industries it took from private hands would be unlikely to 
satisfy many of its own supporters. Even Morrison recognised that tangible checks 
had to be placed on the power of the boards to prevent them exploiting their monopoly 
""Coa/ Industry Nationalisation Act, Section 2. 
"^ See Anthony Eden, HC Deb. (418), col. 718 (29 Jan. 1946). 
^^Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, Section 2 (3). Compare this to Morrison's expressed preference 
for a membership of 'persons who have had wide experience and have shown capacity, in transport, 
industrial, commercial or financial matters or in the conduct of public affairs': Morrison, Socialisation 
and Transport, p. 159. 
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position.'*'* The most direct of these checks were to be exercised by the relevant 
ministers. Firstly, these ministers would appoint the boards running the industries.'*' 
Secondly, the ministers were given the power to issue 'after consultation with the 
Board ... directions of a general character as to the exercise and performance by the 
Board of their functions in relation to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the 
national interest, and the Board shall give effect to any such directions'. Moreover, 
the nationalisation measures required that 'in framing programmes of reorganisation 
or development involving substantial outlay on capital account, the Board shall act on 
lines settled from time to time with the approval of the Minister'.'*^ 
It was not, however, merely with regard to its own position vis-a-vis the 
nationalised boards that the government sought to limit their independence. Although 
worker control had long been abandoned as unrealistic by Labour policy makers, and 
was roundly dismissed in Socialisation and Transport as both impractical and 
undesirable, the notion that workers should have greater influence in the running of 
industries was more readily accepted.'*^ Calls for mandatory trade-union 
representation on the nationalised boards had long been rejected by Morrison as 
incompatible with the notion of boards served by the most able candidates. 
Interestingly, the idea was also unpopular with the TUC, which feared it would be 
impossible for any trade unionists so appointed to reconcile two potentially conflicting 
'*''ln April 1950, when pressure was building for the appointment of a Select Committee to oversee the 
socialised industries (an idea he considered 'would not in the long run facilitate the smooth and 
efficient working of these industries'), Morrison admitted that 'if parliament and the public felt that 
there was no check on the efficient working of each socialised industry other than the opinion of the 
responsible minister and the board, there would be strong pressure for the appointment of a Select 
Committee': CAB 128/17, CM (50) 22, 4 (20 Apr. 1950) and CAB 128/17, CM (50) 66, 8 (27 Apr. 
1950). 
"^Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, Section 2 (7, a). 
*''Ibid., Sections (1-2), 
'''Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, pp. 97-8. 
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loyalties.''^ Instead, the nationalisation measures required the boards to secure, 
alongside the 'safety, health and welfare of persons in their employment', the 'benefit 
of the practical knowledge and experience of such persons in the organisation and 
conduct of the operations in which they are employed'.''^ In addition, the government 
sought to ensure that consumers had a voice in the operation of the new public 
industries by providing for the establishment of Consumers Councils - for both 
industrial and commercial consumers. 
While limited by the requirements to satisfy government, workers and 
consumers, it remained the case that real authority rested with the boards. Such 
checks and balances as existed were little more than inevitable responses to pressures 
for visible accountability. They did little to restrict the scope of the boards' 
domination. Moreover, the Morrisonian nationalisation schemes exhibited strong 
tendencies towards the centralisation of power within the industries at board level. 
Even in cases such as the gas industry (where a semi-independent regional structure 
was implemented) and transport (where a thematic organisation was adopted) it was 
still with a single board that ultimate power effectively rested. 
Given this, two main conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the 
nationalisation schemes. The first is that the unpopularity which was perceived even 
by such advocates as Morrison to rapidly engulf the nationalised industries, is readily 
explicable. The Morrisonian method of nationalisation ensured that little change 
occurred towards a 'democratisafion' of industrial control.^' Moreover, those changes 
that did occur, especially in the granting of substantial independence to the new 
"^Ibid., p. 97. 
''^Coa/ Industry Nationalisation Act, Section 4. 
^^Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, pp. 115-6. 
'^Xhat is to say that neither workers, nor consumers, nor society in general, had any demonstrably 
greater say in the running of the industries than had been the case when they were in private hands. 
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boards, appeared likely to decrease the impression of public accountability, rather than 
the reverse. Secondly, it appears that Morrison's ideas were primarily suited to the 
'basic' industries and services which were taken over between 1945 and 1951. The 
concept of a single board governing an entire industry is surely best applied in cases 
where the industry performs a relatively small number of functions. It is difficult to 
envisage such an organisational structure being suitable in many manufacturing 
industries where a diversity of operations and products are the norm.^ '^  I f these 
industries were to be nationalised then new techniques of nationalisation were surely 
necessary. 
III 
Given the existence of such difficulties with the Morrisonian model of 
nationalisation when exposed to the test of practical experience, it might be wondered 
why the Attlee government persisted with it. However, the process of taking over the 
industries initially proved remarkably straightforward. With the first industries to be 
nationalised, the Socialisation of Industry Committee was rarely faced with issues of 
sufficient contention to require the opinions of the Cabinet as a whole being sought. 
Even in the case of coal - the very first measure - the Committee only submitted its 
proposals to Cabinet when final approval was needed. Moreover, the Cabinet was 
quite willing to accept the Morrisonian scheme outlined by the Committee, and 
approved the draft Bill with the minimum of discussion and no apparent 
disagreement.^'' 
^^If that is, industrial efficiency, which was set out as one of the criteria for nationalisation, was to be 
maintained. 
"iron and steel was such an industry included in the 1945 nationalisation programme, and, as will be 
shown below, its nationalisation was extremely problematic. 
^"AS already noted, Cabinet conclusions are by no means verbatim records of the discussions entered 
into, but it is clear from the brevity of the reported discussion that opposition to the measure was 
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This ready Cabinet acceptance was largely repeated with the gas and electricity 
industries. Conflicting opinions did emerge on the organisational structures of the 
industries, but there were no serious divisions among ministers. That these measures 
failed to generate controversy within the Cabinet is unsurprising. That they failed to 
generate substantial controversy when presented to parliament might seem more 
surprising. The occasion of coal nationalisation could have been used by the 
Conservatives to indicate their continued ideological opposition to nationalisation. 
However, the token nature of their opposition demonstrates that they had little real 
resistance to offer to the fuel and power industries being made public concerns. Eden, 
who opened the debate on the Bill's Second Reading for the Conservatives, 
recognised that the government had 'got their mandate' for nationalisation,^^ and as a 
consequence the main thrust of his speech criticised the details of the Bill rather than 
the justification for the measure per se?^ Considering that a substantial change was 
occurring in the country's industrial structure, general criticism of the change itself 
was in short supply. 
The Conservative reaction to the coal Bill , repeated with gas, electricity and 
the railways, provides support for those arguing in favour of the existence of a post-
war 'consensus'. These first nationalisations reveal how rapidly the Conservatives 
came to accept the existence of a post-war public sector of certain 'basic' industries 
and services. They had themselves acknowledged in 1945 that these industries and 
services would require sustained government support - in the case of coal arguing in 
minimal or non-existent. The only point of discussion was one raised by Bevan regarding the level 
and method of compensation: CAB 128/2, CM (45) 62, 6 (13 Dec. 1945). See below, section V. 
^^HCDeb. (418), col. 725 (29 Jan. 1946). 
"He argued, for instance, that giving the Minister power in Section 3 of the Bill to give 'directions of a 
general character' to the Coal Board meant that there was 'no clear line of demarcation in the Bill 
between the Board and the Minister': ibid., col. 721 
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favour of a 'central authority' to run the industry, albeit a privately-owned one.'^ 
With Labour's election victory the Conservatives clearly decided to accept that the 
method of government intervention in these industries and services would be 
nationalisation. 
However, the Conservatives did not accept the principle of nationalisation as a 
means of industrial organisation on a wider-scale - that is to say, beyond certain basic 
industries and services. This indicated that substantially greater resistance would be 
offered to fijrther nationalisation measures - precisely what happened with the Attlee 
government's later nationalisations, especially iron and steel. An examination of 
these later nationalisations is essential for analysis of nationalisation over a longer 
time period. For the difficulties experienced with nationalisation in the last years of 
the Attlee government had considerable influence on the Labour party's subsequent 
attitudes towards public ownership and control. 
IV 
One of the clearest indicators that the nationalisation programme began to run 
into difficulties is provided by the Cabinet records. While the nationalisations of 
coalmining, gas, electricity and the railways had been matters for little more than the 
rubber stamp of Cabinet approval,^^ those of road haulage and iron and steel received 
considerable attention. Time and time again the Cabinet was asked by the 
Socialisation of Industry Committee to make decisions fundamental to the nature of 
"Conservative Party, 'Mr. Churchill's Declaradon of Policy to the Electors', in Craig, Election 
manifestos, pp. 120-1. 
'^Coal nationalisation took only one Cabinet discussion to be approved: see CAB 128/2, CM (45) 62, 6 
(13 Dec. 1945). The main details of the electricity and gas schemes were also settled in single 
meetings (respectively, CAB 128/6, CM (46) 69, 6 (18 July 1946) and CAB 128/12, CM (48) 3, 2 (13 
Jan. 1948)). With both gas and electricity, the regional structure had been a matter of debate 
(especially regarding the number and nature of control in Scotland and Wales), but little controversy: 
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the schemes, and was frequently unable to reach agreement. The 'sanitised' Cabinet 
minutes cannot hide the lack of agreement on even such crucial questions as whether 
the schemes should go ahead. 
The two industries had several common characteristics which made their 
nationalisation complicated. Firstly, they consisted of a multiplicity of separate 
companies and operators. Incorporating them within Morrisonian nationalisation 
measures was likely to be much more complex than the previous industries. 
Secondly, a great many of the companies were resistant to the idea of nationalisation, 
and determined to make it as hard as possible for the government to take them over. 
This had also been the case with coalmining, but the strength of the coal owners' 
position had been seriously undermined by the poor performance of the industry 
during the war. Thirdly, and this particularly applied to iron and steel, the industries 
were so broad in their scope that to nationalise them in their entirety would be both 
impractical and undesirable, as even the government admitted. While some 
companies were involved in the supply and production of large-scale basic iron and 
steel which classified them as 'utilitarian' in function, the industry also included 
others, especially the specialised, finished steel manufactures, which clearly did not. 
Before attempting to tackle iron and steel, the government found itself faced 
with substantial difficulties over which parts of the road haulage industry it wished to 
take over. To incorporate all possible forms of road haulage would have been in 
effect to nationalise all road transport outright, something that was considered a near 
practical impossibility.^^ The difficulty lay in determining a dividing line, a point at 
for electricity see CAB 128/6, CM (46) 107, 5 (19 Dec. 1946); for gas see CAB 128/12, CM (48) 3, 2 
(13 Jan. 1948). 
^'Given the very large size of the bureaucracy which would have been required to co-ordinate the 
activity of the thousands of vehicles. 
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which road haulage ceased to be for personal use or the internal use of a company, and 
became commercial. This led the Cabinet into long and protracted discussions as to 
the practicality of taking over certain licence classifications, and the practicality of 
restricting other licences to certain short-haul operations. 
The eventual abandonment by the Cabinet of a scheme to which it had finally 
agreed,^ " on the grounds that it was simply impractical, while seemingly only a 
technical matter, is in fact one of fundamental importance.^' For in deciding that the 
nationalisation of industries beyond a certain point was undesirable (in this case on the 
grounds of the bureaucratic nightmare that would ensue) the government was in effect 
rejecting any literal commitment to public ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange laid out in clause IV of the Labour party's constitution. The 
Attlee government's policy on the road haulage industry demonstrated that it was not 
prepared to put ideology before economic logic. In their judgement, nationalisation of 
the entire road haulage industry would lead to great administrative and operational 
difficulties, and to reduced efficiency. They clearly felt this was neither desirable, nor 
politically defensible. 
The difficulties revealed by nationalisation of road haulage were increased 
with the protracted take over of iron and steel. As with road haulage, there was the 
substantial problem to overcome of deciding exactly what part of the industry should 
*°That is to bring within the scope of the nationalisation scheme 'C'-License holders, with certain 
exemptions. 
^'The original proposal of Barnes (Minister of Transport) in April 1946 was to exempt from 
nationalisation C-License holders whose business operated in an area less than 40 miles in radius, plus 
any others who could make a convincing argument for their exemption. The Cabinet was adamant 
that 'to give complete freedom to operate this class of traffic would endanger the economic success of 
the whole scheme of nationalisation', its determination was reinforced by the evidence of how large a 
proportion of the road haulage industry operated under the C-Licence. This importance, however, 
proved the undoing of the scheme, since by March 1947 it was apparent that 'both in parliament and 
in the country there was strong opposition to the proposed restrictions and a majority of the Labour 
party would oppose' any nationalisation of C-Licences. In the light of this, the Cabinet abandoned 
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be nationalised.^^ A relatively small number of firms constituted the vast majority of 
the activity of the industry, certainly in terms of consumption of raw iron and the 
production of basic processed iron and steel. Beyond this, however, was a huge 
number of firms, down to very small producers of finished steel goods such as cutlery. 
Deciding where to draw the line caused much agonising.^^ 
The government's desire not to involve itself in the take over of such concerns 
has much significance. It reinforces the impression created by road haulage that the 
government was not willing to extend the scope of the public sector beyond either 
'basic' industries and services, or 'basic' elements within other industries and 
services. This was consistent with the line taken in Let us Face the Future that 'many 
smaller businesses ... can be left to go on with their usefiil work'.^'' Yet it indicates 
the adoption of a much broader definition of such 'smaller businesses' than was 
apparent from the manifesto, which gave no indication that any parts of the iron and 
steel industry would be exempted from nationalisation. The consequences for future 
nationalisation are important, for this approach necessarily narrows the number of 
industries, and parts of industries, available as potential targets. 
It must be recognised, however, that the government did not necessarily reach 
such a position voluntarily. With iron and steel, its behaviour was influenced by the 
difficuhies it experienced in dealing with the industry's trade association, the British 
any inclusion of C-Licences in the nationalisation measure: see CAB 128/5, CM (46) 35, 5 (15 Apr. 
46); CAB 128/6, CM (46) 64, 4 (4 July 1946); CAB 128/9, CM (47) 28, 3 (13 Mar. 1947). 
*'CAB 128/5, CM (46) 30, 3 (4 Apr. 1946). 
"The Cabinet was primarily torn between two schemes, one encompassing 85 companies and 155 
subsidiaries, the other, more limited, scheme including 32 companies and 100 subsidiaries: CAB 
128/12, CM (48) 39, 5 (14 June 1948). The Cabinet was also faced with particular problems, such as 
the company Messrs. Dorman Long (which was included in the nationalisation scheme), which was 
heavily involved in structural engineering in Britain and in Africa and South America. Although the 
Cabinet decided to continue with its nationalisation, it demonstrates the extent to which the iron and 
steel industry 'crossed' from 'infrastructure' to manufacturing: see CAB 128/16, CM (49) 58, 2 (13 
Oct. 1949). 
"^"Labour party. Let us Face the Future, p. 6. 
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Iron and Steel Federation (BISF). The BISF was a complex organisation, involved in 
far more than simple representation of its members' interests. Through various 
subsidiary organisations, the BISF was a key player in several vital areas of the 
industry's operation, especially the import and distribution of raw iron.^^ It also 
employed a staff of technical experts whose knowledge was considered by many to be 
its most valuable asset.^ ^ Clearly the position of the BISF in the nationalisation 
scheme was a matter of vital importance to its success or failure. 
The difficulties facing the government in any 'take over' of the BISF were 
numerous and substantial. Firstly, the exact nature of the BISF was not readily 
apparent to those outside of its organisation: it had so many inter-linked parts that 
bringing it within the framework of a legislative proposal would not be easy. This 
difficulty was exacerbated by a second obstacle: the intractable opposition of the BISF 
to any substantive measure of nationalisation.^' It was not prepared to co-operate with 
the government's attempts to discover its true structures. Thirdly, so opposed was it 
to nationalisation that the services of its skilled personnel might not be secured: they 
might very well refuse to work for the nationalised industry and resign, leaving a huge 
gap in the management of the industry. Finally, the BISF was sufficiently politically 
aware to realise that it could not simply sit back and wait for nationalisation to 
happen.Instead, it pursued a vigorous propaganda campaign on two fronts: on the 
one hand opposition to the concept of nationalisation, on the other accepting a need 
^^Ruggero Ranieri, 'Partners and enemies: The government's decision to nationalise steel 1944-8', in 
Millward and Singleton, The political economy of nationalisation, p. 281. 
'''Ibid 
" C A B 128/6, CM (46) 76, 3 (1 Aug. 1946); CAB 128/17, CM (50) 6, 4 (2 Mar. 1950). Although, as 
Ranieri shows, they were prepared to try and 'buy off the government with limited schemes of public 
ownership: see 'Partners and enemies', pp. 284, 288-9. 
'^ I^n 1950, for example, it refused to help Strauss in 'persuading suitably qualified people to accept 
appointment to the Iron and Steel Corporation': CAB 128/18, CM (50) 51, 1 (27 July 1950). 
^'Ranieri, 'Partners and enemies', p. 286. 
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for change and making alternative proposals to nationalisation.^" By presenting the 
government with a series of compromise schemes, it sought both to undermine public 
confidence in the need for nationalisation, and to weaken the resolve of members of 
the government to press ahead^' 
While the reception of the general public to the BISF's campaign, supported 
by the Conservatives, is not readily measurable, it seems to have encouraged doubts in 
the minds of several Cabinet members. Despite having been elected only a few years 
before with a commitment to the industry's nationalisation, some ministers were now 
unenthusiastic. One of those who appeared the most doubtful was the architect of 
the entire nationalisation process, Morrison, who was prepared to argue at Cabinet 
that iron and steel was a step too far.^ ^ 
Explanation for the lack of enthusiasm for iron and steel nationalisation among 
ministers such as Morrison, Shinwell, Lord Jowitt (Lord Chancellor), Greenwood 
(Lord Privy Seal), reveals a series of highly significant conclusions on their part.''' 
Their central reason for abandoning or modifying the nationalisation scheme was that 
it would not achieve its desired aims. Primarily, it would fail to bring about the 
greater efficiency which had been put forward as a fundamental justification for public 
'"including its Five-Year Plan in 1946, described by Ranieri as 'a remarkable achievement': ibid., pp. 
281-2. 
"See CAB 128/5, CM (46) 30, 3 (4 Apr. 1946). 
'^ Indeed, Shinwell (Minister of Fuel and Power) argued at the first Cabinet discussion on the subject 
that 'he felt that the Cabinet should not overlook the many difficulties inherent in the proposal', and 
emphasised the problem of deciding 'where the line should be drawn': CAB 128/5, CM (46) 30, 3 (4 
Apr. 1946). Ranieri's contention that the Attlee government would 'probably have dropped it [i.e. 
nationalisation], had they not been under pressure fi-om members of the left both inside the Cabinet, 
among Labour backbenchers and in the trade unions' certainly appears justified: Ranieri, 'Partners 
and enemies', p. 275. 
"See CAB 128/12, CM (48) 36, 4 (7 June 1948). 
'•"For evidence of their opposition, see, for example, the Cabinet meeting of 4 April 1947, at which Lord 
Jowitt and Greenwood argued that 'it would be sufficient if the government were to acquire a 
controlling interest in the companies concerned by the purchase of 51% of the shares. This would 
minimise the extent to which the government might be paying for obsolescent or obsolete assets': 
CAB 128/9, CM (47) 39, 6 (4 Apr. 1947). 
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ownership and con t ro l .Given the BISF's resistance to nationaUsation, any change 
would have to be undertaken in spite of the opposition of the industry, rather than with 
its support - a process which might well result in a weakened industry, rather than a 
strengthened one. 
Consequently, repeated calls were made in Cabinet for compromise with the 
BISF.^^ The issue came to a head in July 1947, when Morrison reported that the BISF 
was prepared to 'accept far-reaching statutory control of the i ndus t ry ' .He argued 
that ' in present circumstances, when it was of vital importance to secure the maximum 
output of steel, it seemed to him to be the duty of the Cabinet to refrain from any step 
which would jeopardise steel production' - the implication being that nationalisation 
would lead to a reduction of output. Morrison was strongly backed by Williams 
(Minister of Agriculture) and Jowitt, while Viscount Addison (Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations) stated 'that he had always doubted whether any real gain 
would come from the nationalisation of the iron and steel industry'. Wilmot (Minster 
of Supply) recognised that the BISF's new proposals 'represent[ed] a very substantial 
change in their former attitude'. Only Bevan and Cripps (President of the Board of 
Trade) expressed 'strong opposition to the compromise proposals' and strong support 
for nationalisation. After three weeks of raging arguments, the Cabinet was persuaded 
by Dalton, Bevin and Attlee to settle for postponing nationalisation - a proposal 
which hardly indicated any great enthusiasm for nationalisation on their part either.^ * 
^^ It was argued in the Cabinet in April 1947 that 'if the government acquire the whole of the shares of 
the companies concerned, it was difficult to see what incentive the companies would have to innovate 
and enterprise', either before or after nationalisation: CAB 128/9, CM (47) 40, 2 (28 Apr. 1947). 
^^Morrison and Dalton (Chancellor of the Exchequer) urged Wilmot in June 1947, for example, to meet 
the BISF to discuss new proposals for co-operation: CAB 128/10, CM (47) 57), 1 (26 June 1947). 
^^ And also agreed that 'these powers would be exercised directly by an Iron and Steel Board, and that, 
to enable the Board to exercise these powers effectively, the necessary expert staff be made available 
from Steel House [the headquarters of the BISF]': CAB 128/10, CM (47) 64, 2 (24 July 1947). 
^^CAB 128/10, CM (47) 66, 4 (31 July 1947) and CM (47) 70, 6 (7 Aug. 1947). 
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Ministers such as Morrison and Jowitt feared that to give greater emphasis to 
the need to nationalise the industry than to secure its efficient operation and 
development would leave the government exposed to accusations of a dogmatic 
attachment to nationalisation that, it is clear, few in the government now had.'^ The 
desire for compromise was reinforced by the potential difficulties that passage of any 
iron and steel nationalisation Bill faced in parliament. In the House of Commons, 
substantially more opposition than had previously been experienced was certain, while 
in the House of Lords the government's ability to gain approval for the Bill was 
questionable. Previously, the Lords had been reluctant to provoke confrontation with 
the Commons over nationalisation Bills that had been uncontroversial in the lower 
House. With iron and steel, however, this was not likely to be the case,^° and given 
that the Bill would in all probability have to be hybrid,^' the scope for delaying its 
passage would be considerable. Reform of the House of Lords was in fact undertaken 
to prevent the upper House obstructing the Bill indefinitely, but it still appeared 
impossible to nationalise the industry before the next election. 
That scenario was keenly felt by Cabinet ministers to be undesirable, since it 
would allow the Conservatives and the BISF to make the nationalisation measure a 
major electoral issue, yet the case for its nationalisation was, as many ministers 
admitted, far from overwhelming.^^ Morrison in particular argued that the 
''See CAB 128/9, CM (47) 40, 2 (28 Apr. 47). 
^''CAB 128/15, CM (49) 41, 2 (20 June 1949). 
'^Xhat is, a measure which affected specific private interests (rather than 'categories' of such interests: 
for example, all steel companies with an output above, say, 500,000 tons per annum). The passage of 
such Bills required they be approved by parliament separately with respect to each individual concern. 
The numerous votes this process entailed made the likelihood of defeat for the government greater 
than otherwise, especially if (as in this case), it was faced by a determined opposition in the Commons 
and, especially, the Lords. For governments with a small majority (the 1964-70 Wilson government, 
for example), the problems were all the greater. 
*^CAB 128/13, CM (48) 77, 3 (2 Dec. 1948); CAB 128/16, CM (49) 47, 2 (21 July 1949); CAB 
128/16, CM (49) 65, 2 (10 Nov. 1949). 
^^Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, pp. 74-5. 
76 
government would be better off dealing with problems in the existing nationalised 
industries, rather than trying more - and highly controversial - nationalisation. The 
eventual nationalisation of the industry in the face of his opposition was undoubtedly 
a triumph for the pro-nationalisation 'faction' within the Cabinet. '^' However, the 
perception that to abandon the measure would be a blatant reneging on a manifesto 
commitment weighed heavily with many, especially Attlee. Moreover, the failure -
unsurprisingly - of the compromise proposals of the BISF to satisfy the majority of 
Cabinet members meant that there were few alternatives to nationalisation available. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which the Cabinet constantly reconsidered the issues, even 
after the passage of the Iron and Steel Nationalisation Act, indicates the lack of 
certainty surrounding the decision to continue. That serious thought was given until 
immediately before the public iron and steel authority was due to assume control over 
the industry to postponing the implementation of the Act until after a further 
election,^*' makes it plain that there were few Cabinet ministers who did not harbour 
some doubts about the proposal. 
V 
The practical doubts which the road haulage and iron and steel raised among 
ministers on nationalisation of such non-'basic' industries would by themselves have 
87 
had a significant impact on the plans of the Labour party for future nationalisation. 
In addition there were further causes for re-consideration, relating to the effectiveness 
'^Led primarily by Sevan who had, for example, pressed the Cabinet in 1945 to nationalise the building 
materials industry, as well as not any action which might 'preclude the government from extending 
public control to other industries during the present parliament if circumstances arose which made 
such action desirable': CAB 128/2, CM (45) 52, 1 (13 Nov. 1945). It was also the case, however, that 
such leading figures as Cripps, Dalton, Bevin and Attlee, favoured nationalisation (even if without the 
fervour of Bevan): Ranieri, 'Partners and enemies', pp. 275, 289-90. 
^^Ibid., pp. 288-9. 
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of nationalisation per se to achieve its aims. Two main areas of doubt emerged: the 
first concerned the ability of nationalisation to bring about a real redistribution of 
wealth, the second whether nationalisation had led to any meaningful redistribution of 
economic power. 
Questions concerning the impact of nationalisation on wealth redistribution 
centred on the impact of the compensation process adopted. Compensation had long 
been controversial for the Labour party. Some on the left had long held that 
expropriation without compensation was all that owners deserved, given the long 
years in which they had earned profits from the exploitation of their workforce. Such 
arguments were expressed especially about the coalmining industry, but were felt by 
some to be more generally applicable. But expropriation had never been accepted by 
the mainstream of the party, and it was not given serious consideration in 1945. 
Moreover, given that in the gas and electricity industries many owners were local 
authorities, its entire conception was demonstrably illogical. Dismissing the concept 
of expropriation, however, was an easier task than drawing up schemes for 
compensation that would satisfy the diverse concerns of existing owners, the 
Treasury, and a majority in the party - which, while accepting that compensation had 
to be given, were unwilling to see too high a level offered. 
The preferred solution - or at least, the method most commonly used by 
Morrison and his colleagues - was that of compensation based on stock-market 
v a l u e . H o l d i n g s in the various companies were compulsorily replaced with 
government stock of a commensurate value, the appropriate value being calculated as 
*^ That is to say, until after the election that was to be called in 1951. See CAB 128/18, CM (50) 58, 2 
(14 Sept. 1950). 
^'Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", pp. 27-8. 
^^CAB 128/9, CM (47) 40, 2 (28 Apr. 1947). 
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an average over a chosen period. While demonstrably fair - assuming a 'typical' 
period could be found to estimate the value of the shares and stocks - this method was 
obviously only suitable for concerns listed with the Stock Exchange. For owners of 
the municipal gas and electricity companies, along with those of other unlisted 
companies, compensation levels had to be set by consideration of the value of their 
enterprises relative to the listed companies. 
The coalmining industry alone was felt to be unsuitable for such calculations. 
So complex was the industry, with the value of individual concerns affected by a huge 
range of factors, often highly technical and geological in basis, that the government 
made no attempt to specify in the Nationalisation Act exactly how much 
compensation would be offered, or exactly how it would be offered. Instead, a 
Compensation Tribunal was set up which would first determine a global sum of 
compensation, and then calculate the distribution of that sum by district, and by 
colliery company. Details of the compensation package were still being disputed in 
the 1950s, and few i f any people ever professed to understand whether the final 
settlement was a fair one.^° 
What was never in dispute, except perhaps in the case of coal where the Coal-
Owners' Association believed they received less than was justified,^' was that the 
terms of compensation were fairly generous so far as the owners were concerned. 
'^See CAB 128/9, CM (47) 26, 5 (6 Mar. 1947). Particular problems were experiences with 
compensation for local authorities, no doubt due to the political sensitivity of expropriating public, 
rather than private, bodies: see, for example, CAB 128/10, CM (47) 54, 4 (17 June 1947), where the 
Cabinet debated, and eventually rejected, a proposal to increase the compensation terms to local 
electricity authorities by £15 million (although a slightly more generous package than originally 
intended was nevertheless agreed to). 
'"officials within the Ministry of Fuel and Power never even worked out how the Compensation 
Tribunal had calculated the global sum, let alone whether the calculation had been equitable, for the 
Tribunal members 'were laconic in the extreme ... provid[ing] neither an indication or their 
assumptions ... nor any other explanation of how they arrived at their decision': Supple, Political 
economy of decline, pp. 658-9. 
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This is demonstrated during the nationalisation debates in the Commons by the lack of 
real objection raised by the Conservatives, many of whom had interests in the 
companies taken over.^ "^  The real objections to the compensation terms came from 
within the Labour party, and indicated growing ideological concerns. 
These arose on two, related, grounds. Firstly, in attempting to be seen to offer 
full and fair levels of compensation, the government was considered by many of its 
supporters to be paying too high levels.^^ In effect, the levels of compensation were 
creating an impression that nationalisation was little more than a financial transaction, 
the only difference from the norm being that the government was the purchaser, and 
was making the purchase compulsory. Moreover, the extent of the compensation not 
only cost the Treasury vast sums at a time when the country was in a perilous financial 
position, but also burdened the industries with such levels of indebtedness that their 
potential for development would be hampered and their consumers have to pay higher 
than desirable prices. 
The sense that the compensation process meant that even after nationalisation 
the industries would still be financially beholden to the old owners, '^' when one of the 
purposes of nationalisation had been to end just such a situation, was felt by many in 
the party to be deeply inequitable.^^ It was also linked to the second strand of 
criticism - that it failed to bring about any redistribution of the nation's wealth. The 
''The lack of clarity over exactly how the Compensation Tribunal had calculated the global sum made it 
easy for the owners to criticise it. 
'^ Although they were not especially enthusiastic about receiving large quantities of fixed-interest 
government stock. 
'^A point recognised by the Cabinet when it considered iron and steel compensation: CAB 128/9, CM 
(47)39,6(4 Apr. 1947). 
'"•in the sense that the public industries were obliged to make payments to the Treasury to cover the 
costs of the compensation issued to the owners: see, for example. Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 
Section 28 (1, a). 
'^As Bevan argued, it was 'important to avoid any suggestion that under the new dispensation miners 
would still be working to provide payments to the owners to compensate them for their former 
profits': CAB 128/2, CM (45) 62, 6 (13 Dec. 1945). 
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ability of nationalisation to act as a method of wealth redistribution had been 
considered a key ethical argument in favour of public ownership. Yet this was 
weakened by the principle of full compensation. For the result of such compensation 
was to ensure that the wealth of the persons concerned was not in fact altered. The 
form of the wealth held by the previous owners changed - from property, company 
stocks, and so on, to government stock - but the actual quantity did not. 
Although this should have been apparent even before 1945, it was not until the 
nationalisation process had begun that serious consideration of the problem was 
undertaken by Labour party thinkers.^^ Before that time, the focus of most work, by 
Durbin for example, had been on economic questions of industrial power, rather than 
equality.^^ Once the matter was addressed, Jay and Crosland questioned whether 
no 
nationalisation could be, in practice, a realistic method of redistribution. It was 
recognised that it would achieve a gradual redistribution of wealth, since the rate of 
interest on government stock tended to be lower than the typical returns earned from 
existing assets.^ ^ However, the effects of such a lower rate of return would take a 
considerable length of time to bring any noticeable change, and it was not a realistic 
method of achieving significant or rapid change. Far better, Crosland argued, to 
pursue active redistributive taxation policies which held out the prospect of results in 
'^ Booth is particularly scathing of the lack of detailed attention given in the 1930s to questions of what 
nationalisation was intended to achieve, and how it would achieve these aims. He alleges, for 
example, that Dalton and others were guilty of 'creating party policy in the context of a widespread 
and dogmatically-held but naive view that the key to improving economic performance lay in control 
over the levers of economic power': see Booth, 'How long are light years?', pp. 10-13. 
"Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", p. 46. 
"^"•Ibid., pp. 45-6. 
''Holding large blocks of a single stock - i.e. government stock - also offered less flexibility than 
owners had previously enjoyed. 
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a much shorter time frame, and leave nationalisation to fulf i l the other ethical, and 
especially economic, aspirations held for it.'"° 
As the nationalisation process advanced from legislation to the actual 
existence of public industries, it was also apparent that it was not producing a 
redistribution of power and influence in and over the economy. One major 
justification for nationalisation had been that it would - as the term implied - remove 
control of the industries concerned from the hands of a few into those of the nation as 
a whole. Clearly, this was not to happen in a literal sense, but the importance given to 
the concept in a more figurative sense should not be under-estimated. The 
nationalised boards were expected to govern in the name, and interests, of the nation, 
with the managerial freedom insisted upon by Morrison being tempered by their sense 
of responsibility and public service. 
Within a very short period of time, however, doubts were expressed about 
whether the method of control was in practice creating any greater sense of public 
responsibility on the part of the managements. Increasingly, it was felt that the only 
change had been to swap a private system of management which gave little or no 
consideration to the opinions of workers, the government, or the nation, for a public 
system which produced no significant improvement. Indeed, some of the new public 
boards seemed even less willing than their predecessors to listen to outside opinions. 
Secure in the knowledge that they had been appointed in the name of the nation, the 
boards were unwilling to recognise that the nation had a right to scrutinise their 
behaviour. 
'""This view was challenged by Durbin until his death in 1948. While accepting that public ownership 
was only one of the instruments of industrial policy, he remained far more convinced of its benefits 
than Crosland: Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", p. 48. 
""jim Tomlinson, 'Mr Attlee's supply-side socialism'. Economic History Review, 46 (1993), p. 15; 
Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, pp. 92-4. 
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The British Electricity Authority (BEA), quickly proved itself keen to pursue 
policies not merely independent of the desires of the government, but in direct 
confrontation with it. In the winter of 1947-8, the Minister of Fuel and Power, 
Gaitskell, was concerned that both the current and future development schemes 
proposed by the BEA were unjustifiably extravagant in the post-war economic 
circumstances.He recognised that demand was increasing at a extreme pace, but he 
sought to persuade the BEA that the solution, in the short term at least, was to restrict 
demand rather than embark on a costly power station development plan. Gaitskell 
asked the BEA to introduce metering, and thereafter differentiated rates dependent on 
the time of day, with the effect of raising the cost of peak-time consumption. 
As Chick notes, 'that the BEA should have resisted Gaitskell's attempts to 
introduce meters and time-of-day tariffs was, perhaps, unsurprising', given that they 
were intent on pursing the rapid expansion of the generative capacity of the 
industry.'^'^ However, as he continues, 'what was more surprising, and certainly 
revealing of the dynamics of the emerging balance of power between ministers and the 
nationalised industries, was that their resistance should have proved successful'. 
The problem was that Morrison's specific purpose in proposing the creation of public 
corporations or boards had been to ensure that interference in their operations be kept 
to the minimum. As Tomlinson rightly argues, 'to a significant degree nafionalisation 
as a means of planning the economy was a chimera, given the Morrisonian notion of 
public sector managerial independence'."'^ While the relevant minister may have 
'°^The reverse was also true. As Tomlinson notes, many boards resisted government attempts to 
persuade them to establish "shelves' of projects against an impending slump': Tomlinson, 'Planning: 
debate and policy in the 1940s', p. 161; Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, pp. 
101-2, 117-120. 
'"'Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, p. 92. 
'''Ibid 
'"^Tomlinson, 'Planning: debate and policy in the 1940s', p. 161. 
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retained the notional power to give 'general directions', the confrontation between 
Gaitskell and the BEA showed how little power the minister had in reality. To have 
issued such a general direction within months of the corporation being established 
would have been politically humiliating for the government. Instead, Gaitskell set up 
a committee to examine the issues in public. The attitude taken by the BEA to this 
body, the Clow Committee, came as a shock: its representatives 'persistently 
obstructed the work of the committee', refiised to release information and engaged in 
'filibustering'. Morrison's 'faith in the "public spirit" of the board of the public 
corporation suddenly looked suspect and fragile'."'^ 
It cannot be mere coincidence, however, that this sense of fragility was 
becoming apparent at the very time that the general problems facing the government 
were rapidly increasing. From 1947 onwards, the government were confronted with a 
series of crises and difficulties that threatened at times to overwhelm them. Within 
days of the coal industry passing into public hands, the country was plunged into a 
fuel crisis that cut short any celebrations for the industry's successful nationalisation. 
The fiiel crisis was succeeded by a currency crisis that summer, when the weakness of 
sterling undermined the attempt to allow open currency conversion. It is no wonder 
that Gaitskell was keen to rein in the expansionist tendencies of the BEA, given the 
financial difficulties that now faced the government."''' Moreover, the combinafion of 
problems was about to grow worse as the 'easy' nationalisations (the utilities and the 
weakened coal and rail industries) had already been implemented, while the more 
'°'^ Chick, Industrial policy in Britain, pp. 93, 97. 
'"'AS Tomlinson and others note, 1947 marked a decisive turning point in the Attlee government's 
general economic policy, towards greater fiscal restriction. 'The central economic point', Tomlinson 
contends, 'is that prior to 1947 the government had not got to grips with the excess demand in the 
economy .... The changes of 1947 were certainly 'Keynesian' in the sense that the budget was 
explicitly used to reduce the level of demand': Tomlinson, 'Planning: debate and policy in the 1940s', 
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controversial proposals, especially iron and steel, had now to be tackled. As Dalton 
famously observed, after 1947 it was 'never glad, confident morning again'.'"^ 
VI 
By the time the iron and steel industry finally passed into public control in 
1951, it was clear that the number of further industries which the Attlee Cabinet was 
likely to consider 'ripe or over-ripe' for public ownership and control was severely 
limited. Water, the one obvious utility industry excluded from the 1945 programme, 
was being prepared for nationalisation when the government lost power at the 1951 
election, but was already facing difficulties. Although Bevan and Dalton were keen 
proponents of the measures, other ministers, including Attlee, had serious doubts 
about the project - the Prime Minister arguing that he 'was not yet satisfied that a 
sufficiently strong case had been made out on general grounds for making this fiarther 
inroad into the functions of local authorities'.'"^ Beyond water the government had 
few fresh targets."" The 1950 election manifesto listed cement, sugar and, ' i f 
necessary', 'any appropriate sections' of the chemicals industry, but by the time of the 
1951 elecfion, this list had been abandoned - to be replaced with the commitment 
pp. 169-70. Clearly this impacted on the investment programmes, and spending in general, of the 
nationalised industries, as Gaitskell's clash with the BEA shows. 
'°^Hugh Dalton, Memoirs. Hi: High tide and after, 1945-1960 (1962), p. 205. 
""See CAB 128/17, CM (50) 28, 6 (4 May 1950); CAB 128/18, CM (50) 44, 6 (10 July 1950). For an 
overview, see John Hassan, 'The water industry 1900-51: A failure of public policy?', in Millward 
and Singleton, Political economy of nationalisation, pp. 189-211. See especially Section 4, 'The role 
of interest groups', pp. 200-4, in which the lack of enthusiasm to clash with local authorities is 
stressed, and Section 6, 'Labour's nationalisation policy in the 1940s', pp. 206-9, in which the 
growing lack of desire to introduce legislation attacking property rights is noted (a lack of desire 
which impacted on land nationalisation as well). 
""initial discussions were held in the Cabinet regarding the nationalisation of sugar. Bevan was 
strongly in favour of nationalisation, but Webb's (Minister of Food) proposals simply to strengthen 
the powers of the British Sugar Corporation, and renegotiate the terms of the Refining Agreement 
1937, found considerably more favour with the Cabinet: CAB 128/18, CM (50) 67, 6 (23 Oct. 1950) 
and CAB 128/18, CM (50) 68, 3 (24 Oct. 1950). 
85 
only to 'take over concerns which fail the nation and start new public enterprises 
wherever this wil l serve the national interest'."' 
This apparent transformation in view can be explained from two perspectives. 
Firstly, it was apparent even to Morrison himself that his corporatist model of 
nationalisation contained serious flaws. Fundamental problems of accountability 
existed, as revealed by the increasing demands from parliament to be granted the 
power of a select committee to oversee the nationalised industries. Moreover, the 
Morrisonian method was best suited to easily identifiable, coherent industries where 
national organisation and direction was appropriate. Such industries, however, were 
few and far between. As the experiences with road haulage and iron and steel had 
shown, more complex industries, especially those in manufacturing, were less well 
suited to such reorganisation. Secondly, it was far from apparent that nationalisation 
would bring about many of the objectives set for it. Nationalisation had failed to 
bring about a substantially more equitable distribution of wealth, and its ability even 
to bring about the more efficient operation and development of the industries 
concerned was being questioned by some. 
The Labour party was thus faced with a difficult ideological situation. As 
Francis has argued, little more than five years after gaining their first ever majority in 
parliament, a key part of their industrial policy, one which they had assumed would be 
a confinuing policy for years to come, appeared to have exhausted its potential."^ 
"'Labour party, 'Let Us Win Through Together', and 'Labour party Election Manifesto', in Craig, 
Election Manifestos, pp. 155-6, 174. 
"^As he argues, 'self-refiecfion was ... necessitated by the fact that while the 1945 manifesto Let us 
Face the Future had in many senses been a summary of the first fifty years of Labour party thinking, 
within three years of the 1945 victory most of the manifesto commitments were already on the statute 
book. The expectations of the two previous generations of socialists had been made a reality with an 
ease few would have predicted ... by 1948 Labour was already having to ask seriously the question 
where could it, or should it, go next?': Francis, 'The nature of Labour's socialism', p. 224. Fielding 
largely supports this conclusion, noting the fact 'that this 'system of though [i.e. the belief in the 
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Fundamental questions had to be addressed: whether public ownership and control 
were still desirable objectives; whether nationalisation was a realistic method of 
bringing about such ownership and control; and how those industries which were 
already nationalised were to be run in order to make them accountable to the nation. 
Even before they lost power, thinkers such as Jay, Crosland and Gaitskell had turned 
their attention to such questions. Without a thorough reappraisal, however, the 
industrial policies of the party appeared fatally weakened by the experience of a 
government which had been expected to lay down their foundations. 
socialism represented by public ownership] entered a terminal crisis at the very same moment at 
which it seemed to have been finally validated is perhaps one of history's cruellest ironies, the 
implications of which have still not yet been fully resolved': Fielding, 'Labourism in the 1940s', p. 
153. 
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Chapter Three 
Revisionism or rhetoric?: 
The changing nature of the Labour party's industrial poHcy 
from Attlee to Wilson 
Between 1945 and 1950, the Labour party's first parliamentary majority had 
allowed the Attlee government to implement its substantial programme of 
nationalisation. Further nationalisation depended on the retention of that majority in 
1950 and beyond. Instead, by 1951 it was the Conservatives who had a majority in 
the House of Commons. Although in strict numerical terms the Labour party 
succeeded in maintaining its voting strength in 1950 and 1951, the increased 
concentration of its votes in certain constituencies meant that its majority was 
massively reduced in 1950 and totally wiped out in 1951.' Labour's electoral fortunes 
were in part affected by the decline in the Liberal vote between 1945 and 1951 which 
appears to have benefited the Conservatives to a much greater extent than Labour.^ In 
addition, the policy rethinking undertaken by the Conservatives during the late 1940s, 
including their acceptance of most of the Attlee government's nationalisations, meant 
that they were a stronger opponent than had been the case in 1945.'^  However, while 
'in 1951, Labour had 295 MPs compared to the Conservatives 321. Labour actually polled more votes 
than the Conservatives - 13.95 million compared to 13.72 million - but due to the concentration of its 
voters, ended with less MPs: see David Butler and Gareth Butler, British political facts 1900-1994 
(7th edn., 1994), p. 216. 
^ The collapse of the Liberal vote between 1945 and 1951 benefited the Conservatives to a far greater 
degree than Labour. If the Liberals had succeeded in maintaining their percentage of the vote (9.0%), 
they would have received 2.57 million votes in 1951. In reality, they gained only 731,000. The 1.84 
million voters the Liberals 'lost' account for the bulk of the increased vote that gave election victory 
to the Conservatives: see ibid. 
^Of the four by-elections which took place between 1945 and 1950, the Conservatives won three, two 
from Independents and one from the ILP, with the four seat remaining Independent: see ibid., p. 236. 
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these factors were largely beyond Labour's control, their defeat in 1951 cannot be 
explained simply by reference to the actions of the other main parties. 
The 'failure' of the Labour party to stay in power focused a degree of attention 
on the content of its 1950/51 programme. Zweiniger-Bargielowska has argued that, in 
terms of economic policy, this attention was particularly concerned with the issue of 
consumption.'* The Attlee government, she has argued, struggled to come to terms 
with the demands of consumers, having focused to a far greater extent on issues of 
production. A great many voters, however, especially females, were more concerned 
with the restrictions which still existed on their consumption patterns, and the 
government, despite such measures as the 'bonfire of controls', appeared determined 
to retain a great number of direct controls over the economy.^  As Rollings has argued, 
the government remained committed to 'the continuance of some controls in the long 
term throughout their period in power'.^ In this regard, the Conservative promise to 
free private industry from excessive government control appeared more in tune with 
shifts in popular opinion. 
Yet while Zweiniger-Bargielowska's identification of consumption as a 
problem area for the Labour party - as it was to remain throughout the 'affluence' of 
the 1950s' - is certainly justified,^ the problems of the party's production policies 
''ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, controls, and consumption, 1939-1955 
(Oxford, 2000), pp. 2-3, 256. 
^Ibid., pp. 256, 261-2; Francis, 'The nature of Labour's socialism', p. 231; Tomlinson, 'Mr. Attlee's 
supply-side socialism', p. 11; Tomlinson, 'Planning: Debate and policy in the 1940s', p. 162. 
S^ee Neil Rollings, "The Reichstag method of governing'? The Attlee governments and permanent 
economic controls', in Helen Mercer, Neil Rollings and Jim Tomlinson (eds.). Labour governments 
and private Industry: The experience of1945-1951 (Edinburgh, 1992), especially pp. 15-17, 27-30. 
'Jefferys notes that 'in 1959, press and academic commentators concluded in unison that Labour's third 
defeat in a row reflected its inability to come to terms with post-war affluence'. This did not, 
however, prevent Gaitskell and the party's General Secretary, Morgan Phillips, concluding that 
nationalisation policy had cost votes: Jefferys, 'British politics and the road to 1964', pp. 130-1. See 
also Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain, pp. 263-4. 
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cannot be ignored. As has been demonstrated, the use of nationalisation as a key 
element of the Attlee government's industrial policies was, by 1950, becoming 
problematic.^ The extended Cabinet deliberations over iron and steel nationalisation 
revealed serious doubts about the success of nationalisation in general, and about the 
desirability of further nationalisation - as the lack of enthusiasm over intervention in 
the water and sugar industries confirms. 
Objections to further nationalisation existed on a number of fronts.'" First, the 
Conservative party and private industry were determined to prevent nationalisation 
extending into the manufacturing sector - witnessed by the Conservative commitment 
to denationalise iron and steel, and the 'Mr Cube' campaign by the sugar producers to 
prevent their nationalisation." Second, questions were raised by some authors and 
commentators about the efficiency of the newly-nationalised sector, and whether 
public ownership itself was responsible for some of the inefficiencies.'^ Third, and 
most important, doubts about future nationalisation existed within the Labour party 
leadership. As has been shown in Chapter Two, Morrison and several other ministers 
expressed the opinion that iron and steel nationalisation risked reducing the efficiency 
of the industry. Problems of accountability also led Mprrison to focus on the 
problems of the existing nationalisation sector.'^  Meanwhile, several of the party's 
most influential thinkers, such as Jay and Durbin, were questioning whether 
*As Brooke notes, Durbin had already identified in 1940 (in The politics of democratic socialism) that 
the 'embourgoisement' of the working class would present a significant challenge to Labour: Brooke, 
'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", p. 42. 
'Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 65. 
'"See Francis, 'The nature of Labour's socialism', p. 229. 
"See Conservative party, 'This is the Road' in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 143. 
'^R. Kelf-Cohen, Nationalisation in Britain: The end of a dogma (1958), pp. 260, 296; D. Jay, 
Socialism in the new society (1962), p. 303. H. Clegg & T. Chester, The future of nationalization 
(Oxford, 1953), p. 153; 'General conclusions', in W. Robson (ed.), Problems of nationalised industry 
(1952) p. 353; J. Hughes, Nationalised industries in the mixed economy {\9()Qi), p. 3; 
'^Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy, p. 121. 
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nationalisation contributed either to greater public - in a broad sense - control over 
industry, or to a redistribution of wealth.''* 
The 1949 revised party programme, Labour Believes in Britain, and the 
election manifestos of 1950 and 1951 reflected the cautiousness of Morrison and other 
party leaders on nationalisation and their sensitivity towards the intensifying 
opposition to it, offering 'consolidation' rather than as radical a programme as 1945.'^ 
In 1950, Let Us Win Through Together offered a substantially smaller number of 
nationalisations than had been promised in 1945.'^ The sugar and cement industries 
were to be taken over and water reorganised under new public control, but beyond this 
only the chemicals industry would be examined with a view to determining i f it were 
necessary to 'transfer to public ownership any appropriate sections of this vital 
industry'.'^ By 1951, even this short 'shopping-list' had been abandoned - although a 
commitment remained to 'take over concerns which fail the nation'.'^ The manifesto 
itself provided an explanation for this reduction in commitments: the party had still to 
face the task of reforming the existing public industries and services 'until each public 
enterprise is a model of efficiency and of social responsibility'.'^ 
However, while the party's relationship with nationalisation was being 
modified to take account of these various problems, the commitment to bring more 
industries under public ownership was still extant in 1950 and 1951.'^ ° Despite the 
Attlee government's experience of nationalisation of certain types of industry being 
'''See Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist". 
^'Ibid., pp. 27-8. 
""Although, as has been noted in Chapter One, a substantial number of industries whose 'need' for 
nationalisation had been identified in the 1930s remained in private hands, 
'labour party, 'Let Us Win Through Together', in Craig, Election manifestos, pp. 155-6. 
'^Labour party, 'Labour Party Election Manifesto', in ibid., p. 174. 
"Labour party, 'Let Us Win Through Together', in ibid., p. 155. However, it should be recognised that 
the economic difficulties brought about primarily by the rearmament programme and the Korean war 
added to the desire to limit the commitments being made: see Hassan, 'The water industry', p. 208. 
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more problematic than expected, and of the Morrisonian model of administration 
creating problems of accountability,^' there was little evidence that the party was 
considering abandonment of its commitment. Moreover, its narrow defeat in 1951 did 
little to convince the party's leadership that a fundamental modification of the 
ideological basis of its programme was desirable.^ ^ The maintenance of the Labour 
vote, even i f not its reflection in numbers of MPs, indicated that a return to power in 
1955 was by no means unlikely. 
Among the party's intellectuals, however, both left- and right-wing,^'* it was 
considered necessary 'to review and re-define Labour's ideology and strategy in the 
light of the experiences of the war years and the post-war Attlee government'.'^ ^ As 
Francis and Brooke argue, it is important to understand that this rethinking was well 
under way even before the fall of the Attlee govemment.'^ ^ Indeed, as was noted in the 
previous chapter, in the activity of Jay and Durbin in particular, it was even being 
undertaken before the establishment of the government. 
As in the 1930s, the Fabian Society placed itself at the centre of much of the 
activity, and its publication in 1952 of the New Fabian Essays demonstrated that new 
ideological perspectives were under active consideration. The emerging policy debate 
^"Francis, 'The nature of Labour's socialism', p. 230. 
"'See Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, pp. 78-90. 
^^Fielding, 'Labourism in the 1940s', p. 151. This is not, of course, to say that no revision of the party 
programme was undertaken in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1949, for example, the party issued 
Labour Believes in Britain, with an emphasis on 'consolidation' of the achievements of the Attlee 
government: see Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", p. 27. 
^^ielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, 'EnglandArise!', p.209. 
"^"Francis rightly stresses the importance of recognising that revisionists came from across the political 
spectrum of the party - from Crosland on the right, to Crossman on the 'left', and on to Strachey who 
was a 'revised Marxist': Martin Francis, 'Mr. Gaitskell's Ganymede? Re-assessing Crosland's The 
future of socialism'. Contemporary British History, 11 (1997), especially pp. 55, 57, 61; Francis, 'The 
nature of Labour's socialism', p. 223. This is supported by Brooke, who, for this very reason, 
describes use of the term revisionist as 'problematic' (yet without suggesting any alternative): Brooke, 
'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", pp. 29, 31. 
'^Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', p. 51. 
^^Ibid., p. 53; Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 5; Brooke, 'Reassessing a Labour 
'revisionist", p. 29. 
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did not initially seek to question the idea of public ownership and control itself On 
the contrary, the desirability of its extension remained an underlying principle for 
almost all of the thinkers involved.'^^ The primary issue was how the party should 
approach the next phase of public ownership and control, given the changed economic 
circumstances and the experiences of nationalisation in practice. Those involved 
urged that attention should be focused on how public ownership and control were to 
be justified in future; in what directions it should advance; and how public industry 
was to be organised. 
However, this search for new foundations for the existing party programme led 
a group of intellectuals to reach conclusions which did fundamentally undermine the 
raison d'etre for nationalisation. In particular, but not exclusively, thinkers on the 
right of the party found themselves involved in a process of ideological 'revisionism' 
whose logic placed them at odds both with the historic ideology of the party and with 
the existing views of many - i f not a majority - of their fellow party members. The 
driving force behind this process was the electoral fortunes of the party. While 
Francis is right to stress the long time period over which revisionist thought 
developed, it remains the case that without the defeats suffered by the party in 1955 
and 1959 much of the immediacy of the revisionists' work would not be present. 
The conclusion which had been drawn in 1951 - that the electoral setback suffered 
was only temporary - could no longer be sustained. The party leadership under 
"Williams, Gaitskell, p. 449. 
^^Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', especially pp. 52-3. Brooke similarly 
stresses that 'as an intellectual outlook, "revisionism" pre-dated "consolidation" [i.e. 1948] 
considerably'. However, his judgement that 'the moment of "consolidation" offered ... an 
opportunity to put the revisionist case less tentatively than in the past' is significant, since the election 
defeats in 1955 and 1959 can be seen to have offered just such opportunities as well: Brooke, 
'Reassessing a Labour 'revisionist", p. 29. 
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Gaitskell concluded that its re-election depended on a thorough reworking of the party 
programme to reflect the changing economic and social conditions of the 1950s. 
No one incident illustrates the importance of electoral defeat on the 
radicalisation of ideological revision than the remarkable attack made by Gaitskell on 
clause IV of the party's constitution.^^ In the immediate aftermath of the 1959 
election defeat, Gaitskell called on the party to reform a commitment to public 
ownership and control which, he argued, could not 'possibly be regarded as adequate' 
for a statement of Labour's aims for the 1960s.^ *^  However, the attempt to modify 
clause IV was not an abandonment of the party's commitment to public ownership 
and control. Despite what was thought by opponents within the party, neither 
Gaitskell, nor his fellow 'revisionists' such as Crosland and Jenkins, considered that 
public ownership and control were of no relevance to 'socialism in the 1960s'.^' It is 
true that in the immediate aftermath of the 1959 election defeat Douglas Jay argued, in 
the revisionist journal Forward, that Labour would never again achieve power without 
reform as radical as dropping clause IV, severing the links with the trade unions, and 
even altering the party name.^ ^ Nonetheless, there appears little indication that 
Gaitskell was convinced of the need for such radical re-thinking, or that he was 
prepared - as Dalton alleged Jay was - to 'pour ... out the baby with the bathwater, 
and then throw ... the bath after them'.^^ As Jones has argued, left-wing suspicions 
^'AS Jones argues, it was 'conceived in a climate of persistent electoral failure': "Taking Genesis out of 
the Bible", p. 1. 
'°LPACR 1959, p. 112. 
^''Socialism in the 1960s' being the title of a Fabian Society pamphlet series that thinkers such as 
Crosland and Crossman contributed to. 
"Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", pp. 4-5; Williams, Gaitskell, pp. 538-9. 
"r^e political diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40, 1945-60, ed. B. Pimlott (1986), p. 695 (11 Oct. 1959). 
As Dalton told Gaitskell, Jay's article 'gave it all a bad start, and struck the tuning-fork for all the 
Gregorian Chants of the Old Believers': Williams, Gaitskell, pp. 543-5. 
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that Jay's article was the 'launching stage of a deliberate, post-election Gaitskellite 
strategy' were 'groundless'.^'' 
For Gaitskell, Crosland, and most other revisionists, the need to reform clause 
IV stemmed from the confusion which it engendered about the aims of the party. 
This, they believed, had been demonstrated at the 1959 election. Gaitskell sought 
clarification of the party's relationship with public ownership and control, not a 
severance. His failure to secure reform of the constitutional position might be taken 
as evidence that the revisionism of the 1950s and early 1960s was a flowering of 
ideological debate which had little impact on the long-term programme of the party.''^ 
At first sight, the content of the 1964 manifesto - Let's Go with Labour for the New 
Britain - might seem to confirm this view. The manifesto re-stated the party's 
commitment not merely to public ownership and control, but also to nationalisation. 
The iron and steel industry was to be renationalised. More generally, whenever 
private industry showed itself incapable of making a breakthrough to greater 
productivity, the impetus was to be provided 'either by public enterprise or ... [by 
state] partnership with private industry'.^^ 
However, it should be asked whether the public ownership and control 
proposed in 1964 was the same sort of ownership and control proposed in 1945 or 
even 1951 - or whether it had undergone a qualitative change. It is from this 
perspective that 'revisionism' has to be considered. The 'clause IV debate' is in many 
ways a distraction. It obscures the re-evaluation of the ideological justifications for 
public ownership and control by the revisionists, since it implies that their 'failure' 
over clause IV indicates a more general failure to impress their new ideas upon the 
^"lones "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 5. 
"This'; the implicit approach taken by Jones: see ibid., especially p. 4. 
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p a r t y . Y e t it is far from clear whether such a failure actually occurred. Without an 
understanding of the nature of revisionist thought, and its impact on the long-term 
ideological perspectives of the party, it is impossible to make an adequate assessment 
of the success or failure of the policies of the Wilson governments, since the very 
reasoning behind them risks remaining undetermined. 
I 
The starting point for almost all of those involved in the policy re-thinking of 
the 1940s and 1950s, particularly for the so-called revisionists, was a belief that 
'renewed attempts to assess the nature of contemporary capitalism are overdue ... [for] 
socialists will not succeed ... unless they form a very clear idea of what capitalism has 
become and is becoming'. The basis of this belief was the impression that over the 
previous decades capitalism had undergone fundamental changes in its nature and 
structure. Furthermore, these changes were so fundamental that they rendered most 
contemporary socialist thinking obsolete; many socialists still fruitlessly 'conduct[ing] 
a battle over the ghost of an economy which no longer inhabits the ea r th ' .The first 
significant exposition of a new 'revisionist' critique of capitalism had come with 
Durbin's The Politics of Democratic Socialism in 1940, and had been substantially 
built on by the Fabian debates from the late 1940s onwards, leading to the New 
Fabian Essays, and especially the contributions of Crossman and Crosland. Debate 
by no means ended there: it was vigorously pursued thereafter through such organs as 
the Socialist Commentary journal. However, the 1955 election defeat provided the 
^^Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 260. 
•''jones has described the attempt to revise clause IV as 'the culmination of the revisionist attempt not 
just to demote the role of public ownership in Labour policy and ideology but also to demythologise 
that dominant idea, thereby eroding its significance for the party': Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the 
Bible", p. 4. 
^ ' j . Strachey, Contemporary capitalism (1956), p. 11. 
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greatest stimulus, resulting in the appointment of a revisionist party leader, Gaitskell, 
and the publication in 1956 of Crosland's The Future of Socialism and Strachey's 
Contemporary Capitalism. These two books together marked the high point of the 
revisionist critique of capitalism, and provide probably the clearest and most detailed 
presentation of the critique.'*'' 
The basis of the revisionist approach was far broader than that required simply 
to analyse the future of public ownership and control as party policy. Its focus was 
more fundamental: it was argued that to consider questions of industrial ownership 
and control before determining the nature of contemporary industrial operation and 
organisation was illogical. This was all the more so since the central inspiration 
behind their work was the contention, expressed in American academic thought from 
the 1930s onwards, that a quantitative change in the size of the units of industrial 
production was bringing about a qualitative change in the nature of that production.'" 
Under the influence of such works as Bumham's Managerial Revolution 
(1942), Berle and Mean's The Modern Corporation (1932), and Galbraith's American 
Capitalism (1952), revisionists attached great importance to the trend apparent since 
at least the turn of the century for the size of industrial companies to increase 
substantially.'*^ This trend - brought about by the 'ruthless strength' of the 
competitive process - was leading, in such industries as chemicals, oil and steel, to a 
situation where the vast majority of production was concentrated in the hands of just a 
^""Ibid., p. 25. 
"•"Stephen Haseler, The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour party 1951-64 (1969), pp. 80, 
82. 
""For an analysis of the impact of American economic thinking on the revisionists, especially Crosland 
- who was criticised by Dalton, Crossman and Young for an over-reliance on American work - see 
Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', pp. 56, 58-9, and Francis, 'The nature of 
Labour's socialism', p. 236. 
''^ Strachey, Contemporary capitalism, pp. 20-5; Anthony Crosland, The future of socialism (1956), pp. 
33-4. 
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few giant companies and corporations.''^ This was not interpreted necessarily as a 
move towards simple monopoly, but certainly one towards oligopoly. Almost without 
exception, greater size was seen to result in 'superior competitive power', producing 
greater market share and allowing for savings in the costs of operation (and hence the 
possibility of superior profits).'*'* 
Significant though this development was, it was not the emergence of giant 
corporations per se that attracted attention, but the consequences. In particular, 
attention was focused on the fact that these giants were almost exclusively joint-stock, 
limited-liability, companies.'*^ This was critical, since it meant that ownership did not 
necessarily involve management; indeed, there was an increasingly clear division 
emerging between the two. Such a process had, of course, been occurring for decades. 
However, it was argued firstly that socialists had given inadequate consideration to 
it,'*^ and secondly that it had accelerated greatly since 1945. Crosland claimed that 
'the nominal owners have largely lost even the residue of control which they retained 
before the war'.'*^ In their place had emerged a 'class' of professional managers, who 
owed their power not to ownership but to their professional skills and - above all - to 
their 'position within the managerial structure'.'*^ 
These revisionists' conclusions over-simplified the motives of both 
shareholders and managements, and revealed an exaggerated belief in an inherent 
moral superiority of the 'manager' over the 'owner'. Nonetheless, the significance of 
the conclusions being drawn are clear. Tradifional socialist arguments for public 
'''strachey. Contemporary capitalism, pp. 20, 23. 
''Ibid., pp. 21, 24. 
Ibid, ^.35. 
'^As Francis observes, 'Durbin had recognised it in 1940, [yet] ... he chose not to develop his 
observations further'. Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', p. 55. 
•"Crosland, Future of socialism, p. 34. 
'^Ibid., pp. 33-4. 
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ownership were undermined by any conclusion that ownership 'has less and less 
relevance to the question of control'.'*^ Crosland argued that ' i t seems unlikely that 
the pattern of ownership wil l uniquely determine anything' .This constituted a direct 
attack on the presumed necessity for future nationalisation schemes. Nationalisation 
had previously been understood as a method whereby control could be obtained for 
the whole of society through a change in the ownership structure of an industry. 
Crosland denied that this aim was achievable by the sort of nationalisation applied by 
the Attlee government. As evidence that ownership and control were no longer 
clearly linked, he claimed that in the nationalised sector control may have 'passed out 
of the hands of the capitalist class [but only] into the hands of a new and largely 
autonomous class of public industry managers'.^' I f control was a socialist aim, then 
a vast increase in nationalisation would be 'wholly irrelevant to socialism'. 
I I 
Nonetheless, to equate the revisionists' rejection of the traditional socialist 
case for nationalisation with a rejection of the need for public ownership and control 
would be fallacious. They still considered that in some instances public ownership 
would be necessary to further the advance towards socialism. Crosland argued that i f 
a 'convincing case could be made out [for public ownership] on economic grounds', 
then to refuse such reorganisation would be illogical. On the other hand, the 
experiences of the existing public sector - where problems such as 'over-
centralisation]' and poor 'labour morale' appeared endemic - indicated to Crosland 
''Ibid., p. 70. 
50 
p. 57. 
99 
that nationalisation would rarely be economically justifiable.^'' Accordingly, his 
attention shifted to other forms of public ownership. 
In addition, the revisionists believed that public ownership was necessary to 
achieve other economic and ethical aims. Indeed, for many revisionists such 
alternative justifications for public ownership were considerably more relevant than 
those of industrial control. The most important of these aims was that of equality.^'' 
Despite the lack of progress evident in this direction from the Attlee government's 
nationalisations,^^ Roy Jenkins, in the New Fabian Essays, concluded that 'a 
substantial extension of public ownership is ... an essential prerequisite of greater 
equality of earned income and an inevitable concomitant of greater equality in the 
ownership of proper ty ' .He was supported by other revisionist thinkers who felt that 
there was a 'gross maldistribution of property' in Britain, and that since one of the 
primary aims of socialism was 'social equality', action was now plainly needed to 
redress this maldistribution." 
To Crosland, despite the changes in the operation of the capitalist system, so 
far as questions of equality were concerned 'the problem is ... fundamentally one of 
the distribution of p r o p e r t y ' . T h i s suggests that Francis' argument that, for 
Crosland, 'socialism was about equality, not about public ownership', is only partially 
"Crosland, Future of socialism, pp. 485 & 469. 
'"•AS Francis has noted, as early as the publication of Labour Believes in Britain, a far greater emphasis 
was being placed on equality than was the case in 1945. Indeed, as he further notes, a case can be 
made for the proposition that 'the Attlee government had been too concerned to define its socialism in 
economic rather than ethical terms' (especially Cripps and Attlee); Francis, 'The nature of Labour's 
socialism', pp. 225, 229, 234-5. 
^^Where the issue of compensation appeared to have blunted the contribution public ownership could 
make in this area: see above. Chapter II, section v. 
^*R. Jenkms, 'Equality', in Richard Crossman (ed.). New Fabian essays (1952), p. 83. 
"Anthony Crosland, 'Transition from capitalism', in ibid., p. 65; Hugh Gaitskell, Socialism and 
nationalisation (1956), p. 3; Williams, Gaitskell, p. 388; Thompson, Political economy and the 
Labour party, p. 157. 
^^Crosland, Future of socialism, p. 487. 
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correct.^^ For while it is true that Crosland saw the purpose of socialism as equality 
rather than public ownership, it remains the case that he continued to view public 
ownership as an essential method of achieving socialism: ownership might well now 
be irrelevant to control, but it was still the primary source of wealth generation, 
especially via capital gains, and thus its concentration in the hands of the few was 
inequitable to the many.^° He was aware that a capital gains tax was a 'perfectly 
possible' method of controlling such gains, but their total removal could only be 
achieved by an extension of public ownership.^' The state had to acquire a 'capital 
stake in economic growth' through share purchasing i f it desired to ensure that such 
growth would result in a fairer distribution of wealth rather than the reverse.^ ^ 
So while the revisionist case for public ownership was increasingly divorced 
from the traditional notions of nationalisation, this did not mean - as many sceptical 
party members feared - that the revisionists had abandoned public ownership. In any 
case, Crosland, for example, found 'the arguments for re-nafionalising steel ... 
irresistible'.^'' Furthermore, although he personally doubted i f many other industries -
with the possible exception of machine tools - were 'patently inefficient or 
unprogressive', i f such industries did emerge then 'precise and selective' public 
ownership could well be the only solution. '^* 
^'Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', pp. 51, 58. 
^"A judgement which Francis himself appears to accept: see 'The nature of Labour's socialism', p. 227. 
^'ibid., p. 485; see also Anthony Crosland, The Conservative enemy: A programme of radical reform 
for the 1960s (1962), pp. 47-8. For a further revisionist examination of the comparative merits of 
taxation and public ownership with regard to reducing the inequality of income, see Jay, Socialism in 
the new society, pp. 259-60, 276-77. 
'^ ^Crosland, Future of socialism, pp. 488 & 495. 
^hbid., p. 40. 
'''Ibid., pp. 472, 476-7. 
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III 
The revisionist position on public ownership and control was most directly 
expressed in Gaitskell's 1956 Fabian pamphlet Socialism and Nationalisation. 
Gaitskell's own intellectual contribution to revisionism has frequentiy been 
downplayed, with Crosland's The Future of Socialism seen as the 'manifesto for 
Gaitskellism' - the implicit assumption being that Gaitskell himself had little to 
contribute.^^ Yet while following a similar approach, Gaitskell's Socialism and 
Nationalisation demonstrates that he was a thinker in his own right. It reveals, as 
Crosland himself recognised, a less radical approach than the work of Crosland and 
Strachey. '^' In re-examining the 'traditional arguments' for nationalisation, Gaitskell 
argued that ' in modem conditions it can hardly be held that shareholders, as such, by 
virtue of their ownership of property ... exercise ... power'.^^ Given this, and given 
also the disappointing failure of nationalisation to live up to expectations in areas such 
as worker control and accountability to parliament, Gaitskell was forced to admit that 
'the earlier traditional arguments for general nationalisation ... are weakened'. 
Significantly, however, this conclusion was followed directiy by the caveat 'but not 
destroyed'. 
Gaitskell fully recognised, as did the other revisionists, that there were 
'genuine drawbacks and difficulties in nationalisation'.^^ Indeed, he was even more 
explicit, arguing that the problems 'are almost all associated with large-scale 
management', and that 'we have to weigh the gains from eliminating the wastes of 
''^ This approach, taken by Haseler in The Gaitskellites, is rightly criticised by Francis: 'Re-assessing 
Crosland's The future of socialism', pp. 51-2. 
^^Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism', p. 51. This is not to deny the explicitly 
revisionist method adopted. It proclaimed, for example, that 'it is time to re-examine the traditional 
arguments [for nationalisation]': Gaitskell, Socialism and nationalisation, p. 7. 
"Ibid.,'p. 11. 
/6/^.,p.98. 68 
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competition against the disadvantages of destroying the competitive spirit'.'" This 
appears to be a fundamental assault on the principles of nationalisation, one of which 
was to remove this 'competitive spirit'. He nevertheless continued in a similar vein, 
stating that he was 'driven to the conclusion that the most vital question is how far 
social and economic equality can be achieved without more nationalisation and public 
ownership'.''' His preliminary conclusion was that the 'growth of social services 
[and] severe taxation' - rather than traditional nationalisation - were bringing about 
such equality as there was.^ ^ However, as with other revisionists this conclusion led 
him towards advocating alternative forms of public ownership, rather than abandoning 
the principle as such. 
Gaitskell was clear that any 'advance towards a more even distribution of 
wealth' could only be carried out i f the 'redistribution of existing privately-ovmed 
wealth', either by taxation or death duties, were combined with a 'high[er] proportion 
of publicly-owned property'.^'' Such ownership, which would not require the 
'exercising [of] detailed control', would be achieved by the acquisition of equity 
shares, either via accepting them in lieu of cash for death duties or as direct purchases 
out of budget surpluses. This would ensure that the profits of industry 'would be 
available for the community'.^'* On the decision of when control as well as ownership 
was desired, even here there were alternatives to nationalisation. The state could 
purchase 'selected firms' as a form of limited nationalisation, but it could also 
establish new state enterprises to 'carry out a project where private firms would not 
undertake the risk', or set up 'mixed enterprise[s]' involving the state and private 
'''Ibid., p. 24. 
pp. 24, 29. 
''Ibid., p. 31. 
'^Ibid.,p.3\. 
''Ibid., pp. 34-5. 
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firms.^^ As Gaitskell - and indeed the revisionists in general - concluded, 'the point 
is that we need not conceive of public ownership as always a matter of taking over a 
whole industry, making a structural change ... and setting up a single large 
organisation, but as embracing also many other types of change'.'^ Or, as he 
succinctly expressed it, nationalisation 'must be treated as a means and not grouped 
with the ultimate aims [of the party]'.^^ 
IV 
Much of the attention given to revisionism by historians has focused on the 
confrontation between Gaitskell and several party conferences which arose as a 
consequence of this particular belief The two main clashes which occurred, in 1957 
on the proposed party statement Industry and Society, and in 1959 on the revision of 
clause IV, are undoubtedly of great significance. Both events demonstrate the bitter 
opposition of many on the left-wing of the party to any dilution of the commitment to 
public ownership and control. They also indicate that the majority of conference 
delegates and trade unions, while prepared to accept some reform of the nature of that 
commitment, would not accept any move which threatened its existence. 
Industry and Society: Labour's policy on future public ownership was 
effectively Socialism and Nationalisation writ large. The similarities were manifold, 
from the opening claim that 'public ovmership has always been regarded by British 
socialists as a means towards achieving the ultimate ideals of socialism [rather than an 
ideal in itself]', to the conclusion that the most significant quesfion to be answered 
''Ibid, p. 35. 
'^Ibid., p. 35. 
'^Ibid., p. 35. For similar conclusions, see, for example, Crosland, The Conservative enemy, p. 44. 
''Gaitskell, Socialism and nationalisation, p. 5. 
'^ See Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible"; Riddell, 'The end of clause IV', especially pp. 25-6; 
Jefferys, 'The road to 1964', pp. 120-146, especially pp. 125-6. 
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was 'what part can public ownership now play in achieving our ends?'.^' Mirroring 
the conclusions in Socialism and Nationalisation, it argued that even ' i f the functions 
of ownership are disappearing, the rewards are not', and that the 'special character of 
equity shares' - primarily their rapid generation of capital gains - made their 
O A 
ownership crucial to the equality of wealth. Although keen to stress that a Labour 
government would not 'indulge in a wildly inflationary scramble for shares', it made 
81 
clear that there would be a gradual transfer. 
Yet while such an approach was a departure from previous party policy. 
Industry and Society did not advocate - any more than the revisionists had done - the 
abandonment of the existing policy of 'extending public ownership in the interests of 
planning and control ' .Alongside 'general controls' over the economy as a whole, 
circumstances were envisaged - for example where 'the units of production are too 
numerous and too small to face effectively the challenge of modem technology', or 
where production 'persistentiy falls short [of demand]' - when direct intervention 
would have to be undertaken.^^ Significantly, however, save in the unique cases of 
iron, steel and road haulage - where renationalisation was called for - new methods of 
public management were proposed.The emphasis was on diversity of ownership 
'^Labour party. Industry and Society: Labour's policy on future public ownership (1957), pp. 7, 10 
[emphasis in original]. The underlying reliance on the revisionist critique of capitalism was 
unmistakable throughout the work. 'The structure of industry', it asserted, 'is rapidly changing', 
leading to the emergence of firms so large as to represent a 'new and distinctive form of business 
organisation'. Furthermore, management in those firms was becoming 'increasingly specialist and 
increasingly professional.' 'More and more' these managements were 'assum[ing] a life of its [sic] 
own', while the role of shareholders was becoming less and less significant. 
^"Ibid., pp. 32-3. 
^'Ibid., pp. 40, 56. 
' W , p . 4 1 . 
^'Ibid., pp. 42, 45. 
'''if, after suitable enquiry had taken place, a change in ownership should prove to be 'desirable', then 
any of several different schemes might be adopted. The public ownership of a single firm, for 
example, might 'suffice to break a production bottleneck', or, in other circumstances, 'new industries, 
like atomic energy, can be pioneered from the start under public ownership': ibid., p. 47. 
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and control, with a flexible approach to industrial problems as - or indeed i f - they 
emerged, rather than with any dogmatic attachment to nationalisation. 
In presenting Industry and Society to the 1957 party conference, the leadership 
emphasised it was not a 'substitute for traditional forms of nationalisation', 
maintaining that 'there is a clear commitment in the document to extend public 
ownership in any industry, or part of industry which, after thorough enquiry, is found 
to be failing the nation' .Opposit ion, however, was vociferous. The instant that 
debate was opened to the floor, a resolution was moved by a delegate from the 
National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) rejecting Industry and Society and stating that 
'this conference affirms its belief in the common ownership of all the basic industries 
and the means of production and deplores the tendency to deviate from these accepted 
principles'.^^ Although this resolution and other proposed amendments were heavily 
defeated by the block votes of the leading unions it set the tone for the debate. When 
delegates stepped to the rostrum to support the pamphlet, cries of 'shame' were 
on 
reported to have echoed through the hall. 
Support for the document from many unions, and the NUM and TGWU in 
particular, ensured that there was no danger of it failing to be accepted. Such loyalty 
could not, however, hide the lack of support within the party for the new proposals. 
Morrison rejected it on presentational grounds, condemning it as 'confusing' and 'too 
clever by half .^ ^ Others were much more bitter in their criticisms - their feelings 
encapsulated by an NUR delegate who alleged that ' i f Ramsay MacDonald had been 
alive today, and had listened to that statement, he would have been overjoyed. You 
^'LPACR 1957, p. 128. 
^'Ibid.,p. 131. 
"Ibid, p. 137. 
« t a , p . 136. 
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are asked today to accept ... the inevitability of graduainess'. The position of the 
unions was made plain by Frank Cousins who, while supporting the document, 
warned the NEC that 'you do not necessarily get socialism with nationalisation, but 
you do not get socialism without nationalisation'.^" 
V 
Given the electorate's reaction to the party programme demonstrated by the 
election defeat in 1955, the maintenance of such an essentially 'conservative' 
ideological position could be considered a risky political strategy. A further election 
defeat in 1959 made some sort of confrontation between revisionists and the rest of 
the party all but inevitable. As Jones has argued, the need to maintain party unity 
during the election meant that the 1959 election manifesto - Britain Belongs to You -
appeared to be far more inspired by the 'shopping list' nationalisation of Let us Face 
the Future than by the revisionism of Industry and Society?^ There was little to 
indicate to the casual reader that any re-thinking of policy in the area of industrial 
policy had taken place at all.^^ Iron and steel and long-distance road haulage were 
singled out for public ownership, and these were to be simple renationalisations: no 
^'/i;t/.,p. 131. 
^°Ibid., p. 143. It was clear that the traditionally 'loyal' unions - upon whose support the party 
leadership depended to pass resolutions at party conferences - would only tolerate limited policy 
reform in the area of public ownership, and remained firmly committed of the merits of 'old-style' 
nationalisation; Lewis Minkin, The contentious alliance: Trade unions and the Labour party 
(Edinburgh, 1991), p. 91. 
"Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 4. 
'^While insisting, for example, that 'where an industry is shown, after thorough enquiry, to be failing 
the nation we reserve the right to take all or any part of it into public ownership if this is necessary', 
the manifesto gave no indication of the wide variety of possible forms of such ownership that Industry 
and Society had contained. It may likewise have been the case that the manifesto promised that 'we 
shall also ensure that the community enjoys some of the profits and capital gains now going to private 
industry by arranging for the purchase of shares by public investment agencies', but it was a lone 
sentence tacked on to the end of five paragraphs concerning 'public ownership'. There was little 
indication that such share purchasing was considered a vital method to achieve the revisionist aim of 
reducing the inequitable distribution of private wealth: Labour party, 'Britain Belongs to You: The 
Labour Party's Policy for Consideration by the British People', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 227. 
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consideration was offered to other forms of take over.^ '^  The 'shopping list' may have 
been shorter, but it was difficult to see much change beyond this. 
More than anything else, this enforced compromising of the revisionists' 
beliefs - despite Gaitskell's position as party leader - by the remainder of the party 
was the catalyst for the head-on confrontation which Gaitskell embarked upon after 
the 1959 defeat.^ "* Although no doubt fuelled by the frustration of the defeat itself, 
there is little doubt that especially for Gaitskell the true source of frustration lay in the 
public perception that the party was largely unchanged from the 1940s, and therefore 
out of touch with the changed circumstances of the late 1950s.^ ^ This angered a 
leader who was himself a contributor to the new thinking. To the revisionists, 
meeting in private at Gaitskell's Frognal Gardens house the weekend after the election 
to consider the lessons of the 'disaster', the confinued retention of clause IV explained 
why the party had failed to project such new thinking into the public consciousness.'^  
Their interpretation of the election defeat was reinforced by Labour's official 
analysis of the elecfion results, prepared by the party's General Secretary, Morgan 
Phillips.^' It would be fiirther reinforced in 1960 by the evidence of a comprehensive 
public-opinion survey commissioned by the revisionist Socialist Commentary and 
conducted by Mark Abrams.'^ The evidence produced on nationalisation was 
'^^Ibid., p. 227. Moreover, the record of the nationalised sector since its creation was strongly defended, 
its failings largely attributed to the wrecking attitude of 'big business and the Tory party' who had 
both tried hard to 'discredit the idea of public ownership'. By contrast, 'under a Labour government, 
the nationalised industries will be given an opportunity once again to forge ahead'. 
^"Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", pp. 1, 5-7; Williams, Gaitskell, p. 546. 
'^And not simply in terms of nationalisation policy; the party was also perceived as out of touch with 
the affluence of society, which appeared to be blurring class divisions: Fielding, 'The evolution of 
'Wilsonism", pp. 31-3. See also Haseler, The Gaitskellites, pp. I l l , 143, 147-8; Jones, "Taking 
Genesis out of the Bible", pp. 5-6. 
'^Brian Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (1996), pp. 331-2. 
'''Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 5. 
''See ibid., p. 13. 
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unequivocal: ' i t is no longer popular with the electorate' .When asked how they 
viewed the performance of the existing nationalised sector, those deeming it to be a 
success - 33% of those interviewed - only just outweighed the 28% who felt that the 
industries had failed to perform as they could and should have done.'"" Even this 
narrow 'victory' must be qualified, since the main reason for it lay in a sense of 
success in just two sectors, electricity and atomic energy - of which the latter had 
never been a private industry at all. The more significant data relate to the coal and 
rail industries where even among those claiming to be Labour party supporters, more 
feh that the industries had failed than succeeded. 
Given this evidence that the electorate considered the 1945-51 nationalisations 
to have been - at best - a marginal success and, in some cases, an outright failure, the 
lack of enthusiasm revealed by the survey for further nationalisation came as little 
surprise. When asked i f they desired an extension of public ownership, only l\% 
answered 'yes', while 75% replied 'no'. Of even greater relevance must be the 
finding that even amongst Labour supporters, only 21% were in favour of greater 
public ownership, while 58%o were opposed.'""^ Furthermore, when asked what would 
have least pleased people about a Labour victory, no less than 33% stated 
nationalisation, including \6% of those who claimed to be Labour supporters. As 
' ' R . Hinden, 'The lessons for Labour', in M. Abrams & R. Rose (with a commentary by R. Hinden), 
Must Labour lose? (1960), p. 109. 
'°°M. Abrams, 'The Socialist Commentary Survey', in ibid., p. 33, Table 16. 
'°'The electricity industry was rated a success by 50% of the respondents, a failure by 16%, the figures 
for the atomic industry being 39% and 5% respectively: ibid., p. 33, Table 16. 
'"^The excess of those rating the industry a failure rather than a success being 2% for coal and 24% for 
rail. The comparable figures for the entirety of those surveyed were an excess of 27% for coal and no 
less than 46% for rail: ibid., p. 33, Table 16. 
'''ibid., p. 35, Table 18. 
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Abrams concluded, 'as a stereotype, "nationalisation" nowadays not only offends non-
Labour electors, but it also apparently bores loyal Labour supporters 
Crucially, however, while the unpopularity of nationalisation appeared self-
evident, the survey nonetheless discovered that the idea of public control over industry 
per se was not. When asked 'how much Government regulation of industry [was] 
necessary?', 13% answered 'a good deal', a fiirther 21% 'a fair amount' and 21% 'a 
little'. Only \9% answered 'practically none' and even among Conservative 
supporters, only 25% did so.'°^ The evidence indicated that whatever opposifion there 
was to further nationalisation, there was little ideological opposition to the principle of 
public ownership and control itself. As Rita Hinden - the editor of Socialist 
Commentary - concluded, the electorate 'wil l judge each case on its merits, and in so 
far as Labour appears to be doctrinaire on this subject of ownership, it saddles itself 
with a l i a b i l i t y ' . T h i s implied, she continued, that 'the "shopping list" approach ... 
is certain to be the wrong one'.'"^ As she stated, "How much nationalisation?' is an 
irrelevant, indeed a harmful, question until an answer has been found to the crucial 
preliminary question 'nationalisation for what?".'°^ 
Gaitskell's speech to the party conference in November 1959 made his 
determination to address this problem painfully clear. He was in no doubt that 
nationalisation '[had] - on balance - lost us v o t e s ' . H e argued that to some extent 
this was simply due to the unpopularity of the existing nationalised sector, but it was 
also due to a 'confusion in the public mind about our future policy ... [that] induced 
[voters] to think that we intended to nationalise any and every private firm ... simply 
'°'lbid., p. 36. 
'°'lbid.,v.36. . 
'"^R. Hinden, 'Lessons for Labour', m ibid., p. 100. 
'"'Ibid., p. 111. 
' ° W , p . 111. 
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out of a doctrinaire belief in public ownership'."" He did not advocate, as had Jay in 
the revisionists' private discussions, the extreme view that public ownership should 
just be abandoned as a policy: for that 'implie[d] that everything works so perfectly in 
the private sector that we shall never want to intervene'. He did, however, forcefully 
reject the 'traditionalist' view that public ownership was an end as well as a means: 
such a conclusion came, he argued, from a 'complete confusion about the fundamental 
meaning of socialism'.'" It was this 'complete confusion' that needed to be 
eradicated, and it was a confusion which to Gaitskell's mind sprang from clause FV."^ 
The clause, 'standing as it does on its own ... cannot possibly be regarded as adequate 
... it implies that common ownership is an end, whereas in fact it is a means ... [and] it 
implies that we propose to nationalise everything, but do we?'."^ Gaitskell's answer 
to the concluding question was an unequivocal 'of course not'. Consequently what 
was needed was a re-statement of 'the fundamental principles of British democratic 
socialism . . . in 1959 not 1918'."^ 
Other revisionists, and such party 'elder statesmen' as Dalton, may have felt 
that it was foolish to focus directly on clause IV - given its emotional associations -
but as Jenkins conceded, to imagine that a confrontation of some sort could have been 
avoided seems fanciful."^ The clause IV conflict has been judged by historians as an 
'°^LPACR 1959, p. 110. 
""/i/W., p. 110. See also Williams, Gaitskell, p. 564; Anthony Crosland, Can Labour win? (1960), pp. 
14-15. 
^'^LPACR ]959,p. 111. 
"^See Williams, Gaitskell, pp. 546-8. 
^'^LPACR 1959, p. 112. 
'''ibid., p. 113. 
"^Jenkins admitted that he was 'convinced that some battle had to be fought': Roy Jenkins, A life at the 
centre (1991), pp. 131, 111. See also Dalton Diary, p. 698, 699 (4 May, 13 July 1960); Brivati, 
Gaitskell, pp. 328-9; Williams, Gaitskell, p. 550; Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 17; 
Haseler, The Gaitskellites,pp. 156-7, 166. 
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error of political judgement on Gaitskell's part,"^ and the effective end of 
revisionism."'' While, however, the former judgement can be readily accepted, the 
latter is by no means as evident. Certainly Gaitskell failed to achieve any revision of 
clause IV, or even to have any additional explanatory clause inserted in the 
constitution. In March 1960 he produced a 'statement of aims' to be added to clause 
IV to make clearer the direction of the party in the 1960s. It was in many ways a 
compromise document, stating among its twelve aims that the party remained 
'convinced that [its] ... social and economic objectives can be achieved only through 
an expansion of common ownership substantial enough to give the community power 
over the commanding heights of the economy'. Such a commitment might have been 
thought sufficient to win over the traditionalists, even given the revisionist additions 
that 'common ownership takes varying forms' and that 'both public and private 
enterprise have a place in the economy'. Nonetheless, the unions refiased to accept the 
statement even as an addition - rather than a replacement - to clause FV, and Gaitskell 
was finally forced, with the prospect of certain conference defeat, to back down. The 
most he achieved was persuading the NEC to declare that the statement was 'a 
valuable expression of the aims of the Labour Party in the second half of the twentieth 
century'."^ Yet no matter how often the party rejected the revisionists' case, it not 
could ignore the fact that three consecutive elections had been fought with a 
traditional commitment to nationalisation, and all had been lost. To that extent the 
'^ Brivati, Gaitskell, p. 344; Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 16-17. In his 1963 edition of 
his British political parties, for example, R.T. McKenzie considered it 'one of the most maladroit 
operations in the modem history of party polities': quoted in ibid., p. 16. Defeat was inevitable given 
the position of the leading unions. That was made clear by Frank Cousins who stated that 'if, as 1 
gather, Rule Four is likely to be revised to make a different reference to our attitude towards public 
ownership, I would suggest, with the greatest respect to our leader... 'no way": LPACR 1959, p. 131. 
See also, Riddell, 'The end of clause IV', pp. 25-6, 
^Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 4. 
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revisionist case was almost certain to triumph, for unless the party was prepared to 
accept losing elections in perpetuity, a 'revision' of its programme was essential. 
V I 
At first glance the 'triumph' of revisionism might not appear obvious. The 
1959 party conference saw not just the rejection of Gaitskell's revision of clause IV, 
but also a forceful exposition of the traditionalist case, primarily by Barbara Castle 
and Aneurin Bevan."^ Castle recognised that it was an illusion to imagine that the 
party wanted to 'nationalise everything'.'^" Nevertheless, she dismissed revisionism -
both in its critique of capitalism and in its proposed new roles for public ownership -
as based upon the fallacious belief 'that you can separate moral issues from economic 
ones'.^ •^ ^ Merely accepting the changed nature of the post-war economy, as the 
revisionists appeared to do, rather than fighting it, risked reducing the party into 'an 
impotent appendage of the windfall state' - and attempting to share in the fruits of 
that state by public share-ownership was akin to 'legalising the Burglars' Union [sic] 
on condition that we share the swag'.''^ ^ 
Castle was adamant that the nation had to be presented with the 'real case' for 
public ownership - making industry 'responsible to us all'.'^^ Directly rejecting the 
revisionist argument that ownership and control were no longer directly linked, she 
argued that 'public accountability' was only possible when 'private interests' were 
"^Williams, Gaitskell, pp. 566, 570; Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", pp. 11-15, 17; The 
Backbench Diaries of Richard Grossman, ed. J. Morgan (1981), pp. 829-30 (22 Mar. 1960); Haseler, 
The Gaitskellites, pp. 267-8. For a full text of the Statement of Aims, see ibid.. Appendix II. 
"'Bevan and Castle were both leading figures of the Labour 'Left' having fought hard in the early 
1950s to push the party in a 'Bevanite' direction (part of which included an explicit commitment to 
nationalisation). 
™LPACR 1959, p. 86. 
'^'ibid., p. 84. 
'^^Ibid., p. 85. 
'^^Ihid., p. 85; Steven Fielding, "White Heat' and white collars: The evolution of 'Wilsonism", in 
Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, pp. 32-3. 
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replaced with public ownership.'^'' Moreover, it was public - rather than private -
enterprise that was showing the path to progress in this 'modem age', an age whose 
symbols were Soviet Russia's Sputnik or Britain's hovercraft (the latter developed by 
the public National Research Development Corporation (NRDC)).'^^ Given such 
evidence of the progressive nature of public enterprise. Castle argued that 'it simply 
won't wash to say that nationalisation is fusty and out-of-date'.'^^ I f the people were 
to be offered 'a call to public service; a call to idealism; a call to comradeship', they 
would surely rally to it. The ftature of the party, she therefore contended, depended on 
it being 'big enough to give them [i.e. the electorate] that call', and above all, in 
'go[ing] out and mak[ing] socialists [of this electorate]'.'•^^ 
While more conciliatory than Castie,'^^ Bevan echoed many of her views: to 
him 'the problem is one of education, not of surrender!'. The people, he argued, had 
to be shown that 'this so-called affluent society is an ugly society s t i l l ' . I f they 
could be so persuaded, then surely they would agree with Bevan that the nation must 
have 'the commanding heights of the economy in our power'. Like Gaitskell, he did 
'not believe that public ownership should ever reach down into every piece of 
economic activity'. Nonetheless, he insisted that the party 'wil l never be able to get 
the economic resources of this nation fully exploited unless we have a planned 
economy in which the nation itself can determine its own priorities'.'•^'^ Furthermore -
'^"LPACR 1959, p. 85. 
'^^Ibid., p. 86. See also Richard Grossman, Labour and the affluent society (1960), p. 9. 
'''LPACR 1959, p. 86. 
'^''ibid., p. 86. 
'^ ^As Jones has noted, his speech went some way towards 'lowering the tensions raised by Gaitskell's 
initiative': "Taking Genesis, out of the Bible", p. 11. 
'^''LPACR 1959,p. 153. 
"°Ibid., pp. 153 & 154. 
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and in contrast to the revisionists - he felt that the power needed to plan could only be 
achieved by nationalisation.'^' 
The response of left-wing conference delegates was emphatic:'^^ Michael Foot 
argued that Castle's speech represented 'one of the finest statements for socialism I 
have ever heard ... she showed quite clearly how public ownership is bang up to 
date'.''^ '^  Like Bevan and Castle, he saw the election defeat as evidence that 'we are 
never going to ... win an election i f we ourselves do not believe in our own principle 
of public ownership'.''^'' However, it is vital to note that, even though Bevan and 
Castle believed firmly in public ownership, there is still evidence that they were 
prepared to accept the need for 'revision' of the party's commitment. Castle's 
argument that nationalisation had 'alienated' voters in the 1959 election not because it 
was out of date, but because the party had failed to demonstrate how and why it was 
still relevant to the modern world, was an implicit acceptance of this.'^^ Indeed, in 
sentiment it was not that dissimilar from Gaitskell's position. 
The problem facing the party was how to turn the common interest in reform 
of the party programme into a statement of aims which would be acceptable both to 
revisionists and their ideological critics. After 1960, Gaitskell tried hard to reach such 
a compromise and made significant progress.'^ ^ However, his success was tempered 
by personality traits which had been revealed during the clause IV controversy: while 
an unquestioned intellect, he had a confrontational style and was impatient with those 
'''lbid.,pp. 153-4. 
'^ ^According to Jones, 'At Blackpool ... the widespread response to Gaitskell's speech was a vehement 
defence of traditional socialist attitudes': "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 10. 
'^'LPACR 1959, p. 122. 
'''Ibid., p. 123. 
"'Ibid., p. 85. 
'^ •^ Jefferys, 'The road to 1964', pp. 126, 137; Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 19. 
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unwilling to see the logic of his point of view.''^^ The election of Wilson to succeed 
him might be considered as simply swapping a leader on the right of the policy divide 
with one on the left.'"'^ Yet despite Wilson's reputation as a Bevanite, and his history 
of opposition to Gaitskell, he was essentially a centrist.''^' As such, he was in a much 
stronger position to introduce reform without alienating party traditionalists. It is no 
small irony that it was he, rather than Gaitskell, who persuaded the party to follow an 
essentially revisionist path, and to fight the 1964 election with a new, modernised, 
industrial policy. 
VII 
Wilson's role in the 'revision' of the party's ideological framework during the 
1950s and early 1960s is difficult to determine with any exactness. His success 
between 1963 and 1964 in 'squaring the circle' - producing a programme that was a 
logical development of the revisionism of the 1950s, yet remained acceptable to the 
mass of the party'''^ - was remarkable, all the more so since until that point he had 
given little public evidence of willingness to contribute to the policy debates. Yet 
there are indications that he agreed with much that Gaitskell and the revisionists 
proposed. For example, he had been convinced that the connection in the minds of 
the electorate between the party and nationalisation had cost votes in the 1955 
13 
'"jones describes him as 'insensitive', with a 'rationalistic view' that 'tended to overlook' the 'mythic 
significance for Labour of the idea of public ownership': "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", pp. 18-
9. His confrontation with the party conference and the unions concerning unilateral disarmament in 
1960 confirms this: his pledge to 'fight and fight and fight' won him few friends among the delegates: 
see Brivati, Gaitskell, pp. 374-5. 
^Having resigned from the Attlee government in 1951 along with Bevan over NHS charges, he was 
considered by some to be a 'Bevanite'. Pimlott's chapter on this period of Wilson's career is entitled 
'Nye's little dog'. Significantly, however, the succeeding chapter is entitled 'The dog bites', 
indicating how limited Wilson's ties with Bevan were: see Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (1992), 
chapters 9 and 10, pp. 154-192 and pp. 173-191. 
"'Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (1993), p. 96; Haseler, The 
Gaitskellites, p. 9. 
''"Ziegler, Wilson, p. 118. 
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election.''" Above all, it was his fear of disunity more than real opposition to the 
proposals which led him to oppose the confrontational approach Gaitskell adopted 
over both clause IV and nuclear disarmament: it was, he argued, 'an unnecessary 
baring of the soul'.'''^ 
More importantly, he believed that confrontation was unnecessary because the 
revisionist case for public ownership and control could be fused with the traditional 
belief in nationalisation in a way that would satisfy a broad spectrum of party 
opinion.'''^ That fusion could be brought about, Wilson argued, through an increased 
emphasis an a 'scientific' element (and, as Francis has argued, a strong commitment 
to economic growth).''*'' At what time Wilson came to place 'science' at the centre of 
his personal conception of socialism is difficuh to determine, since unlike Gaitskell, 
Crosland, Grossman and most other party 'intellectuals', he did not engage in the 
publication of his views during the 1950s.''*^ Its centrality, however, cannot be 
doubted on the basis of the work which he did produce in the 1960s. 
Labour had never, of course, been an 'anti-science' party:'''^ it insisted in 1945 
that 'the genius of British scientists and technicians ... must be given fi i l l rein'.'''^ As 
Francis argues, leading members of the Attlee government such as Morrison and 
Cripps emphasised the need to transform the country 'into a truly scientifically-
"'Crossman Diaries, p. 423 (6 June 1955); Fielding, 'The evolution of'Wilsonism", p. 34; Williams, 
Gaitskell, pp. 354, 447; Pimlott, Wilson, pp. 254, 272. 
"'^Ibid., p. 227; Ziegler, Wilson, p. 117. 
"•^  Jones, "Taking Genesis out of the Bible", p. 19. 
'"''Francis, 'Re-assessing Crosland's The future of socialism", p. 61. 
'''^ Only in the 1960s did he begin to publish, with such works as 77?e relevance of British socialism 
(1964). In that publication, the centrality of science to his socialist commitment is explicitly stated: 'if 
there was one word I would use to identify modem socialism it was 'science" (p. 41). 
'"'For an overview of the relationship between the Labour party and science, see David Homer, 'The 
road to Scarborough: Wilson, Labour and the scientific revoludon', in Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, 
The Wilson governments. 
'"^Labour party. Let us Face the Future, p. 6. 
117 
minded modern nation'.'''^ After the 1955 election defeat Gaitskell raised the profile 
of science further, and the 'Gaitskell Group' of scientists provided a significant new 
impetus for the role of science in the party's programme, 'alerting the Labour party to 
the increasing political importance of the state's involvement in scientific and 
technological development'.''*' However, as Kirby argues, the need for political 
compromise between the left and right of the party which had limited the input of 
revisionist thought in the 1959 manifesto similarly restricted the emphasis given to 
s c i e n c e . A f t e r the election defeat, the perceived need to present Labour as a 
modernising party turned attention back to its 'scientific image ' .Signif icant iy , 
Gaitskell turned to Wilson to provide the impetus,'^^ setting the party on the road to 
Wilson's 1963 claim that 'we are re-defining and re-stating our socialism in terms of 
the scientific revolution'.'^^ 
The first clear evidence of Wilson's attempt to link the party with a 'scientific 
revolution' came at the 1960 Conference when, in the concluding debate on the 
interim party statement Labour in the 1960s, he consciously moved away from the 
continuing arguments concerning clause IV.'^'^ 'The world', he assured delegates, 'is 
a world characterised by a scientific revolution beyond the dreams of only a 
'""^ Martin Francis, 'The Labour party: Modernisation and the politics of restraint', in Becky Conekin, 
Frank Mort and Chris Waters (eds.), Moments of modernity: Reconstructing Britain 1945-1964 
(1999), pp. 156-7. Indeed, Homer emphasises the 'long running discourse on the social relations of 
science which had been developed by radical socialist and communist scientific intellectuals in the 
1930s and 1940s': Homer, 'Wilson, Labour and the scientific revolution', p. 48. 
"'Ibid., p. 50. 
'^°Kirby, 'Blackett in the 'white heat", pp. 986-7; Homer, 'Wilson, Labour and the scientific 
revolution', p. 56. 
'^'ibid., p. 987; Fielding, 'The evolution of'Wilsonism", p. 37. 
'^ ^Whose greater natural enthusiasm for science (compared to Gaitskell) is emphasised in Homer, 
'Wilson, Labour and the scientific revolution', pp. 58-9, 61. 
'^^LPACR 1963, p. 140. As Fielding has argued, the perception of Wilson's 'radicalism' is at least in 
part 'due to the fact that he simply emphasised parts of Labour's programme previously left 
unmentioned': Fielding, 'The evolution of'Wilsonism", p. 39. 
'^*Ibid., pp. 37-8; Homer, 'Wilson, Labour and the scientific revolution', p. 57. 
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generation ago'.'^^ Unfortunately, Britain was 'lagging behind' in this revolution and 
- significantly - Wilson claimed it was doing so because it lacked any 'central 
plarming and direction of our economic life'.'^^ Indeed, the scientific revolution 
might well pass Britain by unless socialism could be 'harnessed to science and science 
to socialism', for only then could there be a 'socialist-inspired scientific and 
technological revolution releasing energy on an enormous scale'.'^^ What Wilson was 
offering to a party still bitter after the fight over clause IV was an inspiring new vision 
of a future socialist Britain. Moreover, it was a vision which found a central role for 
public ownership. Wilson was clear that no matter how many more scientists Britain 
produced, in many industries there would not be the 'right approach ... without public 
ownership'. He offered the machine-tools industry as an example of just such an 
industry 'failing to provide the right scientific and technological approach'. 
Wilson's vision in 1960 might have been dismissed as little more than an up-
beat antidote to the bitterness generated by clause IV and the controversy surrounding 
unilateral nuclear disarmament.'^^ By 1963, however, there could be little doubt that 
he was serious in placing the 'scientific revolution' at the heart of his message. His 
famous promise that a new Britain was 'going to be forged in the white heat of this 
revolution' - issued when proposing the aptly-titled policy statement Labour and the 
Scientific Revolution - was indicative of the extent to which science, and scientific 
metaphors, had become the focal point of Wilson's rhetoric.'^" What remains to be 
'^^LPACR 1960,p. 151. 
"'Ibid.,p. 150. 
"'lbid.,p. 151. 
Ibid., p. 151. 
'Although this is not to dismiss the political importance of healing the divisions in the party: 
Edgerton,'The'White Heat'revisited', p. 57. 
'"LPACRWSS P 140 The impact of his speech should not be under-estimated. Fieldmg argues that 
'members of Wilson's audience considered that he had given them an entirely new vision of Labour's 
future Indeed, both the right and left of the party saw the speech in the same apocalyptic terms : 
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determined is whether his claims that Labour was going to release 'all the latent 
energy and skills of our people', and his threats that ' i f we try to abstract from the 
automative age ... Britain will become a stagnant backwater, pitied and condemned by 
the rest of the w o r l d ' , a c t u a l l y revealed any new development on revisionist 
thinking, or were simply bombast and rhetoric. 
Although Wilson's rhetoric undoubtedly had a tendency to become over-
blown, there are indications - especially in Wilson's 1963 party conference speech -
which suggest that a broad policy framework did exist for realising the dreams of 
technological revolution. Moreover, within that framework Wilson took a remarkably 
'revisionist' approach to industrial policy and the role of public ownership and 
control. In his 1963 conference speech he outlined, unsurprisingly, a commitment to 
increase not just educational standards, but also the number of scientists and, in 
general, the application of science to industry.'^^ Significantly, however, this alone 
was not seen as sufficient - because applying science to industry free from public 
direction would lead only to 'high profits for a few, and ... mass redundancy for the 
many'.'^'^ What was needed, therefore, was 'national planning' and - Wilson asserted 
- this would have to entail much more than mere 'monetary planning'.'^'' Radical 
'structural change' in British industry would be required, and such change would 
imply both public control and - importantly - public ownership.'^^ This ownership 
would not only be necessary in cases of old industries needing restructuring, but also 
in the creation of new industries. A Labour government would build upon the success 
Fielding, 'The evolution of 'Wilsonism", pp. 29-30; Thompson, Political economy and the Labour 
party, p. 185. 
LPACR 1963, pp. 135, 140. 
'^'Ibid., pp. 135-6. 
'^'Ibid., p. 135. 
'^'Ibid., pp. 135, 138. 
'''Ibid., p. 136. 
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of public research and development contracting in defence industries by extending 
such contracting to the civil sector as well. This state-sponsored research and 
development would lead to the creation of new public enterprises as well as 
'productive partnerships' between public and private sectors, in the latter instance it 
being a 'basic principle' that profits 'should accrue in good measure to the 
community'.'^^ 
The policies that Wilson outlined echoed, to a substantial extent, two themes 
emerging in contemporary thought during the early 1960s. First, the growing use of 
computers and other techniques of automation in industry was creating the impression 
that a 'scientific revolution' was indeed dawning, and that Britain risked 'missing 
out'.'^^ Secondly, there was an increasing feeling that Britain was beginning to lag 
behind its rivals in terms of economic growth, leading, as Jefferys has described it, to 
'a national mood of introspection'. This later concern was reflected in Signposts 
for the 60s, the party's 1961 publication which represented the first detailed 'official' 
exposition of Wilson's ideas. Signposts for the 60s was clear that 'our living 
standards and our future as an independent nation are in jeopardy', which, i f a little 
overstated, certainly captured the mood of concern.'^^ The causes of the slow growth 
were 'the [Conservative] government's doctrinaire refusal to accept responsibility for 
'^^Ibid., p. 138; Harold Wilson, The New Britain: Labour's plan, selected speeches (1964), pp. 32-3. 
'"Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited', pp. 53-4, 56-7; Porter, 'Downhill all the way', p. 24. 
'^ ^Jefferys, 'The road to 1964', p. 125; Maurice Kirby, 'Blackett in the 'white heat' of the scientific 
revolution: industrial modernisation under the Labour governments, 1964-1970', Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 50 (1999), p. 985; Porter, 'Downhill all the way', pp. 11, 18-19; 
Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance, 1964-70', in Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, The 
Wilson governments, pp. 78-9; G.D.N. Worswick (Director of the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, 1965-82), in 'Witness seminar: The National Economic Development Council 1962-
67', (ed.) Astrid Ringe, Contemporary British History, 12 (1998), p. 105. The Federafion of Brifish 
Industry, for example, was so concerned with the slow rate of growth in the early 1960s that it 
established the Beaver Committee to examine methods whereby economic growth could be 
accelerated (resulting the Committee's report Policy for Growth): Astrid Ringe, 'Background to 
Neddy: Economic planning in the 1960s', ibid., p. 82. 
'^'Labour party. Signposts for the '60s (1961), p. 5; Wilson, The New Britain, p. 47. 
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planning', coupled with industry's failure to 'exploit the opportunities of the scientific 
r e v o l u t i o n ' . ' T h e solution lay with a National Plan, 'targets for individual 
industries' being overseen by a National Industrial Planning Board."' Once targets 
for growth and investment were drawn up, measures such as tax relief would 
'encourage the enterprising and ... penalise the slothful and inefficient'.'^^ If, 
however, industry still failed to respond, then new public enterprise would be 
needed.'^ ^ 
The 'application of science to industry' would be brought about by a 
'reconstruct[ed] and greatly enlargefdj' NRDC.'^'* The Corporation, which had 
already been responsible for funding research into such technologies as the hovercraft, 
would now be 'authorised to engage in production', this production being either 
entirely publicly-owned, or by newly-created joint enterprises with private firms. The 
Corporation would also help the process of encouraging backward private industries 
to revitalise their structures, by direct intervention i f necessary.'^ ^ However, the bulk 
of the NRDC's work would be with new, technologically-advanced, industries, for it 
was here - Signposts for the 60s envisaged - that the greater part of the 'advance' in 
the public sector would occur at 'the growing points of the British economy and in the 
new industries based on science'.'^^ 
The substance of Wilson's programme, as represented by Signposts for the 
60s,appears clear, and there can be no question that Wilson passionately believed -
'™Labour party, Signposts for the '60s, p. 12; Wilson, The New Britain, p. 11; Labour party, Labour 
and the Scientific Revolution (1963), p. 1. 
'^'Labour party, Signposts for the 60s, p. 13. 
'^ ^Wilson, The New Britain, pp. 16 & 31. 
' "Labour party, Signposts for the 60s, p. 13. 
^'"'Ibid., p. 14 [emphasis in original]. 
"^Ibid., pp. 14-5 [emphasis in original]. 
^^^Ibid., p. 16; Labour party, Labour and the Scientific Revolution, p. 3. 
'"Wilson had been its main author. 
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with a 'messianic zeal' - that a new Britain could be forged in the 'white heat' of 
science combined with socialism.'^^ Nonetheless, when the rhetoric is stripped away 
it is equally clear that his ideas were firmly based on the revisionism of Industry and 
Society. The increased emphasis on the need to revitalise industry and apply the fruits 
of science and technology can be seen as Wilson's evolution of revisionism to the 
conditions of the 1960s, rather than as a new critique of capitalism. 
When the emphasis on the use of science is removed from Wilson's 
pronouncements, the similarities between his work and that of the revisionists are 
striking. The idea of using the NRDC to promote industrial growth does not differ 
greatly in substance from Gaitskell's proposal in Socialism and Nationalisation to 
establish state enterprises to carry out projects 'where private firms would not 
undertake the risk' or 'mixed enterprise[s]' where the risk could be shared.''^ What 
Wilson added was simply the association of this 'risk' primarily with the application 
of scientific developments. A careful analysis of Industry and Society shows that it 
was frequently only in such subtle ways that Wilson was building upon, and 
advancing, revisionist thinking. In Industry and Society, for instance, it had been 
proposed - as an example of when public ownership would be necessary - that 
industries which were incapable of meeting the 'challenge of modem technology' 
should be taken over. Moreover, it had continued - in anticipation of Wilson's ideas 
concerning the Research Development Corporation - by recommending that 'new 
industries, like atomic energy, can be pioneered from the start under public 
ownership'. 
"^Ziegler, Wilson, p. 143. 
'^Gaitskell, Socialism and nationalisation, p. 35. 
180 Labour party, Industry and Society, pp. 45 & 47. 
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If, then, Wilson's ideas in the early 1960s relied so heavily on the work of the 
revisionists, what must be explained is why his policy proposals were warmly 
received by the party, rather than vociferously attacked as the revisionists' work had 
been. To some extent the difference might be explained as a consequence of Wilson's 
opposition to clause IV revision, and to his 'left-wing' credentials that he retained 
I g I 
from the early 1950s. More significantly, however, while basing his ideas on a 
revisionist analysis he did not adopt all of their proposals. Primarily, he avoided 
promoting their controversial proposals of public share ownership so heavily criticised 
in 1959 by Castle. 
Despite these differences, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the main reason that Wilson succeeded where Gaitskell and the revisionists had failed 
was due to his rhetorical style. He appeared able to wrap up what was essentially a 
rejection of 'old-style' nationalisation in the rhetoric of 'socialist advance' and thus 
convince the traditionalists that the barriers of public ownership were to be pushed 
significantly forward. The 1964 election manifesto - Let's Go with Labour for the 
New Britain - was full of inspiring visions that 'Labour is ready. Poised to swing its 
plans into instant operation. Impatient to apply the New Thinking ...'.'^^ Doubts must 
remain, however, about this 'new thinking'. Thompson and Tomlinson argue that it 
was little more than rhetoric which, once in power, would be unable to cover over the 
'prescriptive fragility of the basis on which the vision rested'.'*'* Pimlott takes the 
complete opposite position, accepting much of Wilson's scientific rhetoric at face 
'^'Credentials he had enhanced by symbolically standing against Gaitskell for the Party leadership in 
1960. 
'^ ^Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p. 244; Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, p. 185. 
'"Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 255. 
'^ ''Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, p. 185. Similarly, Tomiinson has dismissed the 
manifesto commitments to economic planning as 'seem[ing] to have been largely a rhetoric which had 
little impact on actual policies': Tomlinson, 'Planning: Debate and policy in the 1940s', p. 154. 
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value.'^^ As Jefferys rightly argues, neither analysis appears sustainable.'^ ^ 
Nevertheless, Wilson's rhetorical bluster placed great pressure on the incoming 
Labour government to succeed in bringing about a breakthrough to a new scientific 
age.'^ ^ The suitability of revisionist thinking to the practicalities of government was 
to be exposed to a rigorous examination in conditions - very much of Wilson's own 
making - when much was expected from it. 
'*^ See Pimlott, Wilson, pp. 273-4. Although Pimlott conceded, in debate with Catterall, that 
'Wilsonism is more a style than a political philosophy': Catterall, 'Anatomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', 
p. 333. 
'^ ^Jefferys, 'British politics and the road to 1964', especially p. 121-2. See also Kirby, 'Blackett in the 
'white heat", p. 987. 
'*'AS Pimlott argues, the government 'was a disappointment against the high hopes that had been raised 
for it. However, in a way I think it needed those high hopes to get elected and the fact that it did not 
fulfil them was the price that had to be paid': Catterall, 'Anatomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', p. 329. 
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Chapter Four 
Constraints on the Wilson government's economic poHcies: 
Unavoidable or self-imposed? 
The industrial policies of the Labour party at the 1964 general election had 
clearly undergone fundamental revision fi:om those of 1945. As the previous chapter 
has shown, the 'shopping-list' approach to nationalisation favoured in the immediate 
post-war years had been substantially changed during the 1950s and early 60s. It had 
not, however, been revised out of existence. It may no longer have been the case that 
industry after industry was felt to be 'ripe or over-ripe for public ownership and 
management'; nonetheless the 1964 election manifesto Let's Go with Labour for the 
New Britain maintained a commitment to extending such ownership and control 
where circumstances were felt to warrant it. Moreover, this was not some generalised 
statement offered merely as a sop to party 'traditionalists': the iron and steel industry 
was specifically named as a candidate for nationalisation.' 
Thus despite having changed both in nature and in prominence, the party's 
commitment to public ownership and control was still extant in 1964. However, the 
record of the government during its six years of office raises serious quesfions about 
the true nature of Labour's commitment to nationalisation by this time. For example, 
the faltering process by which iron and steel was re-nationalised, indicates that the 
Wilson governments approached nationalisation without either enthusiasm or 
determination. Moreover, it was not only in terms of such 'unfinished business' as 
iron and steel that the Wilson govenmients appeared hesitant. The 1964 manifesto 
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had highlighted the 'rapid application of new scientific discoveries' - Wilson's 'white 
heat' of technological revolution - as a particular area in which 'public enterprise' 
would find a new role.'^  However, despite the lack of any obvious breakthrough in the 
use of science by private industry between 1964 and 1970, there was little evidence of 
the government fulfilling the manifesto pledge to overcome such reticence through the 
'establish[ment of] new industries, either by public enterprise or in partnership with 
private industry'.^ 
There is, however, a paradox. Despite the tentativeness with which iron and 
steel nationalisation was addressed, and despite the lack of new public enterprises in 
'white heat' industries such as computing, the government did in fact extend both 
public control and ownership over certain industries and companies not foreshadowed 
by the election manifesto. Shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, for example, were 
exposed to new forms of direct government intervention. In both cases, the 
government pursued the 'partnership with private industry' which the manifesto had 
indicated would be followed in the field of new technology. It cannot, therefore, be 
argued that the Wilson government was not committed to using public ownership and 
control to achieve economic goals. 
Despite this, historians of the Wilson government have as yet given little 
consideration to discovering which particular economic goals were felt to be best 
served by such intervention. Why, for example, was the government prepared to 
intervene directly in some circumstances, such as to save the Fairfields shipyard or the 
Beagle Aircraft Company, but not in other instances which seem equally deserving of 
intervention, such as the computer manufacturing industry? Most historians have 
'Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 259. 
^Ibid., p. 260. 
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focused on aspects of the Wilson government's 'new' economic and technology 
policies - especially concerning the impact of the Department for Economic Affairs 
(DEA) and the National Plan, and the Ministry of Technology (MinTech).'' Yet 'old 
fashioned' industrial intervention was argued in the manifesto to be an integral part of 
the government's overall economic strategy: an examination of its use is clearly 
essential both to a study of the Labour party's public ownership policies, and to any 
broader analysis of the government's economic performance. Before the details of 
specific interventions can be examined, however, it is necessary to undertake a more 
general analysis of the government's economic policies. Woodward and Bale have 
already addressed aspects of the implementation of economic policy, but neither 
sought to determine the impact of general economic policy on the government's 
ability to undertake nationalisation or other forms of industrial intervention.^ 
The evidence of the Attlee government might be thought to demonstrate that 
the impact was minimal. The nationalisation programme implemented between 1945 
and 1951 was not obviously held back by the many economic difficulties which were 
faced. However, two factors made the situation different in 1964. Firstly, the 
incoming Wilson government did not have the clear programme which had existed in 
1945. Industrial intervenfion was to be dynamic - reacting to the economic and 
industrial developments which emerged over the course of the government. This type 
of policy would be substantially affected by the government's economic management. 
Secondly, in contrast to those of the Attlee government the Wilson government's 
^Ibid. 
•"See, for example, Christopher Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the Department of Economic Affairs 1964-
69: British government and indicative planning', Contemporary British History, 11 (1997), and, on 
the Ministry of Technology, Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat' and Edgerton, 'The 'White 
Heat' revisited'. 
'Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance'; Tim Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision: The 'failure' 
to devalue the pound, 1964-7', Twentieth Century British History, 10 (1999). 
128 
economic policies are generally considered to have failed in their objectives. This 
makes an examination of the reasons for this failure of great relevance of any study of 
industrial policy. 
I 
In particular, it is impossible to explain why industrial policy evolved as it did 
without identifying the severe constraints placed by the economic environment upon 
ministries and ministers responsible for nationalisation. Both the ability to introduce 
nationalisation measures in the first place, as well as the specific nature of any such 
measures, were profoundly influenced by the deflationary economic policies that the 
government repeatedly adopted. An assessment of industrial ownership policy cannot 
be divorced from an understanding of the government's inability to master the 
economic circumstances they faced, and the reasons why such crucial manifesto 
proposals as the creation of a Department for Economic Affairs and the establishment 
of a National Plan for economic growth failed to achieve the aims set out for them. 
Consideration must also be given to the constraints facing domestic policy generally 
due to the intractable nature of serious foreign policy problems, notably Vietnam and 
Rhodesia. Any judgement on the nature of the Wilson government's commitment to 
public ownership and control must be tempered by knowledge that the priority given 
by the Cabinet to these policies was affected by the difficulties faced in the execution 
of other policies. A similar order of difficulties had confronted the Attlee government 
throughout its period of office,^ but the Wilson government appeared less able to 
master the problems it faced than the most pessimistic of its supporters might have 
assumed in 1964. 
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This is not to claim that the Labour party entered the 1964 election unaware 
that the country faced economic difficulties. On the contrary, it openly acknowledged 
that Britain was experiencing relative economic decline in comparison with 
continental countries. It argued that the Conservatives had allowed Britain's 
economic performance to drift during their thirteen years in office while other nations, 
particularly France, had planned for, and achieved, superior economic growth.' In 
order to end this malaise, and to accelerate Britain's rate of growth. Labour offered 
'effective economic planning ... and the application of science'.^ Dismissing any 
evidence of a Conservative 'conversion' to planning - even the 1963 establishment of 
the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) - as little more than a 'death-
bed repentance', Labour claimed that true commitment to scientific planning could 
only come through socialism.^ The confidence of the Labour message in 1964 is 
perhaps its most striking aspect. The party proclaimed itself 'impatient' to get to grips 
with the problems of the country; 'poised to swing its plans into instant operation ... 
[and] to apply the New Thinking that will end the chaos and sterility'.'" 
Having promised so much, however, the Wilson government conspicuously 
failed to deliver on almost every aspect of its economic policies. There was little 
evidence of any substantial application of new 'white heat' technology in industry. 
More significantly, the economic planning that the party had claimed in its manifesto 
to be ready to 'swing ... into instant operation' failed to achieve any noticeable 
''For an overview of the challenges facing the Attlee government's economic policies, see Tomlinson, 
Democratic socialism and economic policy. See also Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, p. 7. 
^Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, pp. 256-8. 
Caimcross has questioned whether France's rate of growth was in fact that exceptional: 'Witness 
seminar: The Department for Economic Affairs', (eds.) Christopher Clifford and Alastair McMillan, 
Contemporary British History, 11 (1997), p. 119. 
Vilson, The New Britain, p. 36; Pimlott, Wilson, pp. 272, 307. 
'Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 258. 
^°Ibid., p. 255. 
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'breakthrough in growth'. That which was introduced largely disintegrated into little 
more than meaningless gestures and rhetoric in the face of the simultaneous pursuit by 
the government of directly conflicting policies. The overwhelming impression, both 
among popular opinion at the time, and in the majority of the historiography ever 
since, is of a government which was never really in charge of the economic 
situation." Rather, Wilson and his Cabinet have been portrayed as like the crew of a 
rudderless ship, driven by forces they neither controlled nor understood into deflation, 
stagnation, and ultimately devaluation.'^ For the Wilson government, an atmosphere 
of crisis appeared prevalent from its very inception. There are very few instances 
between 1964 and 1970 when it could be convincingly argued that the government 
was in a situation where it could successfully oversee the implementation of its 
manifesto economic goals and prescripfions. 
Yet while thfere is little reason to doubt the basic premise that the Wilson 
government's economic policies were a failure, the reasons for this failure and the 
conclusions that may be drawn from it remain far from clear cut. Some authors have 
concluded that the failure indicates that the commitment to planning was mere 
rhetoric.'^ Yet as more detailed studies of the activities of the DEA and the Ministry 
of Technology have demonstrated, such a conclusion is unjustified.''* The efforts put 
into the production of the National Plan are evidence that at least some ministers gave 
credence to the notion of planned economic growth. Moreover, despite indications to 
the contrary, it is clear that at times Wilson was strongly committed to the idea of the 
"See 'Introduction: The Wilson years', in Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, pp. 
3-4. 
'^Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
'^ See, for example, Thompson, Political economy and the Labour party, p. 185; Tomlinson, 'Planning: 
Debate and policy in the 1940s', p. 154. 
'••see Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA'; Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat'; Edgerton, 
'The 'White Heat' revisited'. 
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DEA acting as a counterpoint to the perceived hindrance to growth from the 
Treasury's fiscal conservatism.'^ 
Accurate assessment of the failure to achieve the economic goals set out in 
1964 must instead focus on the question why the prescriptive tools of planning were 
not consistently applied by the government. What should be established is first, 
whether the government simply decided that DEA-style planning was an inappropriate 
economic tool and adopted an alternative economic strategy. Second, i f this was not 
the case, then can it be concluded that the Wilson government failed to establish any 
coherent economic strategy at all? Third, can the failure to achieve planned economic 
growth be ascribed to simple naivete on the part of Wilson himself? Was it ever 
realistic to expect a new economic department to be able to overcome the influence of 
the Treasury within Whitehall? 
The answers to these questions are of fundamental importance to an 
understanding not simply of the economic policies of the government, but of its public 
ownership policies too. For i f it was the case that economic policy failed because the 
opinions of the 'new' economic ministries - the DEA and the Ministry of Technology 
- were silenced by the influence of the Treasury, then the implications for public 
ownership policy seem inescapable. Nationalisation represented an increase in the 
burden of state expenditure, and a Cabinet which was overly concerned with 'Treasury 
'^ As Clifford notes, the idea of setting up a DEA was well advanced by Wilson before the 1964 
election, and he 'gave Balogh the job of designing such a ministry': Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the 
DEA', pp. 95-7. Balogh raised this topic with Wilson in January 1968, when the future of the DEA 
was hanging in the balance. Referring to the 'circumstances which led you to the decision to create 
the DEA', he reminded Wilson that 'the most important of these was the decision we reached that a 
centralised overlordship by the Treasury ... cannot yield satisfactory results ... for those of us who 
believe in purposive planning and action in the modem world': CAB 147/8, memorandum on 'The 
future of the DEA' by Balogh (8 Jan. 1968). See also CAB 147/7, Balogh to Wilson (5 Feb. 1965) 
and CAB 147/9, memorandum on 'The experiences with the government machine' by Balogh (25 
Feb. 1965). Surprisingly, Callaghan has, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight, expressed the view 
that the reasoning behind the DEA, including dealing with 'a musty of Treasury', were justified: 
Callaghan in 'Witness seminar: The DEA', pp. 124-5. 
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issues' such as the balance of payments and the strength of sterling might have been 
expected to be loathe to support such measures.'^  
II 
From the first Cabinet meeting of the 1964-70 Wilson government to the last, 
Wilson and his ministers appear to have been reacting to circumstances, usually of a 
negative nature, rather than rationally implementing any form of coherent economic 
policy. It is not at all clear, however, i f the atmosphere of ad hoc crisis management 
was not in fact self-induced, a result of the way in which the government worked and 
the policies it adopted. Undoubtedly the economic conditions faced by Britain 
between 1964 and 1970 were far from favourable and would have troubled any 
government.'^ Yet the Labour party had declared itself capable of tackling such 
economic difficulties and to have policies for overcoming them. Moreover, it 
acknowledged in its 1964 manifesto that there would be hard times to be endured 
before its prescriptive remedies could 'cure' the economic failings of the Conservative 
years.'^ Nonetheless, it had expressed 'impatience' to get to grips with the task of 
modernising the economy. It seems remarkable that having come to power expressing 
such impatience, the Wilson government failed to pursue with any rigour the 
prescriptive policies they had offered as the solution to Britain's economic problems. 
The government did not have to wait long before making serious economic 
choices. No sooner had Wilson arrived at Number 10 than officials bombarded him 
'^ Castle notes that Callaghan warned her in February 1966 against proposing any new public authorities 
for transport (She was Minister of Transport at the time) on the grounds that this risked increasing 
public expenditure: Castle, Diaries, p. 109 (25 Feb. 1966). 
"Although some authors have questioned whether the economic situation was, in reality, as critical as it 
appeared: see, for example, Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State. Vol H: Threats to 
the Postwar Settlement: Britain 1961-74 (1990), p. 112-116. 
'^Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 258. 
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with talk of impending economic crisis.'^ The previous Conservative administration 
had allowed a serious over-heating of the economy to occur in the run-up to the 
election which had caused an £800 million deficit to build up in the balance of 
payments.^ *^ Consequently the officials presented the incoming government with a 
stark choice: either deflationary measures would have to be immediately introduced, 
or the pound might have to be devalued.'^' 
In facing this difficult choice, Wilson sought the advice not only of his 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Callaghan, but also George Brown, head of the DEA 
and holder of the newly-established title of First Minister of State for Economic 
Affairs. Although it would have been difficult to have avoided consulting Brown, his 
key role is an indication that the DEA was at this stage perceived by Wilson as 
playing as important a role as the Treasury in economic affairs.'^ ^ The decision of the 
three men, taken without consulting Cabinet, was that the parity of sterling should be 
defended, despite the fact that this would require a severely restrictive package of 
deflationary measures. This decision has proved the most controversial of the entire 
government, and Pimlott has argued that 'with hindsight ... [it] was also its worst', 
sealing the fate of the government even as it was being formed.'^ ^ It was subsequently 
considered by many members of the government, eventually including Brown himself, 
as a missed opportunity.^ "* Committing the government to defence of the value of 
sterling came to be perceived as limiting the government's room for manoeuvre in 
'^ George Brown, In my way: The political memoirs of Lord George Brown (1971), p. 99; Pimlott, 
Wilson, p. 349 
^"CAB 128/39, CC (64) 1, 2 (19 Oct. 1964); Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance', pp. 75, 79-
80. 
^'Castle, Diaries, pp. xii-xiii (preface); Brown, In my way, p. 99 
^^This impression is reinforced by the subject that was being discussed - sterling parity. The Treasury 
would certainly up until this time have considered such an area of policy to be exclusively within its 
remit. 
"Pimlott, Wilson, p. 351. 
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economic and industrial policy before it even attempted to introduce its 'new' 
economic planning. It was an evaluation that even Wilson conceded during a frank 
assessment of the economic position in June 1965.^ ^^  
As several scholars have argued, however, it is not evident that it is realistic to 
have expected Wilson, Brown and Callaghan to have made any other decision.^^ Bale 
has identified four main reasons why devaluation 'was not an option that could 
seriously be considered' at this time. First, the three were 'concerned to play by the 
rules of the international financial game'.'^ ^ Second, to have devalued within days of 
coming to power would have been a devastating blow to the reputation of the 
government. It would have given powerful ammunition to claims that Labour was the 
'party of devaluation'. It was a charge that Wilson, having been involved in the 
devaluation of 1949, was especially keen to avoid. Third, the three men, and 
particularly Callaghan, were well aware that any devaluation would have to be backed 
by a strong package of deflationary measures which. Bale argues, 'they did not believe 
it [the government] could sell to its own supporters (and indeed its own members) so 
soon after supposedly putting an end to 'thirteen wasted years' of Conservative 
government'. 
Finally, and most importantly, they did not believe that devaluation was an 
appropriate solution to the problems facing the economy at this time: 'the 
overvaluation of sterling was a symptom not a cause', and the cure 'required a long-
^'Brown, In my way, pp. 114-5; Grossman, Diaries, ii, p. 571 (17 June 66); Castle, Diaries, p. xiii. 
^'CAB 128/39, CC (65) 32, 2 (3 June 1965). 
^^Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', especially pp. 197-8; Catterall, 'Atomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', 
p. 328; Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance', pp. 79, 82. Woodward has, however, 
emphasised that their ability to judge the cortect course to take was not helped by Labour's failure to 
develop an adequate financial policy while in opposition, and in particular 'it had no long-run 
conception of the role of sterling'. 
135 
term structural strategy designed to increase productivity and investment'.This had 
been the judgement underpinning the programme of economic planning and 
regeneration on which the government had just been elected, '^' and it was far from 
illogical for them to assume that once this programme was developed and the 
economy resumed higher growth, the balance of payments position would improve, 
the pressure on the pound would recede, and any need for devaluation would 
disappear. Wilson, Brown and Callaghan were backed in their conclusions by the 
Bank of England and the Treasury, although some government officials (notably 
Donald McDougall, the new Director-General of the DEA) did favour a change of 
parity.^' Essentially, however, the judgement that the decision against devaluation in 
October 1964 was a lost opportunity comes not because it went against overwhelming 
advice at the time, but rather because of the evidence of the repeated economic crises 
that followed it over the next three years. 
The dilemma that government ministers came to realise was that the decision 
to defend the parity of sterling was one of the most significant factors preventing 
economic growth. However, such a dilemma was not obvious in October 1964. 
Despite the difficult circumstances in which it was established, the government 
attempted to implement the party manifesto's economic policies. The package of 
deflationary restrictions implemented to defend sterling was blamed on the economic 
recklessness of the previous Conservative administration. In Cabinet Callaghan 
^'AS Bale notes, the reaction of the E F T A countries to the imposition of import surcharges (see below. 
Chapter VII, pp. 224-5) demonstrates that there were real dangers in ignoring overseas opinion: Bale, 
'Dynamics of a non-decision', p. 197. 
^^Ibid.,pp. 198, 199, 203. 
Ibid., pp. 201-2. 
'"Bale stresses that, to a great extent, 'the decision to reject devaluation was taken before Labour came 
to office and merely confirmed ... as soon as Wilson, Brown, and Caliaghan had the chance to 
convene officially': ibid., p. 198. 
^^Ibid., p. 198. 
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insisted that it was not a continuation of the 'stop-go' policies of Treasury-inspired 
restrictions the Conservatives had relied upon, and the government 'did not intend to 
rely either on borrowing or on deflationary policies'. It was a temporary measure 
which would bring the economy and the trade balance back under control in order that 
the new planning policies could get to work.^^ Indeed, even Callaghan openly 
expressed how 'unfortunate' it was that 'action which we had to take in an attempt to 
repel an external threat to sterling in the short-term would exert a disinflationary 
influence on the domestic economy and to that extent would appear to be inconsistent' 
with the government's broader economic policies.^^ 
I l l 
Although Coopey has harshly dismissed it as a 'marginal organisation',^'' the 
most compelling evidence of the government's genuine commitment to fulfilling the 
manifesto's economic policies surely lies in the creation of the Department for 
Economic Affairs. Although it has been alleged that the department was thought up 
by Wilson in the back of a taxi as a means of giving Brown something important to 
'^CAB 128/39, CC (64) 2, 5 (22 Oct. 1966). This is confirmed by the preliminary discussions held by 
senior ministers regarding the National Plan. Brown argued at the Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Affairs (whose membership included Wilson and Callaghan) that if the Plan 'were to be 
implemented successfiilly it would be essential to create the right economic environment'. To this 
end, he argued that 'restrictions in home demand should not be applied too widely in view of the 
undesirable consequences they might have for business confidence'. He recognised that 'this 
objective might conflict, in the short-term, with measures that were necessary for maintaining 
confidence in sterling', but argued that without a commitment to the longer-term aims of the Plan the 
defence of sterling would be frustrated. Significantly, at this time there was 'general agreement with 
the view that the government should adopt the positive attitude of increasing supply rather than the 
negative one of restricting demand': CAB 130/202, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Affairs, paras. 1-3 (19 Feb. 1965). It should be noted, however, that Woodward has convincingly 
argued that the government should in fact have introduced a much harsher package at this time if it 
seriously wished to give itself 'breathing space' to introduce its growth strategies: see Woodward, 
'Labour's economic performance', pp. 82-3. 
"CAB 128/39, CC (64) 10, 2 (24 Nov. 1964). 
"^•Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat', p. 120; Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited', p. 66. 
Even if it may be cortect to assert that it became marginalised by Wilson and Callaghan, this does not 
necessarily mean that it was an unimportant organisation, and certainly does not imply that study of 
the reasons for its maginalisation can be ignored. 
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do, such an analysis cannot be sustained.'^ ^ In October 1964, and even earlier, Wilson, 
and especially his Cabinet Office economic advisor Balogh, were clear that the 
creation of the DEA was an essential strand of economic policy.^^ To this end the 
DEA was charged with the dual planning tasks of drawing up a National Plan for 
economic growth - described by Clifford as 'Labour's raison d'etre'^^ - and 
formulating a prices and incomes policy which would allow the Plan to be 
implemented without inflationary pressures over-heating the economy. Superficially 
both policies were taken forward with much energy and determination. The National 
Plan was produced with incredible rapidity given its complexity, being presented to 
parliament in the autumn of 1965.^ ^ Likewise, the prices and incomes policy was 
forced forward with great enthusiasm and energy by Brown. Building substantially on 
the work of the previous Conservative government and the NEDC,^^ Brown 
succeeded almost by force of personality alone in getting unions and employers to 
agree to a Joint Statement of purpose in December 1964,'*" and this breakthrough was 
followed up with almost continual pressure on both sides of industry to agree to the 
"Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA', pp. 95-6. 
^^Ibid., pp. 95-7. Benn records that discussions were organised by Balogh and Wilson in May 1963 on 
the idea of 'dividing the Treasury into two halves and giving half of it over to a Ministry of Expansion 
or Production': Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 25 (25 May 1963). See also CAB 147/8, memorandum on 
'The future of the DBA' by Balogh (8 Jan. 1968); CAB 147/7, Balogh to Wilson (5 Feb. 1965) and 
CAB 147/9, memorandum on 'The experiences with the government machine' by Balogh (25 Feb. 
1965). Brown himself recalled in August 1966 that Wilson had, when appointing him as First 
Secretary, 'made clear that he would rank in precedence before the Chancellor': EW 27/60, meeting 
of Brown with his officials (12 Aug. 1966). This is to some extent confirmed by his appointment to 
chair the Ministerial Committee on Economic Development. The influence of Balogh on the 
formation of economic policy is addressed in more detail in Chapter VI I . 
"Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA', p. 103. 
^^Treasury economists such as Caimcross have repeatedly criticised the entire exercise as a sham, 
arguing that the Plan offered 'no understanding of how growth could be accelerated'. It is a criticism 
partially accepted by Lord Croham (formerly Douglas Allen, Deputy Under Secretary of State, DEA, 
1964-66, Permanent Secretary of State, DEA, 1966-68): Caimcross and Croham in 'Witness 
seminars: The DEA', pp. 126, 129. Woodward, however, is substantially more positive, arguing that 
'with its emphasis on supply-side policies', the Plan 'still reads quite well': Woodward, 'Labour's 
economic performance', p. 86. 
^'Ringe, 'Background to Neddy', p. 89. 
""CAB 128/39, CC (64) 15, 5 (15 Dec. 1964). 
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establishment of permanent regulation and control over prices and incomes.'" Indeed, 
Clifford has questioned whether Brown's personal devotion to the policy was perhaps 
even excessive, given the range of other tasks he had to undertake."^ 
Given that the DEA under Brown's leadership appeared so dynamic and was 
clearly advancing the mechanisms of economic planning, it might be wondered why 
the government has been considered so directionless in economic policy, and so half-
hearted in its commitment to planning. However, for all the energy of Brown and his 
department, the grave economic problems that the government faced were not 
overcome.'*'^  The reasons for this failure lie not in the activities of DEA and its 
plarmers, but in the refusal of Wilson and Callaghan to allow the policies pursued by 
the DEA to get in the way of their defence of sterling. 
IV 
The reality was that the conditions of restriction imposed in October 1964 as a 
once-only short-term measure to restore confidence and balance to the economy, 
increasingly because the main tool of economic policy. The government discovered 
that by deciding to maintain the value of the pound, it had imposed on itself a straight-
jacket from which it was not able to escape. For it was not simply that the decision 
taken in October 1964 meant a rejection of devaluation at that particular time; it came 
to imply a commitment to ensuring that devaluation would not, and could not, occur 
under the Labour government at any time. 
•"By February 1965, for example, he had secured agreement for the establishment of the National Prices 
and Incomes Board: CAB 128/39, CC (65) 7, 4 (5 Feb. 1965). 
'^Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA', p. 110. 
''^And, as Brown argued in April 1965, until the balance of payments and sterling problems were dealt 
with, it was 'unsatisfactory' to publish details of the Plan, since they were so clearly dependent on the 
policies adopted to deal with these problems: CAB 129/39, CC (65) 20, 3 (1 Apr. 1965). 
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This interpretation was not one universally subscribed to at Cabinet; indeed it 
was one which Brown himself came to reject. It was, however, the interpretation that 
Callaghan, and, more importantly, Wilson, adopted. To devalue later, having publicly 
made the decision not to devalue in 1964, would, in both of their minds, have been a 
devaluation of their own words.'*'' It was a logic from which there was less and less 
escape, for every proclamation they made in support of sterling made the potential 
embarrassment of any later devaluation that much greater.''^  Thus it was not the 
decision against devaluation in 1964 which was so important per se, but the effect of 
that decision in pushing Wilson and Callaghan into a psychological comer from which 
they could see no escape. 
The two men became convinced that even to consider devaluation was to 
admit total defeat on their economic policies.''^ Even in Cabinet discussion could not 
be allowed on the possibility of devaluation, for to do so was to admh the possibility 
that the government might not succeed in its sterling policy.'*^ However, closing off 
the option of devaluation did nothing to prevent either balance-of-payments problems, 
or consequent crises in confidence in sterling. With every change in the trade balance 
or sterling balance scrutinised minutely in 10 and 11 Downing Street, the possibility 
of establishing a coherent long-term economic policy declined rapidly. Instead, 
Wilson and Callaghan became increasingly convinced that negative movements in the 
balances required implementation of deflationary packages lest they should lead to a 
"""Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', p. 208. See HC Deb. (751), cols. 99-102 (24 July 1967), when 
Callaghan explicitly stated that ' I just do not want to devalue our own word'. 
"^Pimlott, Wilson, p. 353. 
''^In June 1965 Callaghan argued that 'a considerable part of our difficulties [regarding sterling] were 
psychological in origin', and Wilson agreed, urging that 'in public the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
should maintain an attitude of quiet confidence', refusing even to countenance devaluation: CAB 
130/202, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs, paras. 1-4 (24 June 1965). 
""'Balogh argued that 'the extreme secretiveness with which this is now handled is an obstacle to rational 
discussion': CAB 147/12, Balogh to Wilson (6 Jan. 1966). 
140 
fall in confidence in the parity. Yet devaluation hampered the very process of 
economic planning for growth that might have reduced or removed the causes of 
difficulties with sterling and the trade balances. Moreover, they reduced the 
likelihood of expensive nationalisation measures finding support with Wilson or 
Callaghan. 
The contradictions inherent in this policy were first brought into the open in 
summer 1965. By this fime. Brown and his fledgling DEA had succeeded in 
producing the National Plan. The heart of the Plan was a firm commitment to 
achieving an increase in national output of 25 percent by 1970.''^  The methods 
whereby this target was to be achieved were elaborated at great length, both in relation 
to what was expected by individual industries, and also, crucially, in terms of the 
economic policies that industries could expect the government to pursue.'*' As Brown 
described it, 'the Plan sets out a common framework to which the government itself is 
firmly committed and on which ... industries can base their investment decisions'. 
At exactly the time that Brown was hailing the Plan as the first step to planned 
economic expansion, however, a balance-of-payments problem was looming.^' The 
conduct of economic policy at this particular juncture shows that far from developing 
into the equal of the Treasury, as Wilson and Balogh had argued was essential for the 
"^ See DEA, The National Plan ((Cmnd. 2764) 1965), Chapter 1, 'The Plan in outline'. In terms of the 
justifiability or otherwise of the rate chosen, Ringe emphasises that the rate of growth adopted had in 
fact been considered 'the base line of economic planning' since the establishment of NEDC: Ringe, 
'Background to Neddy', p. 92. In 1963 the NEDC's publication. Growth of the United Kingdom 
economy to 1966, took the same 4% per annum figure as the Plan as the basis of its examination of the 
restrictions on expansion: Fred Catherwood, 'The National Economic Development Council: A view 
from industry', Contemporary British History, 12 (1998), pp. 77-8. 
'''See DEA, The National Plan, especially Chapters 18 and 19, 'Public expenditure' and 'Defence', as 
well as Part I I , 'Industrial Annexes'. 
^"PREM 13/827, briefing memorandum from Brown to Wilson (13 Sept. 1965); DEA, The National 
Plan, 'foreword'. 
^'indeed, officials in other departments, especially the Treasury, urged the DEA to reconsider the 
adoption of a 25% growth target, arguing that given 'the extent of our balance of payments difficulties 
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success of economic policy, the DEA was in reality unable to establish its aims of 
plarmed growth in the face of the dominance of Treasury thinking over the Cabinet. 
Brown argued that 'the essential purpose of the plan is to provide a way out of 
the vicious circle of balance of payments leading to restrictions in demand which 
themselves have prevented the growth of supply'.^ •^  Yet Callaghan was demanding 
that the Cabinet approved just such a package of deflationary measures to slow the 
economy dovm and restrict the rate of growth in order to maintain balance on the 
trading account.^ "* These two policy prescriptions were clearly inconsistent: 
Callaghan's proposals virtually guaranteed that the Plan's estimate of 25 percent 
growth by 1970 would be rendered meaningless.^ ^ The Cabinet's decision to approve 
Callaghan's deflationary package cannot be considered, as the October 1964 package 
was, as a one-off temporary measure with no impact on long-term economic policy. 
This decision was a fundamental one, as Brown, Castle, Crossman and Crosland 
recognised.^^ The Cabinet rejected planned economic growth as a luxury that could 
and the amount of economic mess which has to be cleared up, it is most unwise for the government to 
commit itself in this way: EW 24/7, note by G.D. MacDougai (DEA) (18 Nov. 1964). 
^^Bale notes the extent to which many non-economic ministers bowed to the perceived 'expert' 
knowledge of the Treasury: Bale, 'Dynamics of a Non-Decision', p. 206. Balogh argued in May 1965 
that unless the contradictions between the positions of the Treasury and the DEA were sorted out, 'the 
whole planning exercise will remain fairly academic': CAB 147/11, Balogh to Michael Stewart (18 
May 1965). He had already informed Wilson in February that he 'totally disagreed' with the 
Treasury's analysis of the economic situation and their assumption, as he saw it, that economic growth 
on the scale envisaged in the Plan would lead to devaluation: CAB 147/11, Balogh to Wilson (17 Feb. 
1965). 
" C A B 130/203, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs, memorandum on 'The Plan' by 
Brown, para. 2(18 Feb. 1965). 
^*CAB 128/39, CC (65) 41, 1 (27 July 1965). 
"Brown admitted that 'it was perhaps debatable whether, in the light of the current economic situation, 
it would be wise to seek to adhere to this timetable [that is, 25% growth by 1970]': CAB 128/39, CC 
(65) 44, 2 (3 Aug. 1965). DEA Officials argued that to 'continue to assert its validity in the face of 
the facts will ... bring the whole concept of planning into disrepute': EW 24/93, memorandum by 
officials for First Secretary (10 May 1966). 
According to Castle, Crosland told the Cabinet that deflation was 'leading us straight into stagnation'. 
Crossman and Castle strongly backed him: Castle, Diaries, p. 52 (27 July 65). Indeed, Clifford has 
gone so far as to argue that Brown should have made this explicit by seeking to include in the 
National Plan a recommendation of devaluation: Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA', p. 109. 
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not be afforded." It was a rejection, in effect, of the purpose of the DEA. The 
decision lays bare the hollowness of Wilson's stated aim of creating the department as 
a counter-balance to the influence of the Treasury. 
Wilson had always recognised that there might be conflict between the two 
CO 
ministries, but he had argued that this would be a 'creative tension'. It is clear, 
however, that the psychological hold which the balance of payments and sterling 
parity had over Wilson ensured he would not stay neutral in any such conflicts. 
Where a perceived threat to sterling was concerned, Wilson would almost inevitably 
back his Chancellor regardless of the consequences to wider economic policy. This 
was demonstrated by the government's response to the repetition in the following 
summer of the balance-of-payments difficulties.^" In July 1966, Callaghan admitted 
to the Cabinet that 'despite the various doses of disinflation ... the economy remains 
in an inflationary condifion'. 'At the same fime', he continued, 'we have not yet 
succeeded in eliminating the enormous deficit in the balance of payments that we 
"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 41, 1 (27 July 1965); Castle, Diaries, p. 54 (3 Aug. 1965). 
^^Both between the ministries and personally between Callaghan and Brown (and from Wilson's 
perspective thereby preventing the two men conspiring against his leadership): Clifford, 'The rise and 
fall of the DEA', p. 107. 
^'Wilson's steadfast support for Callaghan's package is evidence in the records of the July 1965 
Cabinet discussions, during which he did not even acknowledge the negative effect it would have on 
the government's planning: CAB 128/39, CC (65) 41, 1 (27 July 1965). He was rapidly disabused of 
this notion. In January 1966 the government's chief economic advisors (Caimcross, Neild, Kaldor, 
Jukes and Balogh) concluded that Wilson and Callaghan's approach was failing; all the evidence 
indicated 'our inability to reconcile faster growth and extemal balance within the limits of present of 
policies': CAB 130/259, note to the Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs on 'The 
Economic Outlook' by the Economic Advisors, para. 5 (4 Jan. 1966). Caimcross has confirmed that 
these economic advisors 'kept urging the government to devalue', and that Neild left the Treasury in 
1967 'in despair of persuading the government to devalue': Alec Caimcross, 'Economic advisors in 
the United Kingdom', Contemporary British History, 13 (1999), p. 237. 
^°In fact, Callaghan had already raised the prospect of fiirther deflationary measures being taken as 
early as November 1965: CAB 147/12, Callaghan to Wilson (11 Nov. 1965); EW 24/65, Callaghan to 
Wilson (22 Nov. 1965). He urged Wilson to 'recognise that we have not succeeded in getting onto 
the course which we set ourselves in July'. Presumably it was only Callaghan's acceptance that 'the 
forecasts on which the present assessment was based were not exact' which allowed Brown to 
dissuade him and Wilson from taking ftirther deflationary measures at this time (and, possibly, that 
Wilson had already decided to call a general election the following spring): EW 24/65, meeting 
between Brown, Callaghan and Wilson (3 Dec. 1965). 
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found on taking office'.^' Further deflationary measures were needed to protect the 
trade balance and sterling. Several Cabinet ministers were aware that a repeat 
package of restrictive measures would destroy any last vestiges of hope for controlled 
economic growth.^^ However, the Cabinet was offered little or no consultation by 
Callaghan and Wilson.^^ By this time a group of ministers, primarily Brown, Castle, 
Benn, Crosland and Crossman, were convinced that devaluation was the only way to 
resurrect economic policy. '^* To Callaghan and Wilson mere discussion of the 
possibility remained unacceptable,^ ^ so Cabinet consultation and discussion was 
severely restricted. Yet the deflationary fait accompli offered to Cabinet by Wilson 
and his Chancellor dealt an effective final coup de grace to the DEA and its aims,^ ^ 
*'CAB 129/126, C (66) 103, memorandum on 'The economic situation' by Callaghan, para. 16 (8 July 
1966); CAB 128/41, CC (66) 35, I (12 July 1966). 
^^CAB 128/41, CC (66) 35, 1 (12 July 1966). As Catherwood (Chief Industrial Advisor, DEA, 1964-
66) argues, 'what we faced in July 1966 was the fact that the government had chickened out, it wasn't 
going to do anything at all. It wasn't going to devalue, it wasn't going to change any policies, it was 
simply coming back to the idea that you put the squeeze on and that solved the balance of trade 
problem by reducing the imports .... So the DEA, I think, then became a busted flush': Catherwood 
in 'Witness seminar: the NEDC, p. 123. However, it should be noted that opposition to Wilson and 
Callaghan was not total: Jay had been calling for a further package of restrictive measures since April: 
see EW 24/66, Jay to Wilson (20 Apr. 1966). 
"The 'need' for a package of deflationary measures was presented to the Cabinet unannounced on 12 
July, and the Cabinet was expected by Wilson and Callaghan to be able to approve its details just two 
days later: see CAB 128/41, CC (66) 35, I (12 July 1966) and CC (66) 36, 3 (14 July 1966). 
'^'Castle records (as does Benn) that Brown, Crossman, Benn and herself had determined beforehand 
that they had to argue this openly in the Cabinet: Castle, Diaries, p. 147 (18 July 1966); Benn, Diaries 
1963-67, p. 454 (16 July 1966). Other ministers in favour of devaluation (according to Castle) were 
Jenkins and Crosland. 
"Only on very rare, private occasions, was discussion of devaluation permitted: see, for example, 
Casfle, Diaries, p. 282-3 (22 July 1966); Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 510 (29 Aug. 1967). 
^^Clifford is blunt but accurate: 'With the advent of the so-called 'July' measures of 1966, the DEA's 
role as a planning ministry ended. Economic planning in the form originally envisaged by the Wilson 
government disappeared': Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the DEA', pp. 103, 109, As Brown's 
successor, Stewart, told Wilson -due to the July 1966 deflationary package 'to put it crudely, there is 
no progress to report in terms of the original National Plan targets'. He argued that even to publish 
revised targets for growth would be 'giving too much a hostage to fortune' and would 'not be credible 
and would lead to ridicule', since the contradictions in the government's economic policies were so 
great: PREM 13/827, Stewart to Wilson (17 Oct. 1966). While conceding that these judgement are 
generally valid. Woodward has questioned whether governments at this time possessed sufficient 
powers to have been able to achieve the ambitions of the National Plan (emphasising that, in 
comparison to the French government, the DEA 'never had much financial leverage over the private 
sector'): Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance', pp. 85-6. 
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and so infuriated the 'devaluationist' ministers that the minutes of the meefing of 19 
July were considered too confidential to be openly distributed.^^ 
At that meeting, this group of ministers 'urged that a change in the 
government's fundamental economic policies was needed'. They argued that 
Wilson's and Callaghan's proposals 'contained no new features'. In contrast, 
'devaluation would add a new dimension to economic policy, which would give the 
government a wider range of choices and objectives'. It was conceded that 
devaluation 'carried an inherent risk of ftirther devaluations, [but] the same was true 
of the alternafive policy of deflafion'. These ministerial criticisms went to the heart of 
the government's economic policies. Crosland in particular 'urged that the parity of 
$2.80 ... had proved to be incompatible with th[e] major objective of improving the 
rate of the growth', and maintained that 'a ftjndamental weakness in the government's 
present policy was the fact that we were seeking to maintain a position in the world 
which our economy could not support'. He argued, backed by Crossman, that the 
fime to devalue had been October 1964, but 'that occasion having been missed, the 
A f t 
opportunity of the present crisis should be taken'. 
Wilson and Callaghan were dismissive of such opinions, arguing that 'it was 
important to distinguish clearly between problems of reality and problems of 
confidence'.^' However, their rejection of other ministers' arguments, which so 
infuriated Brown that he refused to accept Wilson's summing up and 'reserve[d] his 
position',^" could not overcome the inherent flaws in their own economic strategy. 
Although Bale has argued that those ministers calling for devaluation were guilty of 
^'CAB 128/41, CC (66) 37, i (19 July 1966). 
' 'CAB 128/146, CC (66) 37, 1 (19 July 1966). 
''Ibid. 
70 Ibid.; Castle, Diaries, p. 150 (19 July 1966). 
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'economic naivete', it is difficult to see how the deflationary packages offered a long-
term solution to problems of trade balance and lack of confidence in sterling.^' As the 
Labour party leadership itself had argued when in opposition, such 'stop-go' policies 
were a poor alternative to plarmed measures which actually produced a stronger 
economy. Without the growth that the National Plan had been created to achieve, 
the repetition of balance-of-payments crises was unavoidable. As the government's 
economic advisors concluded in January 1966, 'sooner or later' the two men would 
have to face this dilemma.^ '^  
It was the unavoidability of continuing financial crises that eventually rendered 
the unthinkable act of devaluation inevitable. By autumn 1967 it was clear even to 
Wilson and Callaghan that the two deflafionary packages introduced in the summers 
of 1965 and 1966 had achieved little for the long-term economic position. The 
looming prospect of yet another balance-of-payments crisis presented Callaghan and 
Wilson with a dilemma. Despite the lack of opportunity offered for Cabinet debate, it 
was increasingly obvious to both men that many, possibly even most, ministers were 
opposed to more deflation, and that i f given the chance of an open debate, would 
probably press for devaluation. '^* The decision was consequently taken, with much 
reluctance, to abandon sterling parity. Even then, devaluation was decided upon 
"Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', p. 204. The substance of the argument put forward by Bale had 
been considered and rejected by Wilson's own economic advisor in December 1965: CAB 147/12, 
memorandum from Balogh to Wilson (23 Dec. 1965). Similarly, Stewart described Callaghan's 
thinking in private discussions with his officials in the DEA as 'a counsel of despair ... since 
expansion ... was the one way to put the balance of payments right': EW 24/93, meeting between 
Stewart and advisors (9 Sept. 1966). 
^^Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', pp. 197-8. 
" C A B 130/259, note to the Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs on 'The Economic 
Outlook' by the Economic Advisors, para. 7 (4 Jan. 1966). It is dilemma which Bale appears 
remarkably unwilling to recognise: 'Dynamics of a non-decision', especially, p. 204. 
'""Benn, one of the few ministers taken into Wilson's confidence, indicates that by November 1967 there 
were few ministers prepared to back further deflation: Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 512 (8 Nov. 1967). 
At the same time, groups of MPs on both the left and right of the parliamentary party were allying 
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without formal consultation with other ministers. After the Cabinet had been 
presented with the July 1966 measures, Wilson had been obliged by Cabinet criticism 
to form a Ministerial Steering Committee on Economic Policy to ensure that 'they 
were not confronted again, at equally short notice, by an emergency requiring critical 
decisions to be taken without adequate preparation'.^^ Yet during November 1967 the 
Committee never even considered the economic situation until after devaluation, nor 
was it ever given any indication by Callaghan that sterling was in crisis.^^ Similarly, 
the Cabinet was informed by Callaghan on 14 November that ' i t would be useful for 
the Cabinet to have a general discussion in the near future about the economic 
situation', only to be presented with devaluation two days later.^ ^ 
V 
Devaluation was presented to the public as a planned decision taken to free the 
economy of the constraint of an over-valuation of sterling, but it was not so in 
reality. It was a decision forced on Wilson and Callaghan in the face of the 
inescapable reality that sterling parity could not be preserved.^' They admitted to the 
(like minister in the Cabinet were) to press for devaluation: Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', pp. 
216, 209. 
" C A B 128/46, CC (66) 42, 1 (4 Aug. 1966). 
'^The last occasion before devaluation on which the Committee discussed the state of the economy was 
15 September. On that occasion, Callaghan reported only that 'the development of our balance of 
payments situation has been disappointing', in part due to the closure of the Suez canal due to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. He gave no indication, however, that serious problems would arise before the 
summer of 1968. Nor did he mention the growing crisis at the meeting of 8 November, when the 
sterling crisis was already under way: CAB 134/3196, Ministerial Steering Committee on Economic 
Policy, SEP (67) 12, 1 (15 Sept. 1967) and SEP (67) 17, 1 (8 Nov. 1967). The opportunifies for 
ministerial debate on economic policy were in any case diminished by the dissolufion (without 
explanation) of one of the main fomms for economic policy debate, the Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Policy, in September 1967. 
" C A B 128/42, CC (67) 65, 1 (14 Nov. 1967). Perhaps even more incredibly, Caimcross alleges that 
the government's economic advisors, Balogh and Kaldor, were not informed of devaluation unfil after 
the event: Caimcross, 'Economic advisers in the United Kingdom', p. 237. 
^*It should be emphasised to the public, Wilson told the Cabinet, 'that devaluation would mean that we 
should be more in control of our own destiny and less at the mercy of foreign opinion': CAB 128/42, 
CC (67) 66, 1 (16 Nov. 1967). 
''Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', pp. 211-12. 
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Cabinet that devaluation represented a defeat, not a fresh beginning: it marked, 
according to Callaghan, 'the end of the economic strategy which the government had 
been pursuing hitherto; and he was prepared the draw the necessary conclusion as 
regards his personal position'.^'' Incredibly, however, neither man concluded from the 
defeat that their obsession with maintaining a specific value of sterling had been the 
primary cause of the economic policy failure. This is demonstrated by the decision 
not to allow sterling to float but merely to move to a new fixed level, which could 
then become the new holy grail to defend at all costs. '^ Only at the insistence of some 
ministers was the Cabinet grudgingly allowed to discuss the possibility of a floating 
exchange rate.^ ^ By choosing, under intense pressure from Wilson and Callaghan, to 
ignore that option, the government was freed from the problems of sterling and the 
83 
balance of payments for only a brief time. 
As Callaghan, and then his successor Jenkins, made clear to the Cabinet, the 
new value of sterling was to be defended with just as much vigour, and i f necessary 
with the same packages of deflationary measures, as the old level had been. In the 
immediate aftermath of devaluation, the Cabinet was forced to approve just such a 
package which still further undermined the basis for sustained economic growth, and 
ensured that the aims outlined in the National Plan would be still further pushed into 
the background. '^* The fundamental flaws in a policy of restriction rather than one of 
'"CAB 128/42, CC (67) 66, 1 (16 Nov. 1967). 
^'Callaghan argued that to move to a floating rate 'would run counter to the basic philosophy of 
international exchange rates and would therefore incur the active hostility of the IMF and the 
international monetary community': ibid. It should be noted, however, that any unilateral devaluation 
could be considered as 'counter to the basic philosophy of international exchange rates', and the 
hostility o f the international monetary community had already been shown through their speculation 
against sterling. 
^^Castle, Diaries, p. 325 (16 Nov. 1967). 
"CAB 128/42, CC (67) 66, 1 (16 Nov. 1967). 
*'See especially CAB 128/42, CC (67) 67, 4 (21 Nov. 1967); CAB 128/43, CC (68) 1, 3 (4 Jan. 1968). 
Jenkins reported to the Cabinet that 'in order to make a success of devaluation by establishing the 
balance of payments beyond doubt, we should take further action to reduce demand by an annual rate 
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planned growth remained just as valid as they had been before devaluation. 
Consequently, despite the deflationary package, within months sterling was once 
again under severe pressure. This time, exacerbated by a chronic shortage of 
international liquidity, it was so great that, in a move which smacked of desperate 
crisis management, an emergency Bank Holiday was hastily proclaimed for 15 March 
1968 to stave off an imminent collapse of sterling.^^ 
The psychological impact of this crisis the government can hardly be over-
stated. The 'fresh start' that devaluation was supposed to achieve was shown to be at 
RA 
best wishful thinking, and in reality little more than empty rhetoric. The 
government's reputation, already weakened by the shattering blow of devaluation, 
suffered yet another blow. More signiflcant for this study was the extent to which the 
events of March 1968 threw unforgiving light on the structures through which 
government economic policy was formulated. 
The particular night of 14-15 March on which the emergency Bank Holiday 
was proclaimed has the characteristics of high political farce, yet behind the 
controversy and intrigue two facts seem indisputable. The first is that by 1968 crisis 
of something of the order of £850 million; this is needed to prevent a cumulative expansion which 
would soon become insupportable'. Of course, a 'cumulative expansion' had been the primary aim of 
the National Plan, but Jenkins was adamant that the government should 'err on the side of toughness', 
and introduce a deflationary package of at least £1,000 million in public expenditure to prevent 
substantial economic growth. His attitude towards 'Government Research and Technological 
Support' (which the 1964 manifesto had indicated would be instrumental to a 'white heat' 
breakthrough) is of particular interest. Expenditure in this area was, Jenkins recognised, 'intended 
ultimately to improve our economic performance'. Nevertheless, 'in our present situation there must 
be [he argued] a limit to what we can afford to devote to investment of this kind'. He therefore 
proposed to cut expenditure by almost 20%: CAB 129/135, C (68) 5, memorandum on 'Public 
expenditure: Post-devaluation measures' by Jenkins, paras. 1-3,40 (3 Jan. 1968). 
'^CAB 128/46, CC (68) 21), 1 (15 Mar. 1968). 
'^Although it should be recognised that determined efforts were made to use the opportunity offered by 
devaluation. The DEA, for example, pressed hard for consultation to take place 'over the whole range 
of industry' to ascertain how it could assist in the planned switch of resources from domestic 
consumption to exports: EW 24/159, draft memorandum by officials (unnamed) (28 May 1968). 
*'AS Crosland (President, Board of Trade) put it, 'the episode raised certain issues of the machinery of 
government': 'Note of a Meeting at Number 10 Downing Street, SWl, on Friday, 15 March 1968, at 
1:15 a.m.', recorded in CAB 128/46, CC (68) 21, (15 Mar. 1968). 
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management had replaced any notion of plarmed economic management. The sense of 
'crisis' within the government is indisputable: Jenkins judged that the country was at 
one point only hours from effective bankruptcy. Secondly, Wilson was evidently 
not prepared to use the Cabinet as a forum for significant economic debate. Brown's 
resignation from the Cabinet over what he considered to be Wilson's high-
handedness, and more fundamentally his deliberate failure to consult colleagues -
undermining the principle of collective responsibility - was dismissed by Wilson's 
supporters at the time as typical Brown histrionics. Yet the records of the 
emergency 'Cabinet' meeting held at Brown's insistence at Number 10 in the middle 
of the night show that other ministers considered his arguments to have considerable 
force. He was backed, i f not in his language, then certainly in his argument. Crosland 
told Wilson that 'he, too, resented being excluded from the discussion of such grave 
contingencies', while Stewart supported Brown's contention that Wilson and 
Callaghan could quite easily have consulted more widely i f they had wished.^" Even 
Shore, who was one of only two other ministers (Crossman was the other) who had 
been consulted, stated that 'there was force in the views which had been expressed in 
so far as the real object of criticism was the curtain of secrecy behind which the 
Treasury concealed their conduct of economic policy'.^' Indeed, Crossman noted in 
his diary that, far from being an unimportant issue upon which to resign. Brown's act 
was one founded on an issue of fundamental significance.^^ The incident was no one-
off; it was, as many ministers asserted at the Cabinet meeting the following morning, 
''Crossman, Diaries, ii, pp. 712-13 (17 Mar. 1968). 
' 'CAB 128/43, CC (68) 21, 1 (15 Mar. 1968); Benn, Diaries 1968-72, pp. 44-6 (14 Mar. 1968). 
'°And by implication, presumably supported Brown's contention that Wilson was lying when he 
claimed that he had tried to contact ministers at the House of Commons. 
'•'Note of a Meeting at Number 10 Downing Street, SWI, on Friday, 15 March 1968, at 1:15 a.m.', 
recorded in CAB 128/46, CC (68) 21,(15 Mar. 1968). 
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'merely the latest of several occasions on which issues of monetary policy had been 
judged to be of such secrecy and complexity that decisions had been reserved virtually 
to the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day'.'^ 
By 1968, overall economic policy appeared to be determined primarily by 
Jenkins and Wilson. The notion that the DEA had equal standing with the Treasury 
had been long forgotten and the policies of economic planning it had been set up to 
pursue had been down-graded.''* The National Plan had been sacrificed to defend 
sterling, and after November 1967, it was a case of defeat on both fronts: there was no 
National Plan except in name, and sterling had not after all been saved. Planning had 
been reduced to litfle more than wish-lists which few thought would be realised. 
The extent to which policy after policy was sacrificed must be emphasised.'^  
Like the National Plan, prices and incomes policy, once heralded as a key component 
of the long-term improvement of British industrial productivity was submerged in the 
'^There was, Crossman argued, 'a great deal in it ' , and that ' i f 1 was ever to resign, it would be precisely 
because I can't stand the way Cabinet is run': Crossman, Diaries, ii, pp. 713-14 (17 Mar. 1968). 
'^CAB 128/43, CC (68) 21, 1 (15 Mar. 1968); Benn, Diaries 1968-72, p. 2 (3 Jan. 1968). It was not to 
be the last either, for another international monetary crisis in November 1968 threatened sterling once 
more, and again Wilson and Jenkins gave the Cabinet very little prior warning of what they wished to 
do (mostly place higher excise duties on products such as petrol, alcoholic beverages as well as an 
'import deposit scheme'): CAB 128/46, CC (68) 47, 1 (22 Nov. 1968). 
' ' ' in Ringe's judgement, they had been 'made a farce' by the deflationary packages: 'Background to 
Neddy', p. 93. 
'^Bale's conclusion that sterling was defended primarily 'to avoid the kind of stop on economic growth 
and attack on public (and particularly welfare) spending that devaluation ... must entail' ignores the 
fact that resisting devaluation entailed repeated stops on the policies which could bring economic 
growth without any discernible long-term gain: Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', p. 217. 
Callaghan wrote to Wilson in May 1965, for example, outlining ways in which that the nationalised 
industries could be used to help defend sterling. He noted that their 'huge borrowing ha[s] a big 
economic effect', and was judged as having such an effect by overseas financial experts. 
Consequently, they would have to make improvements in their management and performance, not 
because this was per se desirable, but because it would convince these experts that the Treasury's 
investments were justified. In any case, he was 'reluctant to find more money for them' unless he was 
allowed to implement further deflationary taxation measures: EW 25/74, Callaghan to Wilson (28 
May 1965). His arguments were firmly rejected by Lee and Brown; the latter writing that ' I cannot 
fully accept the Chancellor's approach ... or the need to avoid at all costs any exfra calls on the 
Exchequer for the finance of industries': EW 25/74, Lee to Wilson (14 June 1965) and Brown to 
Wilson (22 June 1965). 
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attempt to save sterling.^^ Indeed, it was perverted from being a long-term policy to 
acting as a short-term expedient.Instead of serving as a conduit whereby a 
fundamental improvement could be brought about in the relationship between prices, 
wages and productivity, it was used instead as a method of clamping down on 
98 
inflationary pressures on the economy. The attempts to implement prices and 
incomes standstills after both the July 1965 and July 1966 measures is a clear 
illustration of this. In 1965, Wilson and Callaghan sought to give statutory foundation 
to the policy, since it was, Wilson argued, 'essential that the improvement in our 
balance of payments should not be endangered by any excessive rise in our costs of 
production'. Brown was highly critical, arguing that the voluntary policy he had 
negotiated 'was probably more effective than was commonly supposed', and such 
progress was threatened by any rush to legislate.^^ The imposition of a standstill in 
July 1966 brought an even more fundamental clash between Brown and Callaghan. 
Brown was adamant that 'the government should not seek to introduce a standstill. 
This would seriously prejudice the changes of the longer-term policy and of retaining 
support for that policy'. Callaghan, however, argued that 'the balance of payments 
97 
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Castle reports that she and Brown agreed in private in February 1966 that the policy was being driven 
by 'the pledges Jim [Callaghan] had given to the bankers', and Brown, she alleges, further claimed 
that Callaghan had promised to Johnson (US President) to use the policy in this fashion: Castle, 
Diaries, p. 103.(11 Feb. 1966). 
As Shore openly recognised in 1968: although, he argued, 'prices and incomes policy was not evolved 
as an instrument of short term management of the economy, during 1966-7 ... we were forced to put 
the greatest stress on prices and incomes policy over the short term': CAB 129/136, C (68) 45, 
memorandum on 'Future productivity, prices and incomes policy' by Shore, para. 2 (27 Feb. 1968). 
'in July 1966, Callaghan explicitly referred to the failure of prices and incomes policy to control 
inflation as one reason why further deflation was necessary to defend sterling: CAB 129/126, C (66) 
103, memorandum on 'The economic situation' by Callaghan, para. 16 (8 July 1966). 
^'CAB 128/39, CC (65) 46, 1 (7 Sept. 1965). Wilson over-ruled Brown, and his conclusion that 'it was 
essential that it should be presented not as a further measure of restriction required in order to 
reinforce international confidence in sterling in the short term but as a positive development of the 
government's policies for the planned ... economy' only confirms the extent to which the reverse was 
true. See also CAB 128/39, CC (65) 57, 5 (4 Nov. 1965), in which 'strongly expressed' opposition to 
the proposed legislation was again over-ruled by Wilson. Castle reports that Brown 'exploded' in 
anger when Wilson and Callaghan first insisted on strengthening the policy: Castle, Diaries, p. 59 (1 
Sept. 1965). 
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situation was such that it was not possible simply to rely on leaving the policy to 
achieve its results in the fullness of time'.'^ *^ The eventual breakdown of the policy 
was, as Brown argued at the time, almost inevitable i f it was used in such a short-term 
manner. 
VI 
Great difficulties remain, however, in understanding why it was that Wilson, 
in particular, allowed economic policy to become so dominated by short-term 
monetary considerations. He was a trained economist, whose commitment to 
plarming in 1964 was apparently genuinely held, yet he allowed himself to become 
almost obsessed with the idea that devaluation meant total economic, as well as 
political, disaster, when it had not done so in 1949, and it was not to do so in 1967. 
Indeed, there is evidence that he was aware that economic policy was being distorted 
by obsession with sterling parity. In June 1965 he proposed a reduction in interest 
rates which he admitted was a reckless gamble (and was ultimately to prove a fiitile 
one). He argued, however, that the gamble was justified i f it allowed the economy to 
break free of the straight-jacket of sterling defence.'^ ^ 
A similar determination appears to have lain behind his decision in October 
1967 to take personal charge of the running of the DEA. It appears an attempt to 
'""CAB 128/41, CC (66) 30, 3 (21 June 1966). 
'"'Catherwood, 'A view from industry', p. 79. However, Woodward has argued that the policy was, in 
any case, flawed in inception: 'such policies, [he argues] ... have their own self-destmct mechanisms. 
Initially the policy commands widespread support, but as time progresses resentments against the 
policy accumulate, until a critical mass is reached, unleashing a wage explosion': Woodward, 
'Labour's economic performance', p. 97. Regardless of the validity of Woodward's criticism, it is 
surely the case that the possibility of success was undermined by the use of prices and incomes policy 
to achieve short-term aims. 
'"^Wilson proposed the cut in Bank Rate, even while admitting that it 'entail[ed] a considerable degree 
of risk', because it would 'provide the Government with greater room for manoeuvre ... [and] it would 
demonstrate that they retained, not only economically but politically, the power of initiative'; CAB 
129/39, CC (65) 32, 2 (3 June 1965). It was a tacit acknowledgement that they had lost the power of 
initiative that was not lost by ministers: Crossman, Diaries, i, p. 242 (23 June 1965). 
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indicate that he had been serious when he had established the DBA as the Treasury's 
equal. He told the new Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Shore, that 'the 
previous three years had been spent getting the balance-of-payments right, and with 
industry streamlined, the government could now go ahead with a big production and 
efficiency drive as a basis for expansion'.'"'' Such renewed optimism in the planning 
potential of the DBA was, however, hopelessly misplaced. In any case, events were to 
rapidly overtake Wilson, for devaluation was at this time only weeks away. 
Wilson's own attempts to escape from the economic strictures imposed by 
sterling make its domination of policy all the more inexplicable. How did he allow 
policy to become so directed towards a single fiscal indicator? Explanation for this 
seeming paradox can be found in two linked directions. The first has already been 
established: Wilson and Callaghan became obsessed with sterling. The second also 
focuses on this idea of policy obsession, but at a more general level. Insufficient time 
and energy were devoted to general economic policy by Wilson - that is, to policy 
other than the defence of sterling. He gave little attention to broader questions of 
economic policy except in conditions of crisis. Instead, he allowed other problems, 
especially in the field of foreign policy, to occupy his and his government's fime. 
The domination of the Cabinet's time with issues of foreign policy, is not itself 
a feature unique to the Wilson government. It was true of the Attlee government and 
it is in general true of all governments - few Cabinet meetings in the twentieth century 
had the 'luxury' of being able to concentrate on domestic affairs alone. It is not, 
however, the amount of attention given by the Wilson government to foreign policy 
issues per se that is problematic. Rather, it is the way it and Wilson in particular 
'^PREM 13/1538, record of a telephone conversation between Wilson and Shore (30 Aug. 1967). 
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became involved in particular foreign policy issues - Vietnam, Rhodesia, membership 
of the European Economic Community - that is of significance."''* 
Neither Vietnam nor Rhodesia were problems of the Wilson government's 
making: Rhodesia was an inherited problem while Vietnam was not even a conflict in 
which they had any direct involvement. Both, however, were political minefields into 
which the Cabinet, and especially Wilson, waded time and time again.Numerous 
Cabinet meetings were devoted entirely to these problems, and barely a meeting might 
go by over periods of months without discussion on developments in talks with the 
Smith regime, or on the prospects for peace in the far East. In particular, Wilson 
expended huge amounts of time and effort in attempting to broker an agreement with 
Smith, never accepting no for an answer and always being prepared to try and try 
again.'"^ 
It is difficult to avoid the feeling that too much time was spent on attempting 
to solve insoluble problems."^' As with sterling, the impression is of a Cabinet and 
more especially a prime minister that once committed to a policy was unable to 
withdraw from it without losing face. Wilson felt he personally had to find a 
1 no 
solution both to Rhodesia and Vietnam, or he would be perceived to have failed. 
'"''For a general consideration of the moral, economic and political perspectives which governed the 
Wilson government's foreign policy, see John Young, 'The Wilson government and the debate over 
arms to South Africa in 1964', Contemporary British History, 12, (1998), especially pp. 63-7. 
'"^Pimlott is highly critical, bluntly stating that 'I think he [Wilson] was completely wrong over 
Vietnam. Vietnam was a tragedy and Rhodesia was a comedy of errors': Catterall, 'Anatomising 
Wilson: Ben Pimlott', p. 336. 
'"^Grossman recorded that Callaghan had admitted to him in December 1965 that Rhodesia was 
occupying more than a third of his time, and he (Grossman) estimated that for Wilson, the figure 
would be above a half: Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 407 (9 Dec. 1965). 
'"^As Pimlott has argued, the government 'made a mess of much of its foreign policy and Wilson was 
partly responsible for that', since he was repeatedly guilty of having 'bitten off more than he could 
chew': Catterall, 'Atomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', pp. 329-30. 
'"^Ghris Wrigley, 'Now you see it, now you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's foreign policy 1964-
70', in Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, p. 130. 
'°^In the case of Vietnam, Young has emphasised Wilson's desire to be seen as 'an honest broker in the 
world's most serious conflict', leading him to be become involved in peace initiatives - such as the 
Davies peace mission examined in detail by Young - which were 'foredoomed' and 'hare-brained': 
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The practicality of finding such a solution was given scant consideration. Other cases 
reinforce the impression that this facet of Wilson's personality frequently guided the 
conduct of government policy, for example the often obsessive attention given to the 
possibility of entry into the European Economic Community is another obvious 
example. Having been convinced by Brown and others that this was essential to the 
economic and political prospects of Britain, Wilson was prepared to give huge 
amounts to time to the project. Yet numerous Cabinet meetings continued to be 
devoted completely to consideration of entry even when it should have been perfectly 
clear that the chances of entry were at best slim and, given the obvious antipathy 
towards Britain displayed by de Gaulle, destined to failure."" At a time when the 
British economy was moving at a stagnant pace from one crisis to another, allowing 
such a doomed project to dominate government business was surely foolhardy.'" 
VII 
The evidence of these for.eign policy 'adventures' all indicate one explanation 
for the failure of the Wilson government to ftalfil its commitment to economic planing 
for growth. It is apparent that, for all his training as an economist and for all his stated 
commitment to planning, Wilson was unable to bring any such sense of planning to 
the machinery of Cabinet government. The main driving forces behind policy making 
at the highest levels were on the one hand, ad hoc reactions to crises, and on the other, 
see John Young, 'The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam, July 
1965', Review of International Studies, 24, (1998), especially pp. 546, 559-562. 
""Pimlott is particularly critical of the attempt to gain entry, dismissing it as 'Wilson and Brown's 
farcical tour of European capitals': Catterall, 'Anatomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', p. 337. 
'"in general, the government often gave insufficient consideration to the economic impact of foreign 
policy 'adventures'. Certainly, Blackett (Industrial Advisor in the Ministry of Technology) became 
increasingly frustrated in this regard: Kirby, 'Blackett in the 'white heat", pp. 990, 992. 
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Wilson's policy fixations."^ Defending the parity of sterling, or finding a solution to 
the Rhodesia question, became virtual obsessions for Wilson. A decision once made, 
or a policy direction once decided upon, could not be questioned, for that was 
tantamount to defeat."^ Wilson had tasted defeat over sterling in 1949 and was 
determined not to do so again."" To that end he was prepared to sacrifice the very 
economic planning and growth that had been at the centre of the 1964 programme, 
because the consequences of defeat on sterling, which was a policy fixation, were felt 
by Wilson to be far greater that those surrounding the failure to supply economic 
growth, which was not. 
Wilson was assisted in making such decisions by the character of those who 
were also responsible for economic policy. In both Callaghan and Jenkins, he had 
Chancellors whose actions, i f not their words, demonstrated a determination to follow 
the strictures of Treasury dogma regardless of the consequences. The pleasure 
Callaghan appears to have gained from using devaluation to bring home the 'truth' to 
the British population about the 'fools' paradise' they had been living in represents a 
clear, i f extraordinary, example of such thinking."^ On the other hand, there was 
Brown at the DEA. Although frequently brilliant, he lacked the staying-power and/or 
reliability to ensure that the progress he made with policies such as prices and 
incomes could be sustained in the face of Treasury orthodoxy. Whether anyone else 
"^Benn, who despite their close friendship became disillusioned with Wilson, argued in July 1966 that 
Wilson did not have 'a long-term vision of the sort of society we want to create', relying instead on 
'the short-term tactical dodging at which he is adept [and which] may have been perfect for the 1964-
6 Parliament but has no place in the developing strategy for the next four years': Benn, Diaries 1963-
(57, p. 456 (18 July 1966). 
"^As Gallaghan has admitted since, the government 'g[ot itself] on tramlines ... and once they are on 
those tramlines it is very difficult to get a car off them, and so you go on running, hoping the thing is 
going to come right': Cailaghan in 'Witness seminar: The DEA', p. 133. 
"''Peter Gatterall, 'Anatomising Wilson: Ben Pimlott', p. 327. 
'"Grossman, Diaries, ii, p. 569. (13 Nov. 1967). See also Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision', p. 215. 
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could have done any better must be open for question, for it was quite often only by 
his sheer force of personality that he achieved what he did."^ 
These personal characteristics of key members of the Wilson government had 
a direct and largely negative effect on overall economic policy. Yet while 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy were mostly determined by these Cabinet leaders, 
the more mundane level of industrial policy was generally overseen by others 
ministers. The question which must be addressed is how the morass of indecision and 
crisis management that became general economic policy affected the implementation 
of clear manifesto commitments such as nationalisation of iron and steel, and use of 
public ownership when private industry was judged to have 'failed'. The atmosphere 
of economic stagnation and fiscal restriction put additional pressure upon those 
ministers responsible for nationalisation measures to justify the desirability or 
necessity of them, but the extent to which it directly undermined their implementation, 
or affected their nature, is not so clear. 
Analysis of the industrial ownership policy of the Wilson governments 
naturally resolves into three distinct strands. Nationalisation of iron and steel appears 
to be a distinct case of 'unfinished business' from the 1940s. In contrast to this were 
industries such as shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture where government 
intervention led to the creation of public or part public enterprises only in the case of 
individual companies. Finally, there was the establishment of new political structures 
which offered the potential to place the extension of industrial ownership on a more 
established, but also dynamic, platform. The Industrial Expansion Act was obvious 
"*As Catherwood has argued, 'The trouble with George [Brown] was that he could get people to do 
these things by sheer weight of personality, and maybe they were the wrong things to be done': 
Catherwood in 'Witness seminar: The DEA', p. 131. 
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evidence of this, although the extent to which the original purpose of the act was to 
establish such structures is open to question. 
In all three strands of industrial ownership policy, the failings identified in 
more general economic policy had a critical impact. The consequences for industrial 
ownership policy i f it had become one of the Prime Minister's, or to a lesser extent, 
one of the Chancellor's, fixations would clearly have been significant, yet Wilson's, 
Callaghan's and later Jenkins's, attachment to public ownership and control varied 
considerably between 1964 and 1970. More significant than establishing whether 
public ovmership and control ever became a policy fixation, however, is the question 
of the impact upon such policies of the more general sense of 're-active' policy 
making in the field of economic affairs. This question appears particularly pertinent 
with regard to the more dynamic, 'revisionist', commitments to public ownership and 
control elaborated in the 1964 manifesto. The establishment of new public enterprises 
effectively to overcome failings in the operation of the private sector of the economy 
seemed to imply the existence of an active government constantly seeking to 
overcome obstacles to economic growth - very much the sort of government the 
Department for Economic Affairs was supposed to represent. With the dominance of 
the Treasury over the DEA, and a lack of clear direction in economic policy from the 
Prime Minister in particular, the scope for successful implementation of such a policy 
was limited."^ 
Given, therefore, that dynamism is not an epithet one could easily use to 
describe the Wilson government's economic policy-making processes, the few 
examples of apparently dynamic public intervention undertaken by the government 
"^As Goopey has identified with regard to the interventionist policies of the Ministry of Technology: 
Goopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat', p. 119. 
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assume an increased significance. For the fact that public intervention did occur, and 
that industries and companies were effectively nationalised, surely indicates one of 
two possible conclusions. Either the government as a whole was capable of more 
dynamic decision making than the broader macroeconomic picture would appear to 
demonstrate; or else the interventions arose largely as a result of individual action by 
ministers or ministries despite of, rather than because of, the nature of the 
goverrmient. 
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Chapter Five 
The renationalisation of the iron and steel industry: 
Unfinished business from the 'commanding heights'? 
The 1964 Labour party manifesto declared that 'private monopoly' in the iron 
and steel industry was to be 'replaced by public ownership and control'.' This brief 
but unequivocal statement^ gave no hint of the controversy over ownership of the 
industry since 1945, nor did it suggest the difficulties which would be faced during the 
protracted passage of the measure through parliament. Yet ownership of the iron and 
steel industry had been one of the most contentious issues in post-war industrial 
policy. Indeed, many contemporaries felt that the question of the industry's ownership 
represented the defining demarcation point between the public and private sectors of 
the economy. 
In 1945, Labour had argued that the maintenance of a 'private monopoly' in 
one of Britain's 'basic' industries had 'maintained high prices and kept inefficient 
high-cost plants in existence'. In order to restore the industry's efficiency, 
reorganisation was necessary and could be achieved only by public ownership and 
control.^ Yet although the argument for nationalisation was based on this principle of 
economic efficiency, iron and steel generated much more ideological controversy than 
the other industries nationalised. This occurred because many industrialists and the 
Conservative party judged its nationalisation to be a step too far. They rejected the 
'Labour party, 'Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain', in Craig, Election manifestos, p. 259 
^Contained in a more general paragraph concerning the role to be played by the public sector in the 
achievement of the aims of the National Plan. 
^Labour party. Let us Face the Future, p. 7. 
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Labour party's proposition that it was a 'basic' industry, instead arguing that it was an 
integral part of the manufacturing sector. It is not necessary at this point to consider 
the detailed arguments that raged over these points in the late 1940s. Of much more 
significance are the consequences for the industry of this opposition to nationalisation. 
For, of all the main industries taken over, only iron and steel was targeted for 
denationalisafion by the Conservatives in their 1951 manifesto.'' 
The denationalisation of the industry between 1953 and 1964^ ensured that, 
while the remainder of the public sector established between 1945 and 1951 was 
largely accepted as a new status quo where the issue of ownership could generate little 
political controversy, iron and steel remained an industry in the political spotlight. 
For the Labour party denationalisation represented an act of ideological spite by the 
Conservatives, and both the 1955 and 1959 election manifestos gave prominence to a 
commitment to renationalise the industry.^ As the one point at which the industrial 
ownership policies of the Conservatives and Labour were fiindamentally opposed, the 
industry remained an issue of significance throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. 
Even the revision of the Labour party's 'shopping list' approach to nationalisation did 
little to alter its importance. 
Given this history, the industry's renationalisation in 1967 may be seen just as 
'unfinished business': putting right the 'wrong' that the Conservatives had committed 
by denationalisation. However, the renation'alisation of iron and steel carmot be 
''it is true that the Gonservative party was also committed to denationalising parts of the road haulage 
industry, but the bulk of the transport sector, especially the railways, were left untouched: iron and 
steel was the only industry as a whole that the Gonservatives sought to denationalise. 
^Only Richard Thomas and Baldwins remained in public hands in 1964, and its retention was primarily 
due to the unique capital demands of its reconstruction and expansion plans. For a detailed history of 
the technical aspects of the denationalisation, see Kathleen Burk, The first privatisation: The 
politicians, the City, and the denationalisation of steel (1988). 
*See Labour party, 'Forward with Labour' and 'Britain Belongs to You', in Graig, Election manifestos, 
pp. 206, 227. 
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treated merely as an undoing of the 1953 denationalisation and a re-imposition of the 
Attlee government's original measure. In the two decades between 1945 and 1964, 
both the industry itself and, more significantly, the Labour position on nationalisation, 
had changed dramatically. The renationalisation represents a unique opportunity to 
explore the realities of revisionism: it was an 'old style' nationalisation being 
conducted by a Labour party which claimed to have adopted 'new' styles of industrial 
intervention. Yet little attention has been given to iron and steel renationalisation by 
historians. The difficulties the government experienced with the process have been 
emphasised, but few attempts have been made to place the nationalisation within the 
context of revisionism or the Labour party's public ownership commitment. By 
examining the renationalisation process, and comparing it with the original 
nationalisation, this chapter will determine the extent to which the intellectual 
revisionism before 1964 was translated into applied revisionism in the Wilson 
government's industrial policies. 
At first glance, the strength of the Wilson Cabinet's commitment to rapid iron 
and steel renationalisation appears unquestionable. Its intention to act was agreed on 
22 October 1964, at only its second meefing. There was 'considerable support' for 
introducing a bill in the first parliamentary session - indeed, Wilson concluded that 
'priority should be given to [its] early introduction'.' This was despite the fact that 
the responsible minister, Lee, argued that the 'highly complex problems of drafting [a 
satisfactory bi l l ] ' were so great that it would be more realistic merely to issue 'a firm 
^CAB 128/39, CC (64) 2, 3 (22 Oct. 1964). After this meeting, officials in the Ministry of Power were 
referting to the 'extreme urgency which Ministers now attach to the steel nationalisation measure': BT 
255/307, memorandum by Stevenson (19 Nov. 1964). 
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statement of the Government's intentions', while postponing the measure to the 
second parliamentary session.^  
The Cabinet's enthusiasm for rapid renationalisation is significant, since it 
contradicts the image of a hesitant and unenthusiastic government created by viewing 
the entire nationalisation process from 1964 to 1967. However, a detailed 
examination of the language used at the Cabinet meeting indicates that ministerial 
motives for wanting the rapid introduction of a nationalisation bill were complex. It 
was argued that the bill 'should not be allowed to jeopardise the introduction of other 
measures particularly in the field of social services to which the government attached 
high priority'. Early introduction would mean either that i f the bill proved 
uncontroversial it might be passed as rapidly as possible, or else i f it proved 
controversial 'public opinion [wjould be able to appreciate the extent to which social 
policies might also be at risk'.^ 
Grossman, at the time Minister of Housing, privately observed that it was the 
belief that the bill would prove to be a controversial measure which caused the 
Cabinet to view delay in introducing the nationalisation measure as 'absolutely fatal'. 
There was, he argued, little enthusiasm for the nationalisation measure per se, but it 
could not be allowed to 'jeopardise the introduction of other measures'.'° However, 
while Grossman's observations demonstrate his own disinterest in renationalisation, 
his interpretation of the Cabinet's motives cannot be accepted imchallenged. For the 
*GAB 128/39, GG (64) 2, 3 (22 Oct. 1964). In his memorandum on the nationalisation, Lee argued that 
'we shall make a much better job of it' if a longer time-frame were adopted: GAB 129/119, G (64) 5, 
memorandum on 'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Lee, para. 6 (21 Oct. 1964). 
'CAB 128/39, GC (64) 2, 3 (22 Oct. 1964). The point being, presumably, that it was hoped that the 
public would blame the opponents of nationalisation for any collapse of the government, and the 
consequent failure of its social reforms, rather than the government for introducing the measure in the 
first place. 
'"Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 27 (22 Oct. 1964). 
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Cabinet's approach does not obviously reveal general disinterest." I f it had been so 
inclined, an easier method of avoiding 'jeopardising' more important measures would 
surely have been to support the postponement proposed by Lee. 
Instead, the Cabinet debated parliamentary tactics which might allow them to 
secure its prompt passage. It was proposed that the second readings of some of the 
'other measures' to which 'high priority' was attached should be pushed forward in 
order that they might coincide with any parliamentary controversy the iron and steel 
bill faced. This would enable these other measures to act as a safeguard for the 
nationalisation bill, ensuring that parliamentary opposition would be diluted by the 
association of opposition to nationalisation with opposition to essential social 
reforms.''^ 
Such an approach required rapid preparation of the nationalisation measure, so 
that its presentation to parliament could be carefully timed. However, despite every 
effort the process of preparation proved neither straightforward nor speedy.'^  Three 
main factors contributed to the derailing of the nationalisation process from the 
programme assumed in October 1964. The first was that the industry's complexity 
presented the Minister of Power and his officials with an extremely difficult and time-
consuming task of framing a suitable nationalisation bill. The second, related, factor, 
was that the Labour party had given little real consideration to how renationalisation 
would be accomplished. Charges of lack of preparation had been made against the 
"Although it should be noted that Wyatt alleges that Brown considered the nationalisation an 
'unpleasant thing' even at this stage: Woodrow Wyatt, Confessions of an optimist (1985), p. 297. 
"CAB 128/39, C C (64) 2, 3 (22 Oct. 1964). 
'^ It was rapidly realised that the time required could be shorted by 're-using' sections from the 1949 
Bill. It was also argued that such problems as the BISF could be 'left over to be dealt with in a 
separate Bill in a later Session'. Wilson urged ministers to actively consider the practicality of such 
an approach, since 'it was essential that a Bill should be inft-oduced this [first] Session ... [and] in 
view of the tight parliamentary timetable, officials should be asked to give urgent consideration to the 
possibility of reducing the size of the Bill' : CAB 130/215, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on the Iron 
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party in 1945. Despite this, and despite the difficulties the Attlee government had 
experienced, similar accusations can convincingly be made against the party in 1964. 
Thirdly, even when the problems of drafting were overcome, the parliamentary and 
political situation severely compromised the bill's passage. 
II 
The complexity of the industry should have come as no surprise. Lee had 
indicated the likely problems when urging the Cabinet to delay introduction of the 
nationalisation bill.''* Yet even he did not anticipate the extent of the difficulties. As 
in 1945, the main reason for the complications lay with the role played in the industry 
by the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF). The BISF continued to be 
extraordinarily influential in almost all aspects of the industry; through its 
subsidiaries, for example, it controlled the vast majority of ore production and 
importation.'^ Indeed, as Lee rapidly acknowledged, the complex BISF structure 
proved to have been 'deliberately designed to make unravelling difficult'.'^ Given 
that the industry had already been faced with nationalisation once before. Lee's 
judgement is most likely correct.'^ 
None of this, however, either explains or excuses the Labour leadership's lack 
of preparation. It cannot be argued that it had been unaware of the problems posed by 
the BISF: the Attlee government had experienced grave difficulties with the 
manufacturers' association, and the existence of the BISF and its various subsidiary 
and Steel Nationalisation Bill, paras 1-3 (30 Nov. 1964) and paras 1-2 (4 Dec. 1964); GAB 134/2264, 
Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS (64) 3, 2 (4 Dec. 1964). 
"CAB 129/39, GG (64) 2, 3 (22 Oct. 1964). 
'^GAB 129/119, G (64) 5, memorandum on 'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Lee, para. 3 (21 Oct. 
1964). 
'^GAB 129/120, G (65) 42, memorandum on 'Steel nafionalisation' by Callaghan and Lee, para. 4 (15 
Mar. 1965). 
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organisations could hardly have been overlooked by the party while in opposition 
prior to 1964. The only conclusion must be that in 1964, as in 1945, the confidence of 
manifesto rhetoric on nationalisation often had little or no foundation in hard planning 
for the realities of establishing new public industries. For a party so keen to assert its 
commitment to planning, its apparent propensity for 'coming into office with half-
baked plans' is all the more inexplicable. 
Handicapped, therefore, by lack of forward planning, and faced with so 
resolute an opponent as the BISF,'^ it was unsurprising that Lee and his officials 
found preparation of the nationalisation bill problematic. Ironically, the extent to 
which the BISF's position lay at the heart of the problems is demonstrated by the ease 
and rapidity with which the main details of the measure were dealt with. Within 
weeks of taking up the task, Lee was able to outline the key characteristics of the 
bill.'^'' The most significant of these was that, compared to the original 1940s 
nationalisation measure, the number of companies to be taken over was substantially 
reduced. Only thirteen companies were to be directly nationalised, and of these 
'^Lee described the BISF as a 'veritable spider's web; either by accident or design': BT 255/289, 
meeting between Lee and Wyatt (22 Apr. 1965). He admitted that study of the BISF 'has shown that 
[its] set-up is even more complicated than we thought': PREM 13/449, Lee to Wilson (25 Feb. 1965). 
'^Grossman, Diaries, i, pp. 28, 118 (22 Oct. 1964), (3 Jan. 1965); Brown, In my way, p. 96. 
"See, for example, BT 255/297, BISF to Lee (1 Feb. 1965), in which the BISF systematically criticised 
every single aspect of the nationalisation scheme. In the same PRO file, see also meeting between 
BISF and Lee (19 Feb. 1965) and Judge (BISF) to Lee (27 Feb. 1965). In the latter. Judge argued 
that 'the economic advantages which the government looks for from nationalisation are neither very 
considerable, nor very speedy and certainly not generally accepted'. He promised to co-operate with 
the government in consideration of any alternative but, by implication, not with the nationalisation 
measure itself Also of note is the support the BISF received for its stance from the Federation of 
British Industry, which was 'wholly opposed' to nationalisafion: BT 255/454, Runge (FBI) to Lee (4 
Dec. 1964); BT 255/456, 'Iron and steel nationalisation: A paper by the FBI' (21 Jan. 1965). In the 
light of this evidence, McEachem's assertion that the BISF's behaviour 'provides a pitiful contrast 
with their vigorous counter-attack in 1949' appears overly harsh: McEachem, A class against itself 
pp. 166-7. 
^"indeed, the main outlines of the Bill had been outlined in a draft Working Paper produced by Lee's 
officials in October 1964: BT 255/278, D. Le Baron Jones, Draft working paper on steel 
nationalisation (Oct. 1964 (no specific day is given)). 
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thirteen, in three cases only the steel interests of the particular combines were to be 
taken over.'^ ' 
The contrast with the 1949 Act, which had nationalised more than one hundred 
companies, could not be more stark. In part this reflected only the changing structure 
of the industry. Since 1951 the trend in the iron and steel industry, as in others 
industries, had been towards the creation of larger and larger companies through 
amalgamations and take-overs.'^ ^ However, it was not merely that there were fewer 
steel companies available to nationalise in 1964. The criteria the government chose to 
adopt in deciding which companies to nationalise was much narrower in 1964 than it 
had been in 1949. Whereas in the earlier instance, nationalisation of all companies 
producing more than 20,000 tons of steel per annum had been considered essential,^ '^  
Lee, his officials, and the Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, 
now concluded that the reimposition of such a criterion would draw too many small 
companies into the measure.^ '' 
The Attiee government's experiences with iron and steel had demonstrated 
that management by public corporation of a large number of small enterprises was not 
^'These being the English Steel Corporation (a subsidiary of Vickers), GKN Steel (part of the GKN 
Group) and the iron and steel division of Tube Investments: CAB 129/119, C (64) 5, memorandum on 
'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Lee, para. 1 (21 Oct. 1964). The three parent companies 
complained to the government against nationalisation of their subsidiaries, but this was rejected on the 
grounds that this would 'prejudice rationalisation and orderly development of the main part of the 
industry and would weaken substantially the position of the nationalised sector': GAB 129/120, C (65) 
42, memorandum on 'Steel nationalisation' by Gallaghan and Lee, para. 3 (b) (15 Mar. 1965). 
^^GAB 129/121, C (65) 59, memorandum on 'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Lee, para. 13 (6 Apr. 
1965). 
^^ The 1949 Act outlined four distinct per annum output criteria which would make a company liable to 
nationalisation: the production of 20,000 tons of steel; the working of 50,000 tons of iron ore; the 
smelting of 20,000 tons of iron; or the rolling of 20,000 tons of steel: Iron and Steel Act (1949), 
Schedule II. 
^"CAB 134/2264, Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS (64) 2, 1 (20 Nov. 
1964). Callaghan reported to Wilson that the Committee had concluded that the nationalisation 
measure should avoid taking responsibility for 'a lot of useless assets', as he succinctly described the 
smaller steel companies: PREM 13/449, Gallaghan to Wilson (23 Nov. 1964). 
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conducive to the nationalised industry's efficient operation.^^ Lee therefore proposed 
limiting nationalisation to those companies whose output exceeded 475,000 tons per 
annum. This decision, which may seem a matter of only technical significance, is of 
considerable importance for two very different reasons. On the one hand, it 
demonstrated that the Labour party was still wedded to the primary method of 
industrial organisation used in the 1945-51 nationalisation programme - the 
Morrisonian public corporation - while on the other hand it confirmed that a 
fundamental shift had occurred in Labour party thinking since 1951 regarding the 
purpose of nationalisation. 
The plethora of small companies taken over in the 1950 nationalisation had 
rendered the operation economically inefficient, primarily because their diversified 
nature conflicted with the highly centralised organisational structure of the 
Morrisonian model. This being so it might be supposed that the Wilson government 
would have circumvented the problem by adopting an alternative method of 
organisation for the renationalised industry. Yet it is clear that, with an industry-wide 
nationalisation measure the Wilson government was virtually as dependent on 
Morrisonian ideas as the Attlee government had been.^ ^ 
The potential difficulties faced by the Wilson government were reduced not 
through the use of any 'revised' thinking on organisation, but through a revision of the 
reasons for nationalisation, which made it possible to justify the exclusion of the 
"it was judged to have 'saddled [the state] with a number of companies of doubtful efficiency and in a 
poor fmancial shape'. In consequence. Ministry of Power officials concluded, 'a disproportionate 
amount of the time ... was taken up with the affairs of the smaller and weaker companies at the 
expense of major problems of policy': BT 255/278, Le Baron Jones, Draft working paper on steel 
nationalisation, para. 18. 
^^ The extent of this dependence was clearly not anticipated by Lee's officials, who considered it 
'politically important that the Bill should show evidence of new thinking ... about the general problem 
of nationalisation': Ibid., para. 10. This point had already been made by the Labour party's research 
department, which had called in November 1963 for any Bill to 'demonstrate that a new look is being 
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smaller iron and steel companies. The decision taken on the size criterion for 
nationalisation demonstrates that its key purpose was now the establishment of public 
control, more than ownership?^ This is clear from the justification offered for the 
decision: Lee argued that taking over just the thirteen concerns would constitute 
effective nationalisation of the entire industry. Since these thirteen companies 
produced more than ninety percent of pig iron and crude steel, they had the power to 
affect the development of the entire industry, including the remainder which would 
TO 
remain in private hands. This approach was quite distinct from most of the 
nationalisations of the 1940s, including the industry's original nationalisation. 
Distinct as this renationalisation must be considered, the working out of the 
bill's details faced problems which were only too similar to those faced in the 
preparation of the 1950 Act. The problems with the BISF effectively resolved 
themselves into two distinct areas. Firstly, it was exceedingly difficult to obtain 
sufficiently detailed information on the exact structures of the BISF as to make the 
drafting of a bill possible.'^ ^ Secondly, and partly as a result of this lack of knowledge, 
it proved increasingly difficult to avoid producing a hybrid bill.^'^ 
taken at the traditional formulae of nationalisation'; BT 255/288, Labour party, 'proposed Bill to re-
nationalise the steel industry' (RD. 549) (November 1963). 
^^This was explicitly acknowledged by Ministry of Power officials: they assumed that first objective of 
the nationalisation would be to 'secure effective government control over the dominant sectors of the 
industry': BT 255/278, Le Baron Jones, Draft working paper on steel nationalisation, para. 2 (a). 
^^CAB 129/119, C (64) 5, memorandum on 'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Lee, para. 5 (21 Oct. 
1964); CAB 129/120, C (65) 42, memorandum on 'Steel nationalisation' by Callaghan and Lee, para. 
3 (a) and (b) (15 Mar. 1965). The nationalisation of iron ore reserves was considered unnecessary 
given the influence of the 13 companies in this area, although it is clear that if sufficient preparation 
time had been available, ministers would have preferred to have public control over all the reserves: 
CAB 134/2264, Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS (64) 2, 1 (20 Nov. 
1964). 
^'The BISF was, unsurprisingly, 'dilatory about providing information' about its own structures and 
those of its companies: BT 255/281, memorandum by D. Le Baron Jones (9 Dec. 1964). Lee 
conceded to Wilson that the government 'cannot dictate the pace at which information will be 
provided': PREM 13/449, Lee to Wilson (2 Dec. 1964); CAB 134/2264, Ministerial Committee on 
Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS (64) 3, 2 (n) (4 Dec. 1964). 
•'°For details of the concept of hybridity, see above, Chapter II, n. 81. 
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Lee was clear that to leave the BISF, and especially its trading subsidiaries, 
outside the provisions of the nationalisation bill was to court disaster. '^ The 1950 Act 
had left the manufacturers' association in private hands and the BISF had 
consequently been able to 'obstruct' the effective workings of the nationalised 
industry.^^ Time and time again at Cabinet there was strong support for Lee's point of 
view: the BISF's opposition to nationalisation was perfectly clear and the extent to 
which it would co-operate with the nationalised enterprise was, at best, questionable.^ ^ 
However, strong Cabinet support could not overcome the fundamental 
problem: rapid preparation of the nationalisation bill was not compatible with a 
thorough enough investigation of the BISF's structures to allow for its inclusion in 
any bill.^"* Moreover, there seemed little doubt among ministers and officials that to 
include parts of the BISF in the bill would render the measure hybrid.However, 
attempting to pass a hybrid measure through parliament was considered by the 
Cabinet to be even less desirable than excluding the BISF altogether from the terms of 
the bill.'^^ The Cabinet records show that the government's various goals - rapid 
'^See PREM 13/449, Lee to Wilson (2 Dec. 1964). 
''-Ibid. 
"See CAB 129/120, C(65) 39, memorandum on 'The British Iron and Steel Federation' by Sir E. Jones 
(Attorney General), paras. 2-3 (15 Mar. 1965). See also Dudley and Richardson, Politics and steel in 
Britain, p. 30. 
•'''Lee reluctantly concluded that the choice which the government had to face was 'between omitting 
provisions about the BISF ... or delay the Bill substantially with no certainty that we should in the end 
be able devise provisions which would achieve our objects': PREM 13/449, Lee to Wilson (25 Feb. 
1965). The Attorney General argued that the government's incomplete knowledge of the BISF's 
structures meant that 'substantial objections' had to be raised to any attempt to nationalise it: CAB 
129/120, C(65) 39, memorandum on 'The British Iron and Steel Federation' by Sir E. Jones (Attorney 
General), paras. 8-9(15 Mar. 1965). 
^'By March 1965, memoranda produced by Ministry of Power officials clearly reveal that they 
considered the inclusion of the BISF as implying hybridity: see POWE 43/497, draft Cabinet 
memorandum prepared by D. Le Baron Jones for Lee (12 Mar. 1965). This conclusion was 
confirmed by the Attorney General: CAB 129/120, C(65) 39, memorandum on 'The British Iron and 
Steel Federation' by Sir E. Jones, paras. 5-6 (15 Mar. 1965). 
^^CAB 128/39, CC (65) 17, 3 (18 Mar. 1965). 
171 
introduction of the bill, incorporation of the BISF, and avoidance of hybridity - were 
simply incompatible.^^ 
The difficulties might not have been so intractable were it not for the particular 
political environment they faced. The government's tiny House of Commons majority 
magnified the problems encountered while preparing the bill. For it made avoidance 
of hybridity critically important. The government feared that its opponents would turn 
every vote into a test of its resolve and commitment, and that this would tire its 
supporters to breaking point. Only with a larger majority could the introduction of a 
hybrid measure have been risked, for in such circumstances, no matter how long the 
parliamentary proceedings dragged on, the government's ultimate victory would not 
have been in doubt. 
It was not, however, the handicap of the government's narrow majority per se 
that made its position so difficult. The government was not in general paralysed by its 
lack of parliamentary strength. The danger came not so much from the size of its 
majority as from the controversial nature of the measure. Renationalisation of iron 
and steel was perhaps the most controversial proposal that the government intended to 
introduce. Outright Conservative and Liberal opposition was certain, making a 
parliamentary battle inevitable. More significant than united resistance from the 
opposition benches, however, was the lack of unity among the government's 
supporters. 
^''ibid. Lee 'reluctantly' conceded that dealing with the BISF in the nationalisation measure was simply 
impossible: CAB 129/120, C (65) 42, memorandum on 'Steel Nationalisation' by Callaghan and Lee, 
para. 4(15 Mar. 1965); CAB 134/2264, Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS 
(65)2,2(3 Mar. 1965). 
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III 
With a wafer-thin majority, the complete support of Labour backbenchers was 
essential, but it could not be taken for granted. Indeed, it seemed more than likely that 
at least two Labour MPs would oppose the measure, a large enough defection to 
prevent the passage of the bill. The chief Labour opponents were Woodrow Wyatt 
and Desmond Donnelly. Both were on the 'right wing' of the party; both had been 
strong supporters of Gaitskell. Wilson and his closest confidants feared that both men 
retained fond memories for their 'lost leader' and despised the 'disloyal' Wilson who 
had challenged Gaitskell for the leadership in 1960, and usurped the victory in 1964 
that would have been Gaitskell's had he lived.^^ Wilson's fears, fomented within the 
'Kitchen Cabinet' atmosphere of Number 10 by such confidants as George Wigg and 
Marcia Williams,'*'' were exaggerated, but they nonetheless contained a fair degree of 
truth."" Both Donnelly and Wyatt were ideologically wedded to Gaitskell and 
Crosland's revisionist crifique of nafionalisation.''^ It was this, more than any personal 
dislike of Wilson, which lay at the heart of Donnelly and Wyatt's opposition.'*^ 
•"'There is also evidence of opposition to the government's proposals among Labour peers in the House 
of Lords. Lord Addison wrote a note entitled 'Steel nationalisation without tears' in October 1964, in 
which he argued, like Wyatt, that 'it might be to the advantage of the authorities to leave a proportion 
of the equity of the steel companies with the public'. He argued that this 'would be thought... in the 
City to be a kind of 'olive-branch' mechanism, and would, I feel sure, remove most of the obstinate 
opposition which obtains at the present time': BT 255/279, Lord Addison to Lord Shepherd 
(Government Chief Whip) (29 Oct. 1964). There is no evidence to suggest that Lord Addison pressed 
the matter further. 
''Pimlott, Wilson, p. 358. 
'"'Benn, who while close to Wilson was not part of the 'Kitchen Cabinet', was scathing of the impact on 
the Prime Minister of these advisors, arguing that 'Number 10 lives in an atmosphere of intrigue, 
encouraged by George Wigg who is a completely crazy advisor, Marcia who gets a bit hysterical and 
Gerald Kaufman who just sits wisely and nods': Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 466 (6 Aug. 1966). 
""in Wyatt's view, Wilson displayed 'contemptible disloyalty' towards Gaitskell: Wyatt, Confessions of 
an optimist, p. 274. 
'^^Ibid., p. 295. 
"•^ Although this is not to deny that they did dislike Wilson. Wyatt argued that the Prime Minister 'had 
weak principles, scarcely any that took precedence over his single-minded self-interest', while 
Donnelly was expelled from the party in 1968 after calling for the Cabinet to remove Wilson: ibid., 
293; Benn, Diaries 1968-72, p. 37 (17 Feb. 1968). 
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There were two main strands in their rejection of nationalisation, one practical, 
the other 'ideological' in inspiration. Firstly, they questioned whether the case for 
taking-over the industry was justifiable on economic grounds. They differed from the 
government not in the use of economic criteria, but in their judgement of the impact of 
nationalisation on the industry's future efficiency.'*'' Secondly, they questioned 
whether, even i f the measure could be justified on such grounds, the method chosen, 
harking back to the 1940s, was appropriate for an industry in the 1960s.''^  Wyatt in 
particular argued from a revisionist perspective that the government should give 
consideration to alternative methods of securing the effective development of the 
industry. 
Of these two strands, the first was the more easy for the government to reftite. 
The case that the industry's performance since 1953 had been inadequate could be 
convincingly ( i f not overwhelmingly) made.''^  The performance of rival European 
steel concerns was markedly superior, and it was argued by independent 
commentators as well as the Wilson government that the industry was failing to 
maintain the pace of modernisation required by international competition.''^ Although 
the evidence was not compelling in either direction, it was difficult for Donnelly, 
Wyatt, or other opponents of nationalisation, to undermine the government's case 
significantly. Yet with the argument far from clear cut, it was also far from easy to 
convince the Labour rebels to support the government line. 
''Ibid., p. 294. 
'^Ibid. As Wyatt records, he had been stressing the desirability of alternative methods of public control 
since the 1950s. 
''^ However, as Lee conceded, the government had to be careful not to exaggerate the extent of criticism 
which could legitimately be made: CAB 129/121, C (65) 59, memorandum on 'Iron and steel 
nationalisation' by Lee, para. 2 (6 Apr. 1965). 
" C A B 128/39, CC (65) 24, 4 (8 Apr. 1965). Dudley and Richardson argue that, by 1964, 'the industry 
was by common consent in thoroughly bad shape in terms of profitability, levels of investment, size of 
plant and technological advance': Dudley and Richardson, Politics and steel in Britain, p. 28. 
174 
Wyatt's and Donnelly's second strand of criticism was substantially more 
difficult to undermine. To such revisionists the essentially 'Morrisonian' form of 
nationalisation proposed seemed a step back to the 1940s. Wyatt forcefully rejected 
the government's argument that its proposals represented the only way of achieving 
sufficient public control. He questioned this notion in correspondence and meetings 
with key government ministers, including the Prime Minister. The strength of his 
position was that rather than simply criticising the government's position, he produced 
alternative proposals, centring around the 'revisionist' idea of partial government 
ownership of the companies, rather than outright take-over.'*^ The ministers' primary 
difficulty was that the 1964 manifesto had declared this to be an appropriate form of 
new public enterprise, so they were placed in the position of having to justify why 
their own policies were inappropriate in the particular case of iron and steel. 
Moreover, since the government was only proposing a partial nationalisation in terms 
of the number of companies, it was not easy to refiite arguments in favour of a partial 
nationalisation in terms of ownership of those companies.'*^ 
The impact of Donnelly and especially Wyatt upon the government's pursuit 
of iron and steel nationalisation cannot be dismissed lightly, even i f in the end their 
views were ignored and their opposition eventually overcome after the 1966 election 
increased the government's parliamentary majority. In 1965 their opposition not only 
forced postponement of nationalisation until after the next general election but also, 
"^BT 255/289, meeting between Lee and Wyatt (22 Apr. 1965). Wyatt argued that such an approach 
would be 'a good deal less complicated than the government's present proposals'. It would 'get away 
from the dogma of nationalisation which had dogged the industry for a good many years', and, 
significantly, 'the industry would be prepared to accept such a scheme'. 
""Although Lee argued in meetings with Wyatt that a fundamental difference existed between their 
proposals: the government's 'partial' measure secured total control, whereas Wyatt's scheme would 
result in partial ownership and control: Ibid. 
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and more significantly, raised serious doubts in the minds of key government 
ministers, especially the Prime Minister, on the method the government was adopting. 
Given the parliamentary situation in 1965, the ability of two Labour rebels to 
wreck the government's legislative intentions was largely unavoidable. The Cabinet, 
despite having been so keen on pressing ahead with the nationalisation, recognised 
that without united backbench support defeat was almost certain. Accordingly they 
decided to 'test the parliamentary waters' with a vote on the white paper before any 
bill were introduced. They reasoned that although serious, a defeat on this was 
unlikely to precipitate a vote of no confidence that could force an election - a situation 
which would have been difficult to avoid i f it had been defeated on the measure 
itself^" 
The government made strenuous efforts to demonstrate that it was not 
adopting this tactic from lack of enthusiasm for the measure, and significant pressure 
was put upon Labour MPs to vote for the white paper. Wilson, in particular, was 
determined to avoid defeat, and faced the challenge head on at the Parliamentary 
Labour Party meeting on 5 May 1965. He told potential opponents that they risked 
the wrath of a party leadership that would not tolerate being 'dictated to by 
minorifies'. Before that would happen, he would 'tell them to go to blazes'.^' Clearly 
Wilson was attempting to frighten his opponents into supporting the measure, but both 
he and they knew that the parliamentary situation rendered such threatening language 
largely meaningless. 
^"indeed, the Cabinet agreed, unconvincingly it might be considered, that it was 'essential that, if the 
government failed to carry the Motion, this should not be construed as an implied defeat for the 
government's legislative proposals themselves. From this point of view, it would be advisable to 
delete the statement [in the White Paper] that legislation embodying the government's proposals 
would be presented to parliament this session': CAB 128/39, CC (65) 24, 4 (8 Apr. 1965). 
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The weakness of the government's position was demonstrated the following 
day in the debate on the white paper. Wyatt elaborated at length on why he could not 
support the measure, and he was strongly backed by Donnelly, and, more hesitantly, 
by S t r a u s s . W i t h the government so exposed, defeat was inevitable. 
Acknowledging this, Brown threw the House of Commons into turmoil by effectively 
announcing that the Cabinet was abandoning any attempt to nationalise the industry 
immediately, ostensibly in order to allow consultation with interested parties." 
Although Brown acted without prior approval of the Cabinet, 'flabbergasting' some of 
his colleagues,^ '* it was clear at the Cabinet meeting the next day that few thought he 
had been left with any choice but to retreat as he did.^^ Better, it was argued, to 
postpone the measure until after another election when it was hoped the opposition of 
Wyatt and Donnelly could be circumvented.^^ 
^'Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 210 (5 May 1965). Castle reports that Wilson told the Cabinet that 'if we 
once start giving to pressure groups, our authority as a government was finished': Castle, Diaries, p. 
21 (18 Mar. 1965). 
^^Strauss had written repeated to Wilson and Lee during 1964 and 1965, arguing that ownership was 
irrelevant to the industry's problems, and that a strengthened Iron and Steel Board (the body created 
by the 1953 Act to oversee the private industry) would have 'all the control over the industry we could 
possibly require to effect its reorganisation': BT 255/290, Strauss to Wilson (5 Nov. 1964) and 
Strauss to Lee (9 Dec. 1964). Wilson was noticeably less convinced by his arguments than those of 
Wyatt, indicating that Wilson believed that ownership was still linked, in some way, to control: see 
Wilson to Strauss (16 Nov. 1964) and BT 255/289, Wilson to Strauss (6 July 1965). By July 1965, 
Strauss was also concerned about the impact of nationalisation on popular opinion. He argued to 
Wilson that the government would 'gain in public esteem and not lose it if we declared that after 
reviewing all the economic and political features, we were going to "end private monopoly in steel" as 
promised, by alternative methods which ensured effective public control': BT 255/289, Strauss to 
Wilson (9 July 1965). Only his timidity (according to Wyatt) prevented him continuing with his 
opposition to the government's proposals: Wyatt, Confessions of an optimist, p. 296. 
'^The compromise was actually struck at the House of Commons between Brown and Wyatt: ibid., pp. 
303-5. 
'^'Grossman claimed to be 'fiabbergasted' by Brown's announcement whilst Barbara Castle was left 
with a 'heavy heart': Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 212 (7 May 1965); Castle, Diaries, p. 30 (6 May 1965). 
"Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 215 (11 May 1965). Only Castle remained unconvinced: Castle, Diaries, p. 
32 (11 May 1965). Wilson reported to the PLP that 'there were no apologies called for and none 
made': PREM 13/449, record of PLP meeting (22 May 1965). However, it should be noted that Benn 
reports that the party as a whole was unwilling to accept Brown's compromise: Benn, Diaries 1963-
67, p. 257(11 May 1965). 
^^Although Lee was concerned about the effect that the period of delay and uncertainty would have on 
development in the industry (and also worried that the companies and the BISF would use the time to 
fiirther complicate their structures, making nationalisation still more difficult): CAB 130/246, 
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The view taken by the Cabinet as a whole - that Brown's forced parliamentary 
retreat was simply the result of the government's limited majority, and had no long 
term consequences for the implementation of the nationalisation measure after 1966 -
has not been challenged by historians. However, while Wyatt and Donnelly's 
opposition effectively forced Brown's hand, it was also true that the alternative views 
expressed by Wyatt in particular were privately given serious credence by senior 
ministers. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Wyatt's ideas caused much doubt to 
develop on the method of nationalisation. 
The strength of Wyatt's argument was that it did not directly question the 
government's chief proposition - that the iron and steel industry was failing the 
nation. Moreover, he agreed with them that the best cure was to extend public control 
over key parts of the industry." Where he diverged was on how this control should be 
achieved. He argued that outright nationalisation was neither desirable nor necessary. 
It was undesirable because it led to problems of responsibility, motivation, and 
efficiency. More significantly, it was unnecessary because effective control could be 
CO 
achieved by far more subtle means. Wyatt argued that i f the government were to 
acquire, by compulsory purchase, around 51 percent of the shares in the relevant iron 
and steel companies, it would have effective control over the companies without 
having to encounter the controversies, and drawbacks, of nationalisation. This was 
, the classic revisionist case for limited nationalisation by more dynamic means than the 
heavy-handed approach of outright nationalisation. 
memorandum to the Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Steel Nationalisation by Lee, paras. 1-2, 4, 6 
(22 Sept. 1965). 
"See PREM 13/449, memorandum on 'Steel nationalisation' by Wyatt (12 Mar. 1965); Wyatt, 
Confessions of an optimist, p. 299. 
^^'Effective control', he argued, not only 'could in practice be secured' by his scheme, but, 'to the 
extent that the Federation [i.e. the BISF] was strongly opposed to nationalisation, but would be 
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Lee and his Ministry of Power officials were dismissive of the basis of Wyatt's 
arguments, considering them a 'complete non-starter'.^^ They saw grave difficulties 
in preparing any legislative procedure to achieve this ownership structure without the 
creation of a hybrid bill. Moreover, they felt that such an ownership structure would 
cause fundamental difficulties for the managements of the companies. The 
managements would be torn between the need to represent the interests of the private 
shareholder who 'was entitled to expect a reasonable return on the money he had 
invested in the company', and those of the state, whose interest was far broader.^ " In 
the Ministry of Power's opinion this conflict of interest was unavoidable and rendered 
Wyatt's proposals unworkable.^' 
This dismissal of Wyatt's proposals might be expected to have marked the end 
of their consideration by the govemment.^^ Wyatt's persistence should have been 
little more than a minor irritation to Lee and his ministry. However, unlike Lee 
Wilson was clearly intrigued by Wyatt's proposals. Wilson's interest, of which he 
had given no indication when speaking to the PLP on 5 May, is manifest in the 
repeated memoranda from his office requesting opinions on the alternatives to outright 
prepared to co-operate with his proposals', would be greater. BT 255/289, meeting between Lee and 
Wyatt (22 Apr. 1965). 
^'They had in fact considered the practicality of similar schemes to Wyatt's as early as October 1964. 
They concluded that anything less than a 51% holding would 'not give control', while even a majority 
holding would 'make it more difficult to bring about changes in the structure of the industry. And it 
would give the directors of the companies an awkward double responsibility': BT 255/278, Le Baron 
Jones, Draft working paper on steel nationalisation, para. 16; BT 255/279, memorandum by M. 
Stevenson (11 Dec. 1964). They rigidly stuck to these conclusions throughout 1965 and 1966: see, 
for example, BT 255/280, memorandum by M. Stevenson to the Plowden Committee (2 July 1965), in 
which the Ministry's consideration of partial nationalisation schemes is reviewed; BT 255/280, 
Cabinet brief by D. Le Baron Jones (8 Sept. 1965), in which it is argued that it would be better to 
'defer action [i.e. nationalisation], rather than adopt one of the alternative solutions'; and BT 255/529, 
memorandum by D. Le Baron Jones (11 May 1966). 
*°BT 255/389, meeting between Lee and Wyatt (22 Apr. 1965). Lee argued that the rationalisation 
which needed to be undertaken after nationalisation would make this conflict still greater. See also 
BT 255/289, meeting between Lee and Wyatt (27 Apr. 1965); POWE, 43/498, brief on 'the 
possibility of non-total nationalisation' by M. Stevenson (10 May 1965). 
'^See POWE 43/497, memorandum fi-om Lee to Wilson (12 Mar. 1965). 
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nafionalisafion.^'^ With the existing nationalisation measure obstructed in parliament, 
the possibility of achieving the same aims by an alternative method plainly appealed 
to Wilson. Moreover, Wyatt's repeated refutations of Lee's criticisms and objecfions 
kept Wilson's interest alive, at a time when Lee considered the matter closed.^ '* 
The serious consideration Wilson gave to Wyatt's proposals has not previously 
been noted, yet it suggests that Wilson's thinking remained open to revisionist ideas 
even after the Cabinet had decided upon outright nationalisation in this instance. 
Wilson's eventual rejection of Wyatt's revisionist proposals might seem to reinforce 
traditional interpretations that he gave little serious consideration to them. However, 
such a conclusion again ignores the precariousness of the government's parliamentary 
position. For just as Wyatt and Donnelly were opposed to nationalisation from their 
'right-wing' perspective, so others in the party were bitterly opposed to anything other 
than nationalisation. Those on the 'left' of the party, such as Michael Foot, who held 
fond memories not of Gaitskell but of Bevan, were unshakeable in their belief that 
*^Even if Wyatt himself was determined not to allow his ideas to be so easily dismissed and continued 
to press his case with Ministry of Power officials and Lee. 
''^ In a letter to Wyatt on the day before the PLP meeting, Wilson assured Wyatt that he had given 'very 
full consideration' to his case: BT 255/289, Wilson to Wyatt (4 May 1965). The record of his 
correspondence demonstrates that this was not mere platitude: see, for example, BT 255/289, Hutton 
(Ministry of Power) to Wilson (26 Apr. 1965), on the potential hybridity of Wyatt's proposals; PREM 
13/449, Trevelyan (Privy Council Office) to Wilson (4 Mar. 1965), on the drafting practicalities of 
legislation to secure 51% ownership; PREM 13/449, Wilson to Trevelyan (10 Mar. 1965), requesting 
more information on such legislation. Wilson's interest is also confirmed by Wyatt: Confessions of an 
optimist, p. 300. 
'^'On the question of hybridity, for example, Wyatt wrote to Wilson on 25 March 1965 directly 
contradicting Lee's contention that his measure would be hybrid. He reported that the Public Bills 
Office had confirmed that 'taking over 51% of all firms ... would invoke a general category which 
would not raise problems of hybridity': PREM 13/449, Wyatt to Wilson (25 Mar. 1965). This 
provoked an immediate response from Wilson, who demanded an explanation from the Ministry of 
Power (they in turn conceded that Wyatt's proposals might not necessarily be hybrid, but argued that 
regardless they would neither give proper control, nor be popular with the industry): Wilson to Lee 
(29 Mar. 1965) and Eagers (Power) to Wilson (2 Apr. 1965). 
"After the correspondence on the subject of hybridity considered in the previous footnote, for example, 
Wilson wrote to Wyatt that 'I find that a 51% scheme is not easy to devise and might not be effective'. 
Nevertheless, he offered to meet Wyatt on any fiiture occasion and discuss the issues again: PREM 
13/449, Wilson to Wyatt (7 Apr. 1965). 
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industrial nationalisation was essent ia l .For Wilson to have accepted Wyatt's 
proposals would almost certainly have lost the support of sufficient 'left-wing' Labour 
MPs to prevent the measure being pursued through parliament in any case.^ ^ 
However, this particular argument against Wyatt's proposals only applied until 
the government's victory at the 1966 general election. The size of its parliamentary 
majority now ensured that almost any measure could be passed into law. It is at this 
juncture, therefore, that the preparedness of Wilson and his Cabinet colleagues to 
consider alternative forms of intervention rather than simple nationalisation, can 
accurately be judged. Yet the evidence of the Cabinet discussions after the elecfion 
reveal that it was not consideration of alternative methods of nationalisation that most 
concerned them, but consideration of whether the project was desirable at all.^^ 
IV 
The contrast between the debate on renationalisation in April and May 1966 
with that of October 1964 when the Cabinet had concluded that iron and steel 
nationalisation was a 'high priority', could not be greater. Wilson himself argued that 
other measures proposed for the Queen's Speech were more important to the 
government's overall strategy, and steel might be postponed from the first to the 
second session of the new parliament.^^ This demonstrates that regardless of the 
method adopted, the Prime Minister no longer considered iron and steel to be the 
*^See Castle, Diaries, p. 66 (9 Nov. 1965). 
'^it would also have antagonised the TUC. Its representatives were already critical of the government 
'failure' to deal decisively with the BISF, arguing that this increased the 'difficulty and complexity of 
the task'. Their reaction if the government had adoption Wyatt's proposals would have been 
explosive: BT 255/457, meeting between TUC representatives and Lee (8 Apr. 1965). 
^^Even before the election, the Cabinet's waning enthusiasm is apparent. In October 1965, when it was 
decided to defer the measure fi-om the next Session, many ministers had argued that 'the 
nationalisation of the industry was not as urgent [as it had been] ... and it could reasonably be 
maintained that a proper allocation of legislative priorities in relation to the government's economic 
policies would not accord a very high place to the Bill to nationalise iron and steel': CAB 128/39, CC 
(65) 53,2 (21 Oct. 1965). 
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'high priority' it had once been. His lack of enthusiasm was shared and expressed 
first by Callaghan, then by Brown. Both pronounced themselves in favour of 
postponement, in order to enable re-negotiation of the entire proposal with the steel 
owners.^" This reinforces the impression that Brown's statement in parliament the 
previous year had not been mere political expediency. 
The contrast between the 1966 Cabinet debate and that of 1964 was 
emphasised still more by the position adopted by the new Minister of Power, Richard 
Marsh. Whereas in 1964 his predecessor Lee had called for delay while other 
ministers pressed for haste, now Marsh stated ('bluntly' according to Grossman) that 
he was going to 'push his Steel Bill through', regardless of the opposifion he faced in 
parliament - or for that matter in the Cabinet.^' Grossman recorded privately that 
Marsh thereafter repeatedly accused Callaghan and Brown of 'deliberately slowing up 
work on steel nationalisation because they didn't really want to push it through'. 
Grossman's personal views at this fime are also of some interest to consider. In 1964 
^'CAB 128/41, CG (66) 18, 4 (1 Apr. 1966). 
™CAB 128/41, GC (66) 25, 4 (19 May 1966). Brown argued in the Ministerial Committee on Iron and 
Steel Nafionalisation that the desire to 'secure a permanent solution to the status of the steel industry' 
meant it would be 'better' if that solution could be agreed to by all parties, including the BISF. As 
chairman, however, he was forced to conclude that 'although his personal view was in favour of delay, 
the great majority of the committee considered that it would be better to proceed': CAB 134/3013, 
Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS (66) 1, 1 (3 May 1966). Other 
opponents were Jenkins and Grosland: Castle, Diaries, p. 128 (19 May 1966). 
"Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 498 (7 Apr. 1966); CAB 128/41, CC (66) 18, 4 (1 Apr. 1966) and CC (66) 
25, 4 (19 May 1966); GAB 134/3013, Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation, NIS 
(66) 1, memorandum on 'The BISF and the timing of the Bill' by Marsh, paras. 7-10 (20 Apr. 1966). 
'^An allegadon Grossman admitted he felt was probably true: Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 511 (4 May 
1966). Castle also states that Roy Jenkins and Tony Crosland supported Callaghan and Brown, and 
that the latter two might even have accepted minority government holdings in place of oufright 
nationalisation: Castle, Diaries, p. 128 (19 May 1966). The Minister of Power stated on 19 May 1966 
that it was 'urgent to proceed with the Bill as quickly as possible', but others at Cabinet were more 
interested in exploring new proposals coming from the BISF, arguing that 'a refusal to do so would 
indicate unnecessary rigidity' and that, moreover, 'a 100% ownership of the 13 main firms [as was 
proposed] ... was not necessarily the right organisadon ... [and would] forgo the possible advantages 
of a wider, though partial, public ownership': GAB 128/41, CC (66) 25, 4 (19 May 1966). An 
example of the 'delaying tactics' allegedly used by Brown is the lengthy debate he entered into with 
Marsh - at the prompting Thomas Balogh - regarding a possible IRC investigation of the industry's 
structures: see BT 255/349, especially Balogh to Brown (24 May 1966) and Marsh to Brown (7 June 
1966). 
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he had expressed little more than disinterest; two years later he considered 
nationalisation to be 'irrelevant'. 
Given the earlier struggles in attempting to nationalise the industry, this lack of 
enthusiasm is striking. The overwhelming impression is that key ministers 
increasingly felt the measure to be tiresome, and tolerated only because Marsh was 
prepared to do all the work on it and because it avoided a potentially explosive clash 
with the 'left wing' in parliament. The truth of this is shown by the Prime Minister's 
disinterest after the 1966 election in ftirther exploring Wyatt's alternative proposals 
for public control.^'' It was not that Wilson had come to favour 'old-style' 
nationalisation instead, rather that he simply lost interest in consideration of the 
project altogether.His declining willingness to enter into debate on the subject was . 
matched by that of many of his colleagues. They appear to have felt initially that the 
general election represented an ideal opportunity to give fresh consideration to 
alternative methods, and that to exclude them from consideration would have been in 
'opposition to the dictates of common sense'.However, in the face of Marsh's 
opposition to any reconsideration of the question of method such enthusiasm rapidly 
faded away.^ ^ 
V 
How was it possible that a Cabinet which enthusiastically sought iron and steel 
nationalisation in 1964 and struggled hard to find a method of pushing it through a 
"Grossman, Diaries, i, pp. 249, 533 (13 June 1965, 12 June 1966). 
"^"Wyatt recognised that Wilson was 'losing interest': Wyatt, Confessions of an optimist, p. 307. 
^^ In September 1966, for example, the CBI attempted to persuade him to re-open the debate, but after 
being advised by Ministry of Power officials that 'it would be pointless to continue', given their 
department's determination to nationalise, he ended the matter: BT 255/456, especially meeting 
between Wilson and CBI (19/9/66) and memorandum by D. Le Baron Jones (11 Oct. 1966). 
'^Grossman, Diaries, i, p. 524 (19 May 1966). 
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hostile parliament in 1965, so rapidly lost - with the notable exception of Marsh and 
one or two other ministers - its enthusiasm at the very time when it could at last 
pursue the measure? To some extent it seems that the battles of 1965 had convinced 
some that nationalisation was simply trouble the government could do without.^* 
However, given its increased parliamentary majority, such problems would be, and 
were, minimised second time around. Much more significant was an increasing 
conviction among ministers that the government should not give priority to 
nationalisafion during its second period in office. 
A key cause of this conviction was the growing atmosphere of despair at the 
failure of general economic policy. As the previous chapter showed, the Cabinet's 
decision to defend the exisfing sterling parity considerably reduced the freedom of 
movement in its economic policy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's attitude 
towards iron and steel nationalisation from 1966 onwards shows that this was true 
also of industrial ownership policy. Callaghan took an increasingly hosfile posifion on 
iron and steel not primarily from any ideological objection to the proposal, but from 
concern about its cost.^ ^ Supported by the Bank of England, he raised technical 
objections on the impact of nationalisation on the markets, arguing that it would 
require the issue of too great a volume of government stock for the markets to 
''Marsh was equally unwilling to allow the BISF to re-open old debates. He told them in May 1966 
that 'the issue of ownership could ... hardly be reopened now': BT 255/298, meeting between Marsh 
and officials fi-om the BISF (10 May 1966). See also CAB 128/41, CC (66) 28, 2 (14 June 1966). 
.'^Despite, for example, the vastly increased government majority, Brown still argued that the 
government should not cause itself trouble by nationalising the BISF. He recognised that the 
government could pass a hybrid bill, but argued that 'it would greatly slow down the speed of progress 
through both Houses of Parliament and might make it impossible to pass the Bill in a single session'. 
Moreover, he argued that the government was still 'far fi-om having fiill knowledge of the complex 
organisation', and had no method of obtaining the necessary information: CAB 129/125, 
memorandum on 'Iron and steel nationalisation' by Brown, para. 2 (b) (6 May 1966). 
™At the beginning of the year he had still expressed the opinion that the desirability of nationalisation 
was 'beyond dispute': Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 383 (6 Feb. 1966). 
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accommodate easily.^" He had not, however, felt in 1964 that such difficulfies would 
arise^' - demonstrating how the failure of economic policy, and the consequently 
perceived need for public financial restraint, impacted upon the pursuit of industrial 
policy goals. 
Even in the case of ministers such as Brown who rejected the deflationary 
economic policies, iron and steel nationalisation was now far from being a major 
priority. The key struggle on the domestic front was over the direction of general 
economic policy - over considerafion of devaluafion as an option, or the continuation 
of the policies of deflation. With the adoption of the July 1966 deflationary package, 
the pursuit of policies such as nationalisation retreated further in the minds of many 
ministers. Nationalisation could not affect the short-term economic malaise that the 
government was presiding over. 
It remains to be explained why nationalisation nonetheless took place. Firstly, 
while nationalisation was not considered to be high priority, most ministers, including 
Wilson, still judged it to be a desirable objective. Secondly, the Cabinet was aware 
that it had been twice elected with a manifesto commitment to nationalise the 
industry, and for Wilson in particular the attainment of manifesto commitments was 
*°He argued that 'the issue of £600 million of gilt-edged stock would raise formidable problems for the 
operation of the gilt-edged market and the more market generally ... it would be catastrophic to the 
government's credit and their general policies to launch such an issue on a falling market': CAB 
130/285, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation: Compensation Terms, 
para. 14 (9 May 1966). For details of the Bank of England's objections, see PREM 13/1035, 
Bancroft (Treasury) to Wilson (31 May 1966). 
*'At least, he did not make public such concerns in 1964, even if he held them. At a meeting on senior 
ministers in February 1965 to discuss methods of compensation, he still did not think the problem 
sufficiently serious to mention: PREM 13/449, meeting between Wilson, Gallaghan, Lee, D.J. 
Mitchell (12 Feb. 1965). However, by April 1965 he did express in private a fear that the timing of 
the parliamentary debate on the measure might undermine confidence unless postponed until after the 
government had received ftinds from the IMF: PREM 13/449, Callaghan to Wilson (15 Apr. 1965). 
'^ He explicitly linked the market difficulties with his support for a re-examination of the case for a 
majority holding. He was only dissuaded from this approach by the vociferous opposition of Marsh: 
GAB 130/285, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Iron and Steel Nationalisation: Compensation 
Terms, para. 20 (9 May 1966). 
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of great significance. However, after 1966 the main reason for iron and steel industry 
nationalisation was that it could occur almost regardless of Cabinet support. The 
Minister of Power had been given clear Cabinet approval to introduce a 
nationalisation bill in October 1964 and, with continual Cabinet approval, had 
succeeded by 1965 in producing just such a bill, even i f the parliamentary situation 
had meant that it had never been presented. In March 1966, all that was necessary 
was for the Cabinet once again to express its commitment to the introduction of the 
measure. With the responsible minister, Marsh, keen to pursue the measure, the 
Cabinet re-endorsed its decision, however unenthusiastically. The Chancellor's 
financial objections could have brought the project to a halt, but even he was 
unwilling to force the issue against Marsh. 
The ability of iron and steel nationalisation to be carried out largely due to the 
enthusiasm of a particular minister, with something close to indifference from his 
Cabinet colleagues, raises many general questions about the pursuit of industrial 
policy. For it surely undermines any argument that the failure of the Wilson 
government's economic policy seriously impacted upon the scope for extending the 
role of public enterprise. It would imply that such expansion could largely be pursued 
independently of economic conditions, provided that, firstly, the Cabinet was 
generally in favour of public enterprise, and that, secondly, the responsible ministers 
and ministries were prepared to pursue to a conclusion cases where public ownership 
and control were felt to be merited. 
However, before reaching such a conclusion, consideration must be given to 
the impact of the method chosen for iron and steel. Was it a consequence of the fact 
that the industry was nationalised that enabled the measure to proceed as it did? The 
nature of nationalisation, being a 'bureaucratic' form of public intervention with 
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which the civil service was already familiar, was particularly suitable for 
implementation largely independent of continual input from the Cabinet. 
Departmental bureaucracies already had experience of nationalisation from the 1940s 
- as shown by the rapidity with which an outline measure was prepared in 1964. The 
only major problem requiring Cabinet assistance was that of the future status of the 
BISF. 
What remains to be seen is the extent to which such civil service procedures 
were appropriate for the production not of systematic renationalisation, but of 
proposals for the more dynamic state intervention envisaged in the 1964 manifesto for 
instances when industries fell seriously behind the targets of the National Plan, or 
proved incapable of applying new 'white heat' technologies. Such 'reactive' 
industrial intervention policies surely required the enthusiasm not just of individual 
ministers, but also of the Cabinet in general (or at the very least, of its key members: 
the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the First Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs). Whether a Cabinet preoccupied with sterling had the time for 
this type of industrial intervention is more doubtful. 
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Chapter Six 
'Revisionism' in the Wilson government's industrial 
policies?: Intervention in the computing, shipbuilding and 
aircraft manufacturing industries 
Although iron and steel nationalisation was the chief manifestation of the 
1964-70 Wilson government's industrial ownership policies, it was not the only 
industry in which it sought fundamental changes in ownership structure. The 
preparedness of the government to contemplate a broad range of solutions to industrial 
policy questions had been implicit in the 1964 Labour party manifesto. Indeed, the 
manifesto proposed that a Labour government would 'take whatever measures are 
required' to support industries where problems arose during the course of its time in 
office. One particular aspect of industrial performance was focused on in the 
manifesto: the 'inject[ion] of modern technology into our industries'. The need to 'get 
more rapid application of new scientific discoveries in industry' was argued to be so 
serious a requirement - and the response of industry so inadequate - that direct 
government action was 'urgently required'. The manifesto outlined three main 
strategies by which the Labour government would pursue such intervention. Firstly, a 
new Ministry of Technology would be established to 'guide and stimulate a major 
effort to bring advanced technology and new processes into industry'. Secondly, the 
government would 'directly stimulate new advance[s] by using, in the field of civil 
production, the Research and Development contracts which have hitherto been largely 
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confined to military projects'.' Thirdly, the manifesto outlined a commitment to 'go 
beyond research and development and establish new industries either by public 
enterprise or in partnership with private industry'. 
The possible use of public enterprise indicated in this third point had formed a 
key aspect of much revisionist thinking in the 1950s on the future role of industrial 
intervention. However, the actual policies pursued by the Wilson government indicate 
that the relationship between the party and revisionism was more complex than the 
manifesto indicated. On the one hand, of the three policies outlined for promoted 
technological modernisation, the one relied upon least by the Wilson administration 
was new public enterprise. Yet, on the other hand, new public enterprises were 
established by the government - for very different reasons - in industries such as 
shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture. While the commitment of the Wilson 
government to 'white heat' technological change has been investigated by historians, 
this evidence of industrial intervention elsewhere has been substantially ignored.^ 
However, by understanding the apparent paradox revealed by such intervention, 
insights may be gained about the extent to which the government's commitment to 
public enterprise really was revisionist. 
I 
The first strand of the paradox is the government's seeming unwillingness to 
use public enterprise to 'inject' modem technology into British industry. There is no 
'A proposal which had been strongly argued for by Blackett and others from the late 1950s onwards. 
See Homer, 'Wilson, Labour and the scientific revolution', pp. 54-5; Kirby, 'Blackett in the 'white 
heat", p. 992. 
^Although, for example, Edgerton has argued that in practice the government adopted 'policies for 
technology quite different from those implied by the rhetoric of the 'White Heat", he has not 
examined cases of intervention which would appear to fall within his scope of enquiry. For example, 
despite critically examining aviation policy, he ignores the government's attempts to save the Beagle 
Aircraft Company: see Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited', especially pp. 54, 59-65. 
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evidence that the government seriously considered such action.'^  Certainly, at no time 
during 1964 and 1965 was the Cabinet pressed by the new Minister of Technology, 
Cousins, to discuss such intervention in the primary modem technology industry -
computing."* This was despite his presentation of damning evidence that the industry 
was suffering severely from American competition, in production of both hardware 
and software. Cousins demonstrated that even when tendering for contracts in the 
United Kingdom, British computing companies could not compete with American 
giants such as IBM. The British industry - hampered by the smaller size of its 
domestic market - produced goods which were generally inferior in cost, delivery 
time, and reliability. 
Given the industry's difficulties - and given the key role computing played in 
modem technology - the case for government intervention was strong. Without 
government support, the domestic industry could not be expected to survive the 
American challenge in the medium- or long-term.^ In such circumstances, Cousins 
might have been expected to press the Cabinet either to nationalise the British 
industry, or at least to establish new companies with government support: after all, he 
was one of Cabinet's strongest proponents of iron and steel nationalisation. However, 
even he appears to have been unconvinced of the merits of nationalisation in this 
case.^  
•'A fact demonstrated by the lack of attention given to the idea by historians concerned with the 
application of the government's technological policies: see Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white 
heat' and Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited'. 
Yet the industry was considered by Cousins to be the 'first industrial priority': CAB 130/217, Ad-hoc 
Ministerial Committee on Technology, para. 1(16 Dec. 1964). 
^CAB 130/217, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Technology, para. 1 (5 Feb. 1965); Castle, Diaries, 
p. 55 (3 Aug. 1965). 
^He did briefly consider nationalisation in July 1965 as a result of the failure of ITC and English 
Electric to merge. Even then, however, he conceded that it did 'not seem a promising candidate for 
the legislative programme': CAB 129/122, C (65) 115, memorandum on 'Computers' by Cousins, 
paras. 14-15 (28 July 1965); CAB 128/39, CC (65) 44, 3 (3 Aug 1965). Most historians of the 
industry do not even mention this limited consideration: see Murray Laver, 'ICL - The Ministry of 
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The simple truth was that there was little evidence that the establishment of 
new public enterprises in the computing industry would be an effective method of 
delivering government support. Fundamentally, the problem facing the industry was 
not a failure of the private enterprises involved, but rather the dominant position of 
American producers in the market.^ Simply changing the ownership of existing 
companies, or even establishing new companies, would do little to challenge the 
American dominance. Instead, as Cousins argued at Cabinet, what was needed was 
increased government support and protection for the existing British companies. This 
would be best achieved not by changing their ownership, but by attempting to ensure 
that they received preferential treatment in the domestic market.^ This would allow 
longer production runs, leading to reduced costs, which hopefully would enable the 
industry to become competitive in the medium-term.^ 
Consequently, the chief focus of Cousins's energies was not on ownership, but 
persuading his Cabinet colleagues that a series of criteria should be adopted for 
government computing purchases which favoured domestic suppliers. The 
government should buy from British computer manufacturers unless the hardware or 
software was either substantially more expensive than its American equivalent, or 
Technology (MinTech) and the merger', Contemporary British History, 13 (1999), pp. 183-5; Ross 
Hamilton, 'Despite best intentions: The evolution of the British minicomputer industry', Business 
History, 38 (1995), pp. 81-104. Castle, however, records Cousins as shying away from nationalisation 
because he feared that Wilson and Callaghan "wouldn't give it. Steel is the only thing in the public 
ownership sector in this government" (a proposition Castle disputed): Castle, Diaries, p. 26 (29 Mar. 
1965). 
^Although there was a strong case in the mainframe sector for amalgamating the existing firms into a 
'single national champion mainframe manufacturer': Hamilton, 'The evolution of the British 
minicomputer industry', p. 81. 
*The origins of such an approach appear to have come as much from Wilson as Cousins. In December 
1964 he urged Cousins to consider 'ways and means of placing orders fmanced from public ftinds in 
such a way as to encourage technological progress in this country': PREM 13/616, Wilson to Cousins 
(1 Dec. 1964). 
'Such an approach need only, Cousins argued, be undertaken for a relatively short period of time (he 
estimated three years): CAB 129/121, C (65) 66, memorandum on 'Computer purchases by the 
government' by Cousins, para. 7 (29 Apr. 1965). 
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could not be supplied without substantial delay.'° There was considerable Cabinet 
support for this approach, although Brown and Jay were vigorously opposed." Brown 
argued that he could 'not imagine that to do so would be defensible as consistent with 
our determination to stimulate efficiency in industry', while Jay contended that 'we 
will do serious damage to our economy and to the balance of payments'.'^ The 
Cabinet rejected such objections, but difficulties still arose over deciding just what 
constituted acceptable excess cost, and acceptable d e l a y . T w o cases - those of a 
new research computer at Farnborough and a Scottish social security computer system 
- highlight both the Cabinet's determination to provide support where possible, and 
also the conflicts inherent in such a process of support. 
In both cases, a clear economic case could be made for allowing American 
companies to win the orders. They could offer cheaper and better machines than their 
British rivals.'"* Nonetheless, Cousins argued that preference had to be given to the 
British companies, and that the extra expense borne by the government was part of the 
cost of supporting key industrial development.'^ This proposition was substantially 
'"Cousins initially called for British machines to be purchased unless: '(a) no British machine can meet 
the requirements; or (b) there would be a serious delay ... (say two years); or (c) there is a gross 
disparity in the price ... (say 25% or more)': CAB 129/121, C (65) 66, memorandum on 'Computer 
purchases by the government' by Cousins, para. 5 (29 Apr. 1965); CAB 128/39, CC (65) 32, 4 (3 
June 1965). 
"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 32, 4 (3 June 1965); Castle, Diaries, p. 36 (3 June 1965). 
'^EW 25/55, draft memorandum from Brown to Jenkins (Minister of Aviation) (26 June 1965); CAB 
129/121, C (65) 80, memorandum on 'Computer purchases by the government' by Jay, para. 9 (1 June 
1965). Jay was especially concerned about the likelihood that Cousins's approach would drive 
foreign investment out of Britain. Callaghan shared, at least in part, their fears, arguing that 'he could 
not accept any proposals to buy British irrespective of cost and performance': CAB 134/1737, 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (65) 10, 4 (29 Mar. 1965). 
'^Brown angrily complained to his officials that even Cousins's compromise proposal for only a twelve 
month delay being allowed was 'an impossible handicap to put on government establishments'; EW 
25/55, note of First Secretary's comments to officials (29 July 1965). 
'''in the Scottish case, the IBM machine was 25% cheaper than ICT's, as well as being 'markedly 
superior in terms of capacity and operation': CAB 128/39, CC (65) 28, 6 (6 May 1965). 
^^Ibid.; CAB 134/1739, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (65) 40, memorandum 
on 'Computers for government departments' by Cousins, para. 8 (8 Apr. 1965). 
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rejected by Brown,bu t a majority of the Cabinet favoured Cousins's contention that 
'for government purchases other [i.e. non-economic], wider, considerations have to be 
taken into account'.'^ The compromise decisions eventually reached, to allow the 
American firm to win the tender for the Scottish order but to support the British case 
for Famborough, shows that the government's position was essentially pragmatic. In 
the Scottish case, the extra costs of supporting the British bid were held to be simply 
too substantial to outweigh the benefits to the industry,'^ but when the extra costs 
were not excessive, as in the case at Farnborough, the government supported an 
uneconomic decision in order to strengthen the industry. 
To what extent can the nature of the Wilson government's support for the 
computer industry - of which these two cases were far from untypical - be seen to 
follow the three strategies offered for high technology industries in the 1964 
manifesto? Certainly, the Ministry of Technology was at the centre of 'guid[ing] and 
stimulat[ing] a major effort' for the industry. The government also clearly set out to 
'stimulate new advance[s]' in the industry through the use of its contracts, not just in 
Research and Development, but also in procurement. Only on the commitment to use 
new public enterprise can it be considered to have 'abandoned' the manifesto 
strategies. The government plainly considered the problems of the computer industry 
with little ideological bias in favour of public enterprise solutions. Instead of 
extending the influence of the state in such a manner, which would have done little to 
^Brown argued that unless British companies - ICT in both these examples - had to face real 
competition, there was no 'sound fijture for a British-owned computer industry'. 'Such a policy', he 
continued, 'is likely to leave us, at the end of the day, with an industry which can supply machines to 
the British government but to no one else'. He proposed an open tendering process for the 
Famborough order and allowing IBM to receive the Scottish order, since it 'thoroughly outbid [ICT] 
on price and performance': CAB 129/121, C (65) 65, memorandum on 'Computers for government 
departments' by Brown, especially paras. 3-5 (27 Apr. 1965); CAB 128/39, CC (65) 28, 6 (6 May 
1965). 
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alter the competitive position of the industry, the government instead adopted a far 
more pragmatic form of industrial intervention. Yet this avoidance of public 
enterprise in the industry did not mean that the revisionist approach towards high 
technology in the 1964 manifesto was not pursued. On the contrary, it reinforces the 
impression that the government was firmly committed to the manifesto's revisionist 
thinking - demonstrating its non-dogmatic approach. 
This is not to say that the policy decided upon was particularly successful, or 
uncontroversial within the government. There were two chief weakness. Firstly, 
there was always strong pressure within government - not just from the Treasury - to 
'water down' the criteria in order to save the Exchequer unnecessary expenditure. 
This was especially the case when, from summer 1965 onwards, defence of sterling 
and the balance of payments caused the Treasury to put extra pressure on other 
departments to cut expenditure.'^ Secondly, there was no means of guaranteeing that 
the protection given to the industry would lead to it becoming more competitive. It 
was equally possible that the industry would, by being sheltered from direct American 
competition, continue to be more expensive and less reliable.^'' Moreover, as Laver 
'^CAB 129/121, C (65) 66, memorandum on 'Computer purchases by the government' by Cousins, 
para. 6 (29 Apr. 1965). 
"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 28, 6 (6 May 1965). 
'^This was precisely the time at which Cousins was arguing strenuously for protection for the industry. 
As he examined the industry further, so it became increasingly apparent that 'US competition is 
becoming more severe, partly as a result of economies of scale and partly because of the competition 
between the American companies themselves. Failing some degree of preference', he argued, 'an 
unacceptable situation will arise': CAB 129/122, C (65) 115, memorandum on 'Computers' by 
Cousins, para. 3 (28 July 1965). 
^°As Brown and Jay had argued. All of these objections were raised when the Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Policy debated the question of using government procurement generally to 'improve the 
technological or competitive position of its suppliers, and promoting desirable changes in the structure 
of industry'. Above all, it was the prospect of a 'cost increase' which worried ministers, along with 
the practicality of government officials being able to judge the relative merits of industrial products: 
CAB 134/2736, Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 2, 1 (23 Jan 1967). 
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has argued, the challenge offered by the dominance of the American companies may 
simply have been insurmountable.'^' 
However, the potential limits to the policy's effectiveness do not alter its 
essentially revisionist nature. Given this, attention must switch from computing, 
where public enterprise was not adopted, to two industries where, paradoxically, it 
was applied. I f it was the case that in computing the government's policy of indirect 
intervention resulted from pragmatic yet revisionist thinking, then how can the more 
direct interventions chosen in shipbuilding and aircraft production be explained? 
Were these, likewise, the result of pragmatic thinking, with the different 
circumstances in both aircraft and shipbuilding warranting the establishment of public 
enterprise? Or was it rather that these two more long-established, and, in the case of 
shipbuilding, 'traditional' industries, were considered from an ideological perspective 
to be different from the more modem computer industry, and so somehow more 
deserving of public enterprise? 
II 
Both aircraft manufacturing and shipbuilding were in a similar position to 
computing. Both were suffering heavily from international competition. In the case 
of aircraft production, in almost all sectors - from light aircraft to large passenger jets 
- American competition was fierce. As in the computer industry, American 
manufacturers had natural advantages in having the largest domestic market in the 
world which allowed for extended production runs and reduced unit costs. Moreover, 
'^He has argued that 'realistically, there was little hope of competing successfiilly with the cascade of 
dollars poured into American space and defence contracts, which ftielled the production of solid-state 
microelectronics there'. As he notes, the research and development budget of IBM was, at this time, 
greater than the entire tumover of any British company: Laver, 'MinTech and the merger', pp. 184-5. 
195 
American products were often technically superior.'^ ^ In shipbuilding, the strongest 
competition came not from America but from Japan, Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries. Although there were few doubts that British ships were technically sound, 
they were more expensive than competitors' products and generally took much longer 
to be produced.^^ 
The seriousness of both industries' position cannot be doubted,^ '* and was 
reflected in the government's almost continual involvement in their affairs from 1964 
through until 1970. Neither industry, however, was nationalised as a whole. Instead, 
the government's support manifested itself in numerous ways, from provision of 
general financial assistance to the take-over of particular companies. The fact that the 
entire industries were not brought under public control makes explanation of the 
government's approach more necessary, not less. What must be established is why, in 
the particular cases of the Fairfields Shipyard Company and the Beagle Aircraft 
Company, the policies adopted for the industries in general were considered 
inappropriate and why, as a consequence, it sought to 'nationalise' both companies, 
either totally or in partnership with private interests. 
From the outset, the government appeared prepared to adopt flexible and 
pragmatic policies towards the two industries. Rather than seeking to impose any 
short-term solutions on either industry, both were subjected to investigation by Royal 
Commissions, chaired by Ray Geddes for shipbuilding and Lord Plowden for the 
22 
23 
24 
'See K. Haywood, Government and British civil aerospace: A case study in post-war technology 
policy (Manchester, 1983), pp. 37-8. 
See E.H. Lorenz, Economic decline in Britain: The shipbuilding industry, 1890-1970 (Oxford, 1991), 
pp. 72-3, 86. 
'As Buxton has noted, 'no one had any doubt in the 1960s that British shipbuilding was in deep crisis'. 
He continues by arguing that 'it is difficult not to see the industry as floundering, with little sense of 
direction ... it was obvious to many that if there was to be any new type of saving the industry from 
near extinction, there had to be a new appraisal [i.e. The Geddes Commission]': A. Buxton, The rise 
andfall of British shipbuilding (1994), pp. 217, 219. 
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aircraft industry. Both were given wide remits to investigate the entire range of 
circumstances affecting the industries and both were invited to offer detailed long-
term solutions to whatever problems were uncovered. The Reports of both Royal 
Commissions recommended wide-ranging structural changes, including - especially 
for aircraft production - proposals for reforming the ownership patterns. However, 
before the long-term proposals contained in the Reports had been acted upon, and in 
the case of shipbuilding even before the Commission had finished its Report, the 
government introduced its own radical changes in ownership. 
I l l 
The government's intervention in the Fairfields shipyard came about as much 
as a consequence of when the yard came to the government's attention, as why it did. 
The Geddes Commission was appointed in spring 1965 and was expected to publish 
its findings the following spring.^^ However, while the Commission was in session 
Fairfields became a matter of concern for the government. The shipyard, despite - or 
perhaps because of - having undergone a thorough modernisation in the preceding 
years,'^ ^ found itself with irredeemable financial difficulties by October 1965. The 
Royal Commission was still a substantial way from being able to report.'^ ^ The 
dilemma was that its findings would clearly be affected by the 'sudden amputation' of 
one of the largest Clydeside yards, yet its recommendations might restore Fairfields' 
fortunes.^^ 
The government felt that this problem of timing obliged it to act to try and 
save the yard from closure. In addition, it was not at all clear whether the yard's 
^^ It was actually published in March 1966. 
^^Buxton, British shipbuilding, p. 215. 
"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 56 2 (2 Nov. 1965) and CC (65) 66 2 (30 Nov. 1965). 
^^HCDeb. 718, cols. 1235 and 1238 (4 Nov. 1965); CAB 128/39, CC (65), 69, 4 (9 Dec. 1965). 
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financial failure was caused by any fundamental problem in its operations, or merely 
by poor management. To stand by and watch the yard close in such uncertain 
circumstances was considered to be particularly undesirable.^^ Finally, the 
government was acutely aware that closure risked adding to the region's already 
substantial unemployment.^*' These factors together seemed more than sufficient to 
justify saving the yard - a decision that appears eminently reasonable. The decision 
was also consistent with the 1964 manifesto commitment that the government would 
take 'whatever measures [we]re required' to save failing industries. 
The government was keen to stress that intervention in Fairfields was an 
'exceptional measure taken in exceptional circumstances': there could be no 
expectation that other yards would be similarly taken over.^' This was reinforced by 
the nature of the initial support action announced on 4 November 1965. It involved 
no public ownership or control, Callaghan merely agreeing to grant the receiver such 
borrowing powers 'as may be necessary to enable the shipyard ... to continue in 
operation until the early s p r i n g ' . Y e t i f this method of intervention supports the 
government's contention that the aim was to 'cover the Fairfields situation pending 
the production of the Geddes Report','^ '^  the £1 million subvention proved to be the 
beginning of much greater intervention. Why did the government move from 
financial support to the establishment of a new company ' in partnership with private 
industry'? 
'^it would have been 'madness' in Buxton's opinion: Buxton, British shipbuilding, p. 227 
^°HCDeb. 722, cols. 618-20 (9 Dec. 1965). 
^^HCDeb. 718, col. 1236 (4 Nov. 1965) and 722, col. 620 (9 Dec. 1965). 
^^HCDeb. 718, col. 1235 (4 Nov. 1965). 
^^EW 27/118, Painter (Treasury) to Burgh (DEA) (1 Nov. 1965). 
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The main pressure on the government was continued deterioration in the 
yard's financial position.^ "* By mid-November it was apparent that the £1 million 
subvention would not save the yard. The shipping companies whose orders the yard 
depended on were not prepared to operate under such conditions of uncertainty, and 
new orders, essential for the operation and fiiture of the yard, could not be pursued 
either.^^ Four of the five berths at the yard were empty and a continuance of such a 
limited scale of operation was not considered by the receiver to be viable. Ostensibly, 
therefore, further public intervention arose from the need to place the yard on a more 
secure financial footing. Yet it remains unclear why this led to the specific form of 
intervention adopted. Given that the government eventually assumed the majority of 
the financial risk, it rnight have been more straightforward simply to nationalise the 
company. In fact, numerous alternatives were considered, and at times favoured -
including closing the yard altogether - but the Cabinet was divided and unsure about 
both the desirability of intervention, and the method to be adopted. 
As with iron and steel nationalisation, the Cabinet's approach to the Fairfields 
case reveals a lack of coherent policy which contrasts sharply with the more dynamic 
approach taken with the computing industry. Yet in reality, the need for repeated 
debate over Fairfields was mostly caused by the domination of similar principles of 
pragmatic economic efficiency to those which guided the Cabinet in the latter 
instance. Rather than simply approving public intervention without thought, the 
Cabinet was determined to judge the Fairfields case on its merits. Intervention in the 
yard was held to be justified i f its long-term potential was sufficiently sound that 
investment could be expected to allow the yard to become self-sustaining and 
^"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 66, 2 (30 Nov. 1965). 
^^BT 291/119, Report of Official Working Group (19 Nov. 1965). 
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competitive. At first glance this is unsurprising: after all, more recent governments 
have argued that all public intervention must be justifiable on economic grounds. 
Moreover, it was consistent with wider government industrial policy: in the computer 
industry direct public intervention had not been considered to be justifiable precisely 
because it would do little to make the industry competitive in the long-term. Over 
Fairfields, however, the Cabinet was increasingly divided between those determined 
to apply strict economic criteria, and others who argued that wider issues should be 
considered. 
Unsurprisingly, Callaghan became most insistent that economic criteria should 
p r e v a i l . H e believed that Fairfields' long-term financial prospects were poor and his 
doubts were increased by the uncertainty of the receiver's estimates.^ ^ At the Cabinet 
on 30 November he still argued that it was 'desirable to keep the yard in operafion' 
and for the government to buy the yard's physical assets i f necessary. However, such 
intervention would 'preferably' be pursued 'in association with private industry' in 
order to share the financial risk. Other ministers shared these doubts, agreeing 'it 
would be dangerous to assume that the enterprise would prove profitable for several 
years'.^* 
By 9 December, Callaghan felt ' it would be a mistake ... to acquire the yard'. 
His scepticism was endorsed by Gunter (Minister of Labour) and by the Prime 
Minister, who agreed that unless 'a reasonable share in the new enterprise were taken 
^^ See BT 291/119, Meeting of Chancellor and receiver (Mr. Mackenzie) (29 Oct. 1965), and CAB 
130/248, first meeting of Cabinet Committee, 'Fairfields Shipbuilding and Engineering Company 
Limited', (3 Nov. 1965). 
"chapman (Shipbuilding Division, Board of Trade) bemoaned that the fragmentary information 
coming from the receiver led to a 'misleading picture of the position': BT 291/119 (19 Nov. 1965). 
^^CAB 128/39, CC (65) 66, 2 (20 Nov. 1965) and CAB 129/123, C (65) 165, 'Fairfields Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Company Ltd', memorandum by the Chancellor (29 Nov. 1965). 
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by private capital' it would 'not be possible to save the yard'.^^ Callaghan repeatedly 
argued that there were 'serious disadvantages in ... continuing with this venture'. He 
continually reminded fellow ministers that it was 'improbable that the new company 
would make a profit for a considerable time and perhaps it never would'. He was 
backed by many at the Cabinet, which, it is clear, came close to allowing the yard to 
close.''^ That Fairfields was nonetheless saved may appear inexplicable. As the 
enthusiasm of Callaghan and others was lost, however, it was replaced with that of 
George Brown. 
Brown's interest in Fairfields was aroused by the Scottish industrialist Iain 
Stewart. Stewart was convinced the yard could have a bright future with new 
management structures and working practices.'" He told Brown that the situation 
'present[ed] a heaven sent opportunity to expose the problems of the industry and 
grasp the nettle of overmanning, demarcation and rank bad management'.'*^ Such a 
promise fitted well with the aims of Brown's DEA, and was eagerly taken up there.'*'' 
At a meeting of senior ministers on 23 November, Brown indicated that he 
preferred to see the yard nationalised. Callaghan was insistent on at least sharing the 
financial risk through partnership with the industrialist Sir Isaac Wolfson,'*'' but Brown 
thought that Wolfson's interest showed how 'powerful the arguments [were] for 
^'CAB 128/39, CC (65) 69, 4 (9 Dec. 1965). 
"•"CAB 128/39, CC (65) 72, 4 (21 Dec. 1965). The Chancellor confirmed to Jay he was 'firmly opposed 
to the acquisition of Fairfields' for this reason: BT 291/120, (17 Dec. 1965). 
'"Stewart was confident profits would be earned 'probably within three' years: EW 27/118, Stewart to 
Brown (19 Nov. 1965). See also Buxton, British shipbuilding, pp. 227-8; Brian Hogwood, 
Government and shipbuilding: The politics of industrial change (Famborough, Hants., 1979), pp. 69-
70. 
^^EW 27/118, Stewart to Brown (19 Nov. 1965). 
''^ By 22 November, Brown's officials were enthusiastically recommending a take-over of the yard 'to 
show what can be achieved [under Stewart's management]': EW 27/118, (22 Nov. 1965). 
•"""Wolfson was a wealthy Glasgow-based businessman: see Sydney Paulden and Bill Hawkins, 
Whatever happened at Fairfields? (1969), p. 34. 
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acquiring the yard for the nation'."^ He was nonetheless persuaded by the Chancellor 
to support the approach to Wolfson.''^ The ensuing search for a financial partner 
proved a tortuous one. Brown was eventually 'let down' by Wolfson/^ and then again 
by his 'replacement', Lord Thomson.''^ In this latter case, the contracts were ready 
and Brown poised to make an announcement in Parliament,''^ only for Thomson to 
withdraw because of spurious (in Brown's opinion) concerns over workers' 
attitudes.^^ The eventual establishment of a consortium, when a single partner could 
not be found, was one of Brown's greatest triumphs during his time at the DEA. 
Why was it, however, that Brown attempted to create a joint company, when 
the frustrations and setbacks were so great? '^ Despite being convinced of the merits 
of saving the yard, and despite flirting with nationalisation,^^ he eventually favoured 
the presence of private interests in the yard" In part, he was driven from 
nationalisation by Cabinet opposition. Eventually, however, even he grew doubtful as 
to the financial prospects of the yard.^" While still wishing to save the yard, he 
admitted by late December that 'to nationalise this particular yard without getting the 
new and dynamic management that was required, and in the face of manifest 
opposition from the shipbuilding industry would entail unacceptable risks' (my 
"^EW 27/118, (23 Jan. 1965). 
"^BT 291/119, (1 Dec. 1965) and (3 Dec. 1965). 
''ibid. (8 Dec. 1965); CAB 128/39, CC (65) 69, 4 (9 Dec. 1965). 
''^ Thompson was a Canadian newspaper proprietor, who at this time owned The Scotsman: see Paulden 
and Hawkins, Whatever happened at Fairfields?, pp. 32-3. 
'^CAB, CC (65) 71, 2 (16 Dec. 1965). 
^''Ibid (15 and 16 Dec. 1965); CAB CC (65) 72, 4 (21 Dec. 1965). See also Hogwood, Government 
and shipbuilding, p. 71. 
^'Brown admitted that the negotiations 'have seemingly been endless': HC Deb. (722), col. 2105 (22 
Dec. 1965). 
^^ On 23 November he wanted a Cabinet paper prepared supporting public ownership: EW 27/118, Note 
by J.C. Burgh of meeting between Brown, Callaghan, Jay and Mayhew (Ministry of Defence for the 
Royal Navy) (21 Nov. 1965). 
" C A B 129/123, C (65) 183, 'Fairfields Shipyard', memorandum by Brown (17 Dec. 1965). 
'"'By 17 December he told Cabinet he was 'not ... attracted' by nationalisation since it would 'prove 
difficult to run the shipyard as a viable commercial concern': CAB 129/123, C (65) 183, 'Fairfields 
Shipyard', memorandum by Brown (17 Dec. 1965). 
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i t a l i c s ) .Suc t i a conclusion from the minister most keen to save the shipyard is of 
great significance. It was an acknowledgement - unchallenged by other members of 
the Cabinet - that the Wilson government had serious reservations regarding 
nationalisation. It helps to explain the lack of enthusiasm noted in the previous 
chapter to complete the take-over of the iron and steel industry. 
Brown's acceptance of the risks posed by outright nationalisation, despite his 
determination to save the shipyard," shows just how pragmatic the Wilson Cabinet 
often was in industrial policy. Both Brown and Callaghan were prepared to 
compromise over Fairfields. Callaghan openly concluded that the yard's financial 
prospects were insufficiently good to justify any intervention by the government. 
Nevertheless, he attempted to find solutions which allowed the yard to be saved while 
reducing the government's financial exposure. Likewise, Brown backed away fi-om 
outright nationalisation when it was clear that a different form of public intervention 
could achieve his desired aims. 
It might be argued that Brown's rejecfion of nafionalisation was forced upon 
him by circumstances. After all, the government was operafing in a political 
environment in which nationalisation faced strong opposition. A narrow 
parliamentary majority, coupled with opposition from two Labour MPs, had already 
meant postponement of iron and steel nationalisation. The potential for further 
nationalisations, especially those such as Fairfields which might be seen as 'back-
^^CAB 128/39, CC (65) 72, 4 (22 Dec. 1965). The opposition of the shipbuilding industry had been 
made apparent to Brown by its representatives; EW 27/118, President of the Shipbuilding Conference 
to Brown (9 Dec. 1965). 
^^ See above, Chapter V, especially section iv. 
^^For there can be no doubt that nationalisation would have been the easiest method of guaranteeing the 
yard's future. 
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door' take overs,^ * was not apparent. However, the commitment Brown showed to the 
exceptionally frustrating task of establishing a consortium to save the yard 
demonstrates that his support for the alternative form of intervention was genuine. It 
would have been possible on the numerous occasions when negotiations broke down 
for Brown to have at least re-opened debate on outright nationalisation. That he did 
not even do this, however, is highly significant. What mattered to Brown was saving 
the shipyard, not the opportunity offered to increase the size of the public sector of the 
economy. 
IV 
The case of the Beagle Aircraft Company was similar to that of Fairfields. 
Like the shipyard, Beagle turned to the government when it appeared that closure was 
the only other option. Like Fairfields, Beagle was not obviously suffering from a lack 
of modem plant. Indeed, the company was in the process of launching a new range of 
light aircraft when it became clear that the financial strength of the company was 
insufficient to sustain its day-to-day operations. However, the primary source of its 
immediate problems was more complex in the case of Beagle than it had been with 
Fairfields. The complications arose from the fact that the aircraft company was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Pressed Steel Company - which was itself a 
subsidiary of the British Motor Corporation (BMC). The problem was not that Beagle 
was so far in debt that its owners could not cover its liabilities. Rather, it was simply 
that Pressed Steel was not prepared to support the losses that Beagle was running, 
*^As the CBI, for example, saw the measure: BT 291/119, note by officials to Jay (President, Board of 
Trade) (8 Dec. 1965). 
'^it must also be recognised, however, that Brown was motivated by the need to defend the status of his 
new Department, and his own status within the Cabinet. In particular, to have 'failed' to save the 
shipyard would have further undermined the standing of the DEA relative to the Treasury. 
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wishing instead to concentrate its resources on its 'major responsibilities to the motor 
car industry'.^'' 
Although the origins of Beagle's problems were different from those of 
Fairfields, it was to the government that Pressed Steel - like the receiver appointed at 
the shipyard - turned for support. From the outset, however. Pressed Steel made it 
clear that it was not simply seeking to reduce its financial exposure by persuading the 
government to share the risks. Rather, Beagle's owners wished the government to 
enter into a partnership, with the government as the primary partner, arguing that 
'light aircraft manufacture is a task of national importance which can go forward to 
success only with government support'.^' When Pressed Steel first entered into 
negotiations in the first half of 1966, they envisaged retaining only a 25% stake in the 
company, and by the early July of the same year they had retreated even from this 
position. They informed the government that they no longer wished to retain any 
share at all, although they were prepared to 'leave 20% of the purchase price in the 
business as an investment'.Unless the government adopted permanent and total 
control over the company, Pressed Steel was not prepared to fund it, and would wind 
Beagle up by the end of the month.^^ 
With Fairfields, the government had been presented with the financial collapse 
of the enterprise, and in attempting to save it had concluded that some form of direct 
state intervenfion would be necessary. Beagle was the reverse of this: the government 
^Vressed Steel argued that the 'large calls on its financial resources' fi-om the motor car business meant 
that it 'c[ould] not provide additional working capital for Beagle': A V I A , 65/1790, Pressed Steel, The 
Beagle range of Beagle light aircraft for world markets (1966), preface, para. 9. See also CAB 
129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 2 (7 July 
1966). 
^ ' A V I A , 65/1790, Pressed Steel, The Beagle range, para. 10. 
^^CAB 129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 3 (7 July 
1966). 
" A V I A , 65/1790, Pressed Steel, The Beagle range, para. 9. 
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faced the prospect that the company, which was not yet insolvent, would be made so 
by its owners unless they agreed to nationalise it. It was the first case any government 
had experienced where the pressure to nationalise came not from the government 
itself, but rather the industry - or rather company - a lone.Given this, it might have 
been thought that the government would have seized the opportunity to bring the light 
aircraft industry into public ownership. However, i f any single case demonstrates that 
the Wilson government lacked any fervent ideological commitment to public 
ownership, then it must be Beagle.Despite the enthusiasm of Pressed Steel, the 
government was determined that, as with Fairfields, any decision on intervention had 
to be justifiable on economic grounds.^ ^ 
With Fairfields, the government had initially intervened because the Royal 
Commission on the industry was still conducting its investigations. This was not the 
case with the aircraft industry: the Plowden Report was published in December 
1965.^ ^ The government accepted 'the basic analysis of the fiiture of the aircraft 
^"There had been pressure from workers in both the coal and railway industries in the 1940s for 
nationalisation, but this had been matched by an existing commitment from the Attlee government: 
Beagle appears to be the first case where the pressure came from the industry alone. 
^^ The government's attitude towards the light aircraft industry in general reveals such an approach. In 
October 1965, for example, the government agreed to provide 50% of the launching costs of the 
Britten-Norman BN-2 'Islander' (a smaller type of aircraft than that produced by Beagle) on the 
grounds that it represented a 'good business proposition': CAB 134/1737, Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Development, ED (65) 21, 2 (18 Oct. 1965), and CAB 134/1741, ED (65) 96, 
memorandum on 'Launching aid for the BN-2 'Islander" by J. Stonehouse (Parliamentary Secretary, 
Ministry of Aviation), especially paras. 3-4 (12 Oct. 1965). See also the lack of enthusiasm for 
providing financial support for Shorts' Skyvan aircraft, deemed to be uncompetitive and therefore a 
poor investment: CAB 134/2736, Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 12, 1 (11 May 
1967). 
^ I^ndeed, Callaghan went so far as to argue in April 1966 that on the grounds of economic efficiency, 
the company might have to be saved without government support, since 'government ownership ... 
may make it more difficult to forge links with another concern which already possesses the necessary 
after sales organisation which is the really effective solution [to Beagle's problems]': EW 25/319, 
Callaghan to Mulley (5 Apr. 1966). Haywood has argued convincingly that the government's 
attitudes were, in no small part, shaped by their general 'hostility' to the 'apparently free-spending 
aero industry', seeing it as 'symbolic of the waste and mismanagement characteristic of the previous 
administration': Haywood, Government and British civil aerospace, pp. 70-1. 
'^Por analysis of reaction to its publication, see Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited', p. 61. 
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industry in the Plowden Report'. Moreover, when specifically asked about the 
goveniment's position on the production of light aircraft in Britain, Mulley (Minister 
of Aviation) gave no indication that this was an area in which he dissented from 
Committee's findings. 
However, as Mulley recognised when considering Pressed Steel's proposals in 
July, the Plowden Committee had argued that the light aircraft industry should 
'eventually become commercially self-supporting and should not have government 
assistance indefinitely'.^" Any decision to take over the company therefore risked 
being viewed as contrary to the conclusions of the Royal Commission the government 
itself had set up.''' Nevertheless, Mulley, while recognising the legitimacy of the 
Commissions findings, gave a higher priority in his thinking to the potential that 
Beagle offered. In the Commons debate on the Plowden Report, he had argued that 
'Beagle seems to me the best way to develop light aircraft in this coun t ry ' .Th i s 
optimism convinced such doubtfial ministers as Brown to conclude that 'Britain ought 
to be able to compete successfully in the light aircraft industry' and that ' i t seems that 
^^CAB 129/124, C (66) 14, memorandum on 'Plowden Report on the aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 
3 (i) (21 Jan. 1966); CAB 130/253, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on the Plowden Report, para. 12 
(10 Dec. 1965). 
''HCDeb. (723), cols. 890-905 (1 Feb. 1966). 
™CAB 129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industry' by Brown (7 July 1966). 
"Although the concept of a government ignoring the conclusions of its own Royal Commission was by 
no means unusual, let alone unprecedented. However, Brown for one strenuously argued that any 
intervention to save Beagle could not be undertaken independently of the government's overall 
response to the Plowden Report. DEA officials were more forthright, concluding that 'the acquisition 
by the government of a major equity holding in this particular company [wa]s inconsistent with the 
general approach of the Plowden Report': EW 25/319, Brown to Mulley (14 Jan. 1966); EW 25/319, 
memorandum for First Secretary by officials (21 Jan. 1966). This also appeared to be the Treasury's 
initial position. Diamond (Chief Secretary to the Treasury) putting forward objections almost word-
for-word the same as Brown: CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED 
(66) 3, 3 (24 Jan. 1966). Brown appears, however, to have been persuaded by Mulley not to adopt 
such a position, for by July 1966 he was suggesting only that it was 'conceivable' that government 
support could be viewed as contrary to Plowden: CAB 129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A 
British light aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 8 (7 July 1966). 
'^HCDeb. (723), col. 903 (1 Feb. 1966). 
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Beagle is the only going concern that provides a basis for a British light aircraft 
industry'." 
Mulley's optimism could not, however, hide the serious financial risks 
involved in any nationalisation of Beagle.^ '* Pressed Steel considered the company to 
be worth £3 million, while Mulley predicted that additional expenditure of some £2-
2.5 million would be needed over a four or five year period before the company was 
profitable. It was calculated that, even over an extended period (of thirteen years), the 
return on such investment could not be expected to be much more than six percent, 
which, as Mulley acknowledged, did not make it a 'very attractive investment 
proposition'.^^ Moreover, even such figures were based more on hopeful expectation 
than anything else. The American company. General Dynamics, had undertaken an 
assessment of Beagle's potential fiiture profitability with a view to either taking it 
over outright, or entering into a partnership with the government, but found the 
prospect of a financial return 'too remote' to justify any investment.'^ 
Despite the financial dangers, however, the Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Development backed Mulley in going ahead with the project, although 
'with some misgivings'. The Committee's one insistence was that he should reach 
'^Although it is clear that Brown was not prepared to support a government take-over unless the price 
was reasonable: CAB 129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industry' by 
Brown, paras. 8-9 (7 July 1966). 
His officials in the Ministty of Aviation pressed this point upon him, expressing 'reservations' about 
Pressed Steel's proposals, especially the financial prospects which were 'not attractive by normal 
commercial standards': AVIA 65/1790, draft memorandum on 'Proposals for a joint company' 
(September 1965 (no specific day given)). 
" C A B 129/125, C (66) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 7 (7 July 
1966). 
'^They concluded that it would be 1974 at the earliest before any profit could be expected: EW 27/158, 
memorandum from Mulley to Callaghan (25 Mar. 1966); EW 25/319, memorandum from A. Albu to 
Brown (29 Mar. 1966). The legitimacy of General Dynamic's conclusions were, however, 
undermined by claims that they had been dissuaded from supporting Beagle only by pressure from the 
US government: CAB 129/125, C (65) 98, memorandum on 'A British light aircraft industty' by 
Brown, para. 4 (7 July 1966); CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED 
(66) 8, 1 (25 Apr. 1966). 
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satisfactory financial terms with Pressed Steel, believing that the government should 
pay no more than £1.5 million - the break-up value of Beagle.'^ This aside, the 
Committee accepted Mulley's arguments that, unless the effort was made to save 
Beagle the British light aircraft industry had no future. As for Cabinet, it did not even 
consider the matter worthy of debate, merely accepting the conclusions of the 
Ministerial Committee. 
That the Cabinet was prepared to go along with what was, to all intents and 
purposes, a nationalisation measure, without even discussion, appears incredible. Still 
more incredible is the attitude taken by the Prime Minister. Wilson was not only 
prepared to let the Ministerial Committee decide whether to proceed, but rarely 
offered any opinion of his own.^^ However, it should be noted that the initial decision 
to involve the government in Fairfields was also made with little real debate.^ ^ It was 
only later, when the difficulties attached to the government's commitment became 
clear that significant Cabinet attention was focused upon the shipyard. The same was 
true of Beagle.^'' Other ministers, although not, significantly, Brown and Callaghan, 
appeared content to allow Mulley to save the light aircraft industry for what was 'not 
" C A B 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (66) 17, 1 (4 July 1966). 
Mulley himself had already expressed the view that that the company should be purchasable for no 
more than £2 million. He had also proposed in March that the government could limit itself, if it 
wished, to temporarily supporting Beagle for a few months while it studied the financial position in 
more detail. Such an approach had, however, been largely negated by the behaviour of Pressed Steel, 
which threatened to wind-up Beagle unless the government acted with haste: EW 27/158, 
memorandum from Mulley to Callaghan (25 Mar. 1966). 
'^ Although in February 1966 he urged the Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee to give 'further consideration' 
to supporting Beagle 'in view of the big demand', in July he wrote to Callaghan that 'if you are 
satisfied that the purchase price is reasonable, I am content to leave it up to you': EW 25/319, 
memorandum by Wilson (2 Feb. 1966); PREM 13/1077, Wilson to Callaghan (28 July 1966). 
™0n 2 November 1965, when Fairfields first came to the Cabinet's attention, ministers simply gave 
permission to Callaghan to decide (after consulting Brown, Jay, Cousins, Gunter (Minister of Labour) 
and Ross (Secretary of State for Scotland)) whether or not to support the shipyard: CAB 128/39, CC 
(65) 56, 2 (2 Nov. 1965). 
'^'Although the precise method of take-over was a subject which exercised other ministers and 
departments. The Board of Trade, for example, strongly rejected the suggestion that it should buy the 
company using its existing powers. Officials advised Jay (President of the Board of Trade) that 'a 
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... an unduly high price to pay for keeping Britain in this business, compared with 
other expenditure in the aircraft industry'.^' 
In December 1966 the future of the proposed take-over of the company again 
came to the Cabinet, but by this time the Ministerial Committee for Economic 
Development had reversed its earlier support for the scheme and advocated allowing 
Pressed Steel to wind Beagle up. The cause was simple: the estimates of the losses 
that the government would have to cover until the company was profitable had 
increased from £2-2.5 million to £3.1 million, meaning that the return which would be 
had on the investment had deteriorated from 6% to only 3%. Michael Stewart, the 
new First Secretary of State,^ '* informed the Cabinet that under such conditions, and 
given doubts about the expertise of the current Beagle management, the Committee 
considered it to be 'disastrous to go ahead'. Even i f it were possible to introduce new 
management, the project should still not be pursued, since 'experience with other 
publicly-owned firms was not encouraging in this respect ' .Such doubts regarding 
the record of nationalisation mirror the sentiments of his predecessor. Brown. It is 
clear that neither man had any dogmatic attachment to nationalisation. However, in 
new policy such as this should be supported by legislation' rather than any less public method: BT 
279/280, memorandum on 'Beagle Aircraft' by Dean (Board of Trade) (8 July 1966). 
*'The DEA and Brown viewed the financial prospects of the company in a negative light throughout. 
Albu (Minister of State for Economic Affairs) argued in March 1966 that the project 'is really a 
rescue operation with, I fear, little real chance of breaking even'. Brown agreed, replying to Albu that 
'I am against doing a 'Fairfields' here': EW 25/319, Albu to Brown (29 Mar. 1966) and Brown to 
Albu (31 Mar. 1966). For Callaghan's equally negative views, see EW 25/319, Callaghan to Mulley 
(5 Apr. 1966). By contrast. Jay was 'very much in agreement' with Mulley, arguing that the project 
was 'in our national mterest, and more particularly essential for our exports': EW 25/319, Jay to 
Callaghan (4 Apr. 1966). 
*^CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (66) 24, 1 (7 Dec. 1966). 
Even Mulley conceded that 'had the latest estimates been available and the management difficulties as 
clear in July as they now were, he would not have recommended government acquisition of Beagle'. 
''Ibid. 
'^'He replaced Brown in August 1966. 
*^CAB 128/41, CC (66) 65, 5 (8 Dec. 1966). 
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the case of Stewart, it is not even clear i f he was prepared to consider nationalisation 
as a method of industrial intervention. 
Stewart's objections were backed by others in the Cabinet who were 
unconvinced that the export prospects of the company were 'sufficient to justify 
acquisition'. Doubts were expressed about the company's ability to sell its products 
in the key American market, and some were even sceptical about the technical quality 
of the aircraft. However, just as Brown had fought strongly to persuade the Cabinet 
to have faith in Fairfields, so Mulley fought to overcome the objections to Beagle. He 
recognised that 'even before the revised estimates of fiiture prospects the 
advantages of the project had been marginal from the government's point of view'. 
He argued, however, that i f the costs rose no more, the project remained justifiable. 
He was backed in such conclusions by other ministers who argued that an increase of 
only £700,000 in costs did not justify losing one of the most successful of British 
aircraft exporters. 
On balance the Cabinet was persuaded that the project should be continued, 
although once more with the proviso that Mulley should obtain a 'very substantially 
lower purchase p r i ce ' .However , the financial position of Beagle continued to 
deteriorate and in the following September the Cabinet found itself once more 
debating - in very similar fashion - the case for intervention. By that stage problems 
with one of the company's aircraft, the B-206, and doubts about new variants of 
another, the B-121, had pushed up the cost of assistance to £4.5 million. Despite 
this, Peter Shore, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs following the reorganisation 
*^CAB 128/41, CC (66) 65, 5 (8 Dec. 1966). 
''Ibid 
^CAB 129/133, C (67) 151, memorandum on 'The Beagle Aircraft Company' by Shore, paras. 1-2 (19 
Sept. 1967). 
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of the DEA in August 1967, retained more faith in the project than had his 
predecessor Stewart, arguing that although obviously not good, the deterioration in the 
financial prospects 'was not sufficiently significant in itself to warrant abandoning the 
p ro jec t ' .Such a withdrawal could only be justified i f it could be shown that 'it had 
been wrong to decide on acquisition originally'. He nevertheless admitted that, 
judging the project 'solely by commercial criteria', its merits were debatable.'^ 
The subsequent Cabinet discussion reveals that Shore's contention - that 
commercial criteria alone should determine the government's approach - was 
supported by many fellow ministers. The debate swung to and fro over estimates of 
the company's potential to win exports, and estimates of costs. One decisive factor 
was that as a result of the government's continuing commitment to support the 
company, some £2 million would be lost i f it was allowed to close. The psychological 
impact of a closure on the aircraft industry in general was also felt to be crucial. 
However, the most important determining factors remained financial. The fact that all 
sales would be exports or import savings, and that overall global demand for light 
aircraft was soaring by an estimated 10% per annum, persuaded the Cabinet to 
reaffirm its earlier decisions to the take-over of the company.'' 
V 
The cases of Fairfields and Beagle share numerous common characteristics. 
However, two in particular were of critical importance. The first is the extent to 
which government policy was determined by a pragmatic application of economic 
^'CAB 128/42, CC (67) 56, (21/9/67), 6. This was also the conclusion held by the Ministry of 
Technology: Stonehouse (Minister of State, Ministry of Technology) argued that, while 'the financial 
position had changed for the worse ... [it] had not changed the prospects so markedly that a 
withdrawal could be justified': CAB 134/2914, Ministerial Committee on Industrial Policy, IN (67) 1, 
1 (8 Sept. 1967). 
'°CAB 128/42, CC (67) 56, 6 (21 Sept. 1967). 
212 
criteria. In both instances, intervention was eventually adopted because it was judged 
that the projects could be justified in financial terms - i f not in the sense that they 
would generate huge profits, at least that there was a realistic prospect of them ceasing 
to lose money in the medium term. Other factors were obviously important, but the 
Cabinet as a whole was not prepared to throw money at the companies without any 
indication that they could actually be returned to profitability. Such thinking also 
explains the methods of intervention chosen. In both cases these were considered the 
best way of keeping the enterprise in operation. At no stage did any minister propose 
nafionalisation for ideological reasons; it was only suggested as a pragmatic solution. 
The second key characteristic of both interventions is the extent to which 
support for the individual projects was dependent on their promotion by individual 
ministers: Brown in the case of Fairfields, Mulley in that of Beagle. Although a 
rational case could be made for intervention in both instances, the arguments were far 
from overwhelming. There were occasions when the Cabinet came very close to 
abandoning both Fairfields and Beagle. It was at these moments that Brown and 
Mulley pressed the Cabinet hard to continue. That they were able to convince their 
colleagues shows that even Callaghan, who was determined to restrict public 
spending, approached the cases with a degree of flexibility. 
It remains the case, however, that flexibility and pragmatism did not 
demonstrate dynamic decision making. Although the Cabinet was prepared to listen 
to arguments for intervention, few of its members were prepared to champion 
individual cases for intervention. It seems difficuft to avoid the conclusion that 
Fairfields and Beagle were only saved because they happened to secure the attention 
of Brown and Mulley. Even they became interested only because the cases were 
''Ibid 
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brought to their attention by private individuals and companies: Fairfields by its 
receiver and Iain Stewart, Beagle by Pressed Steel. The interventions were essentially 
reactive; they do not represent a dynamic government using public enterprise as a 
solution to industrial problems identified by their plarming apparatus. Both the 
reactive character of policy and the dependence on the initiative of individual 
ministers is further demonstrated by the government's policy towards the other civil 
aircraft manufacturers. 
V I 
While concluding that the light aircraft industry should be able to stand on its 
own feet without substantial government support, the Plowden Commission 
nevertheless accepted the overwhelming evidence that the same was not true of larger 
civil aircraft production. The two main airframe producers. Hawker Siddeley 
Aviation and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), were both struggling in the face 
of the giants of American competition such as Boeing, Lockheed and MacDonald 
Douglas. Both depended on government assistance for the development of all aircraft, 
and on the publicly-owned airlines for orders. The Plowden Commission saw no 
prospect of this dependence being reduced, even in the long-term. Accordingly, it 
recommended that the government should take a substantial stake in both companies 
in order to exercise easier control over their use of public funds. 
'^But not that the two companies should be merged. This astounded some ministers, including Jenkins 
(as Minister of Aviation), who had believed that such a merger 'had been the working assumption 
behind the Commission's study'. The Commission's conclusion seemed 'quite wrong' to Jenkins, and 
he was supported by other ministers such as Healey (Secretary of State for Defence): CAB 130/253, 
Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on the Plowden Report, paras. 1-3 (10 Dec. 1965). 
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While several ministers were initially prepared to accept this,^ ^ the Cabinet as 
a whole doubted the practicality of the Commission's conclusions, and set up a sub-
committee to give the matter more thought.^ "* This sub-committee found no reason to 
dissent from the Commission's judgement that the relationship between the 
companies and the government was not functioning to the benefit of either party. 
However, it rejected the recommendation that the government should take a share in 
both companies as 'impracticable' - primarily 'because it would not be accepted by 
the two c o m p a n i e s ' . T h e sub-committee recommended instead two possible 
alternatives, neither of which appeared likely to be welcome to the companies. The 
alternatives were: 
1. To take over the whole of the equity of BAC, and then 
merge BAC and Hawker Siddeley Aviation into a new 
company in which the former BAC equity would represent 
a substantial minority shareholding for the government; or 
2. To take both companies into 100% public ownership, 
bringing them as separate companies under a new public 
corporation, which would also take over responsibility for 
other airframe interests in public ownership (e.g. the 
government's holding in Shorts, and the Beagle Aircraft 
Company) and would be charged with the duty of 
rationalising the industry.^^ 
The sub-committee itself was unable to decide between these two options,^^ but it is 
clear that either represented a substantial extension of public enterprise in the industry. 
" C A B 129/124, C (66) 14, memorandum on 'The Plowden Report on the aircraft industry' by Brown, 
para. 3(21 Jan. 1966). 
'"CAB 128/41, CC (66) 41, (2/8/66), 6; CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Development, ED (66) 19, 3 (25 July 1966). 
'^CAB 128/41, CC (66) 51, 7 (29 Oct. 1966). 
"^CAB 129/127, C (66) 142, memorandum on 'The future of the airfi-ame industry' by Crosland, para. 
10 (18 Oct. 1966). The sub-committee also considered two further alternatives: '(a) to leave things as 
they are; or (b) to take a majority holding in both companies, and use the majority power to carry 
through rationalisation'. It dismissed the first as being equivalent to overseeing the destruction of the 
industry. The second 'would be practical only with the agreement and co-operation of the industty, 
and this would not be forthcoming'. 
' 'CAB 129/127, C (66) 142, memorandum on 'The futtare of the airframe industry' by Crosland, para. 
15 (18 Oct. 1966). It should be noted, however, that their officials had advised that outright 
nationalisation was probably 'unavoidable, given the reported attitudes of the companies, and the 
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The first alternative, in particular, would have been a radical departure in public 
ownership policy - one very much in the direction that revisionist thinking had 
suggested. 
Once again, debate in the Cabinet centred around identification of the best 
solution, without recourse to ideological discussion of the merits of public ownership 
per se. This can be seen in the reasoning given by Mulley for his personal preference 
for outright nationalisation. He argued that with the government already 'so deeply 
Ofi 
involved in the affairs of the industry', nationalisation was the logical next step. 
Without it, the government would continue to exercise over-burdeningly detailed 
'financial and technical control of projects', and would still risk public criticism for 
the 'deliberate creation of a monopoly under the predominant control of private 
enterprise' which might make 'excessive profits out of public money'.'' 
For Mulley, the key question was whether a nationalised industry could 
prevent the existing management and design staff from l e a v i n g . T h i s was 
especially pertinent with regard to Hawker Siddeley Aviation, where he recognised 
that 'while it could not be taken for granted that the present management would be 
wholly unavailable to a public corporation, it was probable that they would not'. '° ' 
This likelihood that staff from the company, which bitterly opposed any state take-
over, would refiise to serve a public enterprise was considered by a majority of the 
disadvantages of a minority holding': EW 27/180, meeting of officials on 'Government shareholding 
in a merged airframe company: Powers' (29 Mar. 1966); meeting of officials (19 Sept. 1966). 
'^CAB 128/41, CC (65) 51, 7 (20 Oct. 1966); CAB 129/126, C (66) 119, memorandum on 'The aircraft 
industry' by Brown, para. 6 (26 July 1966). 
' 'CAB 128/41, CC (65) 51, 7 (20 Oct. 1966). 
'""CAB 129/126, C (66) 119, memorandum on 'The aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 7 (26 July 1966). 
Indeed, even the prospect of nationalisation (and uncertainty regarding the government's intentions) 
was, according to Mulley, 'leading to the loss of key staff: CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Development, ED (66) 19, 3 (25 July 1966). 
""CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (66) 19, 3 (25 July 1966); 
CAB 129/127, C (66) 142, memorandum on 'The futtire of the airframe industty' by Crosland, para. 
13(c) (18 Oct. 1966). 
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Cabinet to be 'decisive'.'"^ Crosland, the Secretary of State for Education and 
Science, thought it justified the alternative option of the government acquiring only a 
minority shareholding in a merged company, for 'it was difficult to see why design 
staff ... should object so strongly to such a solution as to prefer to leave the industry 
rather than to continue on this basis'. Moreover, he argued that given the 
government's existing position as the 'major purchaser and source of ftinds', a 
minority shareholding would in any case provide 'a sufficient measure of influence in 
the affairs of the industry, while preserving an element of commercial discipline and 
expertise in management'. 
Such arguments persuaded the Cabinet that what was for a Labour government 
the more radical - although less potentially controversial - option of obtaining a 
minority shareholding was the most desirable solution.'°'' This option was especially 
desirable since it was feared that the industry was faced with a 'phase of contraction' 
and that the government 'should not take [it] over just at the point when it can be seen 
to be facing a substantial decline'.'"^ There should be no doubt that the Cabinet's 
decision was radical and unprecedented. Never before had a Labour government 
considered nationalising a company - BAC - with the intention of merging it with a 
private enterprise - Hawker Siddeley Aviation - and allowing the private company 
both to manage the new enterprise and to retain the majority of the shareholdings in it. 
'"^CAB 128/41, CC (65) 51, 7 (20 Oct. 1966). 
'°^Ibid.; CAB 129/127, C (66) 142, memorandum on 'The future of the airframe industry' by Crosland, 
para. 13 (d) (18 Oct. 1966). 
'""This was not the universal conclusion of ministers. Berm vigorously opposed the Cabinet's 
approach, being 'convinced that we are not pursuing the right policy ... it was now clear that a 
minority holding would not in itself enable us to exert significantly greater influence than at present'. 
Nationalisation was, for him, the only realisfic option: CAB 130/343, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee 
on the Airframe Industry, paras. 1-3 (6 Nov. 1967). 
'°^CAB 129/126, C (66) 119, memorandum on 'The aircraft industry' by Brown, para. 7 (26 July 1966). 
The Ministerial sub-committee, however, found that 'a number of major uncertainties hung over the 
industry' which made any analysis of its ftiture development less than exact: CAB 129/127, C (66) 
142, memorandum on 'The fiiture of the airframe industry' by Crosland, paras. 5-6(18 Oct. 1966). 
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It might be considered an even clearer example of the Cabinet pursuing a revisionist 
industrial policy than their actions towards the computer industry, or over Fairfields 
and Beagle. 
However, having embarked upon so radical a policy the government then 
failed to translate it into reality. It was not until the 1970s that, with the creation of 
British Aerospace, that this was brought into being by a different government in very 
different circumstances. Why then did the government fail to achieve the aims it had 
agreed in October 1966? After the election in March, it was not due to the lack of 
parliamentary strength. Moreover, as the next chapter will show, with the enactment 
of the Industrial Expansion Act in May 1968, the government gave itself sufficient 
powers to undertake both the take over of BAC, and the consequent merger of that 
company with Hawker Siddeley Aviation. 
Rather than any lack of necessary legislative provision holding the government 
back, the primary reason for its failure to fulf i l its proposed course of action was that 
it lacked the determination to fight the opposition of the industry itself While the 
owners of BAC were keen on the government's plans, the management of Hawker 
Siddeley Aviation were bitterly opposed .The company was determined not to be 
forced into any partnership with the government, which it thought would lead to 
diminution of its managerial control.'"^ It was not overly keen on merging with BAC 
either, at least not unless it was on terms that it alone could set. In the face of this 
opposition the government backed down, and allowed all parts of the scheme to 
'°*BAC's owners adopted a similar attitude to that of Pressed Steel regarding Beagle, 'decid[ing] that 
they did not wish to remain in the airframe business, and were anxious to dispose of BAC to the 
government': CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (66) 19, 3 (25 
July 1966). For details of Hawker Siddeley's opposition, see PRO, CAB 130/263, Ad-hoc Ministerial 
Committee on the Plowden Report, paras. 1-4 (19 Jan. 1966). 
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founder, including the take over of BAC.'"^ This reaction on the part of the 
government might be taken as yet more evidence of the essentially pragmatic nature of 
its policy making. Although seemingly determined to introduce change in the 
industry, on realising that such change would lead to conflict with the management in 
the industry - a confrontation that the Cabinet agreed it was essential to avoid - the 
government backed down. 
Rather than being evidence of pragmatism, however, the government's retreat 
in the face of the industry's opposition instead demonstrates evidence of weakness 
and indec i s ion .For i f this response had been typical of the government's industrial 
policy, then the iron and steel industry would certainly not have been nationalised. 
The opposition of that industry to its nationalisation could hardly be doubted, yet the 
government overcame the opposition through legislation. The same could have been 
done in the case of the airframe industry, and although some managers and designers 
might have left, evidence from other nationalised industries showed that opposition 
usually diminished once the reality of nationalisation was apparent. The difference 
between the airframe industry and the iron and steel industry, or indeed Fairfields and 
Beagle Aircraft, was that in this instance there was no member of the Cabinet 
sufficiently convinced of the merits of the projects to force the measure through. 
Even Mulley, although seemingly in favour of the scheme, made little or no effort to 
'"A diminution the government deemed to be 'essential' (the government wanted very clear control 
over the chairman of any merged company, for example): CAB 134/2736, Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Policy, EN (67) 10, 3 (1 May 1967). 
'"^Ministers were only willing to take BAC into public ownership in order merge it with Hawker 
Siddeley, they expressed no enthusiasm for its nationalisation per se: CAB 134/2736, Ministerial 
Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 21, 2 (20 July 1967). Benn went even further, recording in 
his diary that 'the truth was that I was not interested' in the scheme at all: Diaries 1963-67, p. 510 (6 
Sept. 1967). 
'"^Haywood has argued the government retreated on the basis of a belief that 'the gains [from the 
merger] would not outweigh the political odium of a contested battle to obtain either company': 
Haywood, Government and British civil aerospace, p. 82. 
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persuade his Cabinet colleagues to back a forceful approach to the matter of Hawker 
Siddeley's opposition.'"^ 
Without the presence of a forceful personality behind the project, it was 
allowed to drift. A similar fate befell the Fairfields shipyard after George Brown 
moved, in August 1966, to the Foreign Office, and responsibility for the project 
passed to other hands - eventually to Tony Benn at the Ministry of Technology. Benn 
had none of the personal attachment of Brown to the shipyard, nor the personal 
relationship he had with Iain Stewart. This was shovm when, despite Iain Stewart's 
vehement protests, Berm allowed the yard to be swallowed up in the creation of the 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS). 
VII 
The driving force behind establishment of the UCS consortium was the 
Geddes Commission's Report. It recommended rationalisation of the industry through 
the creation of a series of grouped yards in the various geographical shipbuilding areas 
- such as the upper Clyde.'" In order to bring about the necessary amalgamations 
more rapidly than might otherwise occur 'naturally', the government followed the 
Report's recommendations and created the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB)."^ The 
Board was given access to substantial funds both to cover the costs of amalgamations, 
and also to allow the yards to develop their groupings in the years immediately 
thereafter. It was the promise of these ftinds, and the threat of their being withheld to 
""His successor from 7 January 1967, Stonehouse, does not appear to have been any more enthusiastic. 
'"CAB 129/126, C (66) 126, memorandum on 'Reorganisation of the shipbuilding industry' by Jay, 
para. 2 (2 Aug. 1966). 
"^Hogwood, Government and shipbuilding,, pp. 75-7, 80. 
220 
shipyards refusing to participate in mergers, that was the main motivating force 
behind UCS."^ 
Although the creation of a single shipyard grouping on the upper Clyde, 
encompassing Fairfields, Yarrow, Browns, Stephens of Linthouse, and Connells of 
Scotstoun, made some economic sense, the management at Fairfields and Stewart in 
particular were bitterly opposed to the scheme. They had embarked on the project at 
Fairfields to show what could be done i f they ' grasp [ed] the nettle of overmanning, 
demarcation and rank bad management'."'* After the government-led consortium 
took over the yard, to this end they had launched what became known as the 
'Fairfields Experiment'. Stewart brought in teams of experts to assist the yard in such 
areas as 'time-management' study. The yard's management reached ground-breaking 
agreements with the workforce to break down demarcation barriers and encourage re-
training and flexibility."^ Although by 1968, when UCS was formed, it was too soon 
to see how well the 'experiment' was working, Stewart and his management team 
were convinced that they were achieving a real breakthrough in productivity."* 
The Fairfields Experiment, whether successftil or not, aroused deep suspicions 
among other shipyard owners on the Clyde, who felt that Fairfields was using an 
unfair advantage, given by virtue of being part-owned by the government, to offer 
workers wage settlements they themselves could not hope to match. Moreover, the 
other shipyard owners remained unconvinced of the entire approach adopted by the 
Fairfields management. Stewart knew that i f his yard was merged into a 
conglomeration such as UCS, his ideas would be vetoed by the other owners, and his 
' '^Buxton, British shipbuilding, p. 231. 
" " E W 27 /118 , Stewart to Brown ( 1 9 Nov. 1965) 
115 For a long-term perspective on the changes introduced, see Lorenz, The shipbuilding industry, pp. 
113-120. 
' '^ For details of the 'Fairfields experiment', see Buxton, British shipbuilding, pp. 2 7 8 - 2 3 1 . 
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'experimentation' would be abandoned."^ Berm, however, made it quite clear to 
Stewart that Fairfields could expect no special treatment from the government, no 
matter its ownership, and that unless it took part in UCS it would be financially 
penalised."^ Indeed, he took the view that the purpose of the government's financial 
support for the industry was to 'bring about changes necessary to make the industry 
competitive without further assistance'' (my italics)."^ Fairfields was therefore forced 
into UCS, and Stewart's fears were proved correct. He left soon after as the other 
shipyard owners over-ruled his ideas, and the progress offered by the Fairfields 
experiment was lost. 
To some extent, Benn's refusal to support Fairfields and the pioneering work it 
was doing, was consistent with the aims that the government had when it had saved 
the yard in the first place. At the time, it had been made clear that the yard was only 
being saved so that it could play its part in whatever ftature the Geddes Commission 
offered the industry. To this extent, Benn was merely being consistent in the 
government's approach. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion, however, that he 
allowed a real opportunity to revolutionise working practices and productivity in the 
industry to be lost before it had had the chance to prove itself It is also impossible to 
avoid concluding that had Brown rather than Benn been responsible for the yard, such 
a situation would not have been allowed to o c c u r . W r i t i n g later of the 
amalgamation of the yard into UCS, Brown was clear in his mind that it represented a 
"'/fe/J.,p.231. 
"^Hogwood, Government and shipbuilding, p. 100. 
" 'CAB 134/2736, Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 5, 4 (20 Feb. 1967). 
'^ "Brown asked his officials for advice on the impact of the Geddes Report for Fairfields just months 
before he left the DEA. His successor, Stewart, had attempted in October 1966 to persuade Benn to 
pass responsibility for Fairfields from the Ministry of Technology to the DEA. He argued that 'there 
must be from time to time a conflict of interest between the two roles' Benn had: 'shareholder in one 
company ... and sponsor for the whole industry'. He retained Brown's enthusiasm for the project, 
reminding Benn that Fairfields was 'a proving ground for new and enlightened indusfrial relations'. 
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missed opportunity.'^' Such a judgement is of course affected by the sorry subsequent 
experience of UCS, leading to its collapse in 1971, but that collapse surely reinforces 
still more the sense of lost opportunity. 
More than this, however, the abandonment of Fairfields to its fate with UCS 
shows that the Wilson's government exercises in revisionist uses of public enterprise 
lacked any coherent general strategy. They were so heavily dependent upon the 
whims of individual members of the Cabinet that the fate of an enterprise such as 
Fairfields could change as easily as the Cabinet was reshuffled. Other projects which 
failed even to win a personal backer - such as the airframe industry - had little chance 
of occupying enough of an increasingly over-burdened government's time to be 
translated into reality. It was not what had been envisaged when the revisionists of the 
1950s had proposed that the party should replace its 'shopping list' approach to 
industrial intervention with a more flexible approach. 
However, when Benn refused to agree to the shift, Stewart allowed the matter to lapse: EW 27/82, 
note by Brown for officials (11 Mar. 1966); EW 2/14, Stewart to Benn (24 Oct. 1966). 
'^'Brown, In my way, p. 123. 
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Chapter Seven 
Establishing revisionist frameworks for intervention?: 
The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) and the 
Industrial Expansion Act. 
The evidence of the Wilson government's extensions of public enterprise has 
revealed a strategy that combined both the 'traditional' and the revisionist. 
Renationalisation of iron and steel was a continuation of the policies of the 1940s, yet 
with a greater concentration on control (rather than just ownership) than had been the 
case previously. The rescue of Fairfields and Beagle revealed an altogether more 
revisionist approach to industrial intervention: public ownership used to reinforce the 
government's policies for the two industries in general. However, while revisionist in 
nature, such interventions do not themselves demonstrate the existence of an overall 
revisionist and interventionist industrial policy. Indeed, with neither Fairfields nor 
Beagle could it realistically be argued that the government acted on the basis of an 
industrial policy at all: both measures were largely ad hoc, made to fit the particular 
circumstances that the government faced. 
The largely reactive treatment of Fairfields and Beagle might be seen as 
consistent with the general condition of economic policy: driven more by 
circumstance than intentions. However, conclusions on the government's record of 
industrial intervention should not be drawn too firmly from such examples. As 
Callaghan said of Fairfields, these two instances arose from 'exceptional 
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circumstances', and produced 'exceptional measure[s]' from the government.' A 
similar description could also be offered for iron and steel: the government clearly 
judged the industry to be 'exceptional' in that the only solution to its ills was outright 
nafionalisation. However, beyond these three industries lay the vast remainder of 
private industry which, while not considered to be in 'exceptional' crisis, was still 
perceived by the Labour party - as evidenced by the 1964 manifesto and the 'white 
heat' rhetoric - to be performing inadequately. I f nationalisation was only for iron 
and steel, and rescue through public ovwiership was to be exceptional rather than the 
rule, then it remains to be seen what policies the government adopted in general for 
industrial intervention. 
As already shown, the computer industry provides an example of how the 
government was prepared to act to support private industry. This key 'white heat' 
industry was granted a substantial form of protection from overseas competitors. 
However, more general protectionist policies were not a realistic proposition. It is 
true that measures of an apparently protectionist nature were implemented soon after 
the government came to power: a general Import Surcharge was imposed in October 
1964. However, this policy was intended to bring the balance of payments into line 
rather than to support industry; other ministers were urged by Callaghan to 'make it 
absolutely clear that the restrictions were only temporary measures and were not in 
any way a protective device'.^ The opposition among international opinion to the 
imposition of the Surcharge, especially from Britain's EFTA partners, in any case 
demonstrated that the policy was not pursuable in the long-term.^ 
^HCDeb. 718, col. 1236 (4 Nov. 1965). 
^CAB 130/202, Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs, para. 1 (b) (21 Oct. 1964). 
•'Ministers were under no illusions that the policy was contrary to the govenunent's international 
obligations, especially under GATT, and could only be imposed temporarily: CAB 130/202, Ad-hoc 
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In place of overt protection, the government sought to address the problems of 
industrial productivity more directly. Two measures in particular represented public 
support mechanisms for private industry: the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
(IRC), and the assistance offered under the Industrial Expansion Act. Such 
'framework' intervention did not have at its heart any ideologically-based prescription 
that public enterprise was more productive than private; at least as expressed its 
primary purpose was not to expand the scope of the public sector. Yet it was 
nevertheless intended to create mechanisms whereby the state would intervene 
directly in the private sector, up to and including involvement in ownership.'* 
As such, the IRC and the Industrial Expansion Act might be considered 
evidence that the Wilson government's industrial policies were interventionist in 
intention and revisionist in application. The attempt to combine public finance and 
assistance with private enterprise and ownership may appear to be irrefutable 'proof 
of the government's revisionist credentials. However, neither developed into the 
long-term framework of dynamic public support for private enterprise envisaged by 
the government. This has led Coopey to question their significance, arguing that the 
importance of the IRC in particular has been over-estimated.^ 
However, before dismissing these measures as unimportant, their intended 
purpose should be examined. Little consideration has been given to their intended 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs, paras. 1-2 (17 Oct. 1964). For details of EFTA 
members' objections, see ibid., para. 5(19 Feb. 1965). 
'*As Coopey argues, by the end of the government these and other measures, supervised by the Ministry 
of Technology, placed the Ministry 'in a position to co-ordinate a range of interlocking government 
industry functions including officially funded R&D, procurement, investment and regional policy': 
Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat', p. 103. 
Hbid., pp. 105-6. 
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impact in the area of industrial ownership.^ Yet they had the potential to bring about 
an increase in the size of the public sector. It should be asked, first, whether the 
government intended such an increase to occur as a consequence of their introduction. 
Second, consideration should be given to how the measures complemented the 
government's other industrial interventions - in the iron and steel, shipbuilding, and 
aircraft industries. Third, were the measures merely a short-term solution to specific 
problems, or a longer-term method of supporting private industry? 
I 
The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) was established in December 
1966 as a public corporafion 'with the ftinctions of promoting or assisting the 
reorganisation or development of any industry or section of an industry and 
establishing or developing, or promoting the establishment or development of, any 
industrial enterprise'.^ The scope of the Corporation, as so outlined, seems 
extraordinarily wide. Moreover, the broadness of its potential Sanctions was 
repeatedly confirmed by the terms of the Act which established it. Its primary goal 
was described as 'promoting industrial efficiency and profitability and assisting the 
economy of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom'.^ It would 
pursue these wide goals chiefly through the reorganisation and development of 
industry, but ' i f requested so to do by the Secretary of State', it could 'establish or 
develop' any industrial enterprises it saw fit as well.^ 
^Edgerton's consideration of the Industrial Expansion Act extends only to a description of some (not 
even all) of its most significant clauses, with no examination of the reasoning behind the infroduction 
of the measure: see Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' revisited', p. 69. 
^Industrial Reorganisation Corporation Act (1966), preamble. 
VA/^^., Section 2,(1). 
"^Ibid., Section 2, (1). When ministers had been considering the potential ftinctions of the IRC, Jay had 
urged that 'it should not only be concerned with mergers and concentrations, but also deal with 
expansions and new projects. There should be provision for the Corporation to undertake investments 
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The powers vested in the Corporation were as broad as the aims themselves. It 
received authority 'to do anything, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere''. 
This 'anything' included '(a) the acquisition, holding and disposal of securities; (b) 
the formation of bodies corporate; (c) the making of loans and the giving ... of 
guarantees with respect to loans made by others; [and] (d) the acquisition and placing 
at the disposal of others of premises and plant, machinery and other equipment'.'° 
Only two - albeit significant - caveats limited the Corporafion's powers of 
intervention. Firstly, the total sum of assets that it could own, of moneys it could 
borrow or lend, and of any other financial obligations it could enter into, could not 
exceed £150 million, and this sum could not be increased except by fresh legislation." 
The second limitation was that IRC was not intended to acquire the assets of any 
company or industry compulsorily. This point was repeatedly stressed by ministers, 
primarily in order to demonstrate that it would not be a nationalisation agency.'^  
While this behaviour reinforces the impression that nationalisation was an 
exceptional measure which the government was not prepared to adopt more generally, 
this establishment of a public corporafion was nevertheless a clear departure in 
industrial policy. Unlike other public corporations - for example, that for the 
nationalised iron and steel industry - its functions and scope were general rather than 
specific. Rather than being responsible for running an individual industry or even 
merely a single company, the IRC was charged with pursuing particular industrial 
and to hold shares'. This found no objection from Wilson, Callaghan or Brown: CAB 130/202, Ad-
hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs, paras. 12-13 (22 Dec. 1965); CAB 134/2707, 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (66) 1, 2 (7 Jan. 1966), 2 and ED (66) 2, 3 (20 
Jan. 1966). 
^^Industrial Reorganisation Corporation Act, Section 2, (3). 
^^Ibid., Section 7. 
'^ Although there appears nothing within the Act itself that would specifically prevent the Corporation 
acquiring assets by compulsion. Nonetheless, Brown made it clear from the first that the Corporafion 
would not be seeking 'to acquire anything compulsorily': HCDeb., (723), cols. 57-8 (25 Jan. 1966). 
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developments - primarily 'reorganisation' and 'industrial efficiency and profitability' 
- over the whole range of British industry. This quite distinct purpose was offered as 
explanation for the Corporafion's broad powers. Indeed, given the ambifions laid out 
for the IRC it is difficult to envisage how any more limited powers could have been 
granted to it. However, even i f it is accepted that the powers given to the IRC 
matched the broad nature of the tasks allocated to it, several questions remain to be 
answered. Firstly, it must be wondered why the government felt the question of 
industrial reorganisation to be so serious as to need the creation of the IRC. Why was 
industrial organisation, as distinct from factors such as industrial ownership, singled 
out in this way? Secondly, why was the IRC seen as the best solution to the question 
of industrial organisation? Finally, given that the IRC had such broad-ranging 
powers, why did it not herald a period of significant change in Britain's industrial 
structure? It was, at least in potential, a revisionist public corporation capable of 
extending the influence of the state throughout private industry. Yet almost from its 
inception, critics alleged that it merely acted as a pawn of the Wilson government, 
pursuing a limited number of industrial interventions that the government dare not 
directly involve itself in.'^ 
II 
The origins of the IRC reveal much about its intended purpose, and fiirther 
indicate the particular complexities of economic policy formation. To some extent the 
IRC can be seen as a simple product of the planning for economic development that 
the two new economic ministries, the DEA and the Ministry of Technology, had been 
established to promote. The need for a body such as the IRC, the basic outlines of 
"As Woodward argues, 'the IRC ... acted primarily as a merger broker on behalf of the government': 
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how it might be structured, and how it might function, had been essentially sketched 
out in a working paper produced in the Ministry of Technology by B.R. Cant, some 
fime in early 1965, on a 'Nafional Corporation for Company Reconstruction and 
Development'.''* 
Cant had been seconded into the Ministry on a part-time basis from the 
University of Keele - where he lectured in economics - to act as head of the 
Departmental Advisory Unit on Industrial Structure. Like many other economists in 
this period. Cant was convinced that a key explanation for Britain's comparatively 
poor post-war economic performance lay in its industrial structure. Technological 
developments, together with changes in managerial and administrative techniques, the 
financing of corporate growth, marketing, and many other factors, all pointed to the 
same conclusion: economic advantage and efficiency lay with the larger firm. Several 
industries (for example, motor car manufacture) were being held back in Britain by 
the proliferation of small firms producing a multitude of different models, none of 
which sold in sufficient numbers to allow economies of scale to be made in their 
production. The problem, as outlined in Cant's paper, lay in a failure of British 
industry to realise the advantages of large-scale production through mergers, 
amalgamations and expansions. He argued that with industry failing to take the lead, 
government must seize the inifiative.'^ 
Woodward, 'Labour's economic performance', p. 88. 
'''CAB 147/100, paper on 'A National Corporation for Company Reconsfruction and Development', by 
B.R. Cant (Undated, attached to memorandum from Balogh to D.J. Mitchell (Prime Minister's Office) 
(15 Sept. 1965)). Cant, who was highly regarded by Benn, eventually became a member of the IRC 
he had been instrumental in establishing: see Benn, Diaries 1963-66, p. 467, 479 (9 Aug., 19 Oct. 
1966). 
'^CAB 147/100, paper on 'A National Corporation for Company Reconstruction and Development', by 
B.R. Cant (Undated, attached to memorandum from Balogh to D.J. Mitchell (Prime Minister's Office) 
(15 Sept. 1965)). 
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Cant's arguments were not unfamiliar to members of the Wilson government. 
Indeed, the characteristics of post-war capitalist development he outlined were 
basically the same as those which Labour party 'revisionists' had identified in the 
1950s. It is therefore unclear why the party had not developed proposals of its own 
before the 1964 election.'^ Regardless of this. Cant's suggestions for the creation of a 
govemment-fianded public corporation to support corporate mergers and 
amalgamations where economically justified, and to seek out areas where such 
changes were needed, unsurprisingly found support among ministers and, more 
importantly, from Wilson. Indeed, Cant's proposals were not deemed controversial 
enough to warrant a Cabinet debate, the Committee for Economic Development 
judging that the measure was straightforward enough for it to deal with by itself" 
Despite having only first come to the attention of ministers in general in September 
1965, within four months George Brown announced to parliament the government's 
intenfion to introduce legislation as soon as practicable.'^ Even with the distraction of 
a general election shortly thereafter, the measure was still ready to be introduced in 
Parliament by July 1966. 
This rapid translation of outline into legislation might indicate that the idea of 
an industrial reorganisation authority closely matched the key aims of the 
government's industrial policy. Yet this conclusion would ignore the evidence of 
other government measures, especially the reforms of merger and monopoly law, 
which show policy being directed in a very different direction. The Board of Trade's 
1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act reveals an economic philosophy not simply 
'^ Although it sfill fiirther reinforces the impression that the periods which the party spent in opposition 
ill-prepared it for government - despite the ideological rethinking frequently undertaken. 
"Brown argued that the proposals were 'generally sound' and there was 'general agreement' from the 
other ministers on the Committee: see CAB 134/2707, Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Development, ED (66) 1, 2 (7 Jan. 1966). 
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contrary to, but antagonistic towards that behind the IRC bill. The Board of Trade's 
measure explicitly aimed to strengthen the powers of the Monopoly Commission to 
prevent the establishment of monopolistic practices, arguing that such behaviour was 
against the public interest.'^ Yet the purpose of the IRC bill was to encourage, i f not 
monopolies per se, then the establishment of larger and ever larger companies which 
would tend to squeeze smaller rivals out of the marketplace. Given that the 
government's monopolies legislafion had already passed through parliament before 
the creation of the IRC had been broached, it seems inexplicable that the idea was 
pursued, let alone that it was so uncontroversial and raised no overt opposition from 
any ministers. The main explanation is that, for some months before Cant's paper was 
made known, an influential government advisor had been suggesting that there was a 
dire need for a measure of this type. Significantly, the focus of debate had been at the 
apex of political power: Downing Street. From within the Cabinet Office, the 
quesfion of industrial organisafion had already been placed in the Prime Minister's 
mind by the determined efforts of Thomas Balogh. 
The exact nature of Balogh's position in the government was the subject of 
much conjecture at the time, even among ministers. He was a long-standing confidant 
of Wilson, and had been instrumental in the pre-election thinking which had led to the 
establishment of the DEA.^ *^  At the inception of the government he became Economic 
Advisor to the Prime Minister. His appointment was a result of Wilson's 
determination to 'strengthen the services provided by the Cabinet Office to the 
government as a whole'.^' His stated fiinction to 'provide advice on economic 
'^ See HCDeb. (723), cols. 55-62 (25 Jan. 1966). 
"See CAB 134/1736, Ministerial Committee on Economic Development, ED (64) 8, 5 (14 Dec. 1964). 
'^'Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 25 (25 May 1963). 
^'Public Record Office, 'List notes to CAB 147'. 
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questions with particular reference to external economic policy'.^^ However, the 
physical location of his office within Downing Street, giving him 'direct access' to the 
Prime Minister, led many - both government ministers and civil servants - to fear that 
his influence was in fact significantly broader than his remit might suggest.'^ '' 
An examination of the papers Balogh sent to Wilson confirms that these 
suspicions were well founded. The range of domestic, as opposed to 'external', 
economic policies in which he sought to involve himself was very broad. Over such 
questions as the role of the National Board for Prices and Incomes, or the 
establishment of long-term financial objectives for the nationalised industries, Balogh 
was in active debate with Wilson, firing off numerous memoranda.^ '* One question of 
domestic economic policy which particularly attracted his attention was that of 
industrial organisation. 
Like Cant, Balogh thought the need for reorganisation in many industries to be 
acute i f Britain was ever to increase its industrial productivity significantly. Some 
individual cases - such as shipbuilding and the docks - were given direct attention in 
his papers, but he believed that the question of more general industrial reorganisation 
was still more pressing. This implied re-consideration of the government's approach 
to several areas of policy - most notably the attitude taken towards monopolies and 
mergers. Balogh was scathing of the 'Liberal-American concepts elaborated by the 
Board of Trade', which presented a 'simplistic philosophy of efficiency through 
''Ibid. 
"Caimcross has described him as 'Wilson's 'spy", and claimed that 'throughout his years in Whitehall 
he never once informed me what we was up to, by minute or by word of mouth although we met 
frequently': Caimcross, 'Economic advisors in the United Kingdom', p. 237. 
"^See CAB 147. 
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greater competition'.'^^ Such a viewpoint, he argued to Wilson in a memorandum of 
22 February 1965, was not only 'contrary to all economic theory', but 'even more 
contrary to experience'.'^ ^ Inefficiency, he contended, was due not to monopolistic 
tendencies among companies, but 'mainly to the multifariousness of the firms' which 
led to 'too short production runs' and a 'consequent lack of Research and 
Development'.^^ 
Balogh recognised that there was a trend in many industries towards the 'large 
firms finish[ing] off the small ones', but in industries such as machine tools, motor 
cars, aircraft manufacturing and computers, the process was so essential that every 
effort should be made to encourage it: without it, he asked, 'how are we otherwise to 
compete with the US?'. Given the desirability of merger and amalgamation in these 
industries, the government's policy towards such reorganisation 'must be positive'. 
The 'Monopolies Committee' (sic.) should be given powers 'to recommend mergers 
and standardisation', and should oppose mergers only where there was a danger of the 
process 'protecting the small and inefficient firm through restrictions on production, 
mainly through price rings'. The real danger was not the process of merger and 
amalgamation, but the fact that without government help the reorganisation of 
industry would 'not be quick enough' to meet the American challenge.'^ ^ 
It was his belief in the need to encourage mergers and other amalgamations 
that led Balogh into more general questions of whether new agencies should be 
^'Although many have argued that with hindsight it is Balogh, and other proponents of the 'big is 
beautiful' school of economic theory, who have been judged to be 'somewhat naive': Woodward, 
'Labour's economic performance', p. 88. 
^^CAB 147/95, Balogh to Wilson (22 Feb. 1965). He went so far as to allege that the Board of Trade 
'discourages the rationalisation of industry': PREM 13/400, memorandum on 'The reorganisation of 
industry' from Balogh to Wilson (8 Sept. 1965). 
"CAB 147/95, Balogh to Wilson (22 Feb. 1965). See also PREM 13/400, memorandum on 
'Technology' from Balogh to Wilson (4 Feb. 1965), in which he argued that 'it is [not] an abuse of 
monopoly power that we are suffering from, so much as the inefficiency of the small firm'. 
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created to assist in industrial reorganisation. 'Orderly rationalisation', he argued, 
should 'not merely [be] not opposed or only tolerated, but stimulated'. In particular, 
the financing of reorganisation would need such stimulation, and so he argued for the 
establishment of a 'Financial Corporation for Industry'^^ - in other words the IRC. 
There is no evidence that Balogh persuaded Wilson as early as spring 1965 
that a corporation similar to the IRC was so urgently needed as to warrant legislative 
action. Nonetheless, the impact of Balogh's thinking should not be dismissed. The 
rapidity with which the contents of Cant's paper was acted upon after September 1965 
demonstrates that Balogh had already convinced the Prime Minister of the arguments 
that lay behind it. The importance of Balogh's role is ftarther shown by the process 
which brought Cant's paper before the Cabinet. It was he who discovered that the 
'extremely interesting paper' was circulating privately within the Ministry of 
Technology, and he who brought it to the attention of Wilson's office staff.^° 
Significantly, Balogh recommended the paper on the grounds that it was 'very much 
apropos of what we want to do', and after meeting Cant he noted that 'we [i.e. Wilson 
and Balogh] seem to be thinking along the same lines [as those in Cant's paper]'.^' It 
seems plain that Wilson was already considering the establishment of some form of 
corporation for industrial reorganisation. In this context. Cant's paper was the catalyst 
that convinced him to lead the government's industrial policy away from the 'Liberal-
American concepts' of the Board of Trade. 
It would be inaccurate, however, to suppose that after the distribution of 
Cant's paper, the government turned volte-face and allowed Balogh to dictate the 
^'CAB 147/95, Balogh to Wilson (22 Feb. 1965). 
^"^Ibid.; PREM 13/400, Balogh to Callaghan (17 Feb. 1965). 
^"CAB 147/100, Balogh to D.J. Mitchell (Prime Minister's Office) (15 Sept. 1965). 
''Ibid. 
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foundations of a more 'economically sound' industrial policy. This was not through 
lack of endeavour on Balogh's part: his voluminous correspondence with Wilson 
demonstrates his determination to ensure that the new corporation would match his 
theoretical ideas. Moreover, a comparison of the language of his correspondence with 
the terms of the Act shows he had considerable influence on many aspects of the 
corporation's development, both in terms of ftinction and structure. He was especially 
keen, for example, that the corporation would have as wide a ftinction as possible. On 
15 October he argued to Wilson that the corporation should fulf i l two distinct 
functions: 'one would be principally to rationalise and re-organise ... [where] existing 
units are to small. The other would be to undertake various activities (many of which 
would probably incur losses) in the interests of national growth, efficiency and 
e x p o r t s ' . I n order to achieve the first aim, the corporation should be prepared to 
'buy out' firms in their entirety i f this was the only way in which reorganisation could 
take place. Elaborating on the second ftinction of the corporation, he asserted that 'the 
new IRFC [sic] could force the pace ... in appropriate cases by establishing a new 
industrial unit of suitable size with or without private finance, thus forcing inefficient 
privately owned companies in the industry to merge and specialise or go under'." 
Balogh's ability to influence the scheme came mostly from the unique position 
he occupied with regard to this particular measure. Nonetheless, he was not able to 
dictate the terms of the Bill , demonstrating that his alleged influence over economic 
policy making, and that of his fellow 'Hungarian economist' Kaldor,'''* should not be 
^^CAB 147/100, Balogh to Wilson (15/10/65). 
''Ibid. 
'^'Kaldor served the government in a part-time capacity as Special Advisor to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 
236 
exaggerated.^ ^ The frustrations that Balogh felt over the development of the IRC Bill 
are only too evident in his memoranda to Wilson.''^ On 21 December 1965 he raised 
objections to the draft measure (submitted on 17 December by the preparatory group 
of officials responsible for producing the bill).^^ He argued that'... there are still two 
respects in which I think the approach [being taken by the preparatory group] is 
inadequate'. Firstly, he feared that the group placed too little emphasis on the role the 
IRC could play in the export drive. He thought that it should be prepared to 'play a 
major role in setting up or enlarging factories ... [or] reducing the price of the capital 
equipment used by industries with a good export/import saving potential'. He even 
argued that ' i t might be possible to go ftirther than this ... and subsidise certain kinds 
of machinery' which could help exporters. Balogh's second objection was to the 
proposed 'size of the Corporation', by which he essentially meant the decision to limit 
the total financial resources available to the corporation to £150 million. In his view 
38 
this was 'erring on the low side'. 
However, as Balogh noted in a final memorandum on 8 September 1966 'none 
of the suggestions which I have made at various times to make the institution fit to 
carry out the tasks originally contemplated for it have been accepted'.''' The IRC's 
financial resources remained 'too small', while 'the possibilities of intervening 
directly in export promotion and import saving are severely constrained by the clause 
^^Caimcross has argued that Balogh 'negotiated endlessly, but usually unsuccessful'. Caimcross is 
generally critical of the role played by Balogh and Kaldor, arguing that 'what I learned in 1964-69 
was that too many senior economists spoil the broth of economic policy-making': Caimcross, 
'Economic advisors in the United Kingdom', pp. 236-7. Balogh was, however, able to persuade 
Wilson to transfer control over monopoly policy from the Board of Trade to the DEA: see PREM 
13/1536, especially Balogh to Wilson (18 Jan. 1967) and Wilson to Balogh and Stewart (20 Feb. 
1967). 
^^According to Benn, Balogh was often 'full of colourftil and obscene abuse of Ministers who he thinks 
are obstructing imaginative policies': Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 317 (8 Sept. 1965). 
"CAB 147/100, Balogh to the Prime Minister (21 Dec. 1965). 
''Ibid. 
' ' P R O , CAB 147/100, Balogh to R. Allan, Sir Burke Trend, Hall and Crossman (8 Sept. 1966). 
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[Section 9, (3) of the Bill] on profitability'.'"' Finally, he complained, the IRC was 
restricted by 'the special and onerous and biased requirement for the Corporation to 
disclose every item of its holdings and of its securities at the time of acquisition'. In 
Balogh's opinion this requirement 'largely destroy[ed] ... the possibility of building 
up a profitable public sector or even taking full benefit of the financial advantages of 
reorganisation'. The failure to address these points was 'quite comprehensible' before 
the 1966 general election, but was 'less easy to understand' thereafter.'*' Yet while 
Balogh was mystified by the decisions taken by ministers and officials, they are 
readily explicable i f consideration is given to the detail of ministers' statements during 
and after the passage of the bill, and the actions of the IRC thereafter. 
Il l 
Publicly, ministers were adamant that the IRC would be capable of meeting 
the aims set for it on a long-term basis.''^  When asked specifically 'how long does the 
Right Honourable Gentleman think that the £150 million will last?', Brown stated that 
he was confident that 'the money will last for a very long time'.''^ This confidence 
was based on Brown's analysis of how the corporation would fiancfion. Calming fears 
that the IRC would be a tool for the constant expansion of the public sector, he argued 
that 'the more that the Corporation can use its funds, withdraw them and turn them 
over again, the better job it will be able to do. Its purpose is not to acquire majority 
''Ibid. 
''Ibid 
42 Although in private they were prepared to admit that they gave some importance to its ability to 
achieve certain short-term objectives: in particular, to 'provide a means of quickly encouraging 
exports and thus relieving the balance of payments problems': CAB 130/243, Official Working Group 
on Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, para. 2 (21 Sept. 1965). 
''HCDeb., (723), col. 58 (25 Jan. 1966). 
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holdings and to hang on to them', since such a policy would very rapidly exhaust the 
financial reserves of the Corporation.'*'* 
This explanation for the limitation of the IRC's funds to only £150 million is 
to some extent a logical refutation of Balogh's objections, but it also indicates that 
ministers had a narrower conception of the Corporation's role than he had. Although, 
as Brown indicated, by recycling its funds the IRC could operate over a sustained 
period of time, the financial limit would ensure that at any one time it could support 
only a relatively small number of projects.'*^ Moreover, the Corporation would have 
to avoid becoming involved in too large a number of projects requiring long-term 
reorganisation support. Balogh, like Cant, believed that there was a general need for 
industrial reorganisation. In contrast, the way the government established the IRC 
shows that ministers judged the need for reorganisation to be much less general. 
Reorganisation would only be apparent in a few particular cases at any one time, and 
given this, the IRC would be more than capable of acting - either at the instigation of 
the industry or on its own initiative - with the financial resources it had. 
The actions of the IRC, once established, confirm that this assessment of a 
limited need for industrial reorganisation underpinned its creation. It did not take 
upon itself the role of achieving a general change in the organisation of industry after 
industry. Nor did it attempt to shake up industries by the establishment of its own 
productive facilities, as it was empowered to do. Rather its main achievements were 
to assist a few specific company mergers, amalgamations, and restructuring 
''ibid, cols. 57-8 (25 Jan 1966). 
''^ The IRC itself objected to the financial limits that were placed on it, both in respect of the quantity of 
capital available, and the demands made by the Treasury for close scrutiny of the terms of loans: see 
EW 2/9, especially memoranda from the IRC to the DEA (28 Mar. 1968) and (29 Apr. 1968). 
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operations.''^ It was instrumental, for example, in bringing together General Electric, 
AEI Enterprises and English Electric into GEC, a single giant electricals grouping 
capable of challenging American producers such as General Electric Inc.''^ 
It was not simply in this area that the IRC acted. For example, when the 
Rootes Motor Corporation was faced with closure, the IRC strongly supported its take 
over by the Chrysler Corporation which already had a minority holding in the British 
firm.'*^ These activities show that the IRC acted very much in the way Brown had 
indicated. It involved itself in individual schemes - mostly, it should be noted, in 
'high-technology' industries - where the need for changes was particularly self-
evident and support necessary. In terms of more general questions of industrial 
organisation, however, the IRC was much less active. It is true that it investigated 
various industries or sections of industries (for example, telecommunications), mostly 
at the request of the government. These reports, however, were not seen by the IRC as 
preludes to active involvement in industry-wide reorganisation schemes: rather the 
reports were seen as providing expert advice for others, either in government or 
industry, to instigate any proposed changes. 
The Corporation's record therefore indicates that it acted in a more narrow 
way than might have been possible given its powers. This narrowness was seized 
upon by opposition MPs to argue that the government had been disingenuous in 
establishing the IRC. Was the IRC, they asked, 'to become [merely] the industrial 
consultant of the government?', pointing to the Corporation's investigation of the 
""^ As Coopey notes, the IRC was involved in only 50 of the 3,400 mergers that took place during the 
time of its existence: Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat', p. 106. Even here, 'its record at 
picking winning companies was mixed': 'Kearton's whizz-kids'. The Economist, 302, (28/2/87), p.87. 
^See Robert Jones and Oliver Marriot, Anatomy of a merger: A history of GEC, AEI and English 
Electric (1970). 
*See CAB 128/41, CC (66) 67, 5 (20 Dec. 1966) and CC (66) 68, 2 (22 Dec. 1966). See also Benn, 
Diaries 1963-67, pp. 483-4 (15 Dec. 1966). 
240 
telecommunications industry - undertaken at the direction of the Secretary of State 
under Section 2 (l,b) of the Act - as evidence of this.'*' Moreover, the IRC's 
intervention in the Rootes take over - once again at the direction of the Secretary of 
State - was seen as further evidence of a difference between the rhetoric and reality of 
the Corporation.^" Since the two companies already had close links - financial and 
managerial - the Conservatives wondered whether the IRC's purpose was merely to 
be a lender to companies such as Chrysler at cheaper rates than might otherwise be 
obtained from market sources. '^ 
In the government's defence. Lever (Under-Secretary of State at the DEA) re-
asserted that the IRC had been created to achieve the broad aim of taking a 'lead in the 
modernisation of industry, to promote the export competitiveness of private firms and 
import substitution by private enterprise' .Moreover, its aims were 'not to 
encourage socialism to creep but to encourage private enterprise to g a l l o p ' . T h e 
insistence on these two points is significant. I f they were expressions of the 
government's true intent, then it is clear that ministers did take a contrary view to 
Balogh, i f not on the need for industrial reorganisation, then at least on the necessary 
scale of reorganisation. The support for the Chrysler take-over of Rootes, and the 
similar schemes that were to follow,^'* were sufficient to obtain structural changes in 
British industry. Moreover, even i f industries were felt to be in sufficient difficulfies 
to warrant general investigation (as with telecommunications), the intention was to 
isolate the few areas where problems were probably acute, and to act there, rather than 
"^D. Price (Eastleigh), HC Deb., (740), col. 648 (1 Feb. 1967). 
''Ibid. 
''ibid., col. 649. 
^^Lever, ibid, cols. 660-1. 
"ibid, col 659(1 Feb. 1967). 
^"For example, the proposed take over of Pye Ltd. by Philips Electrical Holdings (part of the Dutch 
Philips electricals group): see CAB 128/42, CC (67) 1,5(12 Jan. 1967). 
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seeking to intervene in a more general fashion. The re-emphasis that the IRC's 
purpose was not to 'encourage socialism' is further confirmation. While clearly 
intended primarily to dampen the fears of those who considered the IRC as an agency 
for 'back-door nafionalisation', behind the statement lies the clear conclusion that 
most of private industry was not in particularly bad shape, and that with some 
assistance at the edges, it could be made to 'gallop.' 
I f this view of the government's intentions is correct, then the IRC's lack of 
any radical change in industrial organisation need not lead to any conclusion that the 
Corporation 'failed'. With the ministerial intention of a narrower remit of supporting 
the fringes of private enterprise, the IRC's actions were more successftil than they 
appear i f assessed solely by the language of the Act and ministers' rhetoric. However, 
before this conclusion is reached, it must be recognised that the savage programme of 
cuts in public expenditure implemented in July 1966 limited the finance available to 
the IRC. Moreover, the evident desire to avoid the Corporation being seen as an 
agency for nationalisation made it still more imperative to limit its financial powers. 
Balogh certainly considered these factors to be significant, but other evidence 
does not necessarily demonstrate that they were critical in shaping the nature of the 
IRC. Most telling is the lack of any other voice within government pressing for the 
extension of the IRC's planned financial limits. I f it had merely been the Treasury 
which was restricting the potential financial powers of the IRC in order to defend 
sterling parity, it might be expected that Cabinet opposition would manifest itself 
Yet while Crosland and Brown were vociferous in arguing that the Callaghan's 
deflationary measures were undermining many other aspects of economic policy, they 
were silent on the impact on the IRC. Given that the IRC's financial limits was never 
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even deemed controversial enough to be debated by the Cabinet, it must be the case 
that ministers accepted the role of the IRC as limited. 
IV 
It terms of its broad potential powers, and narrower focus of actual operations, 
the Industrial Expansion Bill was remarkably similar to the IRC. Certainly the 
preamble to the Industrial Expansion Bill was, i f anything, still more ambitious than 
that for the IRC. The measure sought 
... to authorise the provision of financial support, pursuant to schemes 
laid before Parliament, for industrial projects calculated to improve 
efficiency, create, expand or sustain productive capacity or promote or 
support technological developments, and in that connection to extend 
the powers of the National Research Development Corporation and the 
Industrial Reorganisafion Corporation ...^ ^ 
So broad are these intentions that it is difficult to envisage any industrial intervention 
that might not be justified by them. Like the IRC, the Industrial Expansion Act was 
intended to deal not with an individual industry, but rather with a perceived more 
general economic weakness - in this case the lack of efficient productive capacity in 
the British economy. 
As with the IRC Act, there were few restrictions to the powers granted. Rather 
than creating a public corporation, the Industrial Expansion Act was specifically 
designed to give to ministers power to expand the capacity of the British economy. 
Almost all ministers, from the Minister of Technology to the Minister of Health, were 
deemed by the Act to be 'competent authorities' capable of deciding that an 'industrial 
investment scheme' was necessary.^ ^ A scheme need only be felt ' in the opinion of 
that authority' to meet the stated aims, and could apply to an industry in its entirety, or 
"industrial Expansion Act (1968), Ch. 32, preamble. 
'•"/A/i/., Section 1,(3). 
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only a small section thereof" The chief proviso was that they must be of a nature that 
'would not be undertaken without such financial support as is authorised by this 
section', indicating that the Act was not intended to enable the government to act as a 
source of cheap investment capital for companies and industries.^* 
Like the IRC, the government was empowered to finance the industrial 
schemes through a wide range of methods, including the issue of loans and grants; a 
guarantee of repayment on moneys borrowed by the relevant concerns; underwriting 
of 'the whole or part of any loss which may be incurred by such bodies in connection 
with the production of goods or the provision of services'; and 'subscri[ption] for or 
purchase by agreement shares in any company specified or described in the scheme or 
to be formed pursuant thereto; [or] to purchase by agreement the undertaking or any 
part of the undertaking of any such company' .So while excluding the possibility of 
compulsory purchase the Act left the door open for expansion of the public sector 
through the sort of voluntary agreement reached in the case of the Fairfields shipyard. 
The Act also authorised the creation, where 'appropriate ... to the conditions 
prevailing in any industry or section of an industry', of an 'industry board' which 
would serve, firstly, 'to make recommendations to the competent authority ... for the 
provision of financial support [for the industry]', and, secondly, 'to undertake at the 
request and on behalf of the competent authority any administrative ftinctions of that 
authority ...in relation to the relevant industry or section'.^'' It is clear that this 
provision was intended to enable the establishment of boards similar to the 
"76;^ /., Section 2, (I). 
''Ibid. 
^Ibid, Section 2, {2). 
''ibid. Section 3. 
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Shipbuilding Industry Board,^' but without the 'delay' of a Royal Commission that the 
shipbuilding industry had gone through. 
The terms of the Act were, therefore, similar to the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation Act. The Act even provided a financial limit to its activities similar to 
that governing the IRC; the 'aggregate of the amounts' to be outstanding on industrial 
schemes at any one time could not exceed £100 million, though this could be 
extended by resolution of the House of Commons to match the £150 million available 
to the IRC.^^ The Industrial Expansion Act might well be seen as being, in essence, 
an extension of the terms of the IRC Act into a broader field. Having established the 
IRC to deal with the perceived problem of poor industrial organisation, the 
government now sought to deal with the ftarther problem of a lack of efficient, 
technologically advanced capacity within industries, reorganised or otherwise, which 
was holding back the economy. Once more, the government was seeking to establish 
a framework for supporting private industry, without resort to nationalisation but with 
public funds and the possibility of partial or total public ownership in those instances 
where all sides deemed it appropriate. 
This interpretation of the Industrial Expansion Act's purpose - a pragmatic, 
revisionist, approach - was certainly one the government itself was keen to stress. In 
proposing the measure to Parliament, the Minister of Technology, Benn, described the 
Bill as 'leav[ing] the Government with a general capability to help any industry in 
*'The existence of the Shipbuilding Industry Board required the Industrial Expansion Act to specifically 
exclude support for that industry from its terms until such time as the SIB had ceased to operate: Ibid., 
Section 2, (3). 
^^Benn: HC Deb. (757) col. 1572 (1 Feb. 1968). 
^'industrial Expansion Act, Section 4; CAB 129/134, C (67) 195, memorandum on 'Industrial 
Expansion Bill: Draft white paper' by Shore, para. 2 (15 Dec. 1967). 
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accordance with clearly defined rules'.^'' The pre-existing NRDC and IRC could not 
be asked to perform the duties laid out in the Bill because of the 'clear terms of 
reference' limiting their potential activities. In the case of the NRDC, the requirement 
of technological content to its interventions meant that 'projects which are rich in 
export potential but which are not technologically interesting ... fall outside the terms 
of reference of [the] NRDC'. Similarly, Benn indicated that the government would 
use the powers of the Industrial Expansion Act in 'some sectors of industry' where 
'what needs to be done ... may well go beyond rationalisation ... [and] may involve the 
evolution of a policy that does not require rationalisation at all'. In such instances, the 
IRC would be powerless to act.^ ^ 
While outlining the need for new powers Benn was determined to resist 
suggestions that the Bill was 'nationalisation by the back door'. He emphasised 
repeatedly that 'there is no compulsory power in the Bi l l ' , and attempted to reassure 
parliament that i f he or the government judged it 'right to nationalise an industry or a 
firm, it seems to me that this ought to go through the ftall machinery of an Act of 
Parliament and it would be quite wrong to attempt it as a by-product of a Bill which 
has quite different objectives'.^^ Those objectives, essentially, were to 'make possible 
stimulation without subsidy through a partnership of enterprise, private and public'. 
As an expression of a revisionist framework for industrial intervention, this could 
hardly be bettered. However, the difficulty in accepting Benn's statements is that they 
neither match the origins of the Bill , nor the evidence of how it was used. 
^HC Deb., (757), col. 1577 (1 Feb. 1968). When first proposing the Bill to fellow ministers, he 
stressed this need for 'general powers' to provide 'positive support' for industries: CAB 134/2736, 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 16, 1 (20 June 1967). 
'^HCDeb., (757), cols. 1579-81 (1 Feb. 1968). 
^%id, cols. 1584, 1586-7 (1 Feb. 1968). 
bid, col 1592 (1 Feb. 1968). 
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V 
This can be seen most clearly in the terms of the Bill itself Berm's speech on 
the bill's Second Reading occupies some twenty-two columns of Hansard, and for the 
first eighteen of these columns, he described the need for the bill and its functions as 
outlined above. Towards the end of his speech, however, Benn indicated that 
several clauses of the Bill were special, in that they referred not so much to how the 
government intended to go about introducing new schemes, but rather dealt with 
numerous pre-existing projects.^' These sections allowed for the allocation of loans to 
the Concorde project of up to £125 million (Section 8); for the loan of £24 million to 
Cunard to enable the luxury liner the Queen Elizabeth II to be completed (Section 9); 
to allow an addifional £20 million of finance to be made available to the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board (Section 10); to raise the limit on loans of the NRDC from £25 to £50 
million (Section 11); and to modify Section 1, (1) of the 1949 Civil Aviafion Act in 
order to allow the Ministry of Technology to take over the Beagle Aircraft Company 
(Secfion 12). 
Benn was keen to stress that these 'separate self-contained Clause[s]', should 
be treated in effect as 'one-Clause Bills within the Bill itself They were 
'absolutely categorical and specific', and the expenditure authorised by them was 
completely separate from that allocated for the purposes of the Bill in general.^' 
While these specific projects clearly fitted in with the general tenor of the Bill , Benn 
presented them as separate from it in the sense that they were unfinished business 
which the Bill's introduction merely gave an opportunity to tidy up. He insisted that 
Benn's speech is encompassed in ibid., cols. 1571-92 (1 Feb. 1968). 
Ibid,co\s. 1589-91 (1 Feb. 1968). 
'lbid,co\s. 1590-1 (1 Feb. 1968). 
'''Ibid,col 1591 (1 Feb. 1968). 
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the main purpose of the Bill was not these Sections, but those which preceded it 
creating the more general interventionist framework. 
However, a quite different interpretation of the primary intention behind the 
Bil l is offered by Richard Grossman, Leader of the House of Commons while the Bill 
was being prepared. His diary indicates that far from the Bill having its origins in the 
government's general desire to advance industrial regeneration, its true origins lay in 
the 'special provisions' of Sections Eight to Twelve.^^ Grossman explains that Benn 
came to him seeking parliamentary time to introduce a series of 'small Bills'.'^ 
Grossman, however, made it clear that it was 'impossible' to allocate the necessary 
parliamentary time without upsetting the government's entire legislative timetable.^'' 
Faced with a conflict between the unavoidable need for items of legislation 
with the unavailability of time for them, Grossman and Benn together came to the idea 
of introducing a Bill consolidating all of the required measures into one.^ ^ Grossman 
is adamant that this need to avoid the congestion of parliamentary time alone explains 
the origins of the Industrial Expansion Act.^^ As Benn himself concluded in Cabinet, 
'the proposal for a general enabling Bill , of the kind now proposed, appeared to be a 
'^In his own diary, Benn makes no reference to the origins of the Bill (beyond the factual statement that 
'I introduced the Industrial Expansion Bill, which was a great struggle': Diaries 1963-67, p. 516 (31 
Dec. 1967)). This is surprising given the detail usually given (although it should be noted that the 
diary entries for the period from October to December 1967 are sparse, due to the pressure of work 
Benn was under: see Diaries 1963-67, p. 478). 
"Crossman, Diaries, ii, p. 243 (17 Feb. 1967). 
''Ibid. 
"Crossman records telling Benn "for God's sake work out with your Permanent Secretary a 
streamlined enabling Bill where only an Affirmative Order would be required for each policy": ibid. 
'^Ibid., p. 455 (3 Aug. 1967). At the Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy, Benn admitted that 
'delays in getting legislative authority for state intervention', relating particularly to the 'immediate 
need' to deal with three aircraft projects (the Beagle take-over, the airframe merger, and Concord 
financing), provided the true inspiration for the measure. The 'previous autumn', he reported, he had 
'identified a number of projects to assist industry to increase exports and to save imports'. He had 
'been advised that each project would require separate legislation.': CAB 134/2736, Ministerial 
Committee on Economic Policy, EN (67) 16, 1 (20 June 1967); CAB 128/42, CC (67) 52, 3 (25 July 
1967). 
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progressive solution to the Parliamentary problems i n v o l v e d ' . W h a t does seem 
inexplicable is that the Bill , both as initially presented to Cabinet by Stewart (the First 
Secretary),^^ and thereafter to parliament by Benn, revealed so little of its true origins. 
However, having decided upon producing a Bill to cover a series of individual 
measures, it made logical sense to expand the terms of that Bill in order that a 
repetifion of the same situation might not arise in the near future. Indeed, given that 
the government was demonstrating a willingness to intervene in Fairfields, Beagle and 
Cunard, the likelihood of a further legislafive 'backlog' developing was fairly high. 
The broad terms of the Act as eventually produced, therefore, resulted from a 
determination to avoid any narrowness of scope which might prevent the government 
from being able to use the powers of the Act when the next Beagle or Fairfields came 
along. 
The Industrial Expansion Act therefore demonstrates that the Wilson 
government was committed to an interventionist industrial policy. The government 
was determined not to allow itself to be overly restricted from intervening when 
considered necessary. At the time of its passage, the only cases requiring government 
support were laid out in Sections Eight to Twelve of the Act. However, the Act would 
be used as and when other industrial problems arose. Its passage would make 
intervention easier to undertake in future, suggesting perhaps that Fairfields and 
Beagle were not intended to remain exceptional stage projects. 
This conclusion is supported by the determinafion with which Berm, and 
particularly Wilson, forced the measure in its more general form past the opposition it 
' 'CAB 128/42, CC (67) 52, 3 (25 July 1967). 
'^ See ibid. 
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faced.''^ At the Cabinet meeting of 29 September 1967, for example, Wilson reported 
that the CBI, with whom the government had been discussing the Bill, 'had 
unfortunately chosen to take a doctrinaire line in opposition to the government's 
proposals ... claiming that even the more moderate elements were completely opposed 
to the government's plans.'^" It was recognised that the CBI was objecting 'on 
ideological grounds to the government taking powers to purchase equity shares [even 
if ] by agreement with the firms concerned.' Given that the CBI objected on these 
grounds, i f the government's sole intention was simply to pass an enabling Act for a 
few specific projects, it would have been easier to drop the sections of the Bill which 
allowing for future equity holdings, and so reduce the level of opposition to the Bill. 
That Wilson was determined 'not to be deterred' from introducing the full measure is 
indicative of the intent to pass a more general enabling measure. 
Crossman, indeed, records that Benn and Wilson were absolutely determined 
to brush aside all opposition, even in the Cabinet. He claims that the development 
of the Bill from its original, limited form to the more general, was the work of these 
^Wilson's enthusiasm for the Bill was substantial. When it was first proposed, Wilson noted to Stewart 
that 'this is ... an important part of the policies which we are pursuing', and urged Stewart to give the 
proposals 'sympathetic consideration': PREM 13/1576, Wilson to Stewart (16 June 1967). Crossman 
noted that, despite the opposition of almost all other ministers, 'Wedgy [i.e. Benn] has the Prime 
Minister's solid support and they are going to shove it onto the Statute Book': Crossman, Diaries, ii, 
p. 495 (26 Sept. 1967). 
'"CAB 128/42, CC (67) 57, 4 (29 Sept. 1967); PREM 13/1576, record of a meeting with the CBI (27 
Sept. 1967). A private memorandum from Stewart was even more explicit. 'The CBI's reaction', he 
recorded, 'was hostile and negative. They refiised to be drawn into a reasoned discussion ... [they] 
would almost certainly oppose the Bill root and branch': PREM 13/1576, memorandum from Stewart 
to Wilson (28 July 1967); Coopey, 'Indusfrial policy in the white heat', p. 118. It should be noted that 
not all industrialists were wholly opposed to the measure: see Benn, Diaries 1968-72, p. 28 (5 Feb. 
1968). 
^'CAB 128/42, CC (67) 57, 4 (28 Sept. 1967); Benn, Diaries 1968-72, p. 64 (6 May 1968). 
^^Including his Chancellor. Callaghan argued that 'there is a continuing suspicion of us among 
businessmen ... which can only be damped down ... provided they are convinced that we will let them 
get on with their job'. The clear implication of his memorandum was that the Industrial Expansion 
Bill as proposed by Benn would not convince them of this, and, as he concluded, 'if it became 
generally believed that we could use the powers of the Bill to institute general controls over the 
private sector, the effect on industrial confidence would be disastrous': PREM, 13/1576, 
memorandum from Callaghan to Wilson (31 July 1967). 
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two men, and they became quite obsessed with ensuring its passage. This fits well 
with previous evidence that Wilson, when aroused in favour of a certain proposal, was 
not prepared to countenance defeat on it. In this instance, it seems that the ability to 
present the measure as getting the government back to its 'white heat' message fired 
Wilson's imagination, although how, after four years of silence, he expected to 
rekindle that rhetoric is not clear. He told the CBI that 'no government could allow 
itself to be dictated to by industry', warning them that ' i f the partnership which they 
all desired could not be developed, then other arrangements would clearly have to 
come to the fore' (presumably including nationalisation without consent).^ '* 
Given this determination to introduce the Bill , it hardly seems conceivable that 
the government failed to use its provisions simply through a lack of political will or 
ability. Certainly Wilson's enthusiasm seemed to fade, as other issues came along to 
seize his attention, but Benn and other ministers might have been expected to use the 
powers in the Act i f they so wished. Even the threat of 'back-door nationalisation' 
should not be over-played. It was undoubtedly of some significance, for during the 
passage of the Bill the Conservatives constantly attacked the measure as exactly such 
a proposal,^^ and the government was vehement in its defence. Nonetheless, the 
Cabinet felt confident enough to take over Beagle, and with a huge parliamentary 
majority at its back it is difficult to see that they would have been overly inhibited 
from taking over another enterprise or even industry in a similar situation. 
"Grossman, Diaries, ii, pp. 495, 515-16, 518-19 (26 Sept., 12 Oct., 15 Oct. 1967). This conclusion is 
certainly supported by their memoranda on the subject. Benn argued that since the government's 
proposals had already stirred up the CBI, it might as well proceed, regardless of the likelihood 'of 
harming the confidence that ought to exist between government and industry': PREM 13/1576, 
memorandum from Benn to Wilson (28 July 1967). See also CAB 130/348, Ad-hoc Ministerial 
Committee on the Industrial Expansion Bill, especially paras. 1-5 (12 Dec. 1967). 
^"PREM 13/1576, meeting between Wilson, Stewart and representatives of the CBI (2 Aug. 1967). 
*^ A Conservative party press release argued that 'however it is couched, it is nationalisation by the 
back-door'. PREM 13/1576, report for Wilson by Prime Minister's Office (2 Sept. 1967). 
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It appears, therefore, that the true explanation for lack of use of the powers of 
the Industrial Expansion Act beyond the specific cases contained within it does not lie 
in any government misrepresentation or failure. The reason is simple: situations did 
not arise that required their use. The lack of government 'action' is not evidence of a 
failure to establish an active framework for industrial intervention, but quite the 
contrary. It is evidence that the government was adopting an essentially pragmatic 
approach to questions of industrial support, rather than any ideological one. 
Intervention in a direct, ownership-altering, fashion had been suitable for Fairfields, 
and then Beagle, because of the particular circumstances faced in those instances. 
With the Industrial Expansion Act the government gave itself the power to intervene 
substantially quicker i f cases such as these arose in the fiature. That they did not 
indicates not a failure of the policy, but rather that between the passage of the Act and 
the government's elecfion defeat in 1970, no companies or industries found 
themselves in such dire straights. I f they had done then the government would 
presumably have used the power it now had to intervene, though it seems likely that 
many of the same arguments would have been played out, and doubts produced, as 
had accompanied the interventions in Fairfields and Beagle. 
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Conclusion 
Within days of becoming Prime Minister in October 1964, Harold Wilson 
ruled out the devaluation of sterling as a means of bringing the economy into balance. 
Thereafter he and Callaghan repeatedly refiised to reconsider this initial decision, 
arguing that to do so would be to devalue not just the currency but the worth of their 
own words, and so fatally undermine the credibility of themselves and the 
government. Although they failed in their attempt to defend the value of sterling and 
misjudged the consequences for the economy of its defence, they were proved 
substantially correct in their estimation of the political consequences of devaluation. 
Wilson's attempts in November 1967 to reassure the electorate that 'there has been no 
devaluation of the pound in your pocket' fell on deaf ears.' He and Callaghan were 
unable to persuade the public that devaluation had been anything other than a defeat 
for the government and its economic strategies - hardly surprising given that in 
private they were only too prepared to admit that it had indeed been just such a defeat. 
This image of failure has predominated assessments of the Wilson government 
ever s i n c e . O n so crucial an issue as economic management, the government has 
been judged as failing in almost every goal that it had set itself'^ There had been no 
discernible breakthrough in the field of high - "white heat" - technology. Those 
targets for growth set out in the National Plan had proved unobtainable. The attempts 
' A phrase used by Wilson in a television and radio broadcast of 20 November 1967. Benn dismissed it 
as 'absurd' and even today the speech is considered to have been a significant misjudgement by 
Wilson: Benn, Diaries 1963-67, p. 513 (18 Nov. 1967); Hamish McRae in The Independent (5 May 
2000). 
^As The Economist argued in 1991, 'for many years Lord Wilson has been a byword for blurry polifics, 
disillusionment, failure': The Economist (US), 319, p. 60 (1 June 1991). 
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made to provide positive state intervention in industrial relations and to fix wage and 
price levels had all collapsed. The sterling issue, however, was the most damaging, in 
part because it was substantially the cause of the other difficulties.'' While Bale is 
right to argue that the defence of sterling was more logical than many authors have 
recognised, it remains the case that the commitment to sterling relegated many aspects 
of economic policy to the back of the minds of Wilson and Callaghan, and distorted 
the implementation of others - prices and incomes being a prime example. 
Ultimately, sterling has become the cornerstone of judgements because the 
government itself made the currency so central to its own economic strategy. The 
only way out of their predicament would have been to pursue policies of growth - as 
the National Plan called for - to achieve a fundamental strengthening of the economy, 
and hence of sterling. Yet the implementation of such policies was undermined by 
the need to defend sterling, trapping the government in an inescapable vicious circle. 
This thesis has not set out either to prove or disprove the validity of the many 
criticisms of the government's performance. Its primary aim has been to analyse the 
government's policy on public ownership and control in industry, and to place it in 
the context of the historical development of the Labour party's commitment to 
nationalisation. Nonetheless, it is impossible to consider any aspect of the 
government's policies without reference to the largely negative analysis that has been 
made of it, and nationalisation and public ownership policy is no exception. There is 
'As one of the government's own economic advisors, Cairncross, has put it, 'the figures of growth were 
abominable after 1964, [and] between 1964 and 1970 there was virtually no improvement in 
productivity'; Caimcross in 'Witness seminar: The DEA', p. 137 
* A 1996 article in the New Statesman, entitled 'Devaluation and downfall', summarises the impression 
of the government which has held ever since 1967. In the article, numerous ex-ministers. Labour 
party MPs, and officials repeatedly attempt to distance themselves from the legacy of the government 
by blaming Wilson and his sterling policy for all the difficulties encountered (the list includes Benn, 
Castle, Shore, Rodgers (Under-Secretary, DEA, 1964-7), Chalfont (Minister of State, Foreign 
Affairs, 1964-70), and Taverne (Under-Secretary, Home Office, 1966-68; Minister of State, 
Treasury, 1968-9)): Ausfin Mitchell, 'Devaluafion and downfall', New Statesman, 126, pp. 24-7 (21 
Feb. 1997). 
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little doubt that the government's concentration on the value of the currency became 
less and less defensible from the summer of 1965 onwards. By July 1966 a 
substantial body of opinion, both within Cabinet and outside, was arguing that the 
defence of sterling parity was undermining the performance of the economy to a 
greater extent than might be caused by devaluation itself Wilson's and Callaghan's 
refusal to allow discussion on such issues was to some extent imposed by fear of the 
reaction in the financial markets. However, their stubbornness indicates certain 
personality traits of Wilson, and to some extent of Callaghan and Jenkins too, which 
made it more likely than not that the government might find itself embroiled in just 
such an inescapable tangle. 
During the period of the government, Wilson developed a series of policy 
'obsessions': his desperate determination to defend sterling was matched by his over-
commitment to other issues, especially in foreign policy - Rhodesia and Vietnam 
being the most striking examples. These were, of course, issues to which any Prime 
Minister would have found himself obliged to spend a considerable time and effort. 
In both cases, however, Wilson appeared determined not merely to be involved in 
seeking a solution, but to become so greatly involved that his personal prestige was 
tied up in finding solutions. He was convinced, and made public his conviction, that 
he could be the man to broker a peace deal between the Americans and the North 
Vietnamese, despite the evidence that neither side really desired peace except on their 
own terms. ^  Similarly, he repeatedly attempted to reach agreement with the Smith 
regime in Rhodesia, even when officials and other ministers saw no prospect of any 
acceptable settlement being reached, and he exposed himself to needless criticism 
when talks broke down. 
^Young, 'The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission', p. 562. 
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The potential political gains that Wilson might have received had he been 
successfiil in these endeavours, or, for example, in his attempts to join the European 
Economic Community, would have been significant. Yet the risks involved were 
substantial and success depended more on luck than anything else. To gamble so 
much personal prestige on the success of ventures so little within his own influence, 
was reckless. Even in the case of sterling, the government's ability to determine the 
level of the currency was limited by the scope for independent action by foreign 
bankers and nations, as well as by the money markets. This was demonstrated by the 
continued difficulties sterling experienced in March 1968, when the lack of 
international liquidity threatened to force another devaluation and to split the 
government apart. 
The political misjudgement of Wilson and Callaghan lies at the heart of any 
explanation of the government's unpopularity. However, its impact on the conduct of 
specific policy areas, such as industrial policy is less certain. Clearly it limited the 
scope for industrial intervention throughout the lifetime of the government. At no 
time did the government's economic position give it substantial fi-eedom of movement 
to pursue expensive nationalisation schemes or other forms of industrial intervention. 
On occasions Callaghan even considered that the manifesto commitment to 
nationalisation of the iron and steel industry involved an expense that could not be 
afforded without compromising sterling. However, it was not merely financial 
resources that were scarce: time too was in short supply among leading ministers. 
The domination of debate at the highest levels of the government by a few 'pet 
projects' limited the likelihood that new and controversial proposals - as any 
nationalisation schemes would almost inevitably be - could be given substantial 
attention from the Prime Minister or his Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
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The requirement for nationalisation projects to be forced upon the attention of 
the key ministers had not been an issue with the previous Labour government. In 
1945, the Attlee administration had come to power with a predetermined programme 
of industrial nafionalisation that individual ministers and the Cabinet Committee on 
the Socialisation of Industry had been able to implement without the need for 
substantial input from the full Cabinet, let alone the Prime Minister. Not until 
attention turned to iron and steel and road haulage was the Attlee Cabinet called upon 
to formulate, rather than simply approve, nationalisation policy. The contrast with the 
Wilson government could not be greater. With the exception of iron and steel 
renationalisation, the government came into power with no specific proposals for 
intervention or nafionalisation, only the broad outlines of when such policies might be 
pursued. Impetus therefore had to come from within the government i f action was to 
occur, and approval given by Wilson i f substantial progress was to be made. 
This suggests that the applicability of Millward's thesis on the 1940s 
nationalisation to later periods is limited. Millward proposed five related explanafions 
for the Attlee government's nationalisation programme: the 'infrastructure industries' 
displayed conditions of 'natural monopoly'; the interwar failure of 'arm's length 
regulation' in these cases; industries and services not tending towards monopoly were 
left alone; in coalmining, nationalisation was intended to cure the industrial relations 
problems; and the election of the Labour government was responsible for the 
particular method of nationalisation adopted.^ Extending this model to the 1960s is 
problematic. There were few industries left which were close to 'natural monopoly'; 
nor any obviously suffering dire industrial relations difficulties. However, it certainly 
remained true that there was no intention to extend the public sector substantially into 
V i l l w a r d , 'The 1940s nationalizations in Britain', p. 215. 
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manufacturing or commerce. More importantly, the case offered for renationalising 
iron and steel relied heavily on the argument that the industry had suffered a failure of 
'arm's length 'regulation'. The establishment of the Iron and Steel Board by the 
Conservatives in 1953 was deemed to provide insufficient control,' and hence the 
Wilson government argued that only reorganisation under public ownership could 
cure its ills. Finally, it remained true that the method of take over was directly 
affected by the policies of the Labour government. 
Yet ftmdamental differences remain between the 1940s and 1960s which 
Millward's thesis cannot explain. Any extension of public ownership and control in 
the 1960s had to be far more political in inspiration than those of the 1940s. There 
were none of the 'obvious cases' which had existed in the earlier decade. 
Nationalisation required impetus from the government, and this places substantially 
greater importance on the Labour government's relationship to the party's ideological 
Stance than Millward's thesis allows. In this respect, the evidence in this thesis on 
industries such as aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding indicates that Wilson and 
other Cabinet ministers were loathe to take decisive action, 'revisionist' or otherwise, 
to advance the public sector, or to use nationalisation as a method of restructuring 
industries. The aircraft industry has demonstrated this quite clearly. The Plowden 
Report recommended numerous changes in the structure of large civilian aircraft 
manufacture, and concluded that the industry could not exist independently of the 
state, as the primary source both of finance and orders. While Plowden argued 
against nationalisation of the two main companies involved, the likelihood that they 
would not merge voluntarily made some form of government intervention inevitable. 
'A conclusion with which most historians have not taken serious issue: see, for example, Dudley and 
Richardson, Politics and steel in Britain, pp. 26-7. 
^Although this should not be taken as a negative judgement on the validity of the thesis for the 1940s -
at which it is of course directed. 
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Despite this the government shied away from direct intervention, fearing that such 
action risked driving experienced management from the industry. 
Such reluctance to intervene demonstrates the influence on the government of 
the performance of the nationalised sectors since 1946. The coal industry, for 
example, had been blighted by an exodus of skilled management after its 
nationalisation in 1947, while the experiences of the Attlee government with the iron 
and steel industry showed the dangers of nationalising an industry which opposed the 
measure - though it must be noted that this did not stop the Wilson government 
renationalising the industry. However, nationalisation of iron and steel had been a 
long-standing commitment explicitly recorded in the manifesto, and to have reneged 
on it would have risked a revolt among the party's left-wing. By contrast, no 
commitment to intervention in the aircraft industry had been made, and the Wilson 
government was prepared to see the merger of the two airframe companies founder 
rather than force nationalisation upon them. The agonising witnessed in the Cabinet 
on those occasions when the take over of industrial concerns was considered essential 
reinforces the impression that the government was aware of the limitations of public 
ownership. 
In the case of iron and steel, Wilson was prepared to give serious 
consideration to alternatives to outright nationalisation, even when the government 
appeared committed to the latter policy. To some extent he was obliged to give 
consideration to the ideas of Woodrow Wyatt and others by the parliamentary position 
before March 1966, since the passage of any nationalisation Bill depended on the 
votes of such waverers. However, Wilson's correspondence demonstrates that he was 
genuinely interested in exploring alternative proposals to nationalisation within the 
framework of public control. His eventual conclusion that only public ownership 
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could bring such control was not inevitable. It was a decision based on the merits of 
the two cases, not on any expressed ideological belief that public ownership was, per 
se, a superior form of ownership to all others (although this is not to say that he was 
uninfluenced by the strength of feeling in this direction from the left-wing of the 
party). 
The cases of Fairfields and Beagle reinforce the impression of a government 
directed by a degree of realism on the problems of nationalisation, and by a 
determination that it could not be seen simply as a method of rescuing industries or 
companies which found themselves in trouble. In both instances, strong voices were 
heard at Cabinet expressing the view that the two companies were basically bad 
businesses whose financial futures were uncertain, and that the government should not 
involve itself in loss-making concerns. Indeed, the desire to avoid saddling the state 
with financial millstones appears to have been the primary objection to intervention: 
in the minds of some ministers, notably Callaghan, it over-rode the potential damage 
to the industrial infrastructure that their closure risked. It is important to note, 
however, that such arguments were not put forward merely because members of the 
government wished to avoid burdening an already stretched Treasury - although this 
may well have been the case with Callaghan. It also appears that members of the 
government were conscious of the need to protect the image of public ownership: to 
prevent it being regarded as a refiage for companies and industries incapable of 
adequate financial management or productivity performance, as a safety-net which 
removed the risks of enterprise. 
The existence of such attitudes are of great interest since they match at least in 
part the position of the Conservative party in the 1970 election, when they 
campaigned on the basis of a commitment not to support industrial 'lame ducks'. 
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instead arguing that the market should be allowed to judge the success or failure of 
industries and companies. The significance of the Conservative stance is, of course, 
the fact that they rapidly abandoned it when faced with the prospect of world-
renowned British companies, especially Rolls Royce, going bankrupt.^ Thereafter, 
both the Conservative and the Labour governments of the 1970s used nationalisation 
precisely in the manner which the Conservatives had argued that it should not be 
used. The propaganda of the governments cannot disguise the reality that the 
interventions undertaken in the aerospace, motor manufacture and shipbuilding 
industries were essentially rescue operations, designed to shield the industries from 
the ravages of international competition which threatened to destroy them. 
Given that struggling industries were supported in the 1970s, it must be asked 
why similar policies were not implemented by the Wilson government in the 1960s. 
After all, the aerospace and shipbuilding industries were hardly in the best of 
competitive positions, as the appointment of the Geddes and Plowden Commissions 
recognised. A plausible case for their rescue through public ownership and control 
could undoubtedly have been made i f the government had so desired, and from the 
1966 election onwards the government possessed suitable parliamentary strength to 
have forced through their take-over - as iron and steel showed. A similar case could 
have been made out for other industries, especially computing which was suffering in 
the face of American competition. Yet the government never decided upon such a 
path, nor as a collective whole gave serious consideration to such a policy direction. 
The explanation for this goes to the heart of tinderstanding the government's 
position on industrial ownership and control. It lies in two inter-linked directions. On 
the one hand there was the ideological position of the party at this time, on the other 
'See Haywood, Government and British civil aerospace, pp. 3, 87-9, 99-121. 
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the underlying optimism among the party leadership and ministers on the 
government's ability to achieve an acceleration in the growth rate of the British 
economy. To address this second aspect first, the government's policy towards 
industries such as shipbuilding, computers or aircraft manufacture demonstrates that 
nationalisation was not used as a method of industrial rescue because there was no 
appreciation of a need for such rescue. In all cases it was considered that other, less 
dramatic, policies would lead to substantial increases in their productivity and 
competitive strength, and thus render any change of ownership unnecessary. For 
example, support for the domestic computer industry through procurement policy, or 
the financing of shipyard amalgamation through the Shipbuilding Industry Board, 
were judged to be measures that would themselves place these industries on a sound 
footing for the future. This reflected the government's belief that, in spite of the 
difficulties experienced with sterling, it was capable of putting the economy on the 
path to greater growth. 
This supports arguments recently put forward that the ideological content of 
the 1964 election manifesto and campaign cannot simply be dismissed as empty 
rhetoric.'° The policies of the government towards these industries demonstrates that 
it seriously believed that the plans and policies it had proclaimed itself 'impatient' to 
implement in 1964, would work and rejuvenate the British economy. Moreover, it is 
clear that the rhetoric of the technological breakthrough was also sincerely held. The 
policy towards the computer industry indicate that the government was committed to 
supporting its development. However, since those aspects which were perceived as 
being fiandamentally wrong with the industry did not resolve themselves into 
'"See, for example, Coopey, 'Industrial policy in the white heat'; Edgerton, 'The 'White Heat' 
revisited'. 
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questions of ownership, then nothing so drastic that nationalisation was necessary to 
cure them. 
The policy towards the computer industry indicates a recognition that 
nationalisation was not necessarily the cure-all for industries as had long been 
perceived by the Labour party. The government was open in its recognition that no 
change in ownership could itself change the ftindamental situation facing the 
computer industry: that of the dominance of huge American companies. Government 
industrial intervention had thus to be pursued in a quite different direction fi-om 
nationalisation, attempting to shield the industry from the worst of that dominance, 
through its own procurement policy and through other encouragements, financial or 
otherwise, to the industry. This is indicative of the Labour party's shift in ideology 
and policy from the mid-1950s onwards. The revision of its stance on public 
ownership and control had not been towards an abandonment of that policy. Even in 
the aftermath of the 1959 election defeat and the clause IV controversy, there were 
few who perceived of no use for nationalisation. However, there was a recognition 
that nationalisation would have to become only a part of the party's policies on 
industrial intervention, not its heart and soul. 
Although Wilson may have presented himself as more of a centrist than a 
revisionist, there is no doubt from the evidence of the government's actions that he 
was deeply influenced by such thinking. Government industrial intervention was to 
involve a much broader range of policies than the nationalisation of the 1940s. The 
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation is evidence of this broad approach in action, 
indicating that intervention was perceived as being active as well as essentially 
reactive - as nationalisation often was. The success of the government's industrial 
policies is a quite different matter from the intentions behind it. There is little doubt 
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that many of the government's initiatives were hampered by its failure to get to grips 
with macroeconomic management, and also by the lack of time devoted to questions 
of industrial policy by those at the very head of the government. However, the lack of 
success does not indicate a lack of desire to pursue particular policies. 
The primary difficulty with a 'revisionist' industrial policy is that it was an 
essentially optimistic framework. It had been formulated in the mid to late 1950s 
when the difficulty for the Labour party appeared to be in coming to terms with the 
rising affluence of society. By the 1960s, however, there was a growing awareness 
that, impressive as Britain's economic performance was from an historical 
perspective, its rate of growth was falling behind that of comparable economies. The 
emphasis on the 'white heat' technological breakthrough and the National Plan in 
Labour's 1964 electioneering were reflections of the need to redress this relative 
decline, and demonstrate that Wilson was aware of the economic challenges facing 
the country. Underpinning even the Wilsonian developments of revisionist thinking, 
however, was an underlying optimism that the problems were readily surmountable. 
The problems could be put down to 'thirteen wasted years' of Conservative 
government that a new Labour government would rapidly overcome, with its 
commitment to sweep away existing practices with a technocratic revolution. 
However, this optimism substantially over-estimated the real strength of the 
British economy and British industry. As the failure to save sterling parity 
demonstrated, a fundamental weakening of the British economy's comparative 
strength had occurred during the 1950s. A failure to recognise this, from both a 
practical and ideological perspective, lies at the heart of an understanding of the 
limited use made by the Wilson government of nationalisation and other forms of 
public ovmership and control. The revision undergone by the party's programme in 
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the mid 1950s had been based on a belief that the existing socialist interpretations of 
contemporary capitalism were out of date. Yet within a few years a similar charge 
can be levelled against the new ideological interpretation of capitalism produced by 
Strachey, Crosland, Gaitskell and others. Had Labour won the 1959 election, as the 
revisionists and other Labour party members assumed it would, then their analysis 
would have been of more relevance. As it was, the party came to power believing that 
it could 'manage' the British economy when more radical solutions were needed. 
It is from this perspective that the sterling issue is of such relevance. For the 
belief that the strength of sterling had to be and could be defended, given Britain's 
standing in the world, was demonstrated to be an outdated notion. However, by so 
acting, the government emasculated the very policies - the National Plan and the 
prices and incomes policy in particular - which offered the possibility of producing a 
acceleration of the growth rate through an interventionist policy. By the time of the 
1970 election, it was clear that Britain's economic decline was serious and was 
beginning to manifest itself in industrial collapse. Two different paths were then 
available to politicians. They could, on the one hand, attempt to maintain the post-
war 'miracle' of full , or almost full , employment, using state ownership to rescue 
those concerns that the market threatened to destroy. On the other hand, they could 
allow the market to do its worst, and accept the inevitable increases in unemployment. 
The Heath government pledged to do the latter, but ended up doing the former when 
the political costs of industrial decline proved unpalatable. The 1974-79 Labour 
government under Wilson and Callaghan continued to attempt to rescue industry 
through nationalisation, but found that such actions did nothing to alter the 
fundamental competitive strength of British industry. Only with the rise to power of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 was the decision taken to leave industry to face 
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international competition alone: she argued that it was impossible in the long-term to 
'buck the markets'. 
From the present perspective, after more than two decades of both 
Conservative and Labour goverrmients in which the emphasis has been on allowing 
the market to dictate the fortunes of industrial development, the 1970s are often seen 
as a decade in which politicians took the wrong decision in returning to 
nationalisation, shying away from the 'inevitable truth' that only the market can judge 
the worth of industrial concerns. Whether or not such a critical judgement can be 
accepted is not at issue here, but it is of great relevance to an understanding of the 
1960s Wilson government. For the years of that government were in many ways six 
more 'wasted years' to follow those of the Conservative governments between 1951 
and 1964. 
The government came to power with an analysis of capitalism that was rapidly 
becoming obsolete, and proceeded to become fixated with policies which undermined 
its main economic purposes. In the midst of such macroeconomic failure lay an 
industrial policy broad in nature, but lacking any coherent direction. It contained 
within it elements both of the past - the nationalisation of iron and steel - and of the 
future - the rescue of Fairfields. It also contained elements of the dynamic 
revisionism that had been proposed in the 1950s: the IRC and the Industrial 
Expansion Act; the support for the computer industry; the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board. Yet in the end it was rendered ineffective by the government's inability to 
gain control over the economy. As macroeconomic crisis followed crisis, there was 
little attention left to be focused on the microeconomic. Only in the 1970s, when a 
down-turn in the international economic position pushed industries and companies to 
the verge of bankruptcy, did governments once again turn to nationalisation. 
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